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Abstract 
This study examines the issue of student loans or grants in Malaysia where vertical 
equity underpins the arguments for the quota system embedded in the New Economic 
Policy and National Development Policy. From this perspective, the equity and 
efficiency of the Student Loans and Scholarships were investigated. Surveys involving 
undergraduates in five public universities, and high school students in four high schools 
were conducted. I also undertook formal interviews with the top-level administrators of 
five funding bodies in Malaysia. Informal interviews were also conducted with head 
teachers and undergraduates selected at random. Using cross-tabulation, I investigated 
the equality of scholarship and loan distributions to undergraduates with reference to 
seven independent variables: ethnicity, gender, regions, areas of origin, income groups, 
types of course pursued and previous academic achievements. Chi-square test was used 
to investigate associations between the provision of scholarships and loans and the seven 
independent variables as stated. I also investigated the intra-ethnic equality in the 
distribution of loans and scholarships to undergraduates with reference to six 
independent variables: gender, regions, areas of origin, income groups, types of course 
pursued and previous academic performance. Two concepts of equality, (defined in 
chapters 6 and 7) were used in the analysis. The equity aspect of both systems was 
further investigated by examining the respective "recruitment effects" of loans and 
scholarships. Respondents provided information regarding friends who did not attend 
university education because of financial problems; this information was also used to 
investigate the equity of both scholarship and loan systems. Taking into account the 
interrelationships of other independent variables, multiple logistic regression took a 
further step in analysis by calculating the probability of receiving loans or scholarships. 
The respective efficiency of loan and scholarship provision was examined for cost- 
effectiveness, economic efficiency in meeting manpower needs and administrative 
efficiency. It is concluded that the student financial support system is apparently cost- 
effective but financially inefficient, though it contributes to efficiency in meeting the 
manpower and employment needs of the economy. With increasing students' enrolment, 
it is suggested the system be modified to overcome budgetary constraints while 
becoming more equitable and efficient through the principle of "borrow first, and pay 
later". 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.0 Overview 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the equity and efficiency of student loan 
and scholarship systems in the social and political context of Malaysia while also 
investigating the general debate about loans or grants. The proposals for change, in the 
light of international experiences will also be suggested. This chapter will briefly 
introduce the general debate on higher education finance before investigating the 
Malaysian case. Section One examines the global issue of the financial crisis confronted 
by the higher education sector and hence suggestions for a cost-recovery method of 
financing higher education, which may have equity and efficiency effects. Section Two 
examines briefly different forms of government subsidies and private finance, which 
may also have different equity and efficiency implications. Section Three explores the 
focus of the study by stating its rationale and its main objectives, the statement of the 
problem and major research questions. Section Four discusses the organisation of 
subsequent chapters in the thesis while Section Five summarises the chapter. 
1.1 Higher Education in Financial Crisis 
Education has been advocated by many economists as a worthwhile investment. 
According to Human Capital theory, higher education enhances productivity and hence 
raises the earnings of individuals and contributes to economic growth (Cohn and Geske, 
1990). 
Traditionally, the overall aim of the higher education sector was to provide education to 
an elite group of students who would be needed by the economy, especially in 
developing countries such as in Malaysia. Since the numbers pursuing higher education 
were limited, the overall public expenditure or subsidy was low. However, with rapid 
technological, economic and cultural change, the demand for graduates in disciplines 
such as science and technology, law, humanities and social science has increased 
tremendously (Wilson, 1996). This is especially true in Malaysia where university 
education now aims to meet the manpower needs of a country heading towards becoming 
an industrialised nation by the year 2020 (Mahathir, 1991). This means that there is a 
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rising demand for university education both by individuals and the state, accelerated by 
the political decision to democratise education, leading to a continuous rapid expansion 
of the higher education sector. Thus, the democratisation of education in Malaysia in the 
1990s has changed the elitist secondary education from being elitist to being universal. 
This has enormously increased the demand for university education. 
However, as higher education policy shifts from supporting elitist to mass participation, 
governments globally, including Malaysia, are facing budgetary constraints. These are 
especially acute in times of economic crisis and structural adjustments. In the recent 
Malaysian currency crisis, the Malaysian currency was devalued by almost 100% against 
the Pound Sterling towards the end of 1997. The government was forced to slash public 
expenditure by 2% in 1998 (Anwar, 1998) and a further 18% in subsequent mini budget, 
including the education sector. 
To overcome financial constraints, universities globally have to utilise existing resources 
more efficiently without additional allocations, or find new sources of finance. The 
former option includes an increase in the student to staff ratio, more efficient use of the 
infrastructure and more time devoted to research consultancies for the private sector. 
But, such changes may be at the expense of the quality of education. Thus, Wilson 
(1996) argues that that there is a world-wide consensus on the need to find new sources 
of funding in order to maintain the quality of education. 
Many countries therefore have introduced cost-recovery methods such as loan schemes 
to raise funds from participating students. Various types of loan programmes have been 
implemented. One is mortgage-type loans whereby repayment is made over a specified 
period, usually with fixed monthly payments; interest rates and the maximum length of 
repayment are used to calculate the fixed periodic payments. Interest rates may be partly 
or fully subsidised by governments. An alternative type of loan is the income-contingent 
loan in which loans are repaid as a proportion of a graduate's income each year, 
organised via either income tax or national insurance contributions. From this 
perspective, higher education institutions may regard students as consumers, while 
students may see university education as an investment, rewarded with future high 
monetary and non-monetary benefits (Wilson, 1996). 
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However, the idea of borrowing for learning, contrasting with the traditional system of 
grants and scholarships, has reignited a heated argument among economists of education 
on whether the provision of student loans to replace the grant scheme eventually is better 
than the existing grant system in terms of equity and efficiency. The whole debate raises 
the question who should and how to pay for higher education? Some argue that "he who 
benefits from the education should pay for it". Others propose that the state should pay, 
since education can be regarded as a "public good". Society and taxpayer should also 
contribute since higher education would benefit both the individuals and society as a 
whole. This will be explored further in chapter 2. We shall next examine different forms 
of subsidies and private finance. 
1.2 Forms of Subsidies 
If governments need to subsidise higher education, the major question is whether to 
subsidise institutions or students. Though the "real market" may not be working in 
higher education, the way in which governments provide subsidies may generate 
competitive market mechanisms. Thus, governments can subsidise higher education by 
providing direct grants to institutions using different funding models', or directly to 
students so as to enable them to enter the market. 
Owing to the weaknesses of the institutional funding models, Woodhall, 1989; Blaug, 
1990; and Albrecht and Ziderman, 1995 propose that it would be more efficient and 
equitable for governments to subsidise students directly, rather than through 
institutions. Students will be expected to pay the full cost of attending university 
through direct financial support provided by the government. From this perspective, 
Woodhall, (1989) argues that more people will be able to benefit from higher 
education than would otherwise be the case, even though it is inequitable to those 
taxpayers who do not attend university education. Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) also 
argue that channelling subsidies via students will generate competition at the higher 
education level. The competition would be promoted on two levels: students would 
compete for support and higher education institutions would compete for students. 
Consequently, direct subsidies for students would stimulate efficiency and quality. 
1 In this case, the collegial model, bureaucratic model and quasi market model are used. (See Appendix 
A). 
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Hence, governments can finance higher education by subsidising students through 
grants, fees and quasi market provision. Governments can give grants to students 
directly according to their financial needs and academic merits (Woodhall, 1987) and 
even pay or subsidise the tuition fees on behalf of students. Under the quasi market 
provision, loans guaranteed by government or vouchers are given to students. 
However, there is disagreement over whether students should be subsidised through 
loans or grants and scholarships or even whether they should be subsidised at all. This 
study will therefore examine these issues, considering efficiency and equity aspects in 
the Malaysian case while proposing a modified financial support scheme. 
1.3 The Present Study 
The above contextual issues about the financing of higher education are very relevant 
to Malaysia, especially with reference to student financial support in the form of loans 
and scholarships. This study will focus on the equity and efficiency aspects (concepts 
of equity and efficiency will be discussed in details in chapter 2) of student loan and 
scholarship schemes in Malaysia, which may contribute to the general debate on 
"loans or grants/scholarships? ". 
1.3.1. Rationale 
The present study on student financial support in Malaysia is needed as a consequence of 
the rapid expansion in the higher education sector and fiscal constraints. Similar to the 
global trend, especially that in developing countries, the Malaysian system of higher 
education is expanding very fast, with the establishment of ten public universities todate. 
Private universities such as the Telecom University, the Multimedia University and the 
Petroleum University are also being established to accommodate the growing numbers of 
students 
Furthermore, the Malaysian Government has planned that by the year 2020 at least 40% 
of Malaysian students within the 19-24 age bracket will attend first degree courses either 
locally or overseas, compared with 13-14% of undergraduates at present (The Star, 11 th 
December, 1997). By that time, all secondary school teachers will have degree 
qualifications, and 30% of primary school teachers will be graduates. This indicates that 
there will be a continuously rising demand for university education. 
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However, the government faces budgetary constraints on education, worsened by the 
currency crisis since July 1997. The 1998 Malaysian Budget2 shows a 2% reduction in 
the allocation for every ministry, including the Education Ministry, compared with the 
previous budget (The Star, 17 October, 1997). This was followed by a mini budget for 
19983, which included a further 18% cut in government spending (The Star, 9th 
December, 1997). Hence, the government cannot afford to continuously support students 
financially from the public purse while simultaneously encouraging more students to 
pursue their studies in universities, either locally or overseas. The present system of 
scholarships and highly subsidised loans may fail to meet the objectives of the 
government for the expansion of the higher education sector. This study also examines 
how efficient and equitable the present student loan and scholarship schemes are, before 
considering whether they should be modified. This examination is especially important 
in the Malaysian case, since the social-political context may be a dominant factor in the 
present distribution of financial support which will be investigated in chapters 6 and 7. 
This is because Malaysia has a heterogeneous population4, comprising bumiputeras 
(natives) who are predominantly Malays (60.6 percent), and non-bumiputeras (non- 
natives) who are Chinese (28.1 per cent), Indians (7.9 per cent) and others (3.4 per cent). 
Social and economic disparities between these groups may cause social-political 
upheaval. 
"We live in a multicultural society - multilingual, multiracial, multi religious. There must be 
tolerance and mutual understanding" (The Star, 17 October, 1997) 
The quota system embedded in the New Economic Policy (1971-1990) and the National 
Development Policy (1991-2000) for correcting the racial imbalances in social and 
economic resources will be investigated before proposing a review of the present student 
finance policy. The aspiration of the Vision 2020 will also be taken into account. The 
New Economic Policy, the National Development Policy and Vision 2020 will be 
discussed in Appendix B (1)- (B3) and also argued in chapters 4,5 and 6. 
The study of the Malaysian case may provide some empirical evidence to contribute to 
the debate about student loans versus grants and scholarships. International evidence 
shows that the debate remains an open question. The choice depends on the existing 
2 The budget for 1998 was tabled in the Parliament on the last Friday of October, 1997. 
3 Tabled in the Parliament on 9`h December, 1997 
4 The percentages of ethnic groups are according to the last Malaysian Population Census of 1991. 
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pattern of finance, the size of subsidy desirable for higher education, and the objectives 
of governments (Woodhall, 1983). 
1.3.2 Objectives 
1.3.2.1: Main Objective 
The main objective of this study is to examine critically the present Malaysian 
scholarships and loans systems in terms of equity and efficiency, before making 
modifications to the present system of student finance. 
1.3.2.2 Specific Objectives 
a. To evaluate equality in the distribution of the present student loan and scholarship 
systems, with reference to seven independent variables. These are: ethnicity, areas 
and regions of origin of undergraduates, income-groups, gender, previous academic 
performance and types of courses pursued. 
b. To evaluate the extent to which loans and scholarships help students to gain access 
to university education by examining their recruitment effects 
c. To evaluate critically the extent to which the present student loan and scholarship 
programmes in Malaysia are satisfying the following efficiency criteria: 
i) the attitude of students towards study, that is, whether they study harder with 
student loans as compared with other forms of financial support. Indicators used 
are hours spent for daily private study and rate of attending lectures; 
ii) the expected results, pass rate of students and whether they complete their 
studies on time. This is related to the cost-effectiveness of the loan/scholarship 
systems; 
iii) the financial efficiency of loans, according to investigation of their cost- 
recovery. From this perspective, the rate of repayment, interest subsidy, defaults, 
cost of administration, grace period and length of repayment will be explored; 
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iv) the efficiency in meeting manpower needs of the economy, whether the 
output (graduates) meets the manpower needs of the economy. 
d. To investigate the opinions of lenders towards student loans programmes and 
scholarship schemes as practised in Malaysia: specifically, their views on the 
criteria used for selection of recipients and their suggestions. 
e. To identify possible drawbacks in the present system of student loans and 
scholarship programmes as practised in Malaysia. 
f. To consider international experiences of student aid programmes for financing 
higher education, which may offer insights in modifying the present student finance 
for Malaysia. 
g. To gather the opinions of undergraduates and potential undergraduates on their 
preferences about alternative options (involving cost-recovery) for financing higher 
education. 
h. On the basis of the evidence collected, to put forward a modified system of student 
finance for Malaysia. 
Objectives (a) - (b) investigate the equity implications of the loan and scholarship 
systems, and how they differ. Objectives { c(i )- c(iv)} investigate and compare the 
efficiency of the loan and scholarship systems, while objectives (d) - (g) gather opinions 
for proposing a modified system for higher education finance. 
1.3.3 Statement of the Problem 
As this study is concerned with public investment in education, the ideas of welfare 
economics will be used in its arguments. Fundamental questions addressed in the study 
are: 
"Is the system efficient? " and " Is the system equitable? " These questions will then 
relate to questions such as "Who pays the cost? Who benefits? Who should pay? How 
much should the public subsidise higher education? How can student financial support 
play a role in equalising college opportunities for the low-income and other 
disadvantaged, previously excluded groups in the society? " In the light of financial 
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constraints, it is significant to examine these issues in the present study of the Malaysian 
case. 
1.3.4 Research Questions 
The main research questions below seek to answer the objectives stated in the previous 
section. 
"How efficient and equitable are the existing student loans and scholarships systems in 
Malaysia? 
"How do the student loans and scholarships in Malaysia differ in terms of efficiency and 
equity? " 
" What are the underlying factors that cause the equity and efficiency effects in the 
Malaysian case as identified within this study? " 
1.4 Organisation of Chapters 
Subsequent chapters in the thesis will be organised in the following manner. Chapter 
Two will explore the different costs and benefits of higher education as well as the 
arguments on public versus private payment for higher education. I will define efficiency 
and equity concepts, as the debate about loans and scholarship schemes principally 
concerns issues of efficiency and equity. Various financial strategies will be analysed 
and related to the cost recovery method of financing higher education and the 
diversification of resources for higher education finance. 
Chapter three will investigate different types of loans and scholarships which have been 
implemented in selected developed and developing countries. From international 
experiences, Malaysia could gain insights for formulating an alternative type, or 
improving the present system of student finance. The Income-contingent type of loans 
will be given special attention in the debate on loans versus grants as this type of loans 
may minimise the limitations of the mortgage-type of loans. 
Chapter Four will introduce Malaysia, its people and the development of its higher 
education. The main focus will be the development of the higher education system. I 
will also investigate how economic, social and political developments have brought 
about the "quota system" for the intake of university students based on ethnic groups. 
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The expansion of higher education, the corporatisation of universities and the 
implications of these developments for funding will also be explored. The social policies 
underlying the granting of loans and scholarships will be discussed. 
Chapter Five will introduce the methodology. A survey questionnaire was administered 
in 1999 to collect data from the undergraduates (1996 intake) of five public universities 
to investigate the equality of scholarships as well as loan distributions. Survey 
questionnaires were also used to collect data from students of four high schools to obtain 
their opinions about student financial support. I also conducted interviews with directors 
and senior executive officers of different funding bodies to obtain data concerning the 
administrative efficiency and cost-effectiveness of running the loans and scholarship 
schemes, as well as opinions on a modified system of student finance. 
Chapter Six will analyse the equality or inequality measurements in the distribution of 
the Student Scholarships for equity implications. I first use a chi-square significance test 
to investigate whether there is any association between the provision of scholarships with 
each of the seven independent variables stated. Since the ethnic group may be a 
prominent factor in the provision of scholarships, I also analyse the equality of 
scholarship provision for natives and non-natives separately based on the other six 
independent variables. Moreover, other types of measuring the association are also used 
where appropriate to reinforce the argument. The Kendall's Tau-b, for example, is used 
to indicate the strength of the relationship between ordered categories such as income 
groups and the provision of loans. 
For investigating equality in the distribution of scholarships, two types of equality, Type- 
1 Equality and Type-2 Equality measurements will be used. These will be explained in 
Chapters 5,6 and 7. I mainly use quantitative analysis, reinforced by qualitative data and 
interpretation for examining the equity aspect of the scholarship system in Malaysia. I 
will attempt to give a clear, fair and impartial account of what the data show. 
Similarly, Chapter Seven analyses equality in the distribution of loans. The same 
methods and concepts will be used as in the discussion of the equality of the scholarship 
provision. Both concepts, vertical equity and "horizontal equity" will be defined in 
chapter 2 to underpin the arguments for the scholarship and loan distributions. 
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In Chapter Eight, I will take a further step in the analysis by using multiple logistic 
regression. The chance of having a scholarship for each category/group within the same 
independent variable is examined, taking into account the interrelationships of all 
independent variables by entering them together in the model. The same procedure is 
followed in investigating the chance of having a loan. Distributions of loans and 
scholarships between categories/groups of each independent variable are also examined 
respectively and compared. 
In Chapter Nine, I will analyse the efficiency of the student loan as a system, besides 
analysing four major schemes individually. The cost-effectiveness, exchange efficiency 
and financial efficiency of student loans as a system, and of individual schemes, will be 
investigated. 
Chapter Ten will be a discussion of the results and provide recommendations. I will 
relate findings to the theory and previous literature and point out to the reader the 
strengths of the study. Limitations of the study, such as the time and resource constraints 
and difficulty of access to certain data, will be discussed. A modified student financial 
support programme will be proposed, and suggestions offered for further studies in 
related topics. Hopefully, this research will contribute to knowledge in the area of 
student finance generally, and particularly in the case of Malaysia. 
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has first briefly discussed the world-wide contextual issues of financing 
higher education. These include the rising demand for higher education, especially in the 
developing countries such as in Malaysia, the financial constraints, and different ways of 
financing higher education. Relating to the above issues, the questions about private 
versus public payment of higher education and forms of subsidies have been briefly 
introduced for further discussion in chapter two. The chapter has also discussed the 
present study, its rationale, objectives, the statement of the problem, and research 
questions. Subsequent chapters of the thesis have been outlined. 
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Chapter 2 
The Economics of Higher Education Finance 
2.0 Overview 
This chapter explores the economic arguments and the conceptual framework for the 
debate about who should pay for higher education and how should they pay. The basic 
argument is whether the state or students should pay for higher education. The state could 
pay the cost of higher education by transferring money to universities and colleges ; or 
it could give money to students through grants/scholarships or subsidised loans 
(Williams, 1999). On the other hand, students could pay the cost of higher education 
themselves either through fees or incurring debts by borrowing. The debts incurred could 
be repaid through either mortgage-type or income-contingent loans after graduation. 
From this perspective, Section one introduces the crisis which is faced by the higher 
education sector globally, and which is causing radical changes in its financing. Section 
Two investigates the costs and benefits of higher education, both to individuals and to 
society before evaluating who should pay for higher education. To further investigate the 
issue, section three reviews the economic arguments about public versus private 
payments. To examine the economic arguments for student loans as opposed to the 
scholarship system as a funding mechanism, section four examines some conceptual 
issues about loans and grants and the degree to which there should be public 
subsidisation. These include the concept of efficiency used in the present study, and the 
efficiency arguments about student loans and scholarships. Section Five examines the 
equity concept and its application to loans and scholarships in the argument on how 
should higher education be financed. Section Six concludes the chapter. 
2.1 The Financial Crisis in Higher Education 
In both developed and developing countries, higher education is facing budgetary constraint; 
in particular expenditures per student are under pressure. This is mainly due to funding being 
heavily dependent on government, and unit costs being high relative to other segments of 
education systems (World Bank, 1994). The situation has been most acute in the developing 
countries, as it is difficult for these countries to contain the pressures for enrolment 
expansion as a consequence of high demand from students for higher education. The society 
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also highly demanded a highly educated or skilled work force for meeting the increasing 
manpower needs of a developing economy. 
In fact, the root of the financial crisis in higher education in many countries is the 
democratisation of higher education, leading to dramatic and continuing growth in student 
numbers (Ziderman & Albrecht , 1995). Hence, in the past twenty years, higher education 
has been the fastest growing segment of the education system. In the light of the crisis, it is 
important to examine the relationship between methods of financing education and the 
achievement of desired economic and educational objectives. Student loans as a cost- 
recovery mechanism for funding higher education could be proposed as an alternative to the 
scholarship system. This raises the question of who should pay for the cost of higher 
education. 
In the debate on equity, one group of economists suggests that "he who benefits should pay 
for it" (Barden, Et al 1991; Ziderman and Albrecht, 1995) since he/she would accrue private 
returns from pursuing higher education. The counter-group of economists argues that higher 
education is a public good and therefore should be subsidised (Blaug, 1990). However, 
education can also be regarded as a partly- public good so that private and public interests 
should share the cost of it. Before making any justification, we shall first examine the costs 
of higher education and subsequently the benefits from it. 
2.2 The Cost and Benefits of Higher Education 
2.2.1 Costs 
There is a wide range of definitions of the costs of higher education. Johnstone 1986; 
1993) suggests that the total costs of higher education comprise both direct costs (as 
shown in i and ii) and indirect costs (as indicated in iii). 
i) costs of students' living including room, board and other living expenses; 
stationery costs, which include books, supplies and educational expenses; others 
such as travelling and entertainment. Room, board and living expenses are 
assumed to equal the outlay he/she would have made had he/she chosen to enter 
the labour force instead of study (Verry, 1977) and hence may not represent the 
private opportunity cost of education. However, the difference between such costs 
would represent the private opportunity costs if individuals decide to study away 
26 
from home. Stationery costs and other costs are also considered as the private 
opportunity costs of education. 
ii) costs of instruction, including tuition and fees, faculty and staff salaries, the 
operation and maintenance of plant, supplies and equipment, and the amortisation 
and depreciation of plant. Tuition and fees are transfer payments if students are given 
maintenance grants, and in that case do not represent opportunity costs. Other 
components of the cost of instruction are the social opportunity costs of education. 
iii) earnings forgone, which are the earnings or wages which individuals would 
obtain had they not opted for university education. The earnings (net of tax) 
represent the opportunity cost to individuals. They represent part of the social 
opportunity costs, if measured pre-tax. 
In making decisions whether to invest in higher education or not, individuals need to 
consider the costs incurred, and more importantly who is paying or partially paying for them, 
and also the benefits accrued later on. Students have to consider how much they pay for 
pursuing higher education. They may consider loans they could borrow, term-time earnings, 
and past savings as well as future benefits they could gain after graduation, before they 
decide to make an investment choice. Johnstone (1986) has listed the parents, student 
themselves, taxpayers, institutions/philanthrophists and business as possible sources of 
revenues for paying the costs of higher education (See Appendix Q. We now turn to 
examine the benefits of higher education to argue who should pay for higher education. 
2.2.2 Benefits 
Education brings direct and indirect benefits to both individuals and to society 
(Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1991; Chapman 1996). 
2.2.2.1 Private Benefits 
One of the private benefits which higher education brings to individuals is monetary 
rewards. Using age-earning profiles, Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) show that 
earnings are highly correlated with education. This means that highly educated workers earn 
more than workers with less education in both lifetime and average annual income terms 
(Mensotis, 1998). Many studies have also shown that there is a correlation between earnings 
and the educational level which an individual attains, though genetic and other factors may 
also contribute to both (Chapman, 1996). The study of Harkness and Machine (1999) about 
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graduate earnings in the UK over the period 1974-95 indicated that although graduate 
earnings fell in the 1970s, increased markedly during the 1980s and 1990s (cited by 
Greenaway and Haynes, 2000). 
The evidence tend to support the Human Capital Theory, which hypothesises that an 
individual would become more productive if the duration (quantity) and quality of education 
he/she obtains contributes to his/her human capital (Schultz, 1961). The work of Becker 
(1983), Taubman and Wales (1974) Solomon (1981), Rumberger(1987), and Murphy and 
Welch (1989) seems to validate the Human Capital Theory by employing different 
longitudinal databases. Psacharopolous and Woodhall, (1985) using social rates of return 
results, assume that earnings are a proxy for productivity. 
However, the Human Capital theory has been criticised. For example, Thurow (1970) and 
Berg (1970) cited by Groot and Hartog (1995) both suggest that the higher earnings of the 
more educated over-state their contribution to productivity. Nevertheless, both studies suffer 
from certain methodological shortcomings (Mace, 1987). Critics also point out that other 
factors such as family background and intelligence may contribute to productivity other than 
higher education. My position is that higher education does bring direct financial benefits 
to an individual, though other factors such as on- the job training, innate ability and personal 
characteristics may influence earning capacity. Through regression analysis, studies in the 
US and other developed countries show that the alpha coefficient (extra earnings attributed 
to education) is between 0.7 and 0.8. 
In a more subtle way, Lazear (1977) argues that it is difficult to isolate the effect of 
education on job performance. This is true because in an imperfect market operation, 
earnings may be a poor measure of one's contribution to output. Solomon and Fagnano 
(1995) also argue that the observation of college graduates earning more than high school 
students should not lead to the conclusion that going to college yields higher income, as it 
is difficult to identify, measure and evaluate the benefits of education. 
Mace (1987) suggests that we should measure education's effect on output directly in real 
terms rather than using wages as a proxy for productivity. By using 37 data sets, Lockheed 
et al (1980) concluded that farm productivity increases on the average by 7.4 per cent as a 
result of a farmer completing four years of elementary education rather than none (Mace, 
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1987). 
Critics of the Human Capital Theory also argue that the acquisition of a degree merely acts 
as a screening device for the selection of workers, and is not valuable because of greater 
labour productivity correlated to higher education. Thus, the screening approach 
hypothesises that since persons selected for an educational (or training) programme possess 
the kinds of attributes sought by employers, higher earnings are paid, though no productivity 
effect is discernible (Geske and Cohn, 1990). This may not be true, since higher education 
may not be absolutely related to such attributes such as being hard-working and honest. 
Some highly educated persons may not have desirable ethical values. Psacharopoulos (1979) 
distinguished between the weak version and the strong version of screening hypothesis. The 
weak version refers to employers offering high starting wages to the more highly educated 
owing to inadequate information regarding the potential productivity of workers, whereas 
the stronger version refers to the continued payment of higher wages to the more educated, 
even though evaluation of job performance is then possible. To a certain extent, I agree with 
the weak version of the screening hypothesis, as it takes time to evaluate the job 
performance of workers. In Malaysia, though graduates earn higher salaries than non- 
graduates, the annual salary increment is based on the job performance of employees. 
However, some universities may offer diplomas or degrees which may be of low standard. 
Under this situation, if the screening hypothesis is true, requiring graduation would be a poor 
device for the selection of workers. If the screening hypothesis on higher education is true 
as such education discovers ability and other desirable productive traits, a less expensive 
means rather than education could be developed to serve the same purpose. 
Empirical evidence shows mixed results on the validity of screening models (Winkler, 
1987). Some studies yielded results that support both the screening hypothesis and the 
human capital theory of education; for example, the study of Rao and Datta for the case of 
India (Groot and Hartog, 1995) whereas others only support either the weak or the strong 
version of it. Groot and Hartog (1995) concludes that the strong version of the screening 
hypothesis must be rejected though education seems to have signaling aspects. I agree with 
Groot and Hartog (1995) that the screening theory and human capital theory should not be 
seen as mutually exclusive but rather as complementary especially when mass higher 
education reduces the effectiveness of higher education as a screen (Williams, 1999). 
Another private benefit which accrues to individuals is that added education permits an 
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individual to have a wide selection of employment options which provide non-monetary 
reward, such as greater security, at the expense of monetary reward. Many PhDs or graduates 
may pursue prestigious jobs in government and academe, which earn lower salaries 
compared to other settings, such as the private sector (Blaug, 1990; Solomon and Fagnano, 
1995). These graduates would prefer more job satisfactions, challenge and status to more 
pay. Thus, earnings are inadequate measure as they do not include non-pecuniary benefits. 
People with higher education are also likely to adjust themselves to changing job 
opportunities more readily than those with less education, especially in a time of 
technological change. I take the position that higher education does accrue private benefits. 
2.2.2.2 Social Benefits 
Education also contributes external benefits to society, which the individuals concerned 
cannot capture for themselves. This will be elaborated more in section 2.2.3. The manner 
in which schooling is provided may result in incidental, even accidental, additional services, 
such as child-care in the case of elementary primary education (Weisbrod, 1962). Schools 
make it possible for mothers to do other things rather than supervise their youngsters. The 
alternative costs for mothers who choose to work would be the productivity of the child-care 
services reflected in the earnings of the latter (if there is no distortion of the market). 
Education also affects individuals by inculcating acceptable social values and behavioural 
norms in the community. This can be in the form of voting behaviour, preserving and 
encouraging democratic freedoms (Wolfe, 1995; Halimi, 1998), which may be realised by 
other communities also. After controlling for per capita income, human rights or civil rights 
improve significantly with democratisation (McMahon, 1998) as a result of higher levels 
of education. All OECD countries which have higher levels of education also have 
democracy, compared to most sub-Sahara Africa countries which have less education with 
authoritarian rules (McMahon, 1998). 
There is an inverse link between education and crime rates (Haveman and Wolfe, 1984; 
Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985, Leslie and Brinkman, 1993; Chapman, 1996; 
Merisotis, 1998). Education therefore saves the taxpayers' money as the cost of enforcement 
is reduced. However, this view may not take into account "white-collar" crime (Wolfe, 
1995), which is more sophisticated but also devastating. 
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The education and training of one worker may also bring external benefits to his/her 
fellow workers. This means that the productivity of each member of the group influences 
the productivity of each other member. Each worker therefore has a financial interest in 
the education of his fellow workers. Thus, college-educated individuals not only 
contribute more to research and the development of products and services that enhance 
the quality of other lives, but also promote the diffusion of technology (Merisotis, 1998) 
thereby improving the quality of the labour force. Thus, higher education, contributes to 
improvements in the application of knowledge (Leslie and Brinkman, 1988). Wolf and 
Gittlement (1993) and Wolf (1994) found that university enrolment rates are positively 
associated with labour productivity growth, suggesting that the externalities of higher 
education contribute to the productivity of the labour force. Through cultural activities, 
university-educated graduates may also contribute to the social milieu in ways which 
benefit others, from which the less educated also benefit (Dearing Report, July 1997). 
The endogenous growth theory of Lucas (1988) advocates that the average education 
level in the community as an externality in achieving increasing to scale is responsible 
for economic growth. This has been tested by Barro (1992; Barro & Sala-Imartin, 1995) 
as cited by McMahon (1998). The results show that the richer OECD countries are 
getting richer while the Sub-Saharan Africa countries are getting poorer. The main factor 
for this is human-resource development, after controlling for investment in physical 
capital (Mankiw et al, 1992; Kim and Lau, 1996; McMahon, 1997a), cited by McMahon, 
(1998). I believe that externalities are relevant in Malaysia, as the country is rapidly 
moving towards industrialisation. The emphasis on human resource development through 
the rapid expansion of higher education would improve health, and medical personnel are 
still critically needed by the economy. Higher education also promotes democracy and 
literacy among Malaysians. Expertise in science and technology would also not only 
bring about efficiency in administration and increases in productivity but also indirect 
benefits to the public such as easy accessibility to information, reducing red-tape and may 
encourage a more transparent system of administration. Externalities may not result in 
inadequate private demand for higher education, as there has been always "excess 
demand" for higher education in Malaysia. 
To summarise, the fact that private returns from education realised directly by the 
students and are taken up by them (assuming utility-maximising behaviour) implies that 
individuals should pay for at least part of the cost of attending higher education. 
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Conversely, the positive externalities captured by society may also justify the public 
subsidisation of higher education, though these cannot be accurately quantified it 
(Chapman, 1996). This relates to the argument over public versus private payment for 
higher education, in examining whether the externalities warrant its public subsidisation. 
2.3 Public versus Private Payment For Higher Education and the Mix 
There have been arguments on the balance between public and private finance of higher 
education and the role which government should play. In the context of education, Le Grand 
(1989) argues that the quantity provided, its form, and (with some reservations) the people 
who receive it will be determined best by a free market. This is mainly because in a market 
system, consumers are able to express their preferences when they make decisions about the 
type and quantity of education they purchase. Through the expression of these individual 
choices, the socially efficient quantity of each type of education will be indicated. Hence, 
the required education will be made available. Educational institutions will be competing 
for students (as these will be the source of their income) and will respond by offering those 
types of education that are in demand. However, the market may not operate in this way. 
There are specific failings that may prevent the market in education from operating 
efficiently, and which account for the state's interference by subsidising higher education. 
Market failure may occur because consumers have inadequate information or are unable to 
interpret it. Market failure also occurs because of technical economies of scale, externalities 
in production and/or consumption, and inherent imperfections in capital and insurance 
markets. We analyse these conditions to examine whether they are likely to apply in higher 
education, and whether they may provide a case for government interventions in higher 
education as against private provision. 
2.3.1 Consumer Ignorance 
In market economics, it is considered axiomatic that the consumer knows his/her interest 
better than anyone else. In the case of higher education, Barr (1989) argues that students are 
an intelligent and fairly "street-wise" consumer group. Students have time to acquire the 
information that they need and time for seeking advice. The information is sufficiently 
simple for the student to understand it, and to a large extent, evaluate it. The provision of 
advisory and counselling services independent of schools and colleges would enable students 
to make better-informed decisions. 
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Parents may also give advice to their children in making decision of attending higher 
education. However, in some cases parents may not act in their children's interests, because 
of malevolence or simply lack of information (Le Grand, 1989). Hence, Le Grand (1989) 
claims that some form of intervention will be necessary because of lack of parental 
judgement. However, this may not be true since in a free market, institutions will 
disseminate information more effectively as they compete for students. 
Barr (1989) also argues that students can make better choices than central planners 
concerning the needs of economy. Evidence (Moser and Layard, 1964; Blaug, 1967; Layard, 
1972) has shown the difficulty of trying to project the UK's medium-term manpower needs 
in the Robbins Report (UK, 1963) as cited by (Barr, 1989). However, government should 
have a right to view about and influence over the direction of higher education (Barr, 1989). 
It is unlikely for consumer ignorance to prevail among 18-year-olds making decisions 
whether to undertake higher education courses. Empirical evidence from studies in the UK, 
the USA and Pakistan show that 16-18-year-olds are well informed about the effect of 
schooling on their labour market prospects (Freeman, 1981; Williams and Gordon, 1981). 
I would say that consumer ignorance cannot be a general condition causing failure in higher 
education market in this cyber age when information is accessible freely and quickly. 
2.2.2 Economies of Scale 
Many studies have shown that there are economies of scale in education (Cohn, 1979). 
Unit cost will fall when more students enrol until the university reaches the optimal point. 
These economies exist in conventional universities and even more so in distance- 
educational establishments such as the Open University (Wagner, 1977; Mace, 1987). 
Thus, prima facie, if there has been an inadequate number of students enrolling, subsidies 
should be provided so as to encourage enrolments to rise to adequate numbers thereby 
securing these potential economies of scale. Economies of scale may cause market failure 
as the average cost has not reached its lowest point, and the production is not at an 
optimal level. 
However, the evidence is at best ambivalent. In any case, it is surely a management issue 
to ensure that courses are organised so as to obtain the maximum benefits from 
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economies of scale. Moreover, differences in unit costs of education seem not to be 
clearly related to its financial resources, though there is evidence of economies of scale 
(Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985). Economies of scale do not solely depend on 
student enrolments but also on other factors such as student-staff ratio, quality of staff, 
costs of capital and equipment and cost of different subjects. Moreover, Monk (1990) 
also argues that educational production may not be characterised by economies of scale 
whereby the unit cost declines as size increases. 
Therefore, economies of scale do not provide a general reason for government 
intervention in higher education, because we cannot assume that universities or colleges 
are always and everywhere suboptimal in size. Levels of enrolment can be dealt with case 
by case and hence are not a matter of general principle (Mace, 1987). Thus, to consider 
economies of scale is a management issue, not a rationale for the public subsidy of higher 
education. 
2.2.3 Externalities and the Public Good 
Another economic justification for public subsidies to higher education is based on 
externalities, meaning the benefits of higher education which do not accrue to individual 
graduates (Blaug, 1990). As Mace (1987) defines them, 
"Externalities in higher education occur when the productivity and/or psychic satisfaction of 
person A has been altered solely as a result of the higher education of B". ( Mace, 1987, p7). 
However, externalities can be positive (A's productivity and /or satisfaction rises), or 
negative (A's productivity and/or satisfaction falls). The presence of these externalities 
in the market would violate the necessary conditions for Pareto optimality. 
Externalities could also be represented as a continuum. At one end of the continuum there 
are no externalities, meaning that the market reflects the full value of the services 
provided. This is the case of private good. At the other extreme, externalities are the only 
benefits or losses from the activity in question. This is the case of public good or public 
bad. The national defence service is a good example of a public good where consumption 
is necessarily joint and equal, and no one's enjoyment of the service is affected by anyone 
else's. Thus, the good will not be provided by the market because no individual is 
prepared to pay for the service. It must therefore be provided by the state, if it is to be 
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provided at all. However, critics may question the provision of private security services 
which may also bring "spill-over" benefits to those who do not pay for them. 
Nevertheless, the provision of private security services differs from the provision of 
national defence because the former is limited whereas the latter covers the whole nation. 
Moreover, anyone who employs a private security service bears no responsibilities to 
those who enjoy the "spill-over" benefits. However, no one has succeeded in quantifying 
the exact external benefits of higher education (Blaug, 1990; Seville and Tooley, 1997) 
and there is no simple answer as to how much subsidy should be provided to ensure 
optimal investment in higher education (Mace, 1987). Also, the free-riding problem may 
also change over time (Monk, 1990). 
Literature reporting research on externalities in higher education shows mixed results. 
Studies by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Nehru et al. (1994) and Gemmell (1996), 
have shown that education has a positive effect on growth rates. However, the studies of 
Oulton and Young (1996), and (Pritchett (1995) show that some basic educational 
measures often appear to be uncorrelated with growth, which may be due to the absence 
of measures of educational quality (Dearing Report, 1997). Moreover, though there is 
some evidence that higher education affects income growth positively, a number of 
studies have failed to find such a connection. Milton Friedman (1980) argued that the 
external benefits of American higher education are negligibly small. In contrast, Marris 
(1983) argued that externalities are very large in higher education, amounting to 25 per 
cent of the graduate's indirect cost. Jenkins (1995a, b) is able to draw some tentative 
conclusions on the extent of externalities to higher education for the UK and some other 
developed countries. His "macro" estimates of rates of return to a higher education 
qualification for UK are between 26-86%. Generally, evidence on the extent of 
externalities is derived from fairly crude and unreliable methodologies 
(Dearing 
Report, 1997). 
The issue of externalities in education could become even more complex when related 
to educational finance. We should know the marginal addition to external 
benefits, not 
the total externalities of education (Mace, 1987). The state should 
have the knowledge 
of how externalities are associated with the extra 
(marginal) students that would enter 
universities because of state subsidy. 
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The existence of externalities may provide a genuine reason for subsidising higher 
education, though it does not provide any guidance about the size of subsidy. The real 
question is not how large the subsidies should be but how they vary with the volume of 
enrolments. Blaug (1990) also argues that in the absence of measurement, it is uncertain 
that the net sum of positive and negative externalities is in fact positive. Externalities may 
be negative (Williams, 1999). Thus, the economic case for subsidising higher education 
is at best weak and at worst non-existent (Blaug, 1990). Consequently, the present 
universal system of public support for higher education in UK is not to be explained by 
the alleged external effects of higher education but rather as a political decision, which 
may change in the long run. Therefore, I agree with Blaug (1990) that 
"..... it is electoral support for policies deemed to be fair and just in creating equality in 
educational opportunities that accounts for the particular mix of subsidies that one actually 
observes in different countries. " (Blaug, 1990, p16). 
This suggests that there is a trade-off between efficiency and equity arguments 
regarding the public subsidy for higher education because matters of equity are left to 
political scientists, not economists. The political economy plays an important part in 
determining the public subsidy for the funding of higher education. In the Malaysian 
case, financial policies affecting students may be politically driven in line with the quota 
system embedded in the New Economic Policy and National Development Policy 
discussed in Appendices B(l) and B(2) and will be argued in chapters 4,6 and 7. 
On the other hand, we can also say that societies have an interest in equity not only as 
an ideological principle, but also from an efficiency standpoint. The 
higher education 
system is most efficient when access is determined by ability to achieve, not ability to 
pay. Hence, public intervention is justified to the extent of ensuring that qualified, poor 
individuals, who in most cases have no access to credit and who cannot afford to 
forgo 
income while attending school, have access to education (Carlson, 
1992). 
2.2.4 Imperfections in the Capital and Insurance Markets 
It is claimed that in a non-slave market one usually cannot 
borrow in the capital market 
to finance investment in human capital. We cannot offer ourselves as collateral to a 
bank 
to secure a loan on our own education (Blaug, 
1990). Commercial banks are usually 
unwilling to finance the personal cost of 
higher education, even at excessive rates of 
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interests. However, this view may not hold true since contracts can be signed between the 
lender and the borrower. Nearly all MBA students, for example, are privately funded 
because the banks highly value the potential of MBA holders to repay the loans. 
Commercial banks in the UK are also willing to give education loans to graduates and 
undergraduates, but at excessive rates of interest causing student debts to leap by 17.5% 
in 1999 (The Times, April 22 2000). 
To summarise, the externalities and imperfections in the capital and insurance markets may 
provide support for the state's subsidies to higher education but do not cause it. It is political 
decisions through electoral processes that are responsible to provide the subsidies to higher 
education. Hence, the debate about public versus private payment for higher education 
depends mainly on political decisions rather than on efficiency arguments. However, both 
politicians and economists would ask the same question: " To what extent higher education 
should be subsidised? " though their criteria may differ. I take the position that higher 
education is a "quasi" public good. If higher education is to be subsidised directly to 
students, which option is better, loans or scholarships? 
2.4 Some Conceptual Issues 
In the literature, much has been said about student loans and grants, considered 
conceptually and empirically. The theoretical arguments which underpin the debate on 
loans or grants relate to efficiency and equity aspects. The present study uses three criteria 
of efficiency: cost-effectiveness, exchange efficiency and financial efficiency. 
2.4.1 Cost-effectiveness 
Cost-effectiveness in this study refers to whether investments in education, through 
provision of loans and scholarships, have achieved the objectives as desired by the funding 
bodies, that is, whether recipients graduated with good grades and on time so as to minimise 
costs. Costs refer to loan and scholarship disbursements and output refers to undergraduates 
successfully graduating from universities. Scholarship or loan would be very cost-effective 
if students graduated on time. Thus, cost-effectiveness relates to economic efficiency, that 
is achieving a desired level of output at minimum cost (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985, 
p 206). Related to this type of efficiency are students' attitudes towards studies. I will 
compare the attitude towards study of students receiving loans, those receiving scholarships 
and those who are self-financing. 
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According to Woodhall (1970), advocates of loans claim that students would use their time 
more efficiently once loans are given because they need to pay for the costs of higher 
education. However, opponents of loans argue that the need to repay loans causes financial 
problems and worries among students, leading to wastage if students withdraw from studies; 
whereas a grant system encourages the student to spend time efficiently in devoting himself 
/herself to study without financial worries. Whether students actually work harder under 
different systems is difficult to answer since the question is partly subjective, and the answer 
would vary according to the details of the structure and curriculum of higher education 
(Woodhall, 1970). Moreover, it also depends on the types of loans which students use. 
Income-contingent loans, which require students to pay a proportion of their incomes after 
graduation, may not cause financial worries among students. On the other hand, the 
mortgage type of loans, which require repayments in equal instalments, may add burdens and 
worries to students. Students worry because there is a risk of failure in their studies or of 
being unemployed and therefore unable to repay the debts. Students may be motivated to 
study harder if loans can be converted into grants wholly or partially, depending on their 
final results. 
Related to cost-effectiveness, the present study investigates how students with different 
forms of financial support differ in their attitudes towards studies, which may affect their 
achievements. I use such indicators as the number of hours spent in self-study, that is in 
doing revision, reading and other activities related to studies, and also the percentage of 
attendance, to indicate the attitudes of students towards studies under different forms of 
financial support, contributing to cost-effectiveness. 
2.4.2 Efficiency in meeting the Manpower Needs 
This refers to the aspect of economic efficiency which examines whether the output 
(graduates) meet the demand of the society. This is a narrow version of efficiency. We will 
examine the extent to which tertiary education meets manpower and employment needs. The 
investment in human capital through provisions of loans and scholarships would be efficient 
if output (graduates) is produced on time to meet the forecast manpower needs of the 
economy. In this study, data regarding the demand and supply of manpower needs in various 
fields forecasted by the Economic Planning Unit are used to consider the justification of the 
provisions of loans or scholarships in terms of this type of efficiency argument. 
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This type of efficiency could also relate to the "recruitment effect" of the loan and 
scholarship systems, motivating recipients to enter or continue studies in university, who 
otherwise would not attend or dropout if not given such financial support. The extent to 
which loans and scholarships are used for recruiting qualified persons into attending 
university education shows how far they bring the potential manpower into the economy, 
which would otherwise be lost because of financial constraints, and thus suggests its 
contribution to the efficiency. Comparison of impacts may contribute to the debate on loans 
versus grants. 
This study also investigates qualified friends of respondents (undergraduates) who did not 
attend universities because of financial problems, indicating the "loss" of potential 
manpower. 
2.4.3 Financial Efficiency 
The financial efficiency of loans can be defined as the recovery ratio- the extent to which the 
loan is repaid in full (Albrecht & Ziderman, 1991). Comparing government lending to 
students and what is returned in repayments would indicate the loan efficiency. It also 
indicates whether the loans can be fully self-revolving in a restrictive sense. It also depends 
on the cost of administration, the defaults, interest subsidy, rate of repayment, and grace 
period. Thus, financial efficiency examines loan efficiency at the micro level. However, this 
restrictive definition of financial efficiency would not be a valid efficiency criterion if loans 
were being used as an instrument for delivering the optimal subsidy. 
2.4.3.1 The Cost of Administering the Schemes 
To evaluate the relative financial efficiency of loan and grant systems, we should examine 
the variations in the cost of administering both systems. It is argued that the cost of 
administering a loan scheme is more expensive compared to grants (Barr, 1989). This is 
because once the grants are given, students will only need to complete their courses on time 
and the system incurs no further costs. However, for a loan scheme, there are initial 
processing costs, overall maintenance costs and collection costs (Albrecht & Ziderman, 
1991). The start-up costs include administrative expenses and disbursements to students 
before the first borrowers enter the repayment period (Carlson, 1992). 
Mortgage loans, for example, have a high public-sector cost which does not enable the 
system to expand. They are inflexible and administratively costly (Barr, 1989). Thus, critics 
and opponents of student loans emphasise the administrative problems that can arise, and 
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argue that loan schemes may prove unworkable and thus costly to administer, especially 
when graduates intend to emigrate. It is impractical to enforce collection on the basis of 
foreign earnings and therefore there will be a loss to the country financially (Atkinson, 1983) 
However, the extra administrative cost of loans should not be overstated; developed 
economies have well-established capital markets geared to administer loans to individuals 
which would minimise the marginal cost of administration (Lewis, 1980). The 
administrative cost also depends on the type of loans scheme introduced. The National 
Insurance Contribution Scheme proposed by (Barr 1989; Barr, 1990; Barden, Barr and 
Higginson, 1991, Barr and Crawford, 1996) for England demonstrates that the administrative 
cost will be small since the Department of Social Security needs only to switch on the 
additional National Insurance contributions. The Department of Social Security can switch 
it off years later after the repayments for individuals have settled. The cost of administration 
can be kept minimal through computerisation whereby data can be updated and co-ordinated 
easily. The collection of loans-repayments could be done efficiently through the taxation 
department due to large economies of scales (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1991). Recent work 
also shows that the NIC scheme has a faster repayment stream (Barr and Falkingham, 1993; 
Harding, 1993, provides the similar case of the Australian system) than the loan scheme in 
England and Wales. 
Hence, we should not introduce the types of loan schemes where the costs of administration 
are excessive when compared to the benefits because of heavy subsidy, in small-scale 
operation, and poor communications to the recipients. The introduction of such schemes 
cannot be justified on the grounds that they reduce public spending. If the cost of collection 
is more than the cost of administering the loans, it is better for the government to introduce 
or continue grants. 
In contrast, a grant scheme that attempts to cover full costs is expensive. The British 
taxpayer used to make one of the largest contributions for student maintenance 
in 
comparison to other countries. This helped to keep the higher education system 
in Britain 
before 1990 small, since for taxpayers the cost of expanding the system was high (Barr, 
1989). 
2.4.3.2 Repayment 
The cost-recovery of the loans would also depend on how they are repaid. 
One important 
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factor affecting the effectiveness of loan schemes is the relationship between the loans and 
graduates' future income. The larger the income relative to the loan, the more likely are 
borrowers to have funds for full repayment, and the better the overall rate of cost -recovery 
(Mingat and Tan, 1986) 
Hence, the amount of the loans which can be recovered depends on the terms of repayment 
- the length of repayment and the present income that graduates allocate to repay the loans. 
The government may prefer to keep the repayment period short so that the loan scheme can 
become self-financing quickly. But the graduates want it to be long. This creates tensions 
between the students and the government. One way to relieve this tension is that the 
government could sell the debt (loans borrowed by students) to the private sector through 
securitisation (Williams 1998). The private market would be prepared to buy £1 billion of 
student debt for about £850 million. However, this is not a magic solution as the private sector 
would simply expect the government to meet the cost of the risk element (£150 million). 
Also, tension may also be created between the private sector and the students. Nevertheless, 
the privatisation of loans would produce immediate savings in public spending of that amount 
(£850 million, in the example above) per year. 
Thus, the financial efficiency of any loan scheme will depend centrally on the loan-recovery 
ratio - the extent to which the loan is repaid in full (Albrecht & Adrian Ziderman, 1989). What 
governments lend out to students and what is returned in repayments would indicate the loan 
efficiency. The loan programme would be inefficient if what the government lends out could 
not be recovered almost entirely. 
2.4.3.3 The Grace Period, Interest Rate, and Defaults 
Usually, a grace period is given for graduates who could not find jobs soon after their 
graduations. The longer the grace period, the slower will be the start of loan repayment and 
the more loans will be impaired being fully self-financing quickly. The rate of interest charged 
to the loans is also important, as it would determine both the length of repayment and the 
recipients' ability to pay. If the interest charged is unsubsidised, this may 
discourage students 
from disadvantaged background to borrow and hence would be inequitable. Loans may be 
inefficient if high interest causes high default rates, which would be very costly to the 
taxpayers. 
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2.4.4 Effects of loans to Institutional Efficiency 
The introduction of a loan scheme linked with higher levels of fees may increase the 
efficiency of universities who are forced to compete for students to reduce costs, improve 
the quality of education and upgrade subsequent marketability of skills provided. It is argued 
that universities will seek more efficient allocations and utilisation of resources such as 
physical plant, and academic staff (Williams, 1987). Institutions will be forced to become 
consumer-oriented in the competition for students (Blaug, 1990). Students will be reminded 
about the private cost of their education, which in turn induces them to maximise the 
educational benefits of higher education (Blaug, 1990). This will indeed generate a higher 
economic value for higher education (Ziderman & Albrecht, 1995). 
However, the above view is not completely correct because political factors may influence 
student enrolments to universities. In the case of Malaysia, a quota system is used to 
determine student enrolments into public universities, in which 55 per cent of university 
places are reserved for bumiputera. In this situation, the introduction of loan schemes may 
not have a strong effect on the competitiveness of universities, as the places offered in the 
universities are being regulated. 
It is argued that with the introduction of a loan scheme, universities will be forced to respond 
to students' choices or demand as universities would offer type of courses demanded in the 
labour market (reflecting relative earnings and shortages in the labour market (Ziderman & 
Albrecht, 1995). This would lead to exchange efficiency in terms of ensuring that the output 
they produce will match with the demands of the society (Mace, 1993), and production 
efficiency that will minimise the cost per student. Students are given the power to penalise 
inefficient producers (universities, colleges) by withdrawing (Atkinson, 1983) if the latter 
cannot meet the students' demands. Thus, 
"If institutions derived their finance directly from the customer, they would have stronger 
incentives to innovate and put on courses relevant to the perceived needs of the 
students "(Atkinson, 1983 P 109). 
However, this may not be necessarily the case, because of the imperfect nature of the 
markets. Information obtained by students regarding labour market conditions may 
be 
distorted and inaccurate. Moreover, institutions may sell diplomas or degrees rather than 
education in situations where the labour market rewards degrees rather than skills 
(Ziderman 
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& Albrecht, 1995). Nevertheless, production efficiency may result if students pay part of the 
institutional costs of universities. The impact of this depends on the sources of a university's 
income. If the university's income derives entirely from fees paid by students with borrowed 
money in relation to other sources of income, the impact on the institution will be greater. 
Thus, the power of students to force the university to respond to students' choices depends 
on the size of loans. 
2.4.5 The Cost of Contraction/Expansion of the University 
The introduction of a loan scheme may affect the number of students enrolling, depending 
on the types of loans and the context where loans are introduced. If a mortgage type of loans 
is used to replace existing generous grants, enrolment may contract. In contrast, if an 
income-contingent loan is introduced where scholarships or grants are limited, enrolment 
of university students may expand. The contraction/expansion of student numbers will affect 
the marginal and average costs of the operation of universities. If the average costs are 
minimised already, any contraction/expansion will cause diseconomies, giving rise to 
production inefficiency. 
Figure 2.1 shows that the point E* is optimal where Marginal Cost (MC) equates Average 
Cost (AC) with enrolment of OA. But, at E1 and E2, diseconomies occur, where enrolments 
are at Al and A2 respectively. 
Marginal 
Cost 
Average 
Cost 
Figure 2.1: Contraction and Expansion of Universities 
At OA1, there is room to increase the enrolment to OA by giving generous grants. At OA2, 
replacing grants with mortgage-type of loans or even income-contingent 
loan can reduce the 
students' enrolment. 
0 Al A A2 
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However, the government must also consider whether loans are the best way of achieving 
contractions, since lowering the benefits through increasing the tax rate on graduate incomes 
can also do this. If contraction is not wanted, the government must consider whether it is 
worth offsetting the effect of loans on student numbers by increasing the subsidy in some 
manner or even by subsidising the loan programme (Verry, 1977). 
We can also regard education to some degree as a jointly supplied service (Monk, 1990) 
This means that the education service is equally and simultaneously available to all 
individuals. Thus, the consumption of a jointly supplied good (lecture) by one individual 
does not affect the ability of others to simultaneously consume the same good (lecture). The 
elements of jointness in education are important because the producer (University) can 
reallocate the resources efficiently so that price equates marginal cost. If there is shortfall 
of demand, grants/scholarships can be provided to increase the enrolment to achieve the 
optimal numbers and vice-versa. However, jointness in education may be disputed. As more 
students attend a lecture, their learning ability may decline because of the crowding effect. 
The use of devices such as TV may change the instructor's style of presentation, which may 
affect the learning process of certain students. Moreover, an additional unprepared student 
could seriously disrupt a seminar. Also, free riding problem could arise, because individuals 
may conceal their preferences for education, leading to inefficiencies as a result of unstable 
equilibrium (Monk, 1990). 
2.4.6 Optimal Subsidy 
In examining the loans and the scholarship systems practised in Malaysia, I shall consider 
the question: "Can optimal subsidy be achieved? " Higher education should be expanded 
up to the point where its marginal social cost equates marginal social benefit (Verry, 
1977). 
At this point the society has the optimal number of students (Mace, 1987). But, 
if higher 
education were expanded further, the costs of this expansion would outweigh the 
benefits. 
If expansion has not been carried to this point, potential 
investments (in expansion) for 
which benefits exceed costs have been ignored (Verry, 
1977, p61; Mace, 1987). 
However, private decisions may fail to produce the correct amount of education, 
because any 
rational individual will only invest in education where 
his/her private marginal cost (PMC) 
equates with their private marginal benefits 
(PMB). Thus, individual decisions will tend to 
produce either too much or too little education relative 
to the socially desirable amount 
Verry, 1977, p61). Figure 2.2 shows how private and social marginal costs and 
benefits vary 
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with the amounts of higher education undertaken. 
Social Marginal 
Social Marginal 
Cost (SMC) 
Private Marginal 
Benefit (PMB) 
Private marginal 
Cost (PMC) 
Ep Es Amount of higher education 
Figure 2.2: The Optimal Subsidy (Verry (1977), p61) 
The figure can either refer to an individual or to the higher education sector (Verry, 1977). 
Private costs and benefits refer to those costs and benefits that would be received by the 
individual if there were no subsidisation of higher education. Social costs and benefits 
include not only the private costs and benefits but also include any costs incurred by the 
society as a whole, and any benefits received by the society. All costs and benefits are in 
present-value terms. 
An individual will choose an amount of higher education, where PMC equates PMB, after 
doing a private cost-benefit calculation. But, the socially optimal amount of higher education 
is Es, where social marginal cost (SMC) equates social marginal benefits (SMB). So the 
individual has chosen fewer years of higher education than are socially desirable. In order 
to ensure that this individual, and others like him/her, does not under-invest in higher 
education, the government should subsidise him/her by either giving grant or exempting 
students from paying full fees. The new PMC, that is PMC' will equate PMB, which also 
equates with the socially optimal amount of education. The optimal subsidy equals to "s" or 
BC as shown in figure 2.2. Hence, 
(EsA-EsC)-(EsA-EsB) or (SMB-PMB)-(SMC - PMC) (Verry, 1977, p62) 
Conversely, if private investment in education exceeds the social optimum for education, 
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an unsubsidised loan scheme can be introduced to increase the private marginal cost, thereby- 
decreasing the student enrolment until the optimal subsidy is reached again. The increase in 
cost is equivalent to the interest paid according to the loan scheme. The next section 
examines the equity argument over loans versus grants/scholarship systems. 
2.5 The Equity Argument 
To examine the student loan and scholarship schemes implemented in Malaysia, we should 
also consider the equity aspect, which is no less important than the efficiency aspect. The 
basic question concerns the equity aspect of financing higher education is: "Is the system fair 
or equitable "? Hence, equity is concerned with the distribution of what is produced and how 
fair or equitable that distribution is (Mace, 1987). Unlike questions of efficiency, which are 
value-free, questions about equity are much more clearly subjective and value-laden. Thus, 
traditionally, economists have concentrated on questions of efficiency, leaving matters of 
equity to political scientists (Blaug, 1990). 
Barr (1989) defines equity as "Equality of Opportunity", which means equal opportunity of 
access to education for individuals who have similar tastes and abilities. Each of them 
should receive the same education, irrespective of extraneous considerations such as race, 
sex, social class or personal income. Therefore, an individual who has academic ability 
should not be barred from receiving higher education because of financial or any other 
reasons. However, this does not mean that each equally qualified person will receive the 
same quantity of education, since individuals differ in their preferences and aptitudes. Barr's 
(1989) definition is closely related to the Robbins Report which assumed that equality of 
opportunity was expressed by 
"an axiom that courses of higher education should be available for all those who are qualified by 
ability and attainment to pursue them and who wish to do so. " (Quoted by Barr, 1989, P 11). 
Equity is a slippery concept. Thus, Psacharopolous and Woodhall (1985) suggests that a 
distinction between normative and positive statements regarding equity should be made 
clearly. They argue that equity is not only concerned with 
distribution of resources among 
different groups but also on normative judgements about how society should distribute 
resources. There should be clear definitions of groups and measurements 
for equity. 
The literature also classifies normative judgement on equity into three types. These are the 
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horizontal equity, requiring "equal treatment of equals. " However, there can be no "equal 
treatment of equals" dictum in the real world as no two individuals are the same (Monk, 
1988). Consequently, the concept of vertical equity, requiring "unequal treatment of 
unequals" is proposed, whereby different groups are treated unequally because of differential 
needs. An example of vertical equity treatment is that of racial inequality. A certain race 
may be treated preferentially in the present because they were treated unfairly in the past. 
However, Monk (1988) raises a number of questions regarding moral obligation for the 
vertical equity argument. 
"How responsible are people today for the morally repugnant inequalities that existed in the past 
among the races? " "Is the magnitude of moral indignation relevant to the obligation to provide 
compensation? " "Is the magnitude of the previous discrimination, apart from the moral issue, 
relevant to the obligation to provide compensation? " (Monk, 1988: 38) 
Equity may also be defined as requiring a redistribution of resources designed to achieve the 
community's philosophical and ethical standard of fairness (McMahon, 1982). Thus, we 
should consider whether education has a redistributive effect, either regressive or 
progressive, towards different income groups, genders and ethnic groups. 
The present study will use these two facets of equity as discussed: these are the equality or 
inequality in scholarship and loan distribution, and normative judgement of how equitably 
these distributions are (both "horizontal equity" and vertical equity). In this thesis, I define 
the "horizontal equity" as equal opportunity or access to financial support of all who are 
qualified for universities, and to a certain extent used this concept in the argument. 
Vertical equity will underpin the arguments for the Malaysian quota system and objectives 
related to the NEP and NDP as reflected in unequal distribution of scholarships or loans. 
These objectives are minimising of poverty especially in the rural areas irrespective of 
ethnicity, for regional integration between East Malaysia and West Malaysia, and 
encouraging more participation of women in the economy. The quota system states that the 
distribution of resources such as the granting of scholarships and loans should reflect the 
racial composition of the country. From this perspective, we shall first examine how equally 
scholarships and loans are respectively being distributed towards different income groups, 
ethnic groups, and respondents from different areas and regions, in relation to the types of 
courses respondents pursuing, and the gender and previous academic performances of 
respondents. Results from these investigations will be used for equity 
implications. In other 
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words, vertical equity will underpin the arguments on the findings. 
We shall also investigate how scholarships and loans contribute especially to the low-income 
groups in their access to higher education. This is examined through the "recruitment 
effects" of loans and scholarships and investigation of students' friends who did not attend 
universities because of financial problems. These issues will be explored in chapters 6 and 
7 for equity implications. 
Proponents of student loans schemes argue that on equity grounds, "he who benefits should 
pay for that education" (Barden et al, 1991). It is common knowledge that higher education 
is very expensive and the recipients of higher education, on the average, enter higher income 
and higher status jobs than the less educated. So, why should the average or lower income 
taxpayers pay for the undoubted advantages education bestows on graduates? To do this 
offends both horizontal equity and vertical equity. It contradicts horizontal equity because 
the lower income taxpayers are subsidising the potential higher income groups, since after 
graduation, students earn higher incomes than those who have subsidised them before. It 
also offends vertical equity because the lower income taxpayers should be subsidised, 
instead of them subsidising the potential higher income group. 
Opponents of loan schemes may say that we should also consider equity between education 
and other activities. They argue that the loan expenditures fail to release government 
expenditure for other uses for many years because the government have to provide loan 
finance (Le Grand, 1989). This is because private banks are selective, and would not offer 
students with little collateral; loans which would be paid in the distant future. Hence, it is 
inequitable to taxpayers, who do not attend higher education, and also have to forego certain 
better facilities which would otherwise be provided by the government. However, this 
problem of opportunity cost can be overcome through securitisation, as explained earlier 
(Dearing, 1997). If loans are privatised, the savings to the taxpayers are larger and hence 
funds would be released immediately for other government expenditures such as health 
services and transport. 
The issue of the subsidising of higher education also depends on the national taxation policy. 
If the policy is progressive, the lower income groups may not 
be subsidising the potential 
higher income group. If they do subsidise higher education, they may be subsidising their 
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own children also. However, this argument may be countered by arguments that children in 
lower income groups may not have opportunities to enter higher education because they may 
have dropped out from the secondary. In this situation, it is suggested that financial support 
should be given to those children in lower income groups even at the secondary level of 
education. Hence, the grant system for financing higher education is bad because grants 
overall are redistributive towards the better off (Barr, 1989; Barr, 1990; Barden, et al, 1991) 
as most children from lower income groups have been phased out, even sometimes at the 
senior secondary level (Le Grand, 1989; Blaug, 1991). 
In considering the equity argument about loans and grants, we should also examine the 
methods of repayment of loans with reference to the lifetime disposable income of the 
borrowers. 
"Perhaps the most important aspect of a loan scheme, especially for its equity implications, is 
the method by which the loan is repaid. " (Verry, 1977, p77) 
According to Verry (1977), if the straight-repayment method is used, the loan has adverse 
distributional effects. As every graduate has the same amount to repay, these repayments will 
amount to a higher proportion of lifetime incomes for low earners than for high earners. In 
other words, such repayments represent a regressive tax. However, if income contingent 
loans are introduced, in which loans are repaid as a proportion of a graduate's incomes each 
year, the redistributive effect will be proportional to incomes. Hence, this type of loan is 
expected to be more favourable to low-income students. (Albrecht & Ziderman, 1991). This 
would encourage the participation of lower income groups in higher education. However, 
the interest charged on income-contingent loans would also have life-long effects on 
repayments of loans. If the interest charged is close to the market rate, certain problems may 
arise. Low-income students, particularly may be discouraged from borrowing. Those who 
take up the loans would also require a longer time to repay them, which would increase the 
chance of default. 
" The protection of Income-Contingent arrangements for the low paid means 
that a 
significant minority of graduates would be making repayments which 
did not even cover the 
interest on their loans, let alone repay the debt. " (Dearing Report, 
July, 1997, p 328). 
Consequently, the debts would continue to grow throughout one's life, and could never be 
written-off even with the income-contingency arrangement. 
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Redistribution effects of loans on different income-groups of users differ with types of 
repayments, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
Y1/Yo 
Figure 2.3 
Source: Verry, (1977), p 87. 
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In Figure 2.3, the horizontal axis shows lifetime disposable income levels. The vertical axis 
shows the ratio of new lifetime income after the policy change to lifetime income before the 
policy change, Y1/Yo (Verry, 1977, p87). We assume that the loan and increases in fees 
cancel each other, so that the policy change will always reduce lifetime income (by the 
present value of repayments) so that the ratio Y1/Yo is always less than unity. Curve A 
represents the relationship between Y1/Yo and Yo with a straight repayment loan, whereas 
line B represents the income-contingent method of repayment which is strictly proportional. 
Line C shows no repayments are required and hence Y1=Yo, and Y1/Yo = 1. Under the 
income-contingent loan repayments, the higher earners with higher absolute repayments are 
subsidising the education of low-income earners whose low repayments are insufficient to 
repay their loans (Verry, 1977, p87). This situation contrasts sharply with straight-line 
repayment of the mortgage type of loans. Thus, the low-income group enjoys the incentive 
of being subsidised to repay the loan by the high-income group under the income-contingent 
loan arrangement, and vice-versa in the case of the mortgage-type loan. 
However, the above argument which assumes that there is a 100 percent of students' 
participation who have borrowed equal amounts on income -contingent loans, may not be 
realistic (Verry, 1977). This is because in any voluntary loan scheme, the participation rate 
will be less than 100%, particularly those with higher parental incomes may 
have the 
greatest non-participation rate. It has been argued that 
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"where there is a positive correlation between parental and own income, and where income 
expectations are reasonably well-founded, then loan policies will be more regressive than under 100% participation" (Verry, 1977) p 89 
According to Verry (1977), this problem could be solved by allowing all high earners to drop 
out of the repayment cohort once they have repaid all their debt, and charging them a higher 
rate of interest than that charged to participants who remain in the repayment cohort. Hence, 
the difference between the two interest rates is the subsidy received by the low-income 
earners and provided by the high-income earners, though it is inequitable to the high-income 
group in terms of "horizontal equity". 
Another way to solve the problem of non-participation of the high-income earners is to 
introduce a graduate tax. Under this system, fees would be kept low, but graduates must 
repay their loans in the form of an income tax, which may be progressive while 
simultaneously ensuring that the education costs of the cohort were not excessively 
subsidised. However, this again depends on the rate of interest charged on the income- 
contingent loans. 
Sometimes, the amount of loans given may exceed the fee increase. In this situation, even 
a straight repayment loan may become less regressive or in some cases can be even 
progressive (Verry, 1977). For the income-contingent repayment, it will become more 
progressive. Thus, any equity argument about the relation between of loans and grants 
should consider the types of repayment and the size of loans. 
Proponents of loan schemes argue that loans are most likely to increase equality of access 
if low-income groups can borrow larger amounts and repay them over longer periods than 
higher income-earners can. Though a loan scheme may increase the net private cost of higher 
education, participation by lower income groups may increase rather than 
decrease as the 
loan (especially if it is income-contingent) has shifted much of the cost from the student's 
family to the student himself (Verry, 1977). It also shifts much of the cost 
from the present 
to the future. Although it is frequently asserted that student loans would 
discourage low- 
income families from undertaking higher education, it is at least plausible to argue that the 
reverse might be true with an income-contingent 
loan. Thus, income-contingent loans may 
increase equality of opportunity in higher education, especially 
for the lower income groups 
when no alternative source of income exists. 
Loans especially the mortgage-type may 
discourage students from borrowing while banks may usually 
be unwilling to lend. 
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2.5.1. Reduced Access on the Demand Side 
Barr (1989) argued that from the student's viewpoint loans, especially the mortgage t`pe, 
are risky, thereby deterring many applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds. Middle class 
students might take the loans, but many marginal students will be deterred. The result may 
be a fall in student numbers, leading to empty places in higher education institutions and 
therefore institutional inefficiency as resources may not be utilised efficiently. There will be 
"wasted talent" and reduced intergenerational mobility. 
According to Barr (1989), a person from a lower socio-economic group will take a 
housing mortgage loan rather than buy a degree. This is because an individual taking a 
housing mortgage loan knows that he owns a house and the house is likely to appreciate. 
In contrast, buying a degree cannot be a certain investment since there is a perceived risk 
of failing the degree or being unemployed afterwards. However, a housing mortgage loan 
may not guarantee that an individual will own the house. During recession, houses may 
depreciate and an individual may also be unemployed. The bank may then take the house. 
However, individuals may still prefer housing mortgage loans to study loans because of 
psychological factors. Nevertheless, if income-contingent loans are introduced, 
individuals may prefer study loans rather than housing mortgage loans as individuals 
know that they need only repay according to a proportion of their incomes after 
graduation. 
Opponents of loans argue that the replacement of scholarships by loans may discourage 
low-income students from participating in higher education because of their fear of 
incurring future debts. This is because the poor are more cautious over risk taking 
(Albrecht and Ziderman, 1991; 1992; Ziderman & Albrechtl995; Barr, 1989). However, 
this depends on the types of loans introduced. The income-contingent loans 
in Sweden 
and Australia do not prevent the poor from attending universities. 
How much the demand will be reduced because of the 
introduction of loans depends on 
the elasticity of private demand over the range of price 
increases implied by the particular 
loan scheme under consideration. If private demand 
for higher education is at all price 
elastic, then loans could normally be expected to reduce 
demand. However, the literature 
also suggests that there seems to be no simple relationship 
between the type of student 
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support and the level of participation in higher education. 
"There is no evidence that loans necessary discourage participation, or that grants are more 
likely to lead to high levels of participation. " (Woodhall, 1989, P 20). 
We need to specify the types of loan before we can make justifications for them. The 
mortgage type of loans may deter applicants from lower-income groups because they are 
more risk averse (Barr, 1989). Parents may prevent their children from getting mortgage- 
type debt, but this may not be the case if the income-contingent type of loan is 
introduced. 
In addition, a loan is not excessive if a student can repay it in 10 years and still end up 
with earnings greater than those of a high school graduate (James, 1988). Many Americans 
amortise their homes (roughly double the size of their higher educational investment) over 
30 years. 
In contrast, proponents of the grant system also suggest that grants would increase access 
to higher education for the lower income students. 
2.5.2 Reduced Access on the Supply Side 
Loan opponents have argued that long- term student loans are usually risky to lenders and 
therefore reduce access on the supply side. Lenders are unwilling to supply funds to 
students because of lack of collateral, unless the latter could obtain a personal guarantor 
who undertakes to repay the loan if the student defaults (Woodhall, 1987). Therefore, the 
government needs to provide some sort of security so that financial institutions are willing 
to lend to students. But this involves a high public-sector cost, which may not readily 
enable the system to expand. This view may be untrue, as banks in UK are willing to give 
out loans selectively to graduates and undergraduates with good family background, 
incurring low risk. The problem of reduced access in any case may be solved if income- 
related type of loans are introduced (Barr, 1989 ). 
2.6 Conclusion 
In discussing the issue of loans or scholarships, this chapter has explored some economic 
arguments on who should pay for higher education and 
how should they pay. Budgetary 
constraint as a result of expansion in higher education 
has pushed governments to call for 
a greater private share in financing 
higher education. The efficiency argument on 
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externalities and imperfections in the capital and insurance markets may partially hold true 
for public subsidisation. However, it is a political decision through electoral support that 
warrants public subsidisation. The equity concept is no less important than efficiency in the 
argument over loans or scholarships. From this perspective, the equity effects of different 
financial schemes have been explored or incorporated in the argument. An income- 
contingent type of loan seems to be more efficient and equitable in terms of "horizontal 
equity" than the mortgage-type loans. Loans and scholarships may not be mutually exclusive 
but complement one another. We shall next investigate the empirical evidence of various 
types of loans and scholarships, which have been practised in both developed and 
developing countries in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
International Experience of Student Aid Programme 
3.0 Overview 
The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate the student financial support schemes 
practised in some selected countries whose experiences Malaysia can learn from. From this 
perspective, Section One explores and evaluates student financial support in four developed 
countries, namely the USA, Sweden, the UK, and Australia, in terms of equity and efficiency 
Similarly, Section Two explores and evaluates student financial support in two developing 
countries, namely Colombia and Kenya. These countries are chosen because they are very 
prominent in student higher education finance to provide useful general guidelines regarding 
the granting of financial support. Section Three therefore discusses the lessons, which 
Malaysia can draw from these international experiences of student financial support albeit 
diversity and different context. In fact, no country is similar to the Malaysian multiracial, 
multi-lingual, multireligious and multicultural society. Moreover, the solutions used by one 
country are rarely transportable intact to another (Johnstone, 1987, p9) and hence it can only 
give some general guidelines to be applicable in another country, in adjusted form. Section 
Four summarises the chapter. 
3.1 Student Aid Programmes in Developed Countries 
3.1.1 The USA 
In the USA, the private sector plays an important role in providing higher education. Private 
institutions receive extensive financial aid from alumni, philanthropic and taxpayer sources, 
making it difficult to determine who is actually bearing the tuition cost from the figures 
alone (Johnstone, 1986; 1993). The Student Aid Package may include grants, scholarships, 
subsidised and unsubsidised work-study and loans, fee waivers, and other types of 
assistance. The aid may be need-based, non-need based, or a combination of them 
(California Student Aid Commission, 2000). Grants and loans are provided at three different 
levels namely the Federal Government, the State Governments, and individual institutions, 
organisations and foundations. 
3.1.1.1 The Financial Support Programmes are: 
(a) The National Direct Student Loans (NDSL) 
These were launched in 1958, and are presently known as the Perkins Loans. The loans are 
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means-tested and more heavily subsidised than other loans provided by the Federal 
Government for they are primarily intended for low income students (Woodhall, 1982). The 
loans have provided low interest loans at 5% since 1981 for students with exceptional 
financial need (London Economics, 1993) through participating colleges (California Student 
Aid Commission, 2000). The interest is free during the period of study and nine months after 
graduation. The annual loan limit is currently $4,000 for undergraduates (U. S. Department 
of Education, 2000). 
(b) Guaranteed Student Loans (GSL) 
These were introduced in 1965 and renamed as the Stafford Loans in 1988 (Hansen, 1989). 
They are the most common source of student loan funds for undergraduate, graduate, 
vocational and professional students. Students can receive both subsidised and unsubsidised 
kinds of Stafford Loans simultaneously (California Student aid Commision, 2000). The 
states or federal governments are guarantors of students borrowing loans from private 
lenders. An independent student may also receive additional unsubsidised Stafford loans. 
In the financial year 2000/2001, dependent, independent undergraduate and graduate 
students can borrow different amount of loans (Table 1, Appendix D) 
(c) Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants (FSEOGs) 
The FSEOGs were established in 1965 as Educational Opportunity Grants, but renamed as 
FSEOGs in 1972. The grants are for undergraduates with exceptional financial need, 
qualified for additional assistance beyond the Pell Grant ranging from $100 to $40001 
annually in the 1999-2000 award year. Priority is therefore given to Pell Grant recipients. 
(d) The Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) 
The BEOGs were introduced in 1972, and renamed as Pell grants in 1980. The aim was to 
ensure that even the poorest students had the opportunity to enrol 
in higher education, thus 
increasing their participation in higher education. The Pell Grant provides the 
foundation for 
all additional aids especially for low-income students 
(Woodhall, 1982; California Student 
Aid Commission, 2000). The grant amounts of individual student would depend on the 
student's expected Family Contribution, and on the cost of attendance, whether as 
a full time 
or part-time student. The grants are means-tested 
for tuition or maintenance or both. For the 
1999-2000 award year, the Pell Grant awards ranged 
from $400 to $3,125 (U. S. Department 
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of Education, 2000). 
(e) State Student Incentive Grants ((SSIG) 
These were established in 1972 to provide federal funds to match state government 
expenditure on grants for needy students. All states are encouraged to enact or expand their 
own grant programmes. 
(f). The Parent Loans for Undergraduate Students (PLUS) 
A less subsidised version of GSL enables parents to borrow regardless of income with 
minimal federal subsidy (Hansen, 1989) and is designed to help students who do not qualify 
for GSL loans (Woodhall, 1987). At present, the interest rate is variable, with a cap of 9 
percent. Interest is charged on the loan from the date the first disbursement is made until the 
loan is repaid in full. Parents will pay a fee up to 4 percent of the loan but this is reduced 
proportionately each time a loan repayment is made. For a Parent PLUS Loan, a portion of 
this fee goes to the federal government to help reduce the cost of the loan. Within 60 days 
after the final disbursement for the academic year, parents begin repaying a PLUS Loan 
without any grace period (California Student Aid Commission, 2000). Parents are eligible 
to receive a deferment of their loan repayments under certain circumstances but cannot be 
discharged from the loans before students complete their studies. 
(g) Federal Work Study, Contributions. Institutional/Philanthropic 
The Federal Work-Study Scheme provides jobs for undergraduate and graduate students, 
allowing them to earn money to pay education expenses. The college will help to find a part- 
time job on or off campus. 
The college also receives endowment and current donations from alumni; businesses and 
friends of the college; and budgetary surpluses whereby students and families are charged 
tuition fees which are beyond the amount necessary to cover all costs, so that 
discounts can 
be given to some needy students. Scholarships from a community or professional group can 
help with college costs too. The philantrophic contribution 
has played a significant role for 
1 Grants, Scholarships, and special programmes, http: //www. edfund. org/schools/commwi/edlink/index. 
html 
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most students from low- or middle income families faced with high college costs2 The next 
section evaluates the success of financial aids in the US in terms of equity and financial 
efficiency. 
3.1.1.1 Evaluating Financial Aids in the USA 
(a) Effects on Equality of Opportunity 
Traditionally, any evaluation of the student aid programme should examine whether the 
financial factor has deterred students or potential students from attending higher education. 
No qualified candidate should be discouraged from attending university because of financial 
factor and hence equal opportunity of access to higher education. In the 1970s, it was argued 
that loans benefited higher income students more than lower income students in the USA. 
According to Woodhall (1982), the poorest students might be discouraged from applying for 
loans because of the complexities of the system, and student aid had done little to promote 
equality of opportunity. Even heavily subsidised loans such as National Direct Student 
Loans (NDSL) which were supposed to help the lower income students were then reaching 
mostly middle-income students, especially at medium and higher priced institutions. Hence, 
low-income students appeared to be deterred from attending higher education. 
The NUS study (1985) on the US also revealed that there had been a uniform decline of 
student participation in higher education between 1969 and 1981 across all income groups. 
Students from the poorest backgrounds overall had the lowest participation rate, only 33.0% 
in 1981. The study also concluded that there had been only partial success in increasing the 
participation rates of women (ranging from 0.5% to 4.9% across all income groups. and 
independent students (3.2). But, there had been very little improvement in the position of 
Black students, only 0.8%. 
The congressional Budget Office study (1990) also concluded that the federal programmes, 
measured by educational attainment, were not achieving equality of educational opportunity 
in the 1970s. However, Woodhall (1982) stated that the Federal Government had increased 
spending on both grants and loans for different reasons in the 1970s. Grants were increased 
2 The average college costs of attending California State University for the academic year 1999-2000 ranged 
from $7,248 to $12,126, depending on place of stay while attending the university (California Student Aid 
Commission, 2000). 
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to ensure that students from lower income group participated in higher education and hence 
to promote equality of opportunity for the most disadvantaged sections of the community. 
According to Johnstone (1986), during the 1980s, federal grant aid had declined both in real 
value and as a proportion of total financial resources available to students. From 1980-81 
to 1984-85, federal student aid of all kinds declined by 18.9 percent in constant dollars, 
while federal loan aid and state aid of all forms were increasing3 . Between 1979-80 and 
1983-84, the Pell Grant aid to students at independent colleges fell by 34.5 percent in 
constant dollars4. The Pell and Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants declined in 
real terms by 5.7 percent and 17.2 percent respectively5. The US government perceived that 
federal need-based aid had become excessive, wasteful, and beyond the levels necessary to 
assure higher educational opportunities for the children of the needy. They also assumed that 
the reduction in federal aid would restore the lost parental support in financing higher 
education, motivate student self-help, reduce higher educational costs, and promote more 
economical student living standards. The erosion of Federal Grant Aid led to an increase in 
student-debt levels that could account partially for the decline in the proportion of low- 
income youth, especially blacks and minorities participating in higher education. College 
attendance for black students dropped between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, though 
their high school graduation rates continued to improve (The NUS, 1985 and 
Johnstone, 1986). 
As grants were reduced, there was an increasing reliance on student loans. From 1980-81 
to 1984-85, the GSL Programme had increased by nearly 26 percent in the number of loans, 
and 8.4 percent in the size of the average loan Johnstone (1986). Those who argue for 
expansion of loans have emphasised the needs of middle income students who are not 
supported by the BEOG programme. While grants allowed all low-income students to 
participate in higher education, they did not ensure that poor students could choose freely 
from the most expensive institutions. For the middle income students who were not qualified 
for a grant on a financial basis, loans might also be quite prohibitive for them to study at an 
expensive private university (Woodhall, 1982). However, the loan component of financial 
support has increased, and played a more important part than grants in promoting equality 
of opportunity as well as shifting more and more the burdens of financing higher education 
3 Johnstone (1986), p 13 8 
4 Johnstone (1986), p139 
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to the individuals (Altbach, 1997). Thus, loans could promote equality of opportunity. The 
NUS study (1985) may be biased as students always prefer grants to loans. 
(b) Efficiency of Student Loans in the USA 
The loan efficiency, or cost-recovery, depends on the cost of programmes, level of interest 
subsidy, default rates, repayment of loans, and extent of deferment and cancellation. 
(i) Th e Cost of Programmes 
The loan programmes in the US were expensive because the Federal government subsidised 
them heavily and guaranteed the schemes through interest subsidy and "special allowance", 
especially in the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of the rapid expansion of financial aid to 
promote equality of opportunity. Rising market interest rates, and inflation further 
aggravated the situation. 
It has been argued that subsidised loans are costly because they can never be fully self- 
financing (a restrictive term of financial efficiency) because of the interest subsidy 
(Woodhall, 1982). Gale (1991) as cited by Harrison (1993) argues that interest subsidies 
accounted for 28 cents in the dollar (87.5 per cent of total costs) for the loan programmes 
in the USA over 1980-87. The GSL programme was highly subsidised by the Federal 
Government in terms of interest subsidies and default coverage. 
Government costs would be reduced by 96 per cent by eliminating the in-school interest 
payment. The Congressional Budget Office (1990) also assumed that the implicit subsidy 
of loans is 40 per cent since 1969. The Federal government has paid a "special allowance" 
to GSL lenders equivalent to an amount above the statutory interest rate, though the cap was 
removed to tie with the Treasury bill rate in 1979. Nevertheless, Dresch (1980), cited by 
Woodhall (1982), argued that many of the loan proponents in the United States in the 1970s 
wanted to use grants masquerading as loans to achieve greater public subsidisation of higher 
education. In the 1980s, many rich families reinvested GSLs on the short-term market. 
In the 2000-2001 session, the Subsidised Stafford Loans are interest free during the period 
of study for at least half the time, with a grace period of six months after graduation, or 
authorised periods of deferment. Interest will only 
begin to accrue when individuals enter 
repayment. But the unsubsidised Stafford Loans charged 
interest of 8.25 percent from the 
5 Johnstone, (1986), p139 
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time the loans were disbursed (California Student aid Commission, 2000). The PLUS Loan 
charges interest at 9 percent. Interest rates are variables and adjusted each year on July 1. 
Expenditure on loan programmes increased from 34.1 per cent of generally available 
programme expenditures in fiscal year 1977 to 52 per cent in 1990. Over the same period, 
the GSL programmes grew from 15.9 per cent to 45.9 per cent. The Federal expenditure on 
its loan programmes exceeded that on its grant programmes. In the FY 1990-91, loans 
formed 65 per cent of the total federal government student aid of $21 billion. About 5 
million of students received loans amounting to $14 billion (Woodhall, 1993b). 
It was predicted that the administrative cost of direct lending would rise by 59 per cent over 
the next five years, under the budget agreement (The Florida Times-Union- July 23,1997). 
In this situation, if the direct lending programme leads to high default rates and soaring 
administrative costs, the "savings" from eliminating a small profit will quickly turn into 
huge costs for taxpayers. 
(ii) The Administration of Loans/Student Aids 
In US, the Perkins Loans are campus-based, and the college or the university administers 
them. Private lenders operate the GSLP or Stafford Loans. The financial administrator would 
construct a "package" of aid, comprising a mixture of grants, loans and work-study. 
Different institutions have their own criteria for estimating the financial needs and the 
amount and form of aid a student receives. The college or the university is also responsible 
for collecting the Perkins repayments after the student graduates. For the Stafford Loan 
programmes, the commercial lenders administer the loans. The Federal Government or State 
Guarantee Agencies are guarantors. 
(iii) The Loan Defaults 
In the US, Dynarski (1994) revealed that the default rate on the Stafford Loans was high. 
Between 1983 and 1989, the volume of the loan programme grew 48 by per cent, from $6.5 
billion to $9.6 billion. But, during the same period, the volume of defaulted loans increased 
by 266 per cent, from $444 million to $1.6 billion (General Accounting Office, 1990). This 
suggested that the cost of administering of the loans has been greatly 
increased by high 
defaults. The defaults were associated with borrowers from low-income holders and 
minority groups, dropouts, and borrowers who attended proprietary schools and two-year 
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colleges. Hence, the findings showed that a government-subsidised loan programme to 
encourage borrowing by high-risk borrowers would result in high defaults among these 
borrowers. Therefore, 
" the dilemma is that efforts to reduce default rates are likely to result in more restricted availability 
of student loans to disadvantaged youth, who are the key group for student aid" (Dynarski, 1994: 66) 
The study also discovered that the defaults were closely associated with earnings, monthly 
repayments, and family size. It has been therefore suggested that the repayment period for 
borrowers of limited means or larger family sizes should be extended so as to reduce the 
default rate (Dynarski, 1994). In contrast, studies by the National Commission on Student 
Financial Aid show that " the more student debt a borrower acquires, the less likely the 
borrower is to default" (Woodhall, 1989, p80). Hence, Joseph Cronin, President of the 
Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corporation, believes that the GSL Programme 
has been one of the most successful stories of American higher education. He argues that 
`Hundred of parents have told this writer :" We could not have paid those college bills without the GSL 
Programme. " Thus what critics originally described as a loan of convenience for the middle class has become a 
staple, a necessity for millions of families each year. (Cronin in Gladieux, 1989, p57) cited by (Woodhall, 1989, p80). ' 
Thus, Joseph proposes an increase in the maximum loan limits for GSLs and steps to reduce 
defaults. The defaults, increasing between 1977 and 1981 were higher for NDSLs than 
GSLs. 
(iv) Repayment of Loans 
In the US, most loans to students have to be repaid within 5 or 10 years. At the discretion 
of the lender, a student may seek deferment for up to one year if unemployed or attending 
graduate study at an approved institution. Students could use any of the 
four alternatives for 
repayments of the Stafford Loans and PLUS loans (California 
Student Aid Commission, 
2000). These are: 
i) the Standard Repayment Plan requires borrowers to pay a fixed amount monthly, at 
least 
$50 or the interest that has accrued for up to 10 years. 
The actual repayment period depends 
on the loan amount. 
ii) For the Graduated Repayment Plan, the repayments are 
lower at first but increase. 
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generally every two years. The repayment period cannot exceed 10 years. 
iii) The Extended Repayment Plan allows new borrowers on or after October 1,1998 with 
outstanding loans totalling more than $30,000 to extend loan repayment over a period not 
exceeding 25 years. 
iv) Under the Income-Sensitive Repayment, the monthly repayment is based on the 
individual's annual income and the loan amount, but not exceeding 10 years. Each payment 
must be at least as much as the interest accrued on the loan between scheduled payments. 
To summarise, empirical evidence from the USA shows that the costs of administering of 
loans have been high because of the complexity of the system with so many packages or 
diverse schemes and high defaults. Malaysia should avoid these weaknesses. 
We next examine the case of Sweden. 
3.1.2 Student Aid Programmes in Sweden 
The financial aid programmes for higher education students in Sweden are known as study 
means (studiemedel). The Central Study Assistance Committee, (CSN) established in 1965, 
administers the programmes. The main objectives of CSN were the expansion of higher 
education: to eliminate differences in participation rates between genders and different 
socio-economic groups; and provision of a satisfactory living standard for students during 
their period of study, ensuring completion of studies within a reasonable time (Morris, 
1989). 
Study-means, comprising a loan component and a grant component, is provided to all 
undergraduates. When the system was first introduced in 1965, the grant component 
comprised 25 per cent of the total aid but had fallen to 5.8 per cent in 1988 (Morris, 1989). 
It was then increased to 30 per cent in 1989. This is because the total aid available 
is indexed 
to the inflation rate. Increasing the loan portion leads to a subsequent decline of the grant 
portion. Moreover, the study assistance available is calculated as a percentage of the 
base 
amount6. An additional loan of 25 per cent of the 
base amount is also available if students 
have dependent children. However, as from 1St January, 1989 onwards, the total amount of 
grants was raised by 17 per cent. The grant portion was 
50 per cent of the 1988 "base 
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amount" and would increase as a proportion of study means from 5.8 per cent to 30 per cent. 
The loan reduction was accompanied by an increase in grant. Thus, the total financial aid in 
1989 was 170 per cent of the base amount. The child supplement loan was abolished in 
1989, since child benefits were available from other welfare sources (Morris, 1989). Table 
2 of Appendix D shows the amount, study assistant and child allowance given before the 
reform of 1989. 
3.1.2.1 Who Pay The Costs ? 
According to Morris (1989), students need not pay tuition fees in pursuing higher education 
in Sweden. Students need only to pay the costs of living, books, travel and other expenses 
associated with study. Swedish parents do not have any financial responsibility for their 
children's higher education. Student part-time work is also not expected. Students may 
apply for the grant only; a mixture of grant and the maximum loan; or some lesser amount 
(Morris, 1989, p87). Before 1989 students had to declare their incomes and assets to the 
CSN for checking. With relatively small student population, it is not difficult to enforce 
accurate reporting. In the 1987-88 academic year, the study-means was reduced by 50 per 
cent if a student's annual earnings were in excess of Skr 30,000 (£2,778) and by 40 percent 
of all assets over Skr 155,000 (£14,352). Payment ceased when annual income reached Skr 
100,700 (£9,324) or when assets reached Skr 242,000 (£22,407). Usually, study assistance 
was available for six academic years but students should score a minimum of 75 per cent for 
the courses taken, half way through the second year (Morris, 1989). 
3.1.2.2 Evaluating Financial Aids in Sweden 
(a) Effects on Equality of Opportunity 
According to the NUS (1985), student aid at the post secondary level in Sweden was already 
too late to reduce inequalities of opportunity, and the participation rate of students 
from 
working and lower class backgrounds in higher education was 
less encouraging than the 
gender participation rate. The Swedish Ministry of 
Education, cited by NUS (1985), stated 
that participation in higher education of students 
from social Class A (the top social class) 
had increased whilst participation of the students from class E 
(the working class) had 
declined over the previous 21 years. It was believed that students 
from social class A were 
likely to accept the principle of borrowing as a way of 
financing their needs and their parents 
6 The base amount is the sum of money deemed to be required 
for a pensioner to live on. 
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were likely to encourage them to enter higher education (NUS, 1985). 
It was found that as the ratio of grants to loans declined since 1965 from 25% grant: 75% 
loan to 6.5 per cent grant: 93.5 per cent loan, this approximately coincided with the decline 
in the percentage of working class students (NUS, 1985). This implies that working class 
students in Sweden are less likely to entertain the concept of borrowing than students from 
more affluent backgrounds. 
Contradictory to the view of the NUS (1985), a study by the State Study Assistance 
Commission suggests that financial aid with a higher loan component in Sweden had been 
instrumental in increasing equality of opportunity. The study concluded that: 
"... forty percent of those from farmers' homes and working class homes stated that they would not have embarked 
on a post secondary education without financial aid. The corresponding percentage for the higher socio-economic 
strata is only 12 per cent. "(cited by Woodhall, 1982, P 67 ). 
A study made by Reuterberg and Svensson in 1983 about the impact of financial aid in 
Sweden showed that the probability of entering a degree course was five times greater for 
those from the higher socio-economic strata than for those from the lower strata. However, 
study assistance had the greatest effect on probability of completion, especially among 
students from lower social strata, when compared with the influence of social background, 
gender, and intelligence. 
In another sample made in1986 and 1987, Reuterberg and Svensson showed that there had 
been a continuous decline in the overall transition rate from secondary to post-secondary 
education. This might be due to the restrictions on admission to higher education leading to 
stiff competition for places, which had raised the achievement standard as a criterion for 
selection. Moreover, students of high achievement also declined because 
"the labour market for people who have a university education has deteriorated considerably. 
Thus, many young 
people have refrained from higher education (Morris, 1989, p95)" 
This suggests that extraneous factors such as stricter admission rules and 
labour market 
conditions, not merely the nature of the student aid programme may affect the participation 
rate of higher education. However, Reuterberg and 
Svensson (1987b) concluded that at first, 
financial support for study had a significant socially equalising effect, 
but lost this as times 
went on. 
A review by CSN (1988) also concluded that study assistance 
had played an important role 
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in the expansion of higher education in Sweden. The student population had doubled. 
Almost 40 percent of students would not have pursued higher education if there had not been 
any study assistance. For lower-income students, the figure was 50 per cent 
The study of Reuterberg and Svensson (1990) argued that the student financial aid has had 
a positive general recruitment effect, which had been gradually increasing in the past two 
decades. However, in terms of social class, group I (upper middle class) was clearly over- 
represented while group III (lower class) was still under-represented, though student aid had 
ensured that the social background of the student body was more fairly composed 
(Reuterberg and Svensson, 1994) 
The Reuterberg and Svensson studies (1983; 1990) also showed that the financial aid system 
had achieved some equalising effect on sex differences in choice of programmes. 
Admissions of women in medicine and dentistry, traditionally dominated by men, had 
increased. Student financial aid had led to higher women's participation rate than that of 
men in 1983-86 (Reuterberg and Svensson1987; Morris, 1989). The study of Reuterberg 
and Svenson (1990) again showed that financial aid had led to greater participation of 
women than men by 5-10 % between 1970 to 1990 (Reuterburg and Svensson, 1994). 
Hence, there is no fear of "negative dowry" for the Swedish women in participating in higher 
education. 
Moreover, the participation of mature students increased tremendously in the 1970s and 
1980s due partly to the result of the 1977 reform of higher education and the introduction 
of the 25/5 rule. Under this rule, those aged 25 or above and with five (or four) years' work 
experience were qualified to enter higher education (Morris, 1989) as labour market changes 
required that adults should go for retraining programmes. However, the participation of 
young school leavers had declined during the same period. Therefore, the overall increase 
in the participation rate did not warrant about the impact of financial aid, if the participation 
rate of both young and mature students was considered (Morris, 1989). 
The 1989 revised studiemedel system, which shifted the subsidy from the interest payable 
on loan to the grant, did not have much impact on participation in higher education, 
especially by those from the lower socio-economic groups. This is because the net effect of 
the shift in subsidy did not change the proportion of student-borne costs (Morris, 1989) and 
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would not make any impact on the private rate of return to higher education unless the 
salaries of university educated professionals were increased. 
(b) Efficiency of Student Loans in Sweden 
(i) The Cost of Programmes 
In Sweden, the grant portion of the study support is an explicit subsidy. The loan portion 
under the 1988 system, with an interest rate of only 4.2 per cent was offered at considerably 
below commercial rates of interest. Thus, the "hidden grant " was high. If the interest rate 
was 10 per cent, which approximates to the true commercial rate, the total state subsidy 
amounted to approximately 59 per cent (Morris, 1989)7- However, since January 1989 the 
grant element has been increased to 30 percent, followed by a subsequent reduction in the 
loan portion. The interest rate imposed on the loan portion has also been increased from 4.2 
per cent to 50 per cent of the current rate on government loans (approximately between 5.5 
to 6.5 percent) and a small addition for administrative costs. This may increase again the 
total state subsidy. However, the share of the cost borne by the students may not differ much 
from under the old system, because of changes in the repayment terms. 
In 1987-88, the total amount of loans given out by the government was Skr 3,100 million 
(£287 million) and Skr 201 million on grants (£ 18.6 million). The total budget of 1987-88 
for all programmes was Skr 7,977 million (£738.6 million) including administration cost of 
approximately 1.6 per cent of the total budget (Morris, 1989). The administration cost is 
much lower than that of Canada (4.5 per cent) (Woodhall, 1982; Morris, 1989, p87). 
Approximately 41 percent of the study assistance were given to higher education in the 
1987-88 budget. There were 501,000 study loans in 1978, compared to 795,000 in 1984, and 
910,000 in 1988 (Morris, 1989). 
(ii) The Administration of Student Financial Support 
In Sweden, the system of student financial support is administered by the CSN . Besides the 
main office, employing 150 staff in 1993, there were also local offices in 24 Swedish towns. 
All offices have access to one central computer database, which has considerably 
improved 
In this case, the loan amount is Skr. 1000 over a repayment period of 20 years at a 
discount rate of 10 per cent. 
The present value of the loan is Skr 472 while the student receives a 
"hidden grant" of Ski 528 (52.8 per cent). 
Combined with the grant element (5.8 per cent), the total state subsidy amounts to about 
59 per cent 
(Johnstone, 1986 and Morris 1989). 
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the efficiency of a very complex system. Thus, the concentration of administration in one 
body has demonstrated cost savings (Shackleton, 1993). 
Students apply to their local committee for a grant or loan, but the central committee co- 
ordinates the repayment programmes, produces regulations for the regional committees and 
supervises their activities. The central committee includes representatives of the trade 
unions, student organisations, civil servants and regional interests and a full time secretariat. 
(iii) Loan defaults 
Default rates are very low (1 -2%) because of automatic postponement for those who cannot 
pay their debts as a result of zero or low earnings. About 5% of borrowers are subjected to 
collecting measures (Morris, 1989). CSN issues a reminder in the form of an invoice to any 
borrower who fails to pay an instalment. A second invoice is sent if there is no response. The 
Swedish Crown Bailiff can track down defaulters efficiently because of access to tax and 
addresss records (Shackleton, 1993). The Swedish Embassies abroad have also been 
responsible for recovering debts in countries abroad where students are studying. Since 
1988, a private debt-collecting agency has been responsible to contact defaulting students 
living in Norway, Finland and the UK leading to an increment in the recovery of repayments 
(Morris, 1989). 
(iv) Repayment of loans 
Before 1989, borrowers had a two-year "grace period" before they started repaying loans. 
The usual repayment period was at least 15 or 20 years. Borrowers who were 36 or younger 
when they commenced repaying their debt would finish repayment by 50th birthday. Any 
borrower who was over 50 when starting repayment should normally repay the full debt 
before retiring at the age of 65 (Morris, 1989). 
The first year's repayment amount was determined by dividing the total debt (the principal 
plus the interest accrued from the time the loans are disbursed) with the number of years for 
repayment (Morris, 1989). There is a minimum repayment which was Skr 1610 (about 
£160) 
in 1981 and Skr 2,580 (£239) in 1988. However, the amount of subsequent repayments 
is 
subjected to the annual adjustment index. In 1975, the adjustment 
index was 3.2 per cent 
while in 1982 it was raised to 4.2 per cent, with no subsidy 
for the in-school years. The 
interest could be deferred during the in-school years. This mortgage-type repayment might 
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cause high defaults in times of economic stringency. Table 3 of Appendix D shows the 
repayment plan for a student with a twenty-year repayment period and a debt of Skr 40,0000 
(£3,704) for the year 1984, under the old system. 
With the introduction of the New Study Mean system since January 1989, the grace period 
has been limited to 6 months (Morris, 1989). There has been no specified period of 
repayment since this is based on income-contingency. Under the new system, the interest 
imposed has been raised to 50 per cent that on the Government loans (Morris, 1989). The 
system will become more efficient as subsidised loans are an inefficient substitute for grants. 
(v) Deferment and cancellation of loans 
In Sweden, from 1989, graduates both with and without children could defer their 
repayments when incomes fell below Skr 90,300 (£8,361), and Skr 116,000 (£10,740) 
respectively, leading to an extended repayment period. Remaining debt can be cancelled in 
the case of death, permanent disability and reaching the age of 66. 
The study of Reuterberg and Svensson (1990) shows that generally students on longer 
courses are much more often sceptical of the possibilities of repaying all their debts than 
students on shorter courses, as there is a correlation between total debt and study time. 
Women are only 2 per cent more sceptical than men about this possibility, though the former 
always have lower wages than the latter and more often have part-time work (Reuterberg and 
Svensson, 1994). Subsequently, we examine the case of the UK. 
3.1.3 Student Aid Programme in the UK 
Undergraduates did not pay tuition fees between 1977 and 1997, for these were paid 
automatically by the Government directly to the institutions. Nevertheless, since the 1998/99 
session, undergraduates need to pay tuition fees. 
From 1961 until September 1998, all British students received means-tested grants to 
support them in pursuing higher education. However, the grants 
declined in real terms as 
fiscal pressures increased. A student loan scheme was 
introduced in 1990 to supplement 
student support. The student loan would pay 
half of maintenance costs, the remainder being 
made up of grant, if any, plus parental support. 
The loan is disbursed by the Student Loan 
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Company (SLC). 
In 1999/2000 session, for undergraduates who started in higher education before September 
1998, the maximum grants given to students for paying their costs of living are £2,280 for 
those living in London, £1,855 for students living else-where, and £1,515 for students living 
at their parents' home. However, students who started higher education after September, 
1998 were not eligible to have maintenance grants except for some limited allowances, eg. 
disabled and dependants' allowance. Thus, new entrants to higher education in 1999/2000, 
together with those who started in 1998/99, would receive support for living costs solely 
through loans which are partly income-assessed. The maximum amount of loan that an 
undergraduate can get depends on place of stay and study, course and year of study, length 
of academic year and expected contribution from family. In the 2000/2001 session, full-time 
students who stay away from their parents and study in London receive a maximum loan of 
£4,590, but in the final year full-time students are limited to £3,980. For full-time students 
studying elsewhere, the loans are £3,725 and the final year full-time students would be given 
£3,230. Full-academic year students staying in their parents' home, would receive £2,950 
but the full-academic year final year students would receive £2,575 (DFEE, 2000/2001). 
Parents are expected to contribute to their children's education. For an independent student, 
his/her spouse only is expected to contribute. The Local Education Authority works out the 
amount of this contribution. 
Students may also apply for a Career Development Loan (CDL) if they cannot get any other 
funding. The Department for Education and Employment manages CDLs through 
partnership with a number of High Street banks. The SOCRATES-ERASMUS 
fund may 
provide a top-up grant towards the cost of students studying elsewhere 
in the European 
Union, for between 3 months and one year if they are taking a higher education course 
involving co-operation with other European universities. The 
European Union funded the 
Leonardo da Vinci programme in 1995 to complement vocational training opportunities 
in 
member states, especially in technology-based placements 
lasting for 12 months. Some 
industrial organisations, firms and government 
departments provide very competitive 
schemes. Some educational trust 
funds and charities also give small grants. Some colleges 
have their own small hardship funds. 
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There have been suggestions for the student loan scheme administered by the SLC to be 
replaced by the National Insurance Contributions Scheme in 1998 (Barr 1989; 1996; 1998), 
as recommended by the Dearing Report (July, 1997). The privatisation of loans has also 
been suggested. 
3.1.3.1 Evaluating Student Loans in the UK 
Currently the student loan scheme is linked to income, and many of the problems faced by 
the mortgage-type of repayment when the loan was first introduced have been overcome. 
Evaluation is therefore both based on the loan scheme when first introduced in 1990 and on 
the current scheme seeking lessons for Malaysia. The equity aspect focuses on equality of 
opportunity. 
(a) Effects on equality of opportunity 
From the perspective of equity among users of higher education, Woodhall (1993b) argued 
that the previous UK system of student financial support failed to meet the needs of part- 
time, mature students and those from the most disadvantaged homes. Poor students who did 
not qualify for a mandatory award were excluded or received very little support, while all 
mandatory award holders had tuition fees paid fully, even if they came from the wealthiest 
families. 
When student loans were first introduced in 1990, the government claimed that they assisted 
access in two ways (Barr and Crawford, 1996). They allowed graduates to defer repayment 
if the borrower's income was less than 85 per cent of the national average earnings. The 
government argued that a combination of mean-tested grants and loans would widen 
participation while sharing the cost of student maintenance more equitably between 
taxpayers, parents and student themselves, especially with increasing numbers of students 
attending higher education in the 1980s. There had been widening participation of ethnic 
minorities, women and others in higher education (Dearing Report, July 1997). 
In contrast to the view of the government, Barr and Crawford (1996) argued that the student 
loan system prior to September, 1998, compared to "Income-Contingent" was more 
likely 
to deter students, particularly from poor backgrounds from participating 
in higher education. 
This was because those loans were "mortgage-type" loans and required students to repay 
60 equal and very high monthly instalments, whereas the repayments of 
income-contingent 
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loans would be proportionate to incomes. This view was countered by the government who 
argued that poor people were prepared to buy a council house, and therefore to buy a degree. 
Barr and Crawford (1996) also commented that the system created a "poverty trap" for 
people just above the 85 per cent threshold. 
(b) Efficiency 
(i) The Cost of Programmes 
The student loan scheme when first introduced was costly, for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
the administrative cost was high owing to the duplicating of administrative procedures (Barr 
and Crawford, 1996). The SLC had to establish and maintain two sorts of records: records 
about the particulars of the borrower, such as his/her current address, income; and records 
about the loan, such as details of each student's total borrowing and repayments. Both sets 
of records had to be maintained from the time the student took out a loan until it was fully 
repaid. Since much of the information of the first sort was already contained in the social 
security database, the SLC was duplicating the work. Instead, the National Insurance Loan 
scheme could be introduced, making use of the existing database (Barr and Crawford, 1996). 
Secondly, it was very costly to administer deferment for students whose income fell below 
85 per cent of national average earnings8 (Barr and Crawford, 1996). The SLC had to 
approach the graduate, who then had to claim the deferment. The operation was repeated 
annually. It was difficult and expensive to track changes of students' addresses. Deferment 
slowed down the flow of repayments (about 60 per cent of graduates deferred in the first 
year after leaving university and created major problems for debt collection, aggravating 
defaults. However, this problem may be minimised as the Student Loan Company will work 
with the Inland Revenue to collect the repayments (DfEE, 2000). 
Thirdly, the government also bore a substantial interest subsidy for student loans before 
September, 1998, making the scheme more expensive. However, from September 1998, 
the value of the amount which students pay back will be broadly the same in real terms as 
the value of the money borrowed as it is indexed with the Retail Prices Index9 (DfEE, 2000). 
Fourthly, though the SLC's recovery rate as of 31 March 1996 was 94.2 per cent, which, 
8 This was £ 17,784 up to 31 August 1999 (DfEE, 1999). 
9 The rate until 31 August 1999 was 3.5 per cent. 
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after deducting the deferred repayments, represented the performance indicator of the SLC's 
administrative effectiveness only. Data regarding the percentage of individual loans 
recovered over a specific period was not known, possibly making the scheme even more 
costly (Barr and Crawford, 1996). However, this problem may have been minimised with 
the introduction of an income-contingency type of loan after September, 1998. 
Fifthly, the cost to the taxpayer of the student scheme before September 1998 was very high, 
because students were borrowing public money (Barr and Crawford, 1996; Dearing Report, 
July 1997). The scheme, lending money now and collecting repayments later increased 
public spending in the short run. The government stated that the scheme would not make a 
cumulative saving for at least 25 years from its inception in 1990. This figure was based on 
optimistic assumptions on administrative costs and defaults and completely ignored the 
interest costs of the scheme's accumulated deficit (Barr and Crawford, 1996). Calculation 
at the London School of Economics suggested that the scheme might not save the taxpayer 
money. It would be cheaper just to give the students the grants (Barr and Crawford, 1996). 
(ii)The Administration of Loans 
The SLC still administers the student loan scheme, in disbursing loans, keeping records, 
administering debt collection and deferments. Disbursing loans means that the SLC has to 
send money to student borrowers through "electronic transfer" (DfEE, 1999). The SLC 
maintains two types of records, namely personal records about the borrowers and graduates' 
repayment records, as explained in the previous section. Before September 1998, the SLC 
was responsible for collecting repayments. Its first task is to send reminders to students of 
their entitlement to defer, before court action can be taken against the defaulters. Previously, 
eight reminders were sent before taking court action. This move could increase SLC costs 
(Barr and Crawford, 1996) as issuing a summons costs more than sending a letter. Thus, the 
administering procedures for the SLC in UK was very complex, 
duplicative and hence 
expensive. However, since September 1998, Inland Revenue 
has been charged with 
responsibility for collecting loan repayments and passed to the 
SLC which may minimise 
the cost. 
(iii) Loan Defaults 
According to Barr and Crawford (1996), there was no measure of the scheme's economic 
7 -) 
effectiveness, the amount of money which was ultimately returned to the exchequer as the 
relevant data were not available. Also, data regarding the percentage of individual loans 
recovered over a specific period was unavailable, possibly making the scheme more costly 
than expected. This suggested that the default rate might be high if using the correct 
performance indicator that about 60 per cent of graduates deferred their repayments in the 
first year after leaving university, aggravating defaults (Barr and Crawford, 1996). 
(iv) Repayment of Loans 
The loan repayment was of a mortgage type scheme applying to pre-1998 entrants. 
Borrowers repaid over 60 months if they had taken out between one and four loans and over 
84 months for five or more loans. Repayment could be deferred for twelve months at a time 
if the graduate's income fell below 85 per cent of national average earnings (Barr and 
Crawford, 1998). Deferments involve an expensive computer/telephone operation. This 
would make the system very expensive if the majority of borrowers defer their repayments. 
However, with repayment linked to income, the current scheme may overcome this 
repayment problem. Students do not start repaying if their incomes are below the threshold 
of £10,000. Graduates pay 9 per cent of their marginal income beyond the threshold of 
£10,000. Repayment is collected by the Inland Revenue and is passed to the SLC. Thus, 
collections are more cost-effective than the mortgage scheme (Greenaway and Haynes, 
2000). We next examine the Australian system of student finance. 
3.1.4 Australia 
From 1945 to 1973, students paid tuition fees representing about 15 per cent of course costs 
and were supported by government scholarships, in particular. There were also other 
arrangements, resulting in only about 40 per cent of students paying fees (Woodhall, 1991 a). 
However, there were no tuition fees charged between 1973 and 1986. Between 1986 and 
1988, students paid only a small compulsory Higher Education Administrative Charge, A$ 
263 (US$207) in 1988, to support the administrative costs associated with their enrolment. 
About 40 percent of full-time students were either exempted from the charge or received 
assistance through income support arrangements. According to Greenaway and 
Haynes, 
(2000), differentiated fees have been introduced by course, between home and foreign 
students and also between home students. 
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In 1989, the Wran Committee recommended that the Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
(HECS) should collect a financial contribution from higher education students toward the 
costs of providing their education. The Department of Employment, Education, Training and 
Youth Affairs (DEETYA), and the Australian Taxation authority administers the HECS 
under the Higher Education Funding Act 1988. 
Students have an option to defer repayment until after they leave higher education, and the 
debt will be collected through the tax system. The HECS initiated the transition from state 
financing to a mixed funded system with a growing element of self-investment, though this 
is operated as a public mechanism for securing private costs (Marginson, 1997). 
The Australian Student Maintenance Scheme (AUSTUDY) also gives grants to full-time 
tertiary students to assist them in meeting maintenance costs. The grant is means-tested for 
parental income until the student reaches the age of 25 (Higher Education in the Learning 
Society, 1997). In 1995, about 55 per cent of all tertiary students received income support 
through AUSTUDY. In the August 1992 budget, the government introduced the AUSTUDY 
supplement (Chapman, 1992). The scheme began in 1993 whereby students eligible for 
AUSTUDY grants may voluntarily elect to "trade-in" up to Aus$2000 of their AUSTUDY 
grant for twice as much in the form of a loan (a maximum loan of Aus$4000). This new loan 
is called the Income-Contingent Loan (Harding, 1995). 
3.1.4.1 Evaluating Student Financial Aids in Australia 
(a) Effects on Equality of Opportunity 
In Australia, welfare state policies reached their high point in 1974, when all tuition 
fees 
were abolished while simultaneously a new system of grants was 
introduced (Marginson, 
1997) on the view that students' participation should not be determined 
by financial factors. 
In 1976,66.2% of full time students in higher institution received either a means-tested grant 
or non-means-tested teaching scholarship. Between 
1976 and 1986, though the number of 
grant recipients fell from 116,833 to 78,144, student enrolment 
increased by one-third, 
suggesting that the reduction in grants 
had no deterrent effect on high school students 
participating in higher education. This 
implies that grants should be minimised as they are 
inequitable and inefficient. The Committee on 
Higher Education Funding in 1988 
commented: 
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".... Access to higher education in Australia continues to be inequitable. People who make use of the Australian 
higher education system tend to be, or become, privileged and affluent members of the community.. .. Society in general benefits from higher education, but considerable private benefits accrue to those who have the opportunity 
to participate. Taxpayers carry most of the burden of the cost of higher education. However, most taxpayers are not 
privileged members of society and neither use nor directly benefit from higher education. " (Committee on Higher 
Education Funding, 1988 p. x) 
This implies that the system of financial support in Australia was inequitable in terms of 
equality of opportunity before 1989. Therefore, the Wran Committee Report (1989) 
recommended substantial university tuition charges. The two arguments were that it was 
impossible to continue to finance a burgeoning higher education system almost solely from 
general taxation revenue; and that not having charges was regressive over a life-time, given 
that former students came from high positions of socio-economic benefit from being 
graduates. The proposal of Wran Committee suggested that all who participate in higher 
education would be members of a "funding partnership in which the beneficiaries make a 
direct and fair contribution to what is provided by taxpayers". The DEETYA emphasised 
that the charge was only compulsory when a student or former student's annual income was 
equivalent to or greater than the average income of working Australians (Chapman, 1996). 
The Evaluations and Investigations Programme (EIP) studies of 1989, using a control group 
approach for comparison of those choosing to participate and not to participate, show that 
HECS generally did not appear to be a very important factor in limiting access. Sloan and 
Robertson (1989) concluded that: 
" ...... if HECS 
has made any impact on decision-making in relation to participation, it is largely at the 
postgraduate level, less so at the undergraduate level and hardly at all at the entry 
level ....... pp72)" 
This indicates that the HECS does not discourage students from participating in higher 
education. 
Ernst and Young (1991) made a study of traditionally 
disadvantaged groups within the 
population which concluded that HECS was of minor 
importance for those not enrolling for 
higher education. Four populations were sampled, comprising school 
leavers and adults from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. The study concluded that HECS has had no diminishing access 
effect on the decisions of these groups regarding 
higher education (London Economics. 
1993). 20 per cent of Year 12 students of low SES 
from rural areas thought HECS "likely 
to frustrate their intention to participate" (Chapman, 
1996). 
Moreover, the study made by the Victorian Post-Secondary 
Education Commission 
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(VPSEC), making use of longitudinal data from 1988 to 1990, shows that there were 
significant increases in participation of students in higher education who had the lowest 
participation index formerly. To summarise, surveys and statistical analyses undertaken 
since the introduction of HECS suggest that it has had little effect on participation in higher 
education. It is now widely accepted that the HECS has had no deterrent effect on demand 
for higher education (Chapman and Chia, 1993). 
However, there is also the view that despite the expansion of higher education, participation 
by students from parents with low incomes remains low. Moreover, the Australian 
government's August 1996 Budget stated that for too long Australian students have been 
denied the same opportunity as others to purchase a place at a Commonwealth funded 
Australian University. From 1998 Australian undergraduates were given the opportunity to 
purchase a place at an Australian university (Meek and Wood, 1997). This implies that more 
advantage is given to high income-group students. 
(b) Efficiency 
(i) Cost of Programmes 
In 1996, all undergraduates paid 2442 Australia Dollars for attending tertiary education, 
accounting for 20 per cent of the public sector direct costs for an average full-time student. 
In 1997, a three-tier HECS system was introduced. Fees were charged differently according 
to courses attended (Marginson, 1997) because of differential likely future benefits 
(Vanstone, 1996). 
However, a disadvantage of the HECS approach from a revenue raising perspective is that 
it takes some years before revenues become substantial. In 1989, total federal government 
expenditure on higher education was about A$3.1 billion. The HECS liabilities incurred by 
students totalled A$511 million (US$402 million). Both HECS and AUSTUDY supplements 
bear zero real interest rates, though the amount owing is indexed annually to the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). The loss of part of the non-repayable AUSTUDY grant implies a higher 
effective rate of interest. This may be costly to the scheme if the defaults are high, and it may 
become difficult to ensure that the loans are self-financing. 
(ii) Loan Defaults 
Under the HECS, borrowers need not repay their loans until their incomes reach the 
threshold. The combination of this threshold and the absence of real interest means that low- 
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income earners receive a strong level of protection against adverse circumstances. Such 
"default insurance" should solve the fundamental problem of fewer borrowings for 
education purposes than is desirable, as there would be no chance of default (Chapman, 
1996). 
(iii) Repayment of Loans 
In Australia, repayments of the income-contingent loans have been very successful and 
stable. This is financially efficient as it increases self-recovery. Initially, the rate of 
repayment was set on a scale of 1 to 3 per cent of income, according to level of income but 
was increased from 2 to 4 per cent. This helped to move forward the volume of funds repaid, 
causing little reaction from students or their families (Wagner, 1996). The implicit subsidy 
was thus reduced, shifting much of the charge onto students. Students can meet the 
obligation "up-front" by paying their contribution at a discount of originally 15 percent, 
increased to 25 per cent in 1993. In 1996, students could choose to defer repayment until 
they were earning at least the average taxable income of working Australians, $A27,675 per 
annum. 75 per cent of students chose to postpone payment and the charge was repaid at the 
rates shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: HECS 1996 Repayment Rates 
Taxable Income Annual Repayment Rate (per cent) 
$27,675 - 321,449 3 
$31,450 - 44,029 4 
$44,030 or more 5 
Source: HECS Your Questions answered, Australian Tax Office, 1996, cited by Chapman, B (1996), p 43 
Until 1994, the Australian Taxation Office, sent students an annual HECS bill based upon 
their tax return for that year. However, since July 1994, HECS debts have been repaid 
regularly through PAYE tax collections and through the provisional tax system. There is no 
time limit for repayments but the debt is cancelled upon death. There is no grace period and 
no link between HECS and parental income, and no explicit administration charge. 
Under the AUSTUDY supplement scheme(Harding, 1995), ex-students need not repay any 
of the loan unless their income in a financial year exceeds an indexed minimum threshold. 
Also, ex-students do not have to begin repaying their AUSTUDY supplement until the 
financial year which falls 5.5 years after the beginning of the calendar year in which the 
AUSTUDY supplement was paid. 
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The government receives more than A$400 million from HECS (about 8 per cent of the 
higher education budget). The figure has grown rapidly as former students cross the first 
income threshold. In 1992-1994, students repaid a total of over A$400 million to the 
government (Chapman, 1996). It is expected that when repayments become relatively stable. 
the annual receipts would be about $700 million, representing 15 per cent of total 
government outlays. The liabilities owed to the government were about A$4 billion in 1996 
(Chapman, 1996). 
The work of Ann Harding (1995), employing micro-simulation techniques, found that the 
average male enrolling at age 18 could repay the debt from a four- year degree in full by the 
age of 34. The calculation was based on current expected future graduate incomes. For 
women, the average age of full repayment was 40, so they would have the benefit of about 
six more years of a real interest rate subsidy than male graduates. 
Women are expected to repay only 77 per cent HECS by the age of 65 compared to 93 per 
cent for men. Hence, the government will not collect about 15 per cent of the overall "on- 
paper" debt. The subsidy implicit in a real interest rate of zero is also added. However, the 
impact of repayments of the AUSTUDY supplement is greater and spread across a much 
longer period of the life cycle than is HECS. This is because the accumulated AUSTUDY 
supplement debt is almost twice as great at the point of graduation as the HECS debt. 
We shall next examine the student financial support programmes in two developing 
countries. 
3.2 Student Financial Support /Loans in Developing Countries 
I take two countries, Colombia and Kenya as case studies. 
3.2.1 Colombia 
Colombia was the first country in Latin America and the Caribbean to introduce student 
loans, with the creation of the Colombian Institute for Educational Credit and 
Technical 
Studies Abroad (ICETEX) in 1950 (Carlson, 1992). The loan programme was founded with 
limited capital but with profound commitment that education 
is a sound national and 
personal investment (Woodhall, 1993a). 
ICETEX operates a range of programmes with various 
levels of support for students in 
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public or private universities, locally or overseas. It has very diversified sources of funding, 
both public and private (Carlson, 1992). The Central Bank and Regional Development 
Funds allocate the public funds. Private funding comes from a variety of trust funds, under 
which ICETEX administers funds for various trade and professional associations, 
universities, private companies and corporations, and from the sale of Education Saving 
Bonds. The bonds are protected against inflation, and have a maturity of 15 years, 
encouraging parents to save in order to pay their children's future higher education expenses. 
The idea of education credits spread to other Latin American countries and the Caribbean. 
According to Woodhall (1993a), the main aim in setting up this way of financing of 
Colombian higher education was for Broadening Education. There would be greater 
participation and commitment by families in financing higher education. Most universities' 
resources would come from the recovery of academic costs, the diversification of sources 
of income and administrative and institutional adjustments. Commercial banks would 
participate in financing both students and institutions to eliminate the subsidy for higher 
education. Consequently, there would be an increase in the value of enrolment fees for state 
institutions, covering 33.5 per cent of operating costs. The quality of the programmes would 
improve and more research would be carried out. Commercial banks also established an 
educational credit fund for undergraduates to finance academic costs and upkeep. The fund 
targeted the poorest students. 
Owing to the limited resources to cope with the demand for educational credit, ICETEX 
proposed interest rate differentials, based on the student's socio-economic status and the 
type of programme to be followed. Students could also choose an amortisation plan from a 
series of options, taking into consideration their economic situation and changes which 
might affect it in the future. ICETEX also proposed better use of the enrolment system 
financed through agreements with universities. ICETEX is responsible for portfolio recovery 
from students for repaying to universities later on (Woodhall, 1993a). 
3.2.1.1 Evaluating the Student Loan Schemes in Colombia 
(a) Effects on Equality of Opportunity 
In Colombia, student loans aimed to help poor students to pay for university education 
in 
either public or private universities. Less than 
10% of all students in higher education 
received loans in 1985, and more than 
75% of these came from low-income families. 
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Borrowers should provide a personal guarantee from a parent or other responsible adult. who 
was liable for the debt if the loan was not repaid. Thus, Jallade (1974), as cited by 
(Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985) concluded that loans had helped to increase the 
demand for education by reducing costs to students, and enabled some poor students who 
could not otherwise have afforded it to enrol in higher education. However, loans did not 
serve to redistribute income in favour of the poor, because loan recipients often came from 
upper class families. This indicates that the mortgage-type loans in Colombia were 
inequitable in terms of equal opportunity since they did not help to redistribute income to 
the poor. 
(b) Efficiency of the Loans 
(i) The Cost of the Loans 
According to Carlson (1992), though ICETEX is not fully self-financing in Colombia, the 
high percentage of loan repayment shows that loan recovery is possible. The loan resources 
are diversified. The largest source of money (about 22 per cent) is the Regional 
Development Fund allocated by the Colombian congressmen, municipalities and 
departmental assemblies. The second largest financial resource of ICETEX comes from the 
portfolio recovery. ICETEX loan arrears are just 12.4 per cent, which is relatively low. In 
present value terms it recovers at least 53 per cent of the value of loans disbursed, after 
deducting interest subsidies, administrative costs and defaults. ICETEX also derives its 
financial resource from the interest income (3 per cent), investment income (19 per cent), 
the Education Savings Bonds (7 per cent), 180 trust funds (9 per cent), Bank credit (16 per 
cent), Commission (4 per cent), and National Government (1 per cent). 
Thus, the financial diversification of ICETEX demonstrates that it is possible to offer 
subsidised student loans while expanding the capital base simultaneously (Carlson, 1992). 
Malaysia can learn from this. Through diversification, the risk can be spread, making the 
whole programme less costly 
(ii) The Administration of the Loans 
ICETEX is responsible for administering loans and scholarships (Woodhall, 
1987; 
Woodhall, 1993a). The Regional Development Budget finances a small number of 
scholarships, though the main activity of ICETEX 
is educational credit, or loans. ICETEX 
offers three types of loan, namely short-term, medium-term, and 
long-term. 
In 1985, ICETEX was servicing over 90,000 loans The cost of administering them was about 
US$55 per loan (Woodhall, 1987). The credits covered the period needed 
for the programme 
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of studies. These were 5 years for university training, 2 years for technical training and 2 
years for postgraduate studies. Generally, credits were paid on a half-yearly basis, directly 
to the university, and occasionally to the student. The half-yearly renewal was based on the 
students' academic results. 24 per cent interest was charged on the loan capital and a1 per 
cent guarantee, which is paid on disbursement. The administrative procedures were not 
complicated and hence did not hinder low-income students from applying. 
(iii) Loan Defaults 
In Colombia, part of the interest charged on the loans (one per cent of the 25 per cent 
charged in 1985) was used to pay for insurance against non-repayment of the loan owing to 
death or permanent disability (Woodhall, 1987; Woodhall, 1993a). ICETEX financed this 
guarantee through the Fondo de Garantias (Guarantee Fund) amounting to assets of US$1.2 
million in 1985 (Woodhall, 1987, p95). 
However, high interest rates and rising levels of unemployment in the 1970's caused the loan 
default rate to increase. Nevertheless, the majority of borrowers still repaid their loans. In 
1985, the total value of outstanding loans was US$17.2 billion, and of this, only $2.1 billion 
(or 12 per cent) was in arrears (Woodhall, 1987, p96). 
Borrowers who were late in paying the monthly installments on a loan were reminded with 
three consecutive letters. A commercial debt collection agency attempted to secure 
repayment if four instalments were in arrears. If this failed, the borrower's employer would 
be requested to deduct repayments from monthly salary. Bringing the defaulters to courts 
would be the last resort. 
(iv) Repayment of Loans 
The ICETEX portfolio is recovered in two ways, first and mainly through direct repayment 
to the 21 Regional Offices and the Zonal Office in Bogota, and secondly through collection 
agreements between ICETEX and banks or financial corporations. The debtor authorises 
ICETEX to collect the instalments by deducting them from his payroll if it is through 
portfolio recovery. It has been argued that the increase in the mature portfolio - 
1.73 per 
cent in 1990 and 20.09 per cent in 1991 is due to the slow growth 
in portfolio recovery-39.1 
per cent in 1990 compared to 17.0 per cent in 1991 
(Woodhall, 1993a). External factors such 
as high inflation rates and a high level of unemployment, and their effects on 
the real wages 
of a high percentage of the population, resulted to 
low portfolio recovery. 
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The low portfolio recovery was mainly due to faulty management of recovers' in some 
regional offices, as a consequence of lack of staff or of aggressiveness and continuity in 
recovery policies. Despite low portfolio recovery, more than 20 per cent of ICETEX 
resources came from repayments of loans (Woodhall, 1993a), suggesting that student loan- 
recovery is indeed possible, not withstanding interest subsidies and other costs (Carlson, 
1992). 
3.2.2 Kenya 
Kenya is one of the African countries where a loan scheme operates to finance higher 
education of university students. In 1974 the Government introduced the University Student 
Loan Scheme, established under the Higher Education Loans Funds Act of 1952 (Rodrigues 
and Wandiga, 1997). The Ministry of Education managed the scheme, with mixed results. 
Since October 1991 each Public University and Constituent College has set up its own 
University Bursary Secretariat, (UBS) to identify needy students. This is in line with the 
Government's 1991 policy on cost sharing in which students must pay tuition fees. Student 
loans had been increased to cover fees, representing about 25 per cent of tuition costs. The 
loans were not means-tested. All students were eligible for a loan. Scholarships were also 
available to needy students. The scholarship or bursary was a monetary award meant for 
those unable to afford the fees of ksh 6000 (Rodrigues and Wandiga, 1997). In 1995, a new 
loan scheme based on means-testing was introduced. 
3.2.2.1 Evaluating the Loan Scheme in Kenya 
(a) Equality of Opportunity 
According to Rodrigues and Wandiga (1997), the loan scheme before 1995 was inequitable 
as it was available to all students. As majority of graduates came from above-average 
income, taxpayers with below-average incomes were subsidising graduates with above- 
average incomes. However, the new loan scheme, announced in July, 1995 is more 
equitable as it is means-tested. However, a trade-off exists between losses and gains in the 
equity of access to education. Higher education is heavily subsidised, and hence the system 
is inequitable to primary and secondary education (Rodrigues and Wandiga, 1997). The 
abolition of subsidies to higher education would 
improve equity in two ways. It would avoid 
reinforcing privileges that students in 
higher education already possess in terms of family 
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background and future earnings potential, while enabling more students to share in the 
limited pool of resources for education. 
(b) Efficiency of the Loan Programmes 
(i) The Costs of loans 
Between 1974 and June 1995, the amount of loans disbursed was about Ksh. 5.8 billions. 
About one-third or Ksh. 204,057,493.85 out of Ksh. 600 million due for collection by 
December 1994 had been recovered (Rodrigues and Wandiga, 1997). A substantial amount 
of the loans remained outstanding because of the weak administrative system. The 
government assumes all the administrative costs. The interest charged was only 2 per cent 
before 1995 and 4 per cent beginning in 1995. Hence, the interest charged on the loan 
scheme is unreal rather than positive. 
The study of Rodrigues and Wandinga (1997) shows that the subsidy for the loan scheme 
in Kenya (1974-1995) was very high. The results obtained by employing the simulation 
technique were as follows: 
Using the 1991 disbursement and its outstanding debt on loans, Rodrigues and Wandinga 
(1997) showed that subsidy due to interest was 85.22%; subsidy due to interest rate and 
default was 99.26% and subsidy due to interest rate, default and administrative cost was 
99.54%. This shows that administrative cost was not a critical factor as compared to the 
default rate and the opportunity cost of capital in determining the level of subsidy. The high 
subsidy has made the loan programme very expensive, causing very low cost-recovery. It is 
more costly than just giving scholarships. 
Similar to other developing countries, it is extremely difficult to track mobile students of 
loan recipients, making administrative costs higher. The small average size of loan makes 
them proportionately more costly. 
(ii) The Administration of Loans 
When the student loan scheme was set up in 1974, a section of the Ministry of Education 
was responsible for disbursing the 
loans. In 1980, another office was opened for loan 
collection. However, after the 1988/89 academic year, 
loan disbursements were 
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decentralised to the 41 districts in the countryside. The provincial administration and the 
commercial banks then process the loans and their collection (Woodhall, 1991 b). 
According to Woodhall (1991 b), loans are disbursed twice in one academic year. 
"The part of the loan for catering and accommodation is directed to each public university, where 
internal arrangements for the management of these services are made. About 34 per cent of the loan is 
earmarked for students' personal expenses, including books, while the tuition loan is directed to the 
universities for the necessary purchase of academic materials" (Woodhall, 1991, p54). 
The administration of the loan scheme before 1995 had its weaknesses. This was because 
there was no firm management infrastructure. The administrative structure was diffuse and 
complex, as it involved different parties such as the Ministry of Education, the public 
universities and banks. In fact, most of the administration could have been done by 
commercial banks with the Higher Education Loan Board left to decide matters of policy 
(Rodrigues and Wandinga, 1997). 
The government therefore introduced the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) Act of 
1995 to streamline the management of the University Students' Loan Scheme. The Act 
established a Board to manage a fund for granting loans to needy students attending a 
recognised institution within or outside Kenya. The Act of 1995 allowed loans and bursaries 
to be granted to students of both public and private universities. 
(iii) Loan Defaults 
Loan default in Kenya has been very high, ranging from 75 to 80 per cent (Woodhall, 199 1 b) 
making the programmes very costly. The legislation Act of 1991 enhances the loan 
collection to reduce the number of defaulters. Other measures taken are to improve loan 
recovery such as linking the system with income tax. Student borrowers are identified as 
loanees with taxpayer numbers. The employers are expected to co-operate and inform the 
student loan agency about the number of loanees on the pay roll. With computerisation of 
data, the defaults decline bringing improvements in loan -recovery (Woodhall, 1991 b). 
(iv) Repayment of Loans 
Before 1988, the Loan Recovery Unit in the Ministry of Education was responsible for 
collecting the debts. From the 1988/1989 academic year, the commercial banks help to 
recover the loans as a result of decentralisation of administration (`Voodhall, 1991b). The 
repayment period was ten years. About 15-20 per cent of the salaries of new graduates was 
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directed to the repayment of the loans. Before 1988, a grace period of two to three years was 
given; no grace period was given under the new agreement. There were no considerations 
for the low-paid and unemployed or others facing financial problems, leading to an even 
higher rate of defaults (Woodhall, 1991 b). 
We next discuss the lessons which Malaysia can draw from international experience. 
3.3 Lessons for Malaysia 
These six case studies of student financial support in developed and developing countries 
suggest that Malaysia could draw lessons from them, especially concerning loans 
programmes, albeit diversity and context. 
Income-contingent loans implemented in Australia and Sweden, and the National Insurance 
Contribution Scheme proposed by Barr (1989; 1996; 1997) for the UK are very effective in 
terms of cost-recovery. In Sweden and Australia, loan recovery has been high because of 
very low default rates (Shackleton, 1993), and the repayment being proportionate to level 
of incomes. In the UK, through a simulation technique, Barr and Crawford (1996) show that 
the loan recovery rate can be very high if it is organised via National Insurance Contribution 
Scheme. Thus, loans, especially when based on income-contingent schemes, can be an 
effective cost-recovery mechanism for financing higher education 
International experience shows that a mixture of more loans and limited-target grants is 
workable for efficiency and equity reasons. Income -contingent loans coupled with grants 
could promote equality of opportunity because they encourage the low-income groups, 
minorities and women to participate in higher education, as in Sweden and Australia. The 
increased proportion of grants to loans after 1988 in Sweden is more efficient, as subsidised 
loans are inefficient substitutes for grants (Shackleton, 1993). This is because in a loan 
scheme the subsidy element is implicit, whereas in the case of grants the subsidy is explicit. 
The "hidden grants" in subsidised loans could form a substantial amount of costs and would 
be wasted if high defaults occured whereas the outright grants could be targeted to help the 
disadvantaged. Thus, unsubsidised loans should be preferred, such as the loans in Sweden 
and the unsubsidised Stafford loans in US. 
The cost of administration for loans can be kept low through computerisation and making 
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use of existing mechanism, for example, the Income tax Department in the case of Australia, 
and the National Insurance Contributions in the proposed case of the UK. The complex 
administrative procedure can thus be made simple. In contrast, the US system of 
administration is too complicated as it involves too many parties, the universities, 
commercial banks, federal and state governments, probably leading to high defaults which 
Malaysia should avoid. 
The interest charged on income-contingent loans should be near to the market rate and 
inflation-indexed in order to balance the effects of inflation that may erode the value of loan 
repayments. Hence, students need to repay the loans in real, rather than nominal terms. In 
Sweden, for example, the interest is 70 per cent of the general rate paid on state borrowing 
(Shackleton, 1993) on government loans, with a small addition for administrative costs. 
These rates contribute to the financial efficiency of the programmes, and Malaysia could 
learn from them. 
The idea of securitisaton of loans, whereby the government can sell the loans to the private 
sector so as to save immediately large portion of the expenditure on loans will save an 
immediate portion of public funds. This could be channelled for other levels of educational 
investments. Malaysia can follow this experience. 
High defaults occur mainly because of administrative complexity. Difficulty in tracing 
students can be overcome through the use of existing databases such as the income tax 
mechanism. Students may refuse to repay their loans because they are not being reminded. 
Defaults also occur because of unemployment or low income. These problems may be 
reduced through modifications in the terms and conditions of the loans, for example, the 
repayment is based on the level of income, and discount can be given to those who settle the 
debts earlier. In Sweden, those on low incomes can automatically postpone loan repayments. 
It is believed that borrowers are more likely to accept the obligation to repay if they know 
that cases of genuine hardship would be considered sympathetically (Woodhall, 1987). 
In USA, commercial banks play an important part in the administration and financing of the 
loan schemes. However, the US system is problematic since the Federal Government 
guarantees the loans. Commercial banks therefore are not very concerned about defaults. 
This problem can be overcome through the sale of loans to the banks, which Malaysia could 
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learn from. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored and evaluated the student financial support schemes in six selected 
countries. Though the financial support schemes are very diverse and in different contexts, 
Malaysia could still learn from these schemes generally. Empirical evidence from the 
countries which have been studied about the practices of student loans or grants and 
mixtures of both, suggests several weaknesses and strengths. There are trade-offs between 
cost and availability, and between efficiency and equity, and also complexities and flexibility 
are necessary to meet the different demands and needs of societies as well as individuals. 
Certainly, the views and evidence put forward by students may be biased, because most 
people would prefer a gift rather than a loan, which has to be repaid. Experiences in these 
countries show that a mixture of income-contingent loans and scholarships seems to promote 
equality of opportunity and hence the efficiency of the system. Income -contingent loans 
seem to be the newest measures introduced in countries such as Australia, Sweden and in 
the UK since 1998. This alternative funding may overcome the problems currently 
confronting the mortgage type of loans and scholarships. The next Chapter introduces 
Malaysian education system. 
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Chapter 4 
Malaysia : The Country, Its People and the Development of Higher 
Education 
4.0 Overview 
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore how the social and political situation in 
Malaysia has brought about the development of its higher education system, particularly 
with reference to the political quota system embedded in the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
since 1970. From this perspective, section one discusses the general and historical 
background of Malaysia. Section Two briefly discusses its education system. Section Three 
is about the development of higher education during the pre-NEP, the NEP and post NEP 
periods. The quota system which has been established and its equity and efficiency effects 
on the development of higher education will also be discussed. Policy changes during the 
post- New Economic Policy period moving towards the corporatisation of universities, will 
be discussed in Section Four. Section Five explains the funding of higher education through 
different loan and scholarship schemes and direct grants to universities. Section Six 
discusses the implications of the dramatic expansion of higher education. Section Seven 
concludes the chapter. 
4.1 General Background 
Situated in South East Asia, Malaysia covers an area of about 329,733 square kilometers, 
comprising Peninsular Malaysia (or West Malaysia), the states of Sabah and Sarawak (East 
Malaysia) and the Federal Territory of Labuan in the north western coastal area of Borneo 
Island '. The two regions are separated by about 650 kilometers of the South China Sea. 
Peninsular Malaysia has frontiers with Thailand in the North and Singapore in the south, 
while Sabah and Sarawak border the territory of Indonesia's Kalimantan. 
Malaysia is a land of heterogeneous peoples because of its multiracial, cultural, lingual and 
religious characteristics, consequences of British colonisation. The total population of 
Malaysia was 18.38 million, according to the 1991 Population Census. Of the total 
population, 14.85 million were from West Malaysia whereas 
3.53 million were from East 
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Malaysia. The 1991 Population Census also recorded the ethnic composition of the 
population as 60.6% as bumiputeras 2,28.1 % Chinese, 7.9 % Indians and 3.4 % others. 
Formerly, the Malay Peninsular was under British colonial rule for 83 years (1874-1957). 
The "Pangkor Engagement" of 1874 marked the beginning of British direct intervention in 
the Peninsular Malaysia. Under this agreement, the sultan of Perak agreed to install a British 
Resident to advise the sultan on all matters except those touching Malay religion and custom 
(Snodgrass, 1980 and Shireen, 1998). The residential system was extended to Selangor 
(1874), Negeri Sembilan (1895) and Pahang (1888). The British commercial interest in tin 
mining finally brought the whole of Peninsular Malaysia under some kind of British control 
by the year 1919 (Andaya and Andaya 1982). 
Immigrants from China and India were brought in to meet the growing demand for labour 
in the mines and rubber estates, giving rise to a heterogeneous society. Consequently, a 
rural-urban dichotomy along ethnic lines developed. The majority of Malays remained in 
their traditional society and were backward economically, before the introduction of the New 
Economic Policy in 1971. 
4.2 The Education System in Malaysia 
The Malaysian system of education comprise six years of primary education, five or six 
years of secondary education, one or two years of pre-university education and a normal 
four- year university education. 
Figure 4.1: The Main System of Education in Malaysia. 
Primary Lower Secondary Upper Secondary Pre-University Higher Education 
1º2º3º*º5I II III IV -/'ýº Vý--º VI Universities 
National School ,* 
123456 
National Type T 
Chinese School 
I 11 21 31 41 51 6 
National Type 
Tamil School 
Key: Arabic numbers, e. g. 1,2,3, refer to primary grades 
Roman numerals, e. g. 1,11,111, refer to secondary grades; T= Transition class 
Source: Educational Statistics 1991,1993, Ministry of Education, Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 
(adapted), cited by Zaniah, M (1996) 
I For a geographical map of Malaysia, refer to Appendix E. 
2 The bumiputeras, literally translated as "the sons of the soil, refer to the Malays and other indigenous 
groups in Malaysia. They are termed as natives. I will use bumiputeras and natives 
interchangeably 
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4.2.1 Primary Education 
There are two types of primary schools using the pupils' respective mother tongues as the 
media of instruction. The national primary schools use the Malay language as the medium 
of instruction while the "National Type" primary schools use either Chinese or Tamil. 
The national curriculum is followed in all streams though the hours of instruction vary, 
particularly in the language area. The curriculum is standardised, prescribed, developed and 
constantly revised by the Curriculum Development Centre of the Ministry of Education. All 
primary schools study the Malay language. A new curriculum, with emphasis on reading, 
writing and arithmetic was introduced in 1985. Children can automatically go onto 
secondary education, though an assessment test has been introduced. 
4.2.2 Secondary Education 
The objectives of secondary education are to raise the level of general education of the 
people, to fully develop the human resources of the nation and to supply the manpower 
requirements of the rapidly evolving economy of Malaysia (Ministry of Education 1979, p4). 
The Curriculum Development Centre sets the course content. Secondary education is 
divided into two parts, Lower Secondary Education (Form I through Form III) and Upper 
Secondary Education (Forms IV and V). 
The Malay language is the sole medium of instruction in all government-sponsored 
secondary schools. Students from the Chinese and Tamil primary schools have to attend a 
remove class before they can be promoted to Form One. At the end of Form Three, students 
need to sit an Assessment Test but will automatically go on to the Upper Secondary 
Education until Form V. The Secondary Schools Integrated Curriculum has also been 
introduced to accommodate students who have gone through the new curriculum in primary 
schools. At the end of Form Five, students need to sit a common examination 
known as the 
Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM). Those in the Vocational Stream have to sit for the 
Malaysian Certificate of Vocational Education. 
4.2.3 Pre -University Education 
4.2.2.1 Higher School Certificate 
Students who have passed in the Malaysian Certificate of Education with good grades are 
selected to go on to the Higher School Education. 
The selection is based on academic 
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achievements in the previous examination3. Higher School results are used to apply for 
entrance to the local public universities. 
4.2.2.2 University Matriculation Programs 
Some Malaysian universities have also developed matriculation programs of between one 
and two years to promote bumiputera (native) students' participation in university education 
as one of the measures taken in the affirmative action quotas. After completing the 
programme, students can pursue university education at the respective universities which 
conduct the matriculation courses. Bumiputera students who do not secure any scholarship 
for pursuing overseas education are usually selected for the matriculation program, based 
on their SPM results. 
4.3 Higher Education Development in Malaysia 
4.3.1 Before the New Economic Policy 
Tertiary Education in Malaysia commenced with the establishment of the University of 
Malaya in Singapore in 1949 with degree-granting status (Lim, 1993) at the recommendation 
of the Carr-Saunders Commission. Initially, the University of Malaya offered Arts, Science 
and Medicine. It was intended to provide society with a core of professionals as well as 
liberally educated generalists to serve in public and private institutions (Lim, 1993). The 
western tradition of university autonomy and academic freedom took root as the University 
of Malaya was organised as a British counterpart and was initially staffed by British and 
Commonwealth expatriates (Lim, 1993). As independence approached, there was growing 
pressure to produce more manpower to facilitate the "Malayanization" drive. 
In November, 1958, legislation was passed to allow the University of Malaya to continue 
as a single university and established two autonomous divisions of equal status, one 
in 
Singapore, and the other in Kuala Lumpur. The two divisions pursued independent policies 
to meet manpower needs in their respective territories, with separate Divisional 
Councils and 
Senates. However, overall a Vice-Chancellor, a Central Council and a central degree- 
granting and co-ordinating body controlled their administration. 
This arrangement only 
lasted until 1961 whereby legislation formalised the establishment of two universities, 
effective from 1 January, 1962. The division 
in Kuala Lumpur was called the University of 
3 However, native students with good results can be specially selected to 
follow the matriculation 
programmes or sent overseas sponsored by government. 
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Malaya while the division in Singapore was renamed as the University of Singapore. 
To meet the growing demand for higher education, the government commissioned a 
committee under the Ministry of Education to assess higher education planning in the year 
1967. The committee recommended the long-term goal of providing higher education for 
20 per cent of the age cohort. The committee of 1967 stressed the doctrine of autonomous 
higher education. Hence, 
" Universities, to be worthy of that name, should be allowed complete autonomy in internal 
administration and full freedom in all academic matters" (Selvaratnam, 1989, pp. 196) 
However, violent racial conflicts between the Malays and other groups, especially the 
Chinese, on 13th May 1969 in Kuala Lumpur caused a substantial change in higher 
education policy, with subsequent introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971. 
"The riots became a watershed in the country's history with implications for all aspects of life, including 
higher education" (Lim, 1993 pp2l). 
4.3.2 The New Economic Policy Era 
The authorities blamed the bloody riots on the social and economic disparities or the 
unbalanced distribution of wealth, employment and other benefits of development (Drabble, 
1999) between the bumiputeras (predominantly the Malays) and other races (predominantly 
the Chinese)4. The British-modelled higher education system (as founded in the University 
of Malaya) was also condemned for failing to correct the racial economic imbalance and 
lack 
of national unity. Thus, under the NEP, an affirmative policy favouring the natives 
in all 
dimensions of the State's modernisation project, was implemented in 1971 till 1990 to 
correct these imbalances. The primary objective of the NEP was to achieve national unity, 
through the eradication of poverty and restructuring Malaysian society. Eradication of 
poverty means irrespective of races was intended to ensure minimal political opposition, 
gaining legitimacy and broad support (Gomez and Jomo, 
1997). The Malaysian society was 
to be structured so that major economic functions were not 
identified with races. Thus, the 
main aim of restructuring society was to achieve 
inter-ethnic economic parity between the 
predominantly Malay bumiputeras and the predominantly 
Chinese non-bumiputeras. It was 
hoped that by 1990, the Bumiputeras would have 30 per cent of equity shares 
in the 
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corporate sector. One of the means to achieve this aim was through higher education 
favouring the bumiputeras. 
Enrolment in local universities was regulated on a quota system whereby 55 per cent5 of 
university places were reserved for natives against 45 per cent for non-natives, causing some 
equity and efficiency effects. The implementation of this policy has eroded one of the deeply 
entrenched university traditions, that is the admission of students based on merit 
(Selvaratnam, 1989). Thus, a regulated form of competition which encouraged intra-ethnic 
competition was developed. A Central University Admission Unit was set up in the 1970s 
to ensure compliance by the universities. Moreover, new programmes and institutions such 
as the MARA Institute were established reserved exclusively for Malays. Special efforts 
were made to build up Malay enrolments, particularly in Science and Technology and in 
professional faculties. Consequently, the percentage of Malays in degree courses increased 
from 40.2 per cent in 1970 to 63.0 percent in 1985. 
Many qualified non-natives were denied places at the universities because of the limited 
quota allocations. Only richer non-native students could afford to pursue their studies 
overseas. Those who were not rich enough to do so but denied places in Malaysian public 
universities had to join the labour market. This indicates a loss of talents to the society and 
therefore inefficient. Many excellent bumiputera students were also sent overseas, sponsored 
by the government, indicating a greater ethnic inequity to favour the natives. 
However, the government claims that the quota system favouring the natives is based on 
vertical equity argument or "unequal treatment of unequals", implying that the natives had 
been neglected in social-economic arenas because of historical factors and therefore should 
be treated preferentially. The preferential treatment of the natives is obvious when public 
institutions of higher learning (highly subsidised) enrol mainly bumiputera students and 
private institutions6 (not subsidised) enrol mainly non-bumiputera students who are unable 
to secure a place in government-subsidised institutions. 
4 It was argued that bumiputeras which constituted 56% of the population owned 2.4% of the country's 
wealth compared to 34.3% of non-bumiputeras in 1970 (Mahathir, 1998) 
5 The quota allocated for bumiputeras was 75 cent in th eearly days of the NEP but reduced to 55 per cent 
later on (Lucas and Verry, 1999) 
6 Private tertiary institutions offering diploma or degree programmes in collaboration with foreign 
universities to save escalating cost of overseas education. 
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The quota system has led a decline in the quality of higher education and hence inefficient. 
One observer comments: 
"Rapid expansion and government sponsorship of Bumiputra students has led to the diluting of standards for the Bumiputras, evidenced by a lowering of entrance requirements and falling performance levels....... In the absence 
of a sufficiently large pool of bumiputera students from the secondary school pipeline to take up the increased 
allocation of places in the universities, the universities have been obliged to accept many bumiputera students who 
perform poorly on the qualiflying examination for university entrance" (Singh, 1991, pp 510) 
This was aggravated by the lack of competition among bumiputera students, partly because 
the best bumiputera (native) students from secondary schools had been sent to overseas 
universities, leaving behind the less capable ones who were generally unable to compete 
with their non-bumiputera (non-native)counterparts. The rapid increase in local academic 
staff under the "Malayanisation drive" and the NEP has necessitated the recruitment of a 
large number of bumiputera staff to create an ethnic balance. Younger and relatively 
inexperienced staff dominated universities while the experienced non-bumiputera academic 
staff moved to the private sector, further causing declining standards. 
Efforts made to hasten the conversion of the medium of instruction in universities to Malay, 
national language of Malaysia, by the year 1983 also led to the deterioration of quality, as 
most references were in English language. There was few translation of textbooks in English 
to Malay language. Undergraduates had very low standard in English proficiency. Thus, the 
quota system has brought about some equity and efficiency effects, for national unity and 
stability. 
Four additional universities were established. These were the National University of 
Malaysia (1970); the University of Science Malaysia (1969), University of Agriculture 
(1971) now known as University Putera; and the University of Technology (1972). In the 
1980s, the International Islamic University, which commenced its first session in July 1983, 
and the Northern University of Malaysia were added to meet the increasing demand for 
higher education. 
Thus, higher education experienced a painful adjustment during the NEP whereby a quota 
system was introduced favouring the native student intake and staff recruitment in higher 
education, so that natives should catch up with other groups in socio-economic arenas (Lim, 
1993, p21). Natives gained favourable opportunities in higher education by means of special 
financial support, the mandated use of Malay as the language of instruction, and preferential 
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access to universities and colleges. This policy was diluted when the NEP ended. 
4.3.3 After the New Economic Policy Era 
The NEP ended in 1990. Subsequently, the more liberal National Development Policy 
(1991-2000) replaced the NEP. According to the declaration of Vision 2020 by the 
Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohammad, Malaysia aims to become an 
industrialised country by the year 20207. In line with Vision 2020 and the National 
Development Policy, the main objectives and aims of higher education in Malaysia are to 
provide for the needs of the expanding economy. The demand for an educated and skilled 
workforce will increase in tandem with the country's rapid industrialisation. Consequently, 
the main objectives for Malaysian higher education include commitments to: 
- improve the quality and relevance of courses offered so as to match national manpower 
requirements; increase the capacity of enrolment in science, engineering and technical- 
related courses so as to intensify the production of manpower with scientific and technical 
knowledge (Samuel, 1999) ; and increase the capacity and capability to undertake research 
and development, particularly that which is relevant to the requirements of the industrial and 
service sectors (Malaysia, 1999). 
Consequently, universities tend to play a vital role in meeting the manpower needs. The 
1990s show a significant change in higher education policies, in funding and intake of 
students. There has been a substantial increase in enrolment in recent years for all types of 
courses. The enrolment for Arts, Science and Technical courses are expected to increase 
respectively from 31,220,14,460 and 7,130 in 1990 to 70,970,42,280 and 31,450 in the year 
2000 (Table 1, Appendix F). Enrolment by fields of studies for the academic year 1998/99 
and the enrolment to different Public Institutes of Higher Learning are also shown in Tables 
2 and 3 respectively, Appendix F). 
In addition, in the early 1990s, the University of Malaysia Sarawak (1993) and the 
University of Malaysia Sabah (1994) were established in the East Malaysian states. Private 
universities have also been established. These include the Multimedia University (1997) and 
the Energy University (1997) to meet the specific demands for higher education. Moreover, 
the first virtual university (UNITAR) has been established in 1998 to implement distance 
7 Details of the Vision 2020 are discussed in appendix B (3). 
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learning programmes. The Private Higher Educational Institutions Act of 1996 (Lee, 1997)) 
has also legitimated foreign universities to establish branches in Malaysia upon the invitation 
from the Minister of Education. The Monash University of Australia, was the first foreign 
university to establish its branch in Malaysia. Moreover, a National student loan was 
established in 1997 to give financial support to undergraduates. The expansion of higher 
education has led corporatisation and privatisation. 
4.4 Corporatisation and Privatisation of Higher Education 
The increasing social demand for higher education as a result of the universalisation of 
secondary education has induced corporatisation (Lee, 1997). To meet this rising demand, 
the private sector is encouraged to play an important role in providing higher education. 
Since the 1980s, there has been a rapid growth of private education due to "excess demand" 
rather than "differentiated demand" (Lee, 1997). The former is caused by the limited number 
of places in public institutions which cannot meet an increasing demand for higher 
education, whereas the latter results from cultural heterogeneity reflected in differentiated 
tastes for the types of education that different groups prefer (James, 1994). Due to limited 
quota allocations, many qualified Non-Bumiputra students have to further their education 
in private colleges, to save the high costs of overseas education. Private colleges have also 
organised twinning- programmes with overseas universities. 
From an efficiency standpoint also, the advocacy of corporatisation and privatisation of 
higher education in the mid 1990s was based upon the belief that the public sector is 
wasteful, inefficient and unproductive. On the other hand, the private sector was deemed to 
be efficient, effective, and responsive to the rapid changes that are needed in the modern 
world (Walford, 1990). From this perspective, the Universities and University Colleges 
(Amendment) Act 1995 paved the way for the corporatisation of Malaysia's public 
universities (Lee, 1997). Consequently, the University of Malaya was corporatised on 
January, 1,1998. All other public universities would follow suit. Corporatised universities, 
though operating like private companies, are still monitored by the Ministry of Education 
to ensure that the quota-based intake of students prevails. These universities concerned are 
allowed to venture into business and to acquire and hold investment shares. The government 
still provides development funds for new programmes, but the universities 
have to bear a 
major portion of their operating costs. 
97 
Next section describes the funding of higher education in Malaysia, through loans and 
scholarships, and direct grants to the public universities. 
4.5 Funding of Higher Education 
4.5.1 Funding bodies 
Various funding bodies provide limited scholarships and loans to students who pursue 
studies in higher institutions both locally and overseas. However, students can receive either 
a grant/scholarship or a loan but not both at the same time. Loans and scholarships differ 
from each other in their implications for recipients. Scholarship recipients need not repay 
the money awarded to them but instead are bonded to work in jobs approved by the funding 
bodies for a number of years after graduation. A medical student for example, is bonded with 
the government for at least 10 years or else to compensate with an amount of M$160,000 
(£29,600)8. In the case of loan recipients, there is no commitment between the recipients 
and funding bodies, but the amount of money borrowed must be repaid. However, the 
proportion to be repaid depends on final university academic results. Funding bodies 
standardise the amount of money given per loan annually. It ranges from M$4010 (£760)to 
M$ 56409 (£ 1070) annually (Public Service Department, 1996; Survey data, 1999) 
depending on types of courses undergraduates pursued. Scholarship recipients receive the 
same amount of awards as the loan recipients. East Malaysian scholarship recipients also 
receive free return fare passages annually if they study in West Malaysia. The same applies 
to West Malaysian scholarship recipients if they study in East Malaysia. Loan recipients 
from both regions can also borrow for their return fare passages annually. This would 
accumulate the amounts of loans they borrow. The next section describes financial support 
offered by the funding bodies. 
4.5.1.1 The Public Service Department (PSD) 
The vision of the Public Service Department is to be the major sponsor for human resource 
development. Its main objective is to increase productivity and upgrade the quality of the 
public service. Thus, The Public Service Department provides the largest source of direct 
financial support to students who pursue studies in higher institutions, both locally and 
abroad for pre-service training and civil servants for in-service training. It provides the 
education loan and a limited number of scholarships in the ratio of four to one. Loans are 
8A medical student after graduation needs to serve with the government for three years before he/she is 
allowed to go for private practice. But a number of them prefer to work 
in Singapore with better offers 
9 Undergraduates who pursue arts humanities and medicine would receive M$4010 and M $5640 annually. 
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given to all courses of studies, especially to those from poor families (Interview with the 
director and panel, Public Service Department, 1999). For scholarships, the objective is to 
give more to critical courses seen as necessary for social economic development such as 
medicine, dentistry and pharmacy, on the basis of merit and recognition of academic 
excellence. The sponsorship programmes are intended to ensure that the need for trained and 
skilled manpower for the public service and the nation as a whole is met (Public Service 
Department Annual Report, 1996). 
The Public Service Convertible loan is of the mortgage-type. Students need to repay them 
at regular intervals. The loan is free of interest. The loan can be partially converted into 
scholarships, depending on the final academic results. Those who complete on time with 
honours only need to pay back 25% of the total amount borrowed. Those who get a general 
degree or fail will have to pay back in full amount. According to the information given 
during the interviews, on average, 80% of recipients have their loans converted into 75% 
grants /scholarships (Assistant Director, Public Service Department). The grace period for 
paying back is 6 months after graduation, or after getting a job, which ever is earlier. All 
loan applicants should have two guarantors, namely the parents and one other guarantor. 
4.5.1.2 The MARA (The Council of People's Trust) 
MARA is a special body established to help the natives through higher education to 
participate in business or entrepreneurial activities, under an Act of Parliament in 1966 as 
a statutory body (Annual Report, 1996; interview with Assistant Director, 1999). One of 
its 
principal activities to achieve the above objective is through the education 
loan provision. 
The MARA Education Loans, implemented since 1985 are given only to bumiputera (native) 
students who pursue studies at prominent Institutions of Higher 
Learning, locally and abroad 
The MARA Education sponsorship is only for the bumiputeras in conjunction with the 
Parliament Act of Majlis Amanah Rakyat 1966 (People's Trust Council, 
1966). The areas 
of emphasis are Engineering, Science, Management and 
Information Technology (Annual 
Report, 1996). 
The MARA Convertible Loan has similar characteristics to the Public Service 
Department 
Education as it follows mainly the conditions and regulations of the 
Scholarship and 
Training Division of the Public Service Department. Those who obtained at 
least Second 
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Class Upper (Honours) do not have to repay loans borrowed. But those who get the Second 
Class Lower (Honours) and Third Class (Honours) need to repay 75% of the amounts 
borrowed. Those who obtain a General Degree need to repay 50% of the amounts borrowed. 
Those who fail or cannot complete on time need to repay the full amount irrespective of the 
grades they obtain. 
4.5.1.3 Ministry of Education 
The Scholarship Division in the Ministry of Education plans, organises and implements the 
disbursement of scholarships and loans for in-service teachers and students to pursue their 
undergraduate, Masters and Ph. D locally and abroad. The main aim is to provide manpower 
in the education service and upgrade the qualifications of teachers. 
The convertible loan shares the main characteristics of the Public Service Department 
Convertible Loan. It is given to undergraduates and students studying in polytechnics. 
However, only undergraduates can convert loans into 75% grants, if they obtain at least 
second class lower (honours) and above. 
4.5.1.4 The States Foundation 
Every state government in Malaysia also provides loans or grants to their nationals to pursue 
higher education either locally or abroad. The main aim is to meet the manpower needs of 
the states. The most prominent one is the Sarawak Foundation which I analyse in chapter 9. 
The Sarawak Foundation administers two schemes, namely the Convertible Loan Scheme 
and the Full Education Loan Scheme. The former is for students pursuing higher education 
in the local public universities whereas the latter is for those pursuing higher education in 
overseas universities. 
Though the Sarawak Foundation Convertible Loan follow mainly the characteristics of the 
Public Service Department Convertible Loan, there are some minor differences. Students 
do not have to repay at all if they obtain at least a Second Class Upper (Honours). Those 
who pass with Second Class Lower (Honours) and General Degree need to repay 25 per 
cent and 50 percent of the total loans respectively. But those who fail or do not complete 
the studies on time would have to repay 100 per cent of the total loans. 
The grace period is twelve months for the Education Loan Grant (Sarawak Foundation, 
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Clause 3, Education Loan Agreement, p2, Sarawak Foundation, 1996) which differs from the 
Public Service Department loan which gives six months grace period only. 
4.5.1.5 The National Higher Education Funding Corporation 
National Higher Education Funding Corporation is an agency established by the government 
under the Act 566 in November, 1997 responsible for giving education loans to eligible 
students who are presently pursuing studies at the local public and private institutions of 
Higher learning. 
The main objective of the National Education Funding Corporation Scheme is to help the 
government to achieve the objective of increasing the student numbers at the higher 
education institutions. In the middle of 1998, the first batch of students received loans in the 
local public and private institutes of higher learning. For the first time, the public funding 
was extended to the private universities, established under the 1996 Private Higher 
Educational Institutions Act1°. The loan is of a mortgage-type and is not convertible into 
grants. Borrowers are charged a4 per cent of interest. The loan scheme uses the Inland 
Revenue Board for collecting repayments (Act 566 : 27(1 a) and 27(l b), 1996). The 
allocations are 100 million, 205.3 million and 321.3 million in Malaysian dollars for 1997, 
1998 and 1999 respectively (Interview with Assistant Manager, 1999). 
4.5.2 Direct Grants to Universities 
The Federal government provides grants annually to the public universities through the 
National Budget. The universities also receive funds from endowments, donations, 
subscriptions, tuition and examination fees. At present, students need to pay between 
$M1400 to $M 2500 of tuition fees annually, depending on the type of courses they attend. 
However, tuition fees only represent about 10 per cent of the total operational cost of 
universities. In 1996, the federal government, for example, allocated $M185,714,830 to the 
10 The Private Higher Educational Institutions Act 1996 states that approval must be obtained from the 
Minister of Education before a private educational institution can be established. Private universities can 
only be established at the invitation of the Minister of Education (Lee, 1997) 
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university of Malaya, which constituted 81.6 % of the income expenditure of the university. 
Income from fees was only 8.5 % while other income to the university is 2.3 %. A balance 
of 7.6% was met from the University's accumulated funds. Thus, allocation from the federal 
government forms the major portion of the expenditures of the universities, for both 
recurrent and capital expenditure. In 1998 alone, the budget for the total operating and 
development expenditure for public higher education institutions amounted to $M 1,521.2 
million and $M756.0 million respectively (Table 4, Appendix F). The total budget 
allocations for total operating and the development expenditures increased steadily from 
$M861 million and $M148.6 million respectively in 1991 to $M1,760.2 and $M1,097.4 
million respectively in1999 (Table 5, Appendix F). Table 4.1 shows the total recurrent 
expenditure and enrolment of Malaysia's public universities for the fiscal year 1996. 
Table 4.1: Total Recurrent Expenditure, Enrolment and Average Subsidy 
University 
(1) 
Total Recurrent 
Expenditure 
($M) 
(2) 
Total 
Enrolment 
(3) 
Average Per 
Capita Cost per 
Student($M) 
(4) = (2) = (3) 
Average Fees 
Paid by Students 
$M 
(5) 
Average 
Subsidy Per 
student ($M) 
(6) 
UM 173,769,483 17,563 9,894 1560 8,334 (84%) 
USM 178,869,867 16,397 10,909 1561 9,348 (86% 
UPM 171,125,663 11,644 14,697 1557 13,137(89%) 
UKM 179,570,717 12,710 14,128 1640 12,568(89%) 
UTM 144,149,291 12,498 11,534 1560 9,974 (86%) 
UUM 48,427,979 7,753 6,246 1560 4,686 (75%) 
UNIMAS 17,242,329 468 36,842.6 NA NA 
UMS 23,933,314 963 2,4852 NA NA 
UTA 112,850,197 1917 58868 NA NA 
Source: Universities' Annual Reports, Universities' Calendar Year Books. 
Public university undergraduates in Malaysia are very heavily subsidised with subsidies 
ranging from $M 4,686 (75%) per student to $M13,137 (89%) as indicated in Column (6) 
of Table 4.1. UNIMAS and UMS were heavily subsidised because of their smaller sizes. 
UTM is heavily subsidised because of offering more expensive courses in Science and 
Technology. Even if students do not receive any direct financial support, they have been 
heavily subsidised through direct grants to universities. 
4.6 Financial Implication for Dramatic Change in the Higher Education Sector 
The revolutionary reforms in the higher education sector in Malaysia have important 
implications for its finance. As a consequence of expansion in the sector, there is an 
increasing proportion of Malaysian young people attending university education. The 
government would like to increase the total enrolment in Malaysian tertiary education 
from 
about 8 per cent of the 20-24 age-bracket (Ismail, 1997) to about 
30 per cent in times to 
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come. 
Thus, the government will not be able to heavily subsidise university education either 
through generous direct grants to institutions or subsidised loans and scholarships to 
students. A modified system of funding needs to be formulated whereby the cost of higher 
education should be shifted more to private funding. The present system of student financial 
support has to be reviewed. On equity and efficiency grounds, the modified system of 
financial support should consider low-income students, so that they are not deterred from 
pursuing university education because of financial constraints, especially in the light of the 
privatisation of universities whereby tuition fees will be raised. 
Corporatised and privatised public universities will have to take a more active role in fund 
raising through various revenue - generating activities such as raising tuition fees, increasing 
student enrolment, conducting short-term courses for the private sector, renting out facilities 
and consultancy services for industry as well as government. Efficiency in higher education 
finance will be achieved when education services are thus provided to a growing number of 
users without increasing the amount of public resources which are required (Calero, 1998). 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the general background of Malaysia, the development of higher 
education, and the gradual shift in paradigm for higher education policy. This has initiated 
the shifting of the state's monopoly of funding through the policy of public higher education 
to private sharing through the corporatisation and privatisation of universities. Funding 
bodies which offer loans and scholarships are briefly introduced for further analysis in 
chapter 9. I would suggest that a further shift towards the provision of financial support to 
students according to the principle that the user pays, rather than direct grants to universities 
is necessary, as a consequence of increasing enrolments. 
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Chapter 5 
Methodology and Research Design 
5.0 Overview 
The main purpose of this chapter is to describe and explain the methodology used in the 
study. Section One describes the specific framework or the focus of the study which has 
been elaborated in Chapter One. Section Two explains the sources of both primary and 
secondary data for the research. Section Three shows how the sampling is designed for 
collecting data from different parties. Survey questionnaires were employed to collect 
primary data from undergraduates in five public universities and students in four high 
schools in Malaysia. Structured interviews were conducted with directors or 
representatives of five funding bodies, namely the Public Service Department, the 
MARA (a sponsoring body for natives), the Ministry of Education, the Sarawak 
Foundation, and the National Higher Education Funding Corporation. Semi-structured 
interviews were also conducted with the head teachers of four high schools and randomly 
selected undergraduates. Section Four discusses the instruments for data collection, 
comprising the survey questionnaires and questionnaires for interviews. Different aspects 
and variables contained in the survey questionnaires are explained. Section Five explains 
the research procedure, while Section Six introduces the type of analysis to be used. 
Section Seven summarises the chapter. 
5.1 The Framework of the Study 
The Focus 
The study will focus on examining the efficiency and equity of student loans and 
scholarships schemes in Malaysia. The researcher will investigate the relationship 
between the distribution of loans and scholarships respectively and seven independent 
variables (ethnic groups, income-groups, the areas and regions which respondents come 
from, types of courses which respondents pursue, gender and previous academic 
performance). Another concern is to investigate the efficiency of loans and scholarships. 
For this purpose, various indicators are used to investigate their contributions to efficient 
running of the loans and scholarship programmes. 
The objectives, statement of the problem and research questions 
have been introduced in 
Chapter One. The next section discusses the sources of data. 
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5.2 Sources of Data 
This section briefly introduces the sources of data. Details about the sampling design and 
instruments for data collection will be elaborated in subsequent sections. We use both 
primary and secondary sources in this study. Primary data are needed as they show and 
explain the actual phenomena about the implementation of loans and scholarships from 
the experience of different groups of respondents directly. Secondary data are also 
needed to supplement or to reinforce the arguments. Primary sources are defined as 
"first hand information such as the testimony of an eyewitness, an original document, a relic, or a 
description of a study written by the person who conducted it" (Fraenkel, and Wallen, 1993: p. 555). 
Secondary data are defined as 
"second-hand information, such as a description of historical events by someone not present 
when the event occurred" (ibid. p. 556). 
Questionnaire surveys were used to collect primary data regarding the equity and 
efficiency aspects of student financial support from university students and high school 
students involved in the study. The questionnaire survey for undergraduates was used to 
describe and also locate the rationale for the financial support distribution. In order to 
seek opinion from the high school students regarding a modified form of financial 
support, a survey questionnaire was used also. Target areas chosen through clustering 
were used to collect the data since it was impossible to collect data from all the 
population concerned (all university undergraduates; all high schools students) in 
Malaysia. 
The researcher interviewed directors and administrators of funding bodies to obtain both 
primary and secondary data regarding the efficiency aspects of administering the loan 
and scholarship systems in Malaysia. The interview method is best for such purposes, as 
the researcher can get first hand information in great depth directly from the parties 
concerned. Moreover, the researcher can also explain and clarify some of the terms and 
doubts during the process of interviews. As student financial support policy is quite a 
sensitive issue in any plural society such as Malaysia, it is better for the researcher to 
have direct interactions with the parties concerned and to assure a high degree of 
confidentiality. However, the disadvantage is that the interview method 
is prone to 
subjectivity and bias on the part of the interviewer. 
It is also expensive and time- 
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consuming to the researcher. Nevertheless, interviews are generally the most appropriate 
procedure to obtain data needed, though they introduce various sources of error and bias 
(Moser and Kalton, 1989). 
However, I collected data from available reference books, journals, annual reports, 
governmental documents, and published and unpublished articles before conducting 
interviews with administrators of funding bodies. The data obtained have been 
triangulated and added to the primary data. The next section will explore in detail the 
sampling design, data needed and instruments for data collection. 
5.3 The Sampling Design and Data Needed 
To investigate, using efficiency and equity criteria, the Student Aid Programme in 
Malaysia while seeking a modified programme, different sets of data from different 
subjects would be needed for analysis and triangulation. The sampling designs would be 
different for collecting data from different subjects, as the distribution of various groups 
of subjects is different. Various groups were as follows. 
5.3.1 University Undergraduates 
A questionnaire survey method has been used to obtain data from university students, so 
as to explain rather than to describe phenomena (DeVaus, 1996). This method could be 
used to explain the relationships between a number of variables (Moser and Kalton, 
1989) in determining how efficient and equitable the system of loans and scholarships 
which has been practised in Malaysia. 
Owing to time and resource constraints and to the geographical factor, I obtained 
primary data in Malaysia from 2°d December 1998 to 2nd March, 1999 randomly from the 
third year undergraduates (1996 intake) in five of the 10 public universities (inclusive of 
the International Islamic University). These were the University PUTERA Malaysia, the 
University of Science Malaysia, the University of Malaya, the National University of 
Malaysia and the University of Malaysia Sarawak. University PUTERA Malaysia was 
selected because of its strategic location at the 
Multimedia Super Corridor (See 
Appendix G). The university has changed its name from the Agricultural University to 
its present name to fit its function as a university which will provide manpower 
requirements in all fields, not only 
limited to agriculture but including the science and 
106 
technology as well as cyber media. University Malaysia Sarawak was selected as it is the 
first university in the East Malaysia. The university is in full operation, offering all types 
of courses. The University of Malaya is the oldest university in Malaysia, well 
established and offering all types of courses. The National University symbolises the 
national characteristics, and the University of Science Malaysia was also selected as it 
lies in the northern region of the country. A central body, called the Central Unit of 
Universities, was established to recruit qualified students for all the public universities in 
Malaysia. This means that any public university will have students throughout Malaysia; 
this accelerates the process of integration, especially between West and East Malaysia, 
and ensures that the quota system of intake for natives and non-natives is strictly adhered 
tol. Hence, the present research that takes undergraduates from five out of ten public 
universities fairly represents the same type of respondents at other public universities. 
Characteristics of the samples are shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 of chapter 6. 
Owing to time and resource constraints, the researcher randomly selected the 1996 intake 
from two or three departments of all faculties. These faculties are classified as Arts, 
Science and Technology. To overcome the problem of multiple stratification, students 
from randomly selected departments were given questionnaires. Representation of 
income, ethnic, gender and other variables would emerge automatically from the 
samples. For example, I classified the samples into six income groups. The ethnicity 
variables comprise natives and non-natives. 
After obtaining approval from the deans and heads of departments, I sought approval 
from lecturers concerned to use part of their lectures for delivering and explaining the 
questionnaires to respondents. Questionnaires were collected back between 15 and 20 
minutes later, after the respondents had completed them. The response rate was very 
high, 96.1 %. 
The study was limited to the 1996 intake, mainly because I intended to investigate the 
proportion of undergraduates who are given loans or scholarships for the year concerned. 
Usually, recipients would continuously receive loans or scholarships until they finish 
their courses. The results obtained can be used more generally for inferences on public 
financial support. Also, the overall academic performance of undergraduates could 
1 The quota system means that 55% of the intake of university students should 
be reserved for natives 
against 45 per cent for non-natives, not only 
based for the total intake but also at university and faculty 
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probably be predicted since they were in the final semester, except those taking the 
medical courses. This was useful for the researcher to find the relationships between 
academic performance and the forms of financial support, including students without any 
financial support (those receiving parental, relative and friend support). Details of the 
survey questionnaires will be elaborated in section 5.4. The next subjects are directors 
and administrators of funding bodies. 
5.3.2 Funding Bodies 
Structured interview is a data collection device involving situations where the 
interviewer merely poses questions and records answers in a set pattern (Burgess, 1984). 
Thus, to investigate the efficiency and equity of different types of loans and scholarships 
in Malaysia, 1 conducted structured interviews with directors and administrators of 
different funding bodies at their headquarters. All respondents were given exactly the 
same set of questions to minimise errors. Moreover, my rationale in conducting these 
interviews was always to obtain first hand knowledge from the interviewees about the 
policies and objectives of the funding bodies and their criteria for selecting loan and 
scholarship recipients. These bodies are: 
i. the Public Service Department providing loans and scholarships ; 
ii. the MARA or the People's Trust Council, providing student loans to natives in 
Malaysia; 
iii. the States Foundations, providing loans and scholarships to their own nationals 
respectively; 
iv. the Ministry of Education, Malaysia, providing loans and scholarships; and 
v. the National Higher Education Funding Corporation, which recently implemented 
the National Student Loan. 
I selected the MARA because it provides the largest amount of loans and scholarships to 
the natives in Malaysia. The Public Service Department gives out loans and scholarships 
to civil servants and students who pursue higher education either locally or overseas. 
These bodies provide the largest amount of student financial support in Malaysia. 
The 13 states of Malaysia have established their own Foundations to give loans and 
scholarships to their respective nationals. However, 
it would be very expensive and time 
levels. 
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consuming for the researcher to conduct interviews with the directors of all the 
Foundations. Hence, I only interviewed representatives of the Sarawak Foundation as it 
provides the largest amount of loans and scholarships to nationals compared to other 
states' Foundations. Loans and scholarships have played an important part in manpower 
training and further education for Sarawakians. The Sarawak Foundation would therefore 
represent a prominent example for Malaysia in the provision of loans and grants. 
The Ministry of Education Malaysia provides loans and scholarships to undergraduates 
who pursue courses in education or integrated with education. Education officers who 
pursue further studies are also given for these financial support. A National Student 
Loan system was established in 1997. I collected data through an interview with the 
assistant manager of the funding body. Since the loans were only disbursed in June 1998, 
it is still too early to evaluate its efficiency. 
These data obtained from funding bodies are very useful in helping me to investigate and 
compare the efficiency aspects of different schemes. State at the headquarters of MARA, 
the Public Service Department, States' Foundations, the Ministry of Education and the 
National Higher Education Funding Corporation are policy makers, and they have exact 
knowledge regarding the administration of either loan or scholarship schemes. 
5.3.3 High School Students 
The opinions of potential students towards loans and scholarship schemes were also 
considered. They would give insights for the proposal of a modified type of financial 
aid, after analysing the equity and efficiency aspects of the existing loan and scholarship 
schemes. I collected data from two high schools in Sarawak (East Malaysia) and two 
high schools in the West Malaysia. I did not go to many high schools because of 
financial and time constraints. Nevertheless, the samples would supplement the main 
study and be indicative and the data collected can reflect the whole population since 
education policy for Malaysia is highly centralised. 
Schools were selected by using randomised, clustered samplings, as the schools 
in 
Malaysia are widely dispersed. Three clusters of schools, from rural, semi-metropolitan 
and metropolitan areas, were used because students were generally 
from correspondingly 
different social and economic backgrounds and school facilities also 
differ according to 
areas. Usually, students from the rural areas are mostly 
from poorer backgrounds, 
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whereas students from the semi-metropolitan areas mostly belong to the middle class. 
Students from the metropolitan areas mostly come from affluent backgrounds, though 
some are from the urban poorer classes. I randomly selected a science and an art stream 
class from each school. Table 7.7 of chapter 7 shows the distribution of samples of high 
school students. 
Data were collected through survey questionnaires, for they could explain the 
phenomena rather than describe the relationships of variables. I gave questionnaires to 
the respondents directly when I visited the schools concerned. The return rate was 88.3% 
(212 returned from 240 sets of questionnaires given out). I also went through the 
questionnaires with the respondents, to explain some of the financial terms. 
5.4 Instruments for Data Collection 
Two sets of survey questionnaires for undergraduates and high school students 
(Appendix H, Appendix I respectively), two sets of structured interview questionnaires 
for funding bodies (Appendix J and Appendix K), one set of semi-structured interview 
questionnaires for undergraduates and an informal discussion scheme with the head 
teachers of high schools were designed and tested in a pilot study to check their 
reliabilities (Appendix L and Appendix M). Through the survey questionnaires, and 
structured and semi-structured interviews, I would collect information on various 
variables as addressed in the main research questions and supplementary questions. 
5.4.1 University Undergraduates 
The questionnaire for university undergraduates was divided into five parts: 
Part A: The socio-economic background of undergraduates 
The information on SES of undergraduates is important, as this study examines the 
equity aspect of the present student loan and scholarship systems practised in Malaysia. I 
examined whether there is a relationship between the receipts of loans and scholarships 
and parental income, or their own incomes in the case of mature students. I also wanted 
to investigate whether the provision of loans and scholarships has different implications 
for equity in terms of regions in Malaysia: West Malaysia and East Malaysia. The SES 
would include: 
Gender (q 1) is important because the literature has argued that women may not like to 
take loans because of the "negative dowry" problem (Atkinson, 1983) though an income- 
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contingent loan could overcome the "negative dowry" problem (Barr, 1989). The 
equality of the distribution of loans and scholarships could also be investigated 
Age (q2) was included to investigate the average age of the undergraduates. Ethnicit v 
(q3) was included as the literature also examines whether there is discrimination against 
minorities in the student financial support. In Malaysia, a quota system is used for the 
intake of university students in line with the New Economic Policy and National 
Development Policy. This study examines to what extent the policy is pursued when 
granting the financial support, and hence its equity implication. The state which 
respondents domicile from (q4a) was important to see whether there is any difference in 
loan and scholarship provision because of regional differences. Areas which respondents 
come (q4b) would detect any difference in financial support in terms of rural-urban 
differences. 
To indicate the income groups of respondents, questions relating to father's and mother's 
educational levels respectively (q5a and 5b) were used. Similarly, parental and guardian 
occupations as well as their total incomes were investigated (q5c- q5d). 
Part B: Student Academic Background 
The academic background of undergraduates refers to their previous academic 
performance before their entrance to universities, and to their present field of studies. 
Information on previous academic background (q6) was needed as I intended to examine 
the relationship between the previous academic performance of respondents and the offer 
of scholarships and loans (q7a and q7b). The present field of studies of students could 
be 
used to find if there is any relationship between this and the offer of scholarships and 
loans (q8b). The equity distribution according to criteria for each of these two 
independent variables would be investigated. 
Q9a and q9b were included to examine any association 
between attitudes towards study 
and forms of financial support and hence to efficiency 
implication. Q9c was used to 
examine the relationship between the expected result and 
forms of financial support and 
hence to consider efficiency (cost-effectiveness) implications. 
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Part C. Information on Financial Support (glOa-q13) 
From the samples chosen for study, I obtained the number or percentage of respondents 
who were taking loans or scholarships. Those who did not receive loans or scholarship 
could also be obtained. This enabled me to make a comparison between those who 
receive loans or scholarships with those who do not, for discussing the equity 
implications. 
In order to further investigate the equity argument, the recipients of loans and 
scholarships were asked whether they would still enter or continue university education 
if loans or scholarships had not been given to them (q 12). 
To examine the risk of default of the present loans, recipients were asked whether they 
could repay their debts after graduation (q13). Sources for financing university education 
of undergraduates were sought (q14). Moreover, respondents who did not receive any 
financial support were asked about the demand for loans and scholarships (gl5a and 
g15b) to further investigate the equity implication of the loans and scholarships systems. 
Respondents were classified according to ethnicity, gender, areas of origins and income. 
PART D: Information About Friends Qualified to Attend University But Excluded 
Questions were included about friends who were qualified academically but did not 
attend university (q 16a). Reasons for not attending university were sought (q 16b). 
Respondents were asked whether the friends concerned applied for financial support, and 
the types of loans or scholarships which they applied (q l 6c &ql 6d). This further 
investigates the equity and efficiency aspects of loan and scholarship systems. This 
second-hand information was obtained as it is difficult to trace an exact sample of 
respondents who are qualified to go for university education but are excluded for some 
reasons did not attend. The problem is that different respondents may sometimes quote 
the same friend. However, the chance is quite small as to a certain extent respondents 
were randomly selected2. Another problem is that respondents may have such qualified 
friends but do not have any knowledge about their reasons for not attending university, 
other than financial reasons. I believe that such cases are marginal since 
Malaysian 
society is very cohesive. Usually, classmates or close 
friends are concerned about their 
friends and are closely in touch. Previous school head-teachers may also 
have some 
general knowledge about some qualified students who 
did not attend university 
education. Information from these head-teachers could 
be used for triangulation. 
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PART E: Opinions of Students Concerning Loans and Scholarships 
Information concerned with the opinions of students about different types of loans and 
scholarship provision would be helpful when considering a modified type of student 
financial support for Malaysia. Statements elicited in this part of the questionnaire were 
concerned with their opinions on: 
loan repayment based on income contingency (q l 7a); whether unemployed married 
women need to repay the debts (q 17b); negative dowry problem (ql7c); preference of 
Income-Contingent loan (q 17d); the role of industry in sharing the cost of higher 
education (q 17e); whether rich parents need to share the cost of their children's higher 
education (q 17f); whether interest should be free for education loans (17g); provisions 
of scholarships and grants to the target groups, that is those from poor backgrounds 
(17h); means-testing of loans (q 17i); the loan amount and the fields of studies (q 17j); 
the grace period (ql7k); and attitude of loan recipients towards study (q171); whether 
graduates should play a leading role in realising the Vision 2020 (q l 7m); the extent to 
which university education enhances productivity and hence graduates should have 
higher pay than non-graduates (gl7n). 
5.4.2 High School Students 
The second set of questionnaires was for high school students who are potential 
undergraduates. The opinions of high school students regarding the existing student 
loans and scholarships in Malaysia and on a modified type of student financial support 
were sought. 
A questionnaire survey was used to collect primary data as this would allow a thorough 
investigation about the opinions of high school students regarding financial support. The 
social and economic background of students was asked. The detailed questionnaire 
is 
presented in Appendix I. 
5.4.3 Structured- Interviews with Top Management of Funding Bodies 
Structured interviews with top-management of funding bodies were conducted. Prior to 
interviews, two set of questionnaire were sent to each funding body (See Appendix 
J and 
K) regarding the rationale and criteria for providing financial support 
(loans and grants); 
evaluation and opinions on the existing loan and scholarship schemes and on a modified 
2 Departments of every faculty were randomly selected for questionnaires to 
be given. 
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type of student financial programme; information regarding the total cost of 
administration, which comprises the start-up cost of administration and the running cost 
of administration; data regarding the period of loans (the number of years of study for 
which they are available), period of repayment (in years) and period of grace on interest 
(in years); the interest subsidy, average annual loan size in one year and whether it was 
expected to support fees or living expenses or both; the default rate (% of graduates) and 
passing rate of recipients in percentage. 
The information obtained would be important as it would be used to examine whether 
the present loan and scholarship schemes are being run efficiently and equitably. During 
interviews, I also requested copies of the annual reports of the funding bodies, and 
published or unpublished bulletins, to obtain additional data to reinforce and triangulate 
with the survey data. 
5.4.4 Interviews with Random Samples of Undergraduates 
In order to triangulate the survey data, it was necessary to conduct interviews with 
certain available samples of undergraduates. For this, I went to the university libraries to 
find some of the undergraduates, or through e-mails those who agreed to have interviews 
with me. Sometimes, I caught some of them after the lectures. They were classified 
according to gender, income groups and different fields of studies (Appendix L). Their 
opinions about current loan and scholarship provision were asked. The information 
gained was used to reinforce the quantitative analysis. 
5.4.5 Semi structured-Interviews with Head-Teachers 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the head teachers of a few chosen 
schools, seeking reasons why certain qualified high school students did not attend 
university education. The semi-structured interview was preferred as it provided 
flexibility for both interviewer and interviewee to explore the information in depth. This 
strategy gives informants an opportunity to develop their answers outside the structured 
format (Burgess, 1984). The schools chosen were the same as those schools selected for 
getting primary data from the high school students. Head teachers have some knowledge 
of the reasons why certain qualified high schools students did not attend university 
education, since the high school examination results are released through the schools. 
Questions asked were related to the social economic status of these students, and reasons 
why these students were excluded from attending university education 
(Appendix M). 
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5.5 Procedure 
The collection of different sets of data involved different parties, as mentioned above. I 
sent the research proposal, including the questionnaires, to the Education Planning and 
Research Division, Malaysia, Ministry of Education for vetting and approval before 
questionnaires could be distributed and interviews conducted in universities, schools and 
offices in Malaysia. 
After the approval was given, I had to translate the research instruments from English 
into Malay, as the Malay language is the medium of instruction. I asked a lecturer at the 
Rajang Teacher Training College in Malaysia to translate the questionnaires from the 
English version into the Malay language. A second translator was sought to translate 
back the questionnaires from Malay to English. The two versions of the questionnaires in 
English were compared. After matching and mismatching of the two versions in English 
language with the translators, the questionnaires in English were revised. After going 
through them with the translators, the final version of the questionnaires in the Malay 
language was used to collect data from the respondents. This was to ensure that the 
respondents could understand the translation. 
I conducted a pilot study at the University of Malaysia Sarawak and the Meradong 
Government High School from June to July 1998 to test the sets of questionnaire items 
so as to detect problems with the questions and questionnaire design. I also piloted 
interviews with two funding bodies in Sarawak. The main fieldwork started on 2nd 
December 1998 and continued until 2nd March, 1999. I went to five public universities 
and four high schools to deliver and explain the questionnaires directly to the 
respondents. Questionnaires were collected back after 15-20 minutes. The return rate was 
high, 96.1% and 88.3% for the undergraduates and high school students respectively. 
Subsequently, it took two months to key in all the data to the SPSS 9.0 programme. 
5.6 Analysis 
Analysis on equity and efficiency aspect of student scholarship and 
loan distribution will 
be made in chapters 6 to 9. I will firstly use the cross tabulations to examine 
the 
association between the provision of scholarships and 
loans respectively with each of the 
seven independent variables (ethnic group, 
income-group, gender, areas and regions 
which respondents come, types of courses respondents pursued and previous 
academic 
performance). The percentage distribution of scholarships and 
loans between categories 
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(for example, natives and non-natives) of the same independent variable (for example, 
ethnicity) is obtained individually. These variables are used as they are closely related to 
the desired objectives of the Malaysian social economic policies. This will be further 
elaborated in Chapters 6,7 and 8. 
Two types of equality measurements will be employed. These are type-1 equality and 
type-2 equality measurements, which will be examined on seven independent variables 
as stated. Type-1 equality examines whether scholarships and loans (will be discussed in 
chapters 6 and 7) have been respectively distributed equally to all, irrespective of each of 
the independent variable. Subsequently, we examine the percentage of each category 
within the same independent variable that is provided with scholarships and loans 
respectively. For example, we can examine the percentage of natives and non-natives 
(categories) who were provided with scholarships by ethnicity, an independent variable. 
The scholarship provision, for example, is said to favour the category (natives) with its 
higher percentage to be provided with scholarships, when compared with another 
category (non-natives). 
Type-2 equality is defined as the shares of loans or scholarships of all categories within 
the same independent variable, as compared to their respective shares in the general 
population. For example, the percentages of native and non-native populations in the 
year 1995 were used to compare with their respective shares of scholarships. If the share 
of scholarship of each category matches its population share, type-2 equality is said to be 
achieved. The representation index was also used to indicate whether a particular group 
or category, for example native, within the same independent variable (ethnicity defined 
as natives and non-natives) was over- or under-represented in relation to the general 
population. This was calculated by dividing the scholarship share of natives with their 
share of the general population. 
The analysis on efficiency aspects refers to cost-effectiveness, efficiency in meeting the 
manpower needs and financial efficiency. Cost-effectiveness refers to whether the loan 
or scholarship system has achieved its objective, producing the output (graduates) on 
time with good grades without any failure or extension. Exchange efficiency refers to 
whether the investment in education through loans or scholarships meets the demands of 
the economy. Data regarding the demand and supply of manpower in the Malaysian 
Plans are used. 
116 
Financial efficiency refers to the extent to which the loan is repaid in full (Albrecht & 
Ziderman, 1991) which is a restrictive definition. What the government lends to students, 
compared with what is returned in repayments would indicate the loan efficiency. This 
also depends on the cost of administration, defaults, interest subsidy, rate of repayment 
and the portion converted into grants. For these features, I will analyse four major 
schemes. Information obtained from the interviews with the administrators of funding 
bodies, annual reports, agreements signed between recipients, newspaper reports, and 
data from questionnaires survey to the undergraduates is used for analysis of financial 
efficiency. 
The extent to which portions of loans are being converted into scholarships will have 
implications for financial efficiency as the grants represent a temporary loss to the public 
funds. The "recruitment effects" of loans and scholarships are compared, to investigate 
their differential impact on efficiency in meeting the manpower needs of the economy. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has explored the research methodological framework of the study. Sources 
of data, the sampling design, instruments for collecting data and procedures have been 
discussed. The analysis of equity and efficiency aspects has also been briefly discussed. 
Both survey method and interviews are used to investigate the equity and efficiency of 
loans and scholarships, and the rationale which underpins the arguments. The next 
chapter will investigate the equality of the scholarship distribution and its equity 
implications. 
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Chapter 6 
Scholarship Distribution at the Malaysian Public Universities 
6.0 Overview 
One of the main objectives of the present study is to compare the equity of the student loan 
and scholarship systems practised in Malaysia. Based on the survey conducted in five public 
universities as discussed in chapter 5, this chapter analyses the equality of scholarship 
distribution by investigating the provision of scholarships for undergraduates based on seven 
independent variables. These are ethnic groups, gender, regions (East Malaysia or West 
Malaysia), income groups, respondents' courses of studies, areas of origin (rural or urban), 
and previous academic performance. To take a further step in the analysis, interrelationships 
of these variables will be taken into account by using multiple logistic regression in chapter 
8. Results of the distribution will be used for equity implications. 
From this perspective, Section One discusses the characteristics of the respondents, the 
undergraduates. Section Two defines the terms employed in the analysis. Section Three 
analyses the equality of scholarships for all groups (native and non-native combined), based 
on seven independent variables, by investigating the respective provision of scholarships to 
undergraduates. Section Four repeats the procedure, analysing the equality of scholarships in 
the case of natives exclusively. Section Five does the same for the case of non-natives. 
Section Six further examines the equity of scholarships, studying their recruitment effects by 
asking recipients whether they would have decided to enter and continue university 
education if scholarships were not given in the first place. Similarly, to further investigate 
the equity of the scholarship system, Section Seven examines the data obtained 
from the 
respondents about their friends who were qualified but did not pursue studies 
in the 
Malaysian public universities. Section Eight concludes the chapter. 
6.1 Distribution of the samples for university undergraduates 
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of respondents from five public universities. 
Column (2) 
shows the sample size from each university whereas 
Column (3) shows the 1996 
undergraduate intake. Column (4) expresses the sample size of each university 
as a 
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percentage to its 1996 intake. The samples (2645) represent 18% of the population of the 
1996 intake in the 5 public universities as shown in Column 4, and 13% of the total 
undergraduate intake of 1996 for all public universities. I have taken only 10.3% from the 
National University of Malaysia because of concentrating mainly on faculties there, which 
are not found in other universities. However, the samples taken are representative because 
they include over 10% of the 1996 intake at the university. 
Table: 6.1: Distribution of Samples (Undergraduates, 1996 intake) 
Institutions (1) Sample Size (2) 1996 Intake (3) (4) = (2) = (3) 
The University of Science Malaysia 484(18.3%) 3160 15.3% 
The University of Malaya 803(30.4%) 3477 23.1% 
The University PUTERA Malaysia 776 (29.3%) 3700 20.9% 
The National University of Malaysia 413(15.0%) 4022 10.3% 
The university of Malaysia Sarawak 169 (6.40%) 328 51.5% 
TOTAL 2645 (100%) 14687 18% 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates), and Registrars of various universities 
Table: 6.2: Forms of Financial Support 
Forms of Financial Support Loans 1689 63.9% 
Scholarships 396 15.0% 
Parental 560 21.1% 
Total 2645 100% 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 6.2 shows the forms of financial support to the respondents. There were 2645 
respondents, 396 receiving scholarships, 1689 receiving loans and 560 just receiving 
parental support. Loans and scholarships are quite different from each other in their 
implications for recipients. Scholarship recipients need not repay the amount of money 
awarded to them but instead are bonded to work with the funding bodies for a number of 
years after graduation. In the case of loan recipients, there is no employment commitment 
between the recipients and funding bodies, but the amount of money borrowed must be 
repaid, though the loans are heavily subsidised in terms of interest and partially convertible 
into grants depending on final university academic results. In analysing the equality or 
inequality of scholarship distribution, we compare those who receive scholarships 
(396 of 
them) with those do not receive scholarships (2249 of them). We 
investigate the percentage 
of each category, within each independent variable which receives a scholarship. 
We shall 
now define some of the terms used in the analysis 
before doing any further analysis. 
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6.2 Definition of Terms 
6.2.1 The Demand for scholarships 
The demand means those parties concerned who had applied for scholarships whether 
accepted or rejected. These include the demand for scholarships of respondents who receive 
scholarship and parental support, of respondents' friends who were qualified academically 
but did not attend university because of financial reasons. The study also investigates the 
demand of high school students for scholarships. However, data regarding loan recipients 
who might demand for scholarships were not sought. Nevertheless, components of demand 
available would further examine the equity or equality of the scholarship system. 
6.2.2 The Provision of scholarships 
In my survey of five public universities, there were 396 respondents receiving scholarships 
from the Public Service Department, the MARA, the Ministry of Education, States 
Governments and private firms. The equity implication of this study is to examine whether 
scholarships are being distributed equally between the categories for seven respective 
independent variables as stated. The equity aspect does not investigate the amounts received, 
as types of scholarships are similar in amounts given and conditions, following the rulings 
set by the Malaysian Public Service Department. The amount annually received by 
recipients differs marginally according to the types of courses they are following, 
corresponding to marginal differential fees charged. 
Cross-tabulations are used to find whether there is any association between the provision of 
scholarships to recipients and the respective independent variables. It is used because of the 
large sample size, and the variables analysed are both categorical or nominal for examples 
income groups, gender, ethnicity and so on. Moreover, data used are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. The provision of scholarships for all categories within each independent variable 
is used to investigate the equality of the scholarship distribution between these categories. 
The Kendall's tau-b statistic is also used to indicate the strength of the relationship between 
ordered categories, such as the income groups. 
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6.2.2 Equity 
The concept of equity has been explored in chapter 2. Equity is difficult to define, as it 
involves not only how resources are distributed but also a normative judgement about how 
society should distribute resources (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985). Thus, the concept 
is closely bound up with the notion of fairness. There has been disagreement about relevant 
criteria to be used when normative judgements are made about fairness or justice. As 
discussed in chapter 2, Monk (1990) and McMahon (1982) discern three types of equity: 
horizontal equity, which means equal treatment of equals; vertical equity, referring to 
unequal treatment of unequals; and intergenerational equity, which extends between the 
other two types of equity. Intergenerational equity ensures that inequalities in one generation 
are not simply perpetuated (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 185). 
This chapter will use two types of equality, which we term type- I equality and type-2 
equality or representative indices for measuring the scholarship distribution. For type-1 
equality, we investigate whether scholarships have been distributed equally to all 
undergraduates across all categories (for example, males and females) within each 
independent variable (for example, gender), for all groups (natives and non-natives 
combined), and also for the native and non-native groups when analysed separately. Then, 
we examine the percentage of each category within each independent variable, which is 
provided with scholarships. The next stage is to compare the percentages of all categories 
within the same independent variable, which were provided with scholarships. The 
scholarship provision is said to favour the category with its higher percentage to be provided 
with scholarships over other categories within the same independent variable. For example, 
if 90% of natives are provided with scholarships, compared to 60% of non-natives, the 
scholarship provision therefore favours the natives with the independent variable, ethnicity. 
Vertical equity underpins the judgements on equality or inequality of scholarship 
distribution. To a certain extent, "horizontal equity" which I defined as equal opportunity of 
access to financial support will also be used to assess the equity of the system with reference 
to the different variables. 
For the type-2 measurement of scholarship distribution, the shares of scholarships 
for 
different categories within the same independent variable can 
be compared with their 
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relative shares in the general population. This concept can also be termed as the 
representative index {ter Weele et al, (1979), cited by Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 
(1985)} who examined the equality or inequality of distribution of primary education among 
provinces in a hypothetical country. The index indicates whether a particular group or 
category within the same independent variable is over- or under-represented in relation to 
the total population. I will use the same principle in measuring the type-2 distribution of 
scholarships, based on relative shares of scholarships for different groups of students, 
corresponding to their shares in the general population, for the four independent variables 
mentioned. Results from this investigation can be used for equity implications in terms of 
ethnicity, areas, regions and gender. 
An alternative benchmark would be to compare the shares of scholarships with the 
proportions of university aged population, classified according to the four variables above. 
But, the data was unavailable, though it could be obtained in the 1987 Malaysia Household 
Income Survey, which was the latest survey data available at the time when my research was 
conducted'. This data was not used as it was out of date which would differ very much from 
the current situation as a result of dramatic expansion of higher education and social 
economic change since 1987. Type-2 equality was not measured for the Income and others 
as data regarding the population proportions of households were not available for each 
income bracket. 
The analysis involving the relative shares of scholarships in comparison with their 
respective percentage population distribution is particularly useful to examine whether the 
distribution of scholarships follows the principles of the NEP (1971-1990) and the NDP 
(1991-2000) as always debated in the Malaysian political arena. These policies aim at the 
restructuring of society so that the social groups in the Malaysian society are not identified 
with racial origins, at the regional integration of Malaysia, and at the eradication of 
hard- 
core poverty in the rural areas2. As discussed in Appendix B1 and chapter 
4, the NEP aims 
to correct the social-economic disparities between natives and non-natives through 
'I did enquire of this data from the Statistics Department in Kuching, 
Sarawak in 1999, the officer told me that 
the latest Income and Household Survey was conducted in 1987 for the purpose of evaluating the 
NEP before 
the policy ended in 1990. 
2 The incidence of poverty in rural areas was 15.3% in 1995, compared to 
3.7% in urban areas (Malaysia, 
1996). 
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affirmative measures favouring natives, including the quotas for entrance to the universities 
and granting of financial support. There are also social and economic disparities between 
West and East Malaysia, as the latter is difficult to develop owing to its larger size and 
sparse population, and historical factors. To eradicate rural hard-core poverty, provision of 
financial support such as loans or scholarships may be given disproportionately to the 
respondents in rural areas, so that no qualified students are barred from attending the 
university because of financial constraints. We will also examine whether there is any 
gender discrimination in Malaysian society by taking the gender population shares as a 
parameter, to compare with their relative shares of scholarships. Type-2 equality 
measurement investigates particularly whether the distribution of scholarships goes beyond 
what the policies and vertical equity argument is allowed for in the case of ethnicity. 
For ethnic groups, I take as parameters3 their percentage in the 19954 estimates for the 
Malaysian population, which is 61.7% for natives and 38.3% for non-natives, compared to 
their respective shares of scholarships. For the areas which respondents come from, I take 
the population percentage of rural (45.3%) and urban (54.7%) areas respectively as 
parameters. Similarly, in the case of regions, the percentages of the population of East 
Malaysia (20.7%) and West Malaysia (79.3%) are used as parameters. For gender, I take the 
male population of 49.5% and 50.5% of female population as parameters. Subsequently, we 
need to examine whether the scholarship distribution matches the population distribution of 
the respective categories for the four independent variables mentioned, though such factors 
as ability, social class, and income may also have interrelationships. 
The equity aspect of scholarships can also be investigated by examining 
how far 
scholarships help recipients to gain access to university education. From this perspective, 
scholarship recipients were asked whether they would have entered or would continue 
studies in universities if scholarships had not been given 
in the first place. The negative 
responses would indicate the "recruitment effects" of scholarships. 
The present study also 
examines whether the provision of scholarships 
has fully reached the target groups, the 
lowest and low-income groups, by asking respondents about their 
friends who did not go to 
3 In Malaysia, the general population composition of the country 
is always taken as parameters for vertical 
equity argument in the distribution of resources 
based on the four variables as stated. 
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universities because of financial problems. The demand for scholarships by friends who did 
not attend universities was investigated. 
The ongoing analysis will be done in the following manner. We begin by examining the 
association between the provision of scholarships in number/percentage and each respective 
factor. Subsequently, type-1 equality of scholarship distribution is examined on seven 
independent variables, and type-2 equality on four variables, as explained earlier. The same 
procedure is repeated in investigating the equality of scholarship distribution on natives and 
non-natives exclusively. We now examine the equality of scholarship distribution for all 
groups (natives and non-natives combined), based on seven independent variables. 
6.3 Equality of Scholarship Distribution on Seven Independent Variables (All Groups) 
6.3.1. Ethnicity 
Malaysia is a multiracial society comprised of natives (bumiputeras) and non-natives (non- 
bumiputeras). The bumiputeras are mainly the Malays, the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, 
and the aborigines in West Malaysia. The non-natives (non-bumiputeras) are the Chinese, 
Indians and others. In 1995, the natives formed 61.7% of the total Malaysian population 
whereas non-natives comprised 38.3 %. The distinction between natives and non-natives 
used in this analysis, follows the definitions of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and 
National Development Policy (NDP). The provision of scholarships, shown in percentages 
for natives and non-natives, shown in Table 1 of Appendix N is additionally indicated in 
Table 6.3 in next page for examining its type-1 equality distribution. 
Chi -square test shows a significant association 
between the provisions of scholarships and 
ethnicity with x2 = 59.789; df =1; p =. 000. (Table 1, Appendix N). Column (2) of Table 6.3 
shows that 19.6% and 8.7% of natives and non-natives respectively are provided with 
scholarships. The scholarship distribution therefore favours the natives 
in terms of type-1 
equality measurement, as indicated in Column (2). Mathematically, 
ES 1>ES2 (Provision of 
scholarship to the native is greater than its provision to non-natives). 
This is in line with the 
government affirmative policy5 of motivating native participation 
in higher education so that 
4 The latest Population Census was in 1991. I use the 1995 population estimates 
for the latest data of the four 
variables taken simultaneously (Department of 
Statistics Malaysia, 1995). 
5 The policy refers to the New Economic Policy and National 
Development Policy as discussed in Appendix B 
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the quota allocated for natives, that is 55% as against 45% of non-natives is met. The 
provision of scholarships is affected by the political quota system embedded in the NEP and 
NDP practised after the racial riots in 1969. The government believed that the root of the 
riots was the social and economic disparities between the natives and non-natives. 
Affirmative measures favouring the natives have been used to correct these disparities and 
based on the vertical equity grounds, natives should be treated preferentially because they 
had been neglected in the past. 
Table: 6.3: Provision, and Equity of Scholarship Distribution for All Groups 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) 
Provision of Scholarships 
within Groups (%) 
(Type-1 Equality) 
(2) 
General Population 
Share (%) 
(3) 
Proportions of 
Scholarships 
For Each Group 
(4) 
Type-2 Equality 
5 =(4)+(3) x100 
Ethnicity 
Native 19.6% (ES 1) 61.7% 75.3% 123.4 (ES3) 
Non-native 8.7% (ES2) 38.3% 24.7% 64.4 (ES4) 
Gender 
Female 15.4% (ES5) 50.5% 62.9% 124.6 (ES7) 
Male 14.4% (ES6) 49.5% 37.1% 74.9 (ES8) 
Regions 
East Malaysia 30.1 % (ES9) 20.7% 25.3% 122.5 (ES 11) 
West Malaysia 12.8% (ES 10) 79.3% 74.7% 94.1 (ES 12) 
Areas 
Rural 15.5% (ES13) 45.3% 55.6% 122.7 (ES 15) 
Urbali 14.4% (ES 14) 54.7% 44.4% 81.2 (ES 16) 
Income G 
Lowest 13.1 % (ES 17) 
Low 14.7% (ES 18) 
Medium 15.8% (ES 19) 
High 15.9% (ES20) 
Top-bracket 44.4% (ES21) 
Scores 
Low 17.5% (ES22) 
Low-middle 12.4% (ES23) 
Upper-middle 10.3% (ES24) 
High 21.8% (ES25) 
Courses 
Arts and 
Humanities 2.2% (ES26) 
Professional Art 15.8% (ES27) 
Medicine 40.2% (ES28) 
Pure Sc 7.00%(ES29) 
Applied Sc 13.2% (ES30) 
Technology 17.5% ES31 
*P <0.01; Sample Size = 2645 ; ES1... ES31 means equality measurements of scholarships on criteria 
1 
to 31 of independent variables 
Source: Tables 1- 5,7-8, Appendix N 
We can also examine the equality of scholarship 
distribution between ethnic groups by 
comparing their relative shares of scholarships with their shares 
in the Malaysian population 
and subsequently results are used for equity 
implication. This is to investigate whether the 
provision of scholarships follows the principles of 
the New Economic Policy and National 
Development Policy, which state that the distribution of resources should reflect 
the racial 
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composition of the Malaysian society. The racial composition is used as a parameter for 
type-2 equality measurement. 
Column (3) shows the racial composition of the estimated Malaysian population in 1995, 
which was 61.7% native and 38.3% non-native. However, Column (4) shows that the 
provision of scholarships to natives (75.3%) is higher than its population share (61.7%). In 
contrast, the provision of scholarships to non-natives (24.7%) is much lower than its 
population share (38.3%). Thus, natives are over-represented in their scholarship share 
whereas non-natives are under-represented, as indicated by the representation indices6 of 
123.4 and 64.4 in column (5) for natives and non-natives respectively. Mathematically, 
ES3>ES4. This point is verified through a circular from a funding body. It states: 
"The selection in the offer of scholarships for natives and non-natives is based on the ratio of 9: 1. The cut-off mark for the 
selection is 50.5 marks for natives and 81.5 marks for non-natives. " Scholarships and Loan Division, Ministry of Education, 
Malaysia, 1997 Circular. 
This suggests that non-natives should score much higher merit points in their previous 
academic attainment in order to be awarded scholarships. Result from the type-2 equality 
measurement and the selection ratio which favours natives for scholarship provision, 
indicate that the scholarship distribution favours the natives beyond the quota system is 
allowed for. 
6.3.2 Gender 
The Malaysian public universities are co-educational. In the main study, female respondents 
account for 61.3% of the students and the males only 38.7%. This may be mainly because 
more females meet the academic requirements for university entrance than their male 
counterparts7. Undergraduates of the 1996 intake for the University of Science Malaysia 
comprised 39.1% male and 60.8% female; that of the University of Malaya was 59% 
female 
and 41% male; that of University PUTERA was 38% male and 62 % 
female (Registrars, 
various universities). 
6A representative index of less than 100 shows under-representation, whereas over 
100 means over- 
representation of the categories in the population share. 
Another possible reason is that more males study abroad. 
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We shall examine the equality of the scholarship distribution between gender groups by 
investigating the provision of scholarships in percentages, as indicated in Table 6.3 (see also 
Table 2, Appendix N). The survey on undergraduates shows no significant association 
between the provision of scholarships and gender, shown by the chi-square test, x2 = . 498; 
df =1; p= . 480. Table 6.3 shows that 15.4% and 14.4% of females and males are receiving 
scholarships respectively. In terms of type-1 equality, scholarships slightly favour the 
females. Mathematically, ES5>ES6. This seems that females are not being discriminated 
against in the offer of scholarships in both "horizontal equity" and vertical equity grounds. 
This aligns with the government's policy of encouraging highly educated women 
participating in the economy (Lucas and Verry, 1999). Before arriving at a conclusion, 
interrelationships with other factors will be examined in chapter 8 by using multiple logistic 
regression. 
To examine type-2 equality, we compare the relative shares of scholarships for males and 
females with their respective percentage distribution in the general population. Column (3) 
shows the gender composition in the Malaysian population, that is, 50.5% and 49.5% for 
females and males respectively. However, the provision of scholarships to female and male 
respondents was 62.9% and 37.1% respectively, indicated in Column (4). This means that 
females are over-represented in the provision of scholarships (124.6) whereas males are 
under-represented (74.9), as shown by representative indices in column (5). Thus, ES7>ES8. 
Again, this shows that scholarship provision is inequitable to males in terms of type-2 
equality measurement. 
6.3.3 Regions 
Malaysia comprises two main regions, West Malaysia (formerly known as Malaya) and East 
Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak, which joined Malaya to form Malaysia in 1963). West 
Malaysia is more developed than the East Malaysia; the former has a smaller area with a 
much higher population than the latter. East Malaysia is sparsely populated, making 
it 
difficult to develop. This study therefore dichotomises Malaysia into East and West 
Malaysia. 
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There is a significant association between the provision of scholarships and regions for all 
groups, with x2 = 68.440; df = 1; p=. 000 (Table 3, Appendix N). 30.1% and 12.8% of East 
Malaysian and West Malaysian respondents respectively were receiving scholarships. Thus, 
the scholarship distribution favours the East Malaysians over the West Malaysians in terms 
of type-1 equality measurement. This is because the East Malaysian States give more 
scholarships to their nationals in order to commit them to employment after graduation, as 
the states face a more acute shortage of manpower, especially in medical and technical 
fields. The labour force with university education in Sarawak (the East Malaysian State), for 
example, was still very small with 6.4% only (Year Book of Statistics Sarawak, 1999) 
compared to 13.2% for the whole country in 1998 (Year Book of Statistics Malaysia, 1999). 
Thus, ES9>ES 10. 
In terms of type-2 equality measures, the percentage distribution of the Malaysian 
population based on regions is used. The population for East Malaysia was 5.20 million 
(20.7%) in 1995 whereas that of West Malaysia was 18.1 million (79.3%). Column (4) of 
Table 6.3 shows that the proportions of all scholarships received by East Malaysians and 
West Malaysians were 25.3% and 74.7% respectively, compared to their respective 
population composition of 20.7% and 79.3% in column (3). Thus, East Malaysians are over- 
represented in the provision of scholarships, as their share of scholarships (25.3%) is more 
than their population share (20.7%). In contrast, West Malaysians are under-represented in 
scholarship provision, as their scholarship share (74.7%) is less than their population 
composition (79.3%). The representation indices obtained are 122.5 and 94.1 for the East 
Malaysians and West Malaysians respectively, as shown in Column (5). Thus, more 
scholarships were given to East Malaysians in terms of vertical equity argument as these 
states face a more acute shortage of skilled manpower than West Malaysia. 
6.3.4. Areas 
Originally, I classified areas as rural, small town, big town, semi-metropolitan and 
metropolitan areas. However, for the purpose of urban /rural analysis the strata are 
dichotomised into URBAN areas, comprising the metropolitan, semi-metropolitan and big 
towns, and RURAL areas, comprising the small towns and all rural areas. This follows the 
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definition of the 1991 Population and Household Census. Urban areas are defined as those 
areas gazetted as local authority areas, which, with their adjoining built-up areas. had a 
combined population of 10,000 or more. All other gazetted local authority areas with a 
population of less than 10,000 persons , and non-gazetted areas are classified as rural. We 
will examine the equality or inequality in the scholarship distribution for all groups (natives 
and non-natives combined), and natives and non-natives separately, in terms of type-1 
equality measurement. However, we also examine type-2 equality measurement for all 
groups. From this perspective, I use the population percentages of the rural and urban areas 
as parameters to examine the area-equity. The incidence of poverty is also used to examine 
the success of the government's efforts to minimise rural poverty regardless of ethnic 
groups. 
Table 4 of Appendix N shows no significant association between the provision of 
scholarships and the areas, which respondents come from (x, 2 = . 628; dgl; p=. 000). The 
provision of scholarships by areas which respondents come from, indicated in Table 6.3 (see 
also Table 4, Appendix N) is used to indicate type-1 equality. The provision of scholarships 
only marginally favours the respondents from rural areas in terms of type-1 equality 
measurement, as 15.5% and 14.4% of rural and urban undergraduates are respectively being 
provided with scholarships. Thus, one of the objectives of the New Economic Policy, that is 
to minimise poverty especially in the rural areas, has been only slightly encouraged by the 
present distribution of scholarships on vertical equity grounds. Mathematically, ES 13>ES 14. 
In terms of type-2 equality measurement, I use the percentage distribution of the Malaysian 
population between the rural and urban areas as parameters. Column (6) of Table 6.3 shows 
that the provision of scholarships comparing rural and urban areas is 55.6% and 44.4% 
respectively and their respective shares of the population are 45.3% and 54.7%. Thus, the 
provision of scholarships to the rural areas (55.6%) is higher than their population share 
(45.3%). In contrast, the provision of scholarships to respondents in the urban areas (44.4%) 
is much less than their population share (54.7%). Thus, the scholarship distribution 
favours 
those from the rural areas, as can be also shown by the representation indices of 122.7 and 
81.2 for rural and urban areas respectively as indicated in column (5) of Table 
6.3. This 
implies that rural areas are over-represented in scholarship provision compared to urban 
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areas, which are under-represented, in comparison to their population share. This is therefore 
consistent with the government policy of eradicating hard-core poverty and minimising 
poverty in the rural areas, irrespective of racial origins, through higher education. 
Undergraduates from the rural areas were given more scholarships in terms of vertical equity 
argument as the incidence of poverty in the rural is much higher than urban areas. The 
incidence of poverty in the rural areas is 4.1 times higher than that of the urban areas8. 
Thus, the vertical equity argument suggests that a larger share of scholarships should have 
been given to rural students, as they receive only 1.3 times more scholarships than urban 
students. This implies that the provision of scholarships to the rural areas, though consistent 
with the government policy of minimising poverty in these areas, could be intensified. This 
would accomplish one of the prime objectives of the Seventh Malaysian Plan in a more 
meaningful way. The Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000) states: 
" During the 7`h Malaysian Plan Period, the thrust of poverty eradication will be directed at reducing the 
incidence of poverty among Malaysians to 5.5 per cent by the year 2000. Priority will be given to the 
poorest states and districts .... " The Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000), p 92. 
6.3.5 Income-Groups 
My study uses the lowest (below $M686)9, low ($M 687-$M 1500), medium ($M1501- 
$M3500), high ($M3501-$M8000) and top-bracket groups (above $M8000) for 
classification of income groups or social status10. The household income comprise the 
parental income and subsistence income. For the lowest and top-bracket groups, the study 
has adopted the same method used by Bardai (1993) in his analysis of the income tax 
distribution system in Malaysia, and Rosni (1996), in her thesis on the distributional effects 
of higher education in Malaysia. To get more accurate income classifications, I also 
triangulate the income data with the occupational groups, classified by the Household 
Population Survey, Malaysia 1991 and the study made by Jasbir (1989) on Education and 
Social Mobility in Malaysia: A Case Study of Petaling Jaya. 
However, I do not use occupational status as a criterion for the social status of respondents 
in this study, for it is difficult to use it to identify those in the core poverty group and also 
8 The incidence of poverty was 15.3% in the rural areas as compared to 3.7% in the urban areas in the year 
1995 (Malaysia, 1996). 
9 This monthly income was regarded as an income under the poverty line defined in the Seventh Malaysian 
Plan (1996-2000) 
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those in the top-bracket group. Another reason is that occupational status may not accurately 
reflect incomes, as some of those with low occupational status are high-income earners 11. 
Therefore, the income criterion is preferred, though I also triangulate with occupational 
status. 
The provision of scholarships in percentages across income groups from Table 5 of 
Appendix N is additionally indicated in Table 6.3 for examining its type-1 equality 
measurement. 12 Type-1 equality measurement shows that the scholarships favour the top- 
bracket group most, followed by the high, medium, low and lowest income-groups. 
Mathematically, ES21>ES20>ES 19>ES 18>ES l 7. Thus, the scholarship distribution is 
regressive and not in line with the NEP policy of eradicating poverty. The result indicates 
that the scholarship distribution seems to be inequitable to the low-income groups. If vertical 
equity refers to the "unequal treatment of unequals" this notion of equity is offended since 
lower income groups receive proportionately fewer scholarship than higher income groups. 
This result may be explained if more academically successful students tend to come from 
higher income groups, and they secure scholarships. This will be investigated in the next 
section, and also in chapter 8, when interrelationships of other factors are taken into account. 
6.3.6 Previous academic performance 
The entrance of undergraduates to the public universities in Malaysia is based on their 
merits and also on a quota system. The quota system specifies that the admission to 
university places should be 55 percent reserved for natives against 45 per cent for non- 
natives. The merit points used have been standardised, though the grading systems for 
different modes of entrance differ (see Table 6, Appendix N). Within the quotas, the merit 
points encourage intra-ethnic competition for entrance into universities. In this study, I 
10 The Mid-Term Review of the Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000), defined the low jncome group as those 
earning below $M1500; medium as those earning $M 1501-$M3500; and high as those earning above $M 
3500. 
II Examples of these are timber loggers and tin miners, because of high risks. Moreover, hawkers may also 
earn high incomes though their occupational status is low. 
12 There is a significant association between income-groups and the provision of scholarships with x2 = 
14.568; df = 4; p= . 
005. (Table 5, Appendix N). However, the Kendall's tau-b shows correlation coefficient of 
. 
035 at p=0.052 (2-tailed significance). 
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classify the merit points into low (32.50-42.50), low-middle (43.0-54.50), upper-middle (55- 
65) and high (65.50-75.50) scores for all modes of entrance. 
There is a significant association between the provision of scholarships and previous 
academic performance with x2 = 58.916; df = 3; and p=. 000 (Table 7, Appendix N). When 
taking scores for previous academic performance as a criterion, the scholarship distribution 
favours most the respondents with the high scores in accordance with type-1 equality 
measurement and least those with upper-middle scores, as indicated in Column (2). 
Mathematically, ES25>ES23>ES22>ES24. This implies that the provision of scholarships is 
generally for excellent students. This was verified through an interview with a senior officer 
of a funding body. 
" The objective of scholarships is for good students. " Senior Executive Officer, Sarawak Foundation. 
Thus, the distribution of scholarships seems to promote "unequal treatment of unequals", 
taking ability as the criterion. 
6.3.7 Types of Course 
Malaysian public universities offer all types of courses. The Department of Higher 
Education in the Malaysian Ministry of Education has classified courses into 6 main types. 
These are Arts and Humanities (Arts and Social Sciences, Islamic Studies, History, 
Geography, Linguistics); Professional Arts (Economics/Business/Accountancy, Law and 
Arts with Education); Medicine (Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy); Pure Science (Physic, 
Chemistry, Biology and Mathematics); Applied Science (Computer Science, Food 
Technology, Resource Sciences, Fishery and Forestry); and Technology (Engineering, 
Urban Development and Architecture). This study uses these classifications. Though 
differential fees are charged according to type of course, this would not affect the entrance 
behaviour of undergraduates as the difference in fees is marginal and financial support given 
would correspond to this difference. Though for medical and technical courses higher fees 
are charged, there is a high demand for these. Only science students who excel in their 
entrance examination could pursue these courses, because of the limited places. Therefore, 
differential fees charged do not affect the entrance behaviour of students. 
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There is a significant association between the provision of scholarships and type of courses 
which respondents pursued with xz = 200.282; df = 5; p=. 000 (Table 8, Appendix N). 
Column (2) shows that the scholarship distribution most favours those taking medicine and 
least those pursuing arts and humanities in terms of type-1 equality measurement. 
Mathematically, ES28>ES3l>ES30>ES27>ES29>ES26. This is because the public funding 
bodies would like to bind the recipients according to manpower needs in critical areas after 
graduation. This point was verified through interviews. 
" We give 20% of the financial support in the form of scholarships in order to bind the potential doctors, 
engineers and technicians to work in the public sector. We are facing acute shortages of manpower in 
these fields. " The Director, Training Division, Public Service Department, Malaysia 
Thus, the objective of the Malaysian Public Service Department is to ensure that the need 
for trained and skilled manpower for the public services and the nation as a whole is met 
through sound training policies and sponsorship programmes. Moreover, efforts are also 
geared up to encourage secondary students to take science subjects, so that they can pursue 
medical and technical courses in universities. Based on vertical equity arguments, 
scholarship distribution therefore favours those pursuing courses in medicine and 
technology to achieve the desired objective, that is meeting a more critical manpower needs. 
Next, we investigate the equality of the scholarship distribution based on six independent 
variables, in the case of natives exclusively. This is elaborated in Table 6.4 in the next page. 
There is no significant association in the provision of scholarships and gender in the case of 
natives with x2 = 0.2180; df = 1; p= . 640 
(Table 9, Appendix N). Table 6.4 shows that the 
scholarship provision slightly favours male natives in terms of type-1 equality, as 20.3% of 
male natives are receiving scholarships, compared to 19.3% of female natives. 
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6.4 Equality of Scholarship Distribution For Natives, Based on Six Variables 
Table: 6.4: Provision, and Equality of Scholarship Distribution Based on Six Independent Variables (Natives and Non -Natives Exclusively) 
Independent Variables Provision (Natives) Provision (Non-natives) 
1-1 
Gender 
Female 19.3% (ES32) 7.8% (ES53) 
Male 20.3% (ES33) 9.6% (ES54) 
Regions * * 
East Malaysia 35.9% (ES34) 16.3% (ES55) 
West Malaysia 16.6% (ES35) 8.0% (ES56) 
Areas 
Rural 17.5% (ES36) 10.3% (ES57) 
Urban 23.8% (ES37) 7.9% (ES58) 
Income Groups 
Lowest 13.0% (ES38) 13.6% (ES59) 
Low 19.7% (ES39) 9.1% (ES60) 
Medium 25.7% (ES40) 8.0% (ES61) 
High 24.6% (ES41) 5.2% (ES62) 
Top-bracket 66.7% (ES42) 0% (ES63) 
Courses * * 
Arts and Humanities 1.3% (ES43) 4.2% (ES64) 
Professional Art 19.5%(ES44) 9.8% (ES65) 
Medicine 59.3% (ES45) 15.3% (ES66) 
Pure Science 12.3% (ES46) 3.5% (ES67) 
Applied Science 18.5% (ES47) 5.3% (ES68) 
Technology 24.6% (ES48) 12.4% (ES69) 
Scores 
Low (32.50 - 42.50) 15.2% (ES49) 28.6% (ES70) 
Low-middle (43.0 - 54.50) 16.7% (ES50) 1.7% (ES71) 
Upper-middle (55.0-65.0) 14.7% (ES51) 4.6% (ES72) 
High (65.50 - 75.50) 28.4% (ES52) 14.8% (ES73) 
*p <0.01 ; Sample Size = 1522 (natives) and 1123 (Non-natives); ES32... ES73 means equality 
measurement of scholarships on criteria of independent variables 
Source: Tables 9-20, Appendix N 
In the case of natives, there is a significant association between the provision of scholarships 
and regions with x2 = 46.760; df = 1; p= . 000 
(Table 10, Appendix N). Column (2) of Table 
6.4 (See also Table 10, Appendix N) shows that the scholarship system favours the East 
Malaysian natives in terms of type-1 equality measurement. 35.9% and 16.6% of East 
Malaysian natives and West Malaysian natives are given respectively scholarships. Again, 
this is mainly because the East Malaysian States give out more scholarships to their own 
nationals, to meet their more acute shortage of manpower needs. Thus, ES34>ES35. This 
seems to promote "unequal treatment of unequals" based on regions. 
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With respect to areas, there is a significant association between the provision of 
scholarships and the areas which natives come from with x2 = 8.423; df = 4; p= . 004 (Table 
11, Appendix N). The scholarship distribution favours native respondents from the urban 
areas in terms of type-1 equality. 17.5% and 23.8% of rural and urban natives respectively 
are given with scholarships. Thus, ES36<ES37. This implies that the provision of 
scholarships fails to follow one of the objectives of the New Economic Policy and the 
National Development Policy, that is, to minimise poverty among the natives in the rural 
areas. Perhaps rural natives did not perform well in their previous academic attainment, 
compared to their urban counterparts, as scholarships are for good students. This implies that 
the scholarship distribution is especially inequitable to the rural natives both on vertical 
equity and "horizontal equity" arguments, as the incidence of poverty is much higher in the 
rural than urban areas as discussed. Moreover, the mean monthly income of rural natives 
($M 1,498) was much lower than their urban counterparts ($M 2,769) in 1997 (Malaysia, 
1999). 
There is a significant association between the provision of scholarships and the income 
groups for natives' 3 with x2 = 40.490; df = 4; p= . 000 
(Table 12, Appendix N). Column (2) 
of Table 6.4 indicates that the scholarship system favours most the top-bracket group, with 
66.7% of them provided with scholarships, compared to 13%, 19.7%, 24.6% and 25.7% of 
those of the lowest, low, high, and medium income-groups respectively. The distribution is 
generally regressive (except for the high and medium interval). This implies that the 
provision of scholarships may not follow the NEP and NDP in tending to eradicate poverty 
which always advocates preferential treatment to low income groups in terms of vertical 
equity argument. Mathematically, ES42>ES40>ES41>ES39>ES38. 
In the case of natives, the survey shows a significant association between the provision of 
scholarships and the types of courses pursued with x2 = 217.690; df = 5; p= . 000 
(Table 13, 
Appendix N). Table 6.4 indicates that the scholarship distribution favours most the natives 
pursuing the medical course but again least those taking arts and 
humanities. Thus, 
mathematically, ES45>ES48>ES44>ES47>ES46>ES43. 
More scholarships are therefore 
13 The Kendall's tau-b also shows the correlation coefficient of 0.1271 at p=0.000 (two-tailed significance) 
between provision and income-groups. 
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given to those pursuing courses in medicine, technology and professional arts to meet the 
manpower needs of the Malaysian Vision 2020 whereby Malaysia would become a fully 
developed country. Moreover, the government also encourages more natives to pursue these 
courses, thereby increasing the percentage of native in these professions, in line with the 
NEP and NDP aimed at shifting native employment from agriculture to the manufacturing 
and service sectors (Malaysia, 1999). Thus, this seems to promote "unequal treatment of 
unequals" based on type of courses pursued. 
There is a significant association between the scores for previous academic attainment and 
the provision of scholarships with x2 = 37.323; df = 3; p =. 000 (Table 14, Appendix 
N). Column (2) of Table 6.4 shows that 28.4%, 16.7%, 15.2% and 14.7% of natives, whose 
scores were respectively in the high, low-middle, low and upper-middle categories, were 
given scholarships. Thus, the scholarship distribution favours most those with high scores 
but least those with low-middle scores in terms of type-1 equality measurement. This seems 
to promote "unequal treatment of unequals" based on previous scores or ability. 
Mathematically, ES52>ES50>ES49>ES51. 
We next investigate the equality of scholarship distribution of non-native, based on six 
independent variables as elaborated in Table 6.4. 
6.5 Equality of Scholarship Distribution to Non-natives Exclusively, Based on Six 
Independent Variables 
There is no significant association between the provision of scholarships and gender with 
x2 =1.19607; df = 1; p =0.274 (Table 15, Appendix N). Column (3) of Table 6.4 also shows 
that scholarships are being given to 7.8% of non-native females, compared to 9.6% of males. 
This implies that the scholarship distribution may slightly favour the male non-natives in 
terms of type-1 equality measurement. This may be due to the fact that more non-native 
males are pursuing courses in medicine and technical courses. Thus, ES53<ES54. 
There is a significant association between the provision of scholarships and regions which 
non-natives come from, with X2 =7.786; df =1; p =. 005 (Table 16, Appendix 
N). The 
distribution of scholarships favours the East Malaysian non-natives over their 
West 
Malaysian counterparts in terms of type-1 equality measurement. 16.3% and 
8% of East 
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Malaysian and West Malaysian non-natives are given scholarships. This is mainly because 
the non-native clans and associations and churches of the East Malaysian states provide 
more scholarship to their members. One of the main objectives of the clans and associations 
is to give incentives to children of clan members and church members14 to pursue higher 
education by providing grants and scholarships. The result is similar as in the case of 
natives, and for all groups. Thus, ES55>ES56. This again implies that the vertical equity is 
promoted, based on regional differences, which also aligns with the objectives of NEP and 
NDP for enhancing regional integration. 
Subsequently, for areas which non-natives come from, there is no significant association 
between them and the provision of scholarships (x2 = 1.86450; df = 1; p= . 172; Table 17, 
Appendix N). In terms of the Type-1 equality of scholarship distribution, Column (3) of 
Table 6.4 shows that the scholarship distribution favours those from the rural rather than the 
urban areas, with 10.3% and 7.9% of each group being provided with scholarships. This 
contrasts sharply with the case of natives, where scholarship distribution favours the urban 
natives rather than their rural counterparts. In the case of non-natives, the scholarship 
distribution therefore accords with the government policy of minimising rural poverty, based 
on vertical equity argument. 
For the non-native income groups, there is no significant association with X2 =5.764; df = 4; 
p=. 217 (Table 18, Appendix N) between income groups and the provision of scholarships' 
5. 
The type-1 equality of the scholarship distribution across income groups is investigated by 
taking the provision of scholarships for each income group. Column (3) of Table 6.4 shows 
that 13.6%, 9.1%, 8%, 5.2% and 0% of the lowest, low, medium, high, and top-bracket 
groups were given scholarships respectively. This implies that scholarship distribution was 
progressive in the case of non-natives. This differed from the case of natives, which was 
generally regressive (except that it favours medium rather than high income-groups). 
Perhaps the granting of scholarships follows the government's policy of tending to eradicate 
poverty for non-natives. This seems that "unequal treatment of unequals" 
based on financial 
14 The Methodist Church in East Malaysia provides scholarships for children of the ministers to pursue 
higher 
education. 
15 However, the kendall's tau-b shows a correlation coefficient of -0.0578 at p= 0.039 
(2-tailed significance). 
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needs is promoted in the case of non-natives. Mathematically 
ES59>ES60>ES61>ES62>ES63. 
For type of courses pursued by non-natives, there is a significant association between the 
provision of scholarships and the types of courses which non-natives are pursuing with 
x2 =21.35559; df = 5; p= . 000 (Table 19, Appendix N). The scholarship distribution favours 
most those taking medical courses, but least those taking pure science, in terms of type-1 
equality measurement. This differs from the case of all groups and natives, whereby the 
scholarships are least provided to those pursuing arts and humanities. 15.3%, 12.4%, 9.8%, 
5.3%, 4.2% and 3.5% of non-natives pursuing medicine, technology, professional arts, 
applied science, arts and humanities and pure science are respectively given scholarships. 
Thus, ES66>ES69>ES65>ES68>ES64>ES67. Again, scholarships favour non-natives 
pursuing medical and technical courses, as they are critically needed by the economy, in 
both the public and private sectors. 
There is a significant association between the provision of scholarships and the previous 
academic attainment in the case of non-natives with 0.000, d. f. =3 X2 = 44.337; df =3; 
p=. 000 (Table 20, Appendix N). Table 6.4 shows that scholarships have been given to 
28.6%, 14.8%, 4.6% and 1.7% of non-natives whose previous academic scores were low, 
low-middle, upper-middle and high. Thus, the scholarship distribution favours non-natives 
whose previous academic scores were low, and this differs from the cases of all groups and 
natives. Mathematically, ES70>ES73>ES72>ES71. This is due to the non-native clans and 
associations 16 , who may take 
income as the main criterion in the offer of scholarships, as 
explained earlier. 
The equity aspect of the scholarship system can also be further investigated by looking at its 
recruitment effect. 
16 The non-native clans and associations play a significant role 
in granting scholarships to children of their 
members as a consequence of very limited public 
financial support allocated to them in the quota. 
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6.6 Recruitment Effect of Scholarships 
Adopting the approach of Reuterberg (1984) and Reuterberg and Svensson (1994) in their 
studies of the recruitment effects 17 of the Swedish student financial aid with reference to 
students' income, gender and age, the present section investigates whether the scholarships 
helped students, especially from the low-income groups, to begin and continue their 
university education. The question asked is: 
"If there had been no scholarships available to finance your university education, would you have started 
and continued your study? " 
Table: 6.5: Would students have begun/continued university education if scholarships 
had not been available? 
Responses Frequency Per cent 
Yes, definitely 160 40.4% 
Yes, Probably 105 26.5% 
No, probably not 87 22.0% 
No, definitely not 44 11.1% 
Total 396 100.0% 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 6.5 indicates that 22.0% and 11.1 % of scholarship recipients respectively stated that 
they would probably or definitely not have entered/continued university education if there 
had been no scholarships available to them. Thus, the overall recruitment effect is 33.1% 
(the sum of negative responses). However, 40.4% and 26.5% of scholarship recipients state 
respectively that they would definitely and probably have started or continued their 
university education even there had been no scholarships given to them. This implies that 
they might get other sources of finance such as help from relatives, friends, and part-time 
jobs if scholarships were not offered. 
We next examine the selective recruitment effects of scholarships in relation to income- 
groups, gender, ethnicity and the areas which recipients come from, in Table 6.6. 
17 The recruitment effect is defined as those (in percentages) who 
definitely and probably would not attend 
universities if scholarships were not offered in the 
first place. 
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For income-groups and recruitment effects of scholarships 18,75.1 % of the lowest-income 
group stated that they would probably or definitely not be attending/continuing university 
education, if there had been no scholarships given to them. None of the top-bracket 
expressed the opinion that they would not enter/continue higher education if there had been 
no scholarships available. Only 35.9%, 10.7% and 8.8% of the low, medium and high 
income-groups respectively indicate that they would probably and definitely not pursue 
university education if there had been no scholarships given to them. Thus, scholarships 
have the greatest effects in recruiting and preventing the dropout of the lowest and low- 
income groups in attending university education. These results show that the present 
scholarship system which is inequitable to the lower-income groups may be unjustified even 
on vertical equity grounds, as it favours the high-income groups, where there is a lower 
"recruitment effect" than that of the lower-income groups. Surely, the vertical inequity is 
compounded by the fact that the latter group's recruitment is most likely to be affected by 
availability of scholarships. 
Table 6.6: Decisions to Enter/Continue University Education by Income-Groups, Gender, 
Ethnicity, and Areas if No Scholarships had been given. 
Independent 
Variables/Responses 
Yes, 
definitely 
Yes, 
probably 
No, probably 
not 
No, definitely 
not 
Total = 100% 
Income * 
Lowest 15.0% 10.0% 33.8% 41.3% 80 
Low 30.1% 34.0% 29.4% 6.5% 153 
Medium 62.0% 27.3% 9.9% 0.8% 121 
High 58.8% 32.4% 8.8% 0.0% 34 
Top-Bracket 87.5% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 8 
Gender 
Female 38.2% 28.9% 22.1% 10.8% 249 
Male 44.2% 22.4% 21.8% 11.6% 147 
Ethnicity * 
Native 34.6% 31.5% 23.5% 10.4% 298 
Non-native 58.2% 11.2% 17.3% 13.3% 98 
Areas * 
Rural 32.3% 27.3% 28.5% 11.8% 220 
Urban 50.6% 25.6% 13.6% 10.2% 176 
*P<0.01, Sample Size= 396 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
18 There is a significant association between decisions whether to enter/continue university education and 
income groups if no scholarships were given (x2=156.337; 
df=12; p=. 000). The kendall's tau-b also indicates 
the correlation coefficient of -0.4525 at p=. 000. 
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For the recruitment effects by gender19,33.4% and 32.9% of males and females respectively 
would probably and definitely not continuing university education. The recruitment effect is 
therefore higher for males over females. Thus, the present study, which shows that the 
scholarship provision favours the females suggests that the system, may be partially 
unjustified. 
In the case of ethnicity20,33.9% of natives and 30.6% of non-natives expressed that they 
would definitely or probably not begin/continue university education if no scholarships had 
been given to them. Thus, the recruitment effects of scholarships for natives are slightly 
higher than those for non-natives. This may partially justify the fact that scholarship 
distribution favours the natives on vertical equity grounds shown in Table 6.3, although this 
is affected by selection bias. Probably, given the overall disadvantages they face, non- 
natives at university are likely, on average, to be more determined due to limited allocation 
of places to them according to the quotas. 
For areas 21, the recruitment effect of scholarships is higher for rural respondents (40.4%) 
than for urban respondents (23.8%). The present scholarship distribution which favours the 
rural undergraduates on vertical equity grounds, as discussed and as shown in Table 6.3, is 
therefore partially justified. 
We next examine the information obtained from the respondents about their qualified 
friends who did not pursue university education in the public universities. 
6.7 Friends Who Did Not Attend Universities 
To further investigate the equity of the scholarship system in Malaysia, the information 
obtained from the respondents about their friends who were qualified but did not pursue 
studies in the public universities is examined. Reasons for not attending the public university 
education were financial problems, not interested in university education, wanting to get a 
job, need to take care of parents and preference for overseas education. We investigated the 
19 There is no significant association between decisions whether to enter/continue university education and 
f0ender, if there had been no scholarships given (x2 = 2.34688; df = 3; p= . 
504) 
There is a significant association between decisions whether to enter/continue university education and 
ethnicity, if there had been no scholarships given (x2 = 23.45933; df = 3; p =. 000). 
21 There is a significant association between decisions whether to enter/continue university education and areas 
respondents come from, if there had been no scholarships given. 
(x2 = 18.444; df = 3; p =. 000). 
141 
financial problem only to see whether it has deterred qualified friends from attending 
university to further investigate the equity of the financial support system. 
Table: 6.7: Financial Problem 
Reasons Frequency Percent 
The most important reason 1160 83.1% 
Second most important reason 88 6.3% 
Third most important reason 24 1.7% 
Not the reason 124 8.9% 
Total 1396 100.0% 
Source: 1 he Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 6.7 shows that 83.1 % of respondents quoted financial problems as the most important 
reason for their friends not attending the Malaysian public universities. The second most 
important reason, 6.3%, and the third most important reason, 1.7% follow this. However, 
only 8.9% of friends do not attend the university education because of other reasons as 
stated before. Scholarships may not have fully reached those who really need them, as 
indicated in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 : Financial Reasons or not, By income-Groups, Ethnicity, Gender, and Areas 
Variables/ 
Reasons 
Not 
reason 
the 1St important 
reason 
2°d important 
reason 
3rd important 
reason 
Total = 100% 
Income-Groups * 
Poor/Low 0.3% 93.0% 5.8% 0.9% 1035 
Medium/Middle 32.3% 56.4% 7.8% 3.5% 344 
Rich/High 66.7% 13.3% 6.3% 13.3% 15 
Ethnicity * 
Native 4.8% 88.1% 5.7% 1.4% 949 
Non-Native 17.5% 72.6% 7.6% 2.2% 445 
Gender * 
Female 5.2% 88.2% 6.0% 0.7% 756 
Male 13.3% 77.2% 6.7% 2.8% 639 
Areas * 
Rural 3.9% 90% 4.9% 1.2% 882 
Urban 17.5% 71.2% 8.8% 2.5% 514 
* p<. 01; Sample Size = 1396 
Source: The main study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
In the case of income-groups 
22,1035 of friends are from low-income group who did not 
attend public university for financial reasons. Of these, 93.0%, 
5.8% and 0.9% of them cited 
financial problems as the first most important, second most 
important and third most 
important reasons respectively. Only 0.3% of low-income 
friends indicated that financial 
problems were not the reason in preventing them 
from attending university education. 
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Similarly, 32.3% of low- income friends and 66.7% of high income friends respectively' 
indicated that financial constraints were not the reasons to prevent them from pursuing 
university education. Thus, financial problem is the major barrier for the low-income group 
from pursuing university education. This implies that scholarships have not fully accessed 
the low-income group, for whom the recruitment effects of scholarships are greatest. 83.1 % 
of friends, as indicated in Table 6.8, did not attend university because of financial 
constraints as the most important reason, which could be overcome if scholarships or loans 
were given to them, instead of granting scholarships to the higher income groups where the 
recruitment effects are much lower. Head-teachers of high school also revealed that financial 
factor was prominent for those qualified candidates who did not attend universities 
(Interview with high school head teachers). 
In terms of ethnicity 23,4.8% of native friends stated that financial constraints were not the 
reason preventing them from entering the university education, compared to 17.5% of non- 
native friends. Similarly, 88.1%, 5.7% and 1.4% from a total of 949 native friends stated 
respectively that financial problems were the most important, second most important, and 
third most important reasons for not attending university education. Also, 72.6%, 7.6% 2.2% 
from a total of 445 non-native friends stated that financial problems were the most 
important, second most important and third most important reason respectively for not 
attending university education. This indicates that financial problems are still having a 
prominent effect in preventing the qualified youth, both natives and non-natives, from 
entering universities. More financial support may be given especially to needy students. 
However, the present financial aid is constrained by limited funds. A proposal for a 
modified financial system is needed, to overcome budgetary constraints. 
For gender24,88.2% of female friends who could not attend public universities because of 
financial problem as the most important reason, whereas that of male is 77.2% of them. This 
means that female friends have a higher chance of not attending the university education 
22 Table 6.9 shows a significant association between reasons for not attending the public university and 
income-groups (x2 = 429.292; df =6; p= . 
000). The kendall's tau-b correlation coefficient is -0.297 at p=. 000 
23 There is a significant association between the financial problem as reasons 
for not attending the university 
and ethnic groups (x2 = 66.904; df = 3; p= . 
000). 
24 The association between gender and financial problem as reasons, 
in preventing qualified youth from 
entering universities is significant (x2 = 41.034; 
df = 3; p =. 000). 
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because of financial constraints. The present scholarship distribution, which favours female 
is therefore partially justified. 
For areas friends come from25,90% of rural friends could not attend public universities -gave 
financial problems as the most important reason, compared to 71,2% of urban friends. 
Thus, rural friends are more likely not to attend university education because of financial 
constraints. The present scholarship distribution which favours undergraduates from rural 
areas may be partially justified. 
To further investigate the equity of the scholarship system, we now examine the demand for 
scholarships of friends who did not attend universities because of financial constraint as the 
main factor. This is elaborated in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9 : Demand for Scholarships By Income-Groups, Ethnicity, Gender and Areas 
Respondents' Friends Come From, with Finance as the Most Important Reason 
Demand/Variables NO YES NOT SURE Total = 100% 
Income-Groups * 
Low/Poor 2.5% 96.1% 1.5% 963 
Middle/Medium 9.8% 89.2% 1.0% 194 
Rich/High 100% 0.0% 0% 2 
Ethnicity 
Native 3.3% 95.5% 1.2% 836 
Non-native 5.3% 92.9% 1.9% 323 
Gender 
Female 3.8% 95.0% 1.2% 666 
Male 4.1% 94.3% 1.6% 493 
Areas 
Rural 2.9% 95.8% 1.3% 794 
Urban 6% 92.3% 1.6% 366 
*p <0.01; Sample Size = 1160 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
For income-groups 26,96.1% of low-income group friends who did not attend the public 
university because of financial problems as the main reason, stated that they 
had applied for 
scholarships but were rejected. Only 2.5% of them did not apply 
for scholarships. Also, 
1.5% of respondents were not sure whether their low-income 
friends applied for 
scholarships or not. Thus, the scholarship system has not 
fully reached the low income- 
25 There is a significant association between areas and 
financial problem as reasons or not, for friends not 
attending universities (x2 = 92.864; df = 3, p =. 
000). 
26 Table 6.10 shows a significant association between the demand 
for scholarships by friends who did not 
attend university education and income-groups because of 
financial constraints as the main reason 
(x2 = 72.784; df = 4; p=. 000). The Kendall's tau-b also shows 
the correlation coefficient of -0.1453, p=. 000 (2- 
tailed significance). 
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groups who wish to pursue the university education. This higher demand for scholarships 
among the low-income groups further implies that the scholarship system is inequitable to 
the low-income groups on both "horizontal equity" and vertical equity grounds, as the result 
of the analysis discussed in Section 6.3.5 suggests that the scholarship distribution is 
regressive. It is therefore inequitable to those who are qualified academically but barred 
from university education because of financial problems. Similarly, 89.2% of the middle 
income group applied for scholarships but were rejected. More of them would be recruited if 
the funds were sufficient. The present scholarship system is therefore also inefficient, as 
potential manpower to meet the needs of economy has been lost, when qualified candidates 
did not go for university because of financial constraints. 
The demand of native friends for scholarships was higher (95.5%) over non-native friends 
(92.9%). The demand of female friends for scholarships was higher over males. In terms of 
areas, 95.8% and 92.3% of friends from the rural and urban, who did not attend university 
because of financial constraints as the main reason applied for scholarships respectively. The 
higher demand for scholarships by friends from rural than that of the urban friends suggests 
that the present scholarship distribution, favouring undergraduates from the rural area may 
be partially justified on vertical equity grounds. The significant association between the 
demand for scholarships and areas friends come from (x2 = 11.131; df = 2; p= . 03 8) 
reinforces this. 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed critically the equality of scholarship distribution among 
undergraduates (1996 intake) in five Malaysian public universities, by first investigating the 
provision of scholarships to undergraduates classified according to seven independent 
variables, case by case. These independent variables are ethnicity, gender, areas and regions 
which respondents come from, income groups, courses of studies, and previous academic 
performance. Cross-tabulations are used in examining the association 
between the provision 
of scholarships with each independent variable. Kendall's tau-b 
is also used to indicate the 
strength of relations between the independent and 
dependent variables concerned. Since 
ethnicity is prominent in determining scholarship provision, we 
have also therefore analysed 
separately the natives and non-natives classified according 
to the other independent 
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variables (gender, regions, areas where respondents coming from, courses of studies, 
income-groups and previous academic performance). 
Type-1 equality measures the equality or inequality of scholarship distribution in 
investigating whether scholarships were distributed equally across all categories within the 
same independent variable. On the other hand, type-2 equality measurement examines 
whether the scholarship distribution between all categories within each independent variable 
concerned, is relatively equal to their percentage distribution in the general population. The 
representation index is calculated to examine whether categories of these independent 
variables are over- or under-represented in the general population. Type-2 equality 
measurement is useful to examine whether the scholarship distribution follows strictly the 
ethnic quota and other principles embedded in the NEP and the NDP. According to these 
policies, the distribution of resources should reflect the racial composition of the country, 
the minimising of poverty especially in rural areas, and the regional integration of East 
Malaysia and West Malaysia. Since gender is generally an important issue, I also examine 
whether there is any discrimination by gender in the scholarship distribution. Vertical 
equity and "horizontal equity" grounds were used as valued judgements for the distributions. 
The equity aspect is further investigated by examining the recruitment effect of scholarships, 
that is, the extent to which scholarship recipients would not enter or continue in university 
education, if there were no scholarships offered to them. Scholarship recipients were asked 
whether they would still decide to enter or continue to pursue university education if there 
were no scholarships offered to them. This has been selectively examined in the case of 
gender, ethnicity, income-groups and areas. Scholarships have general/overall recruitment 
effects of 33.1% in helping the students to begin and continue in university education. 
However, scholarships have a higher recruitment effect, that is 75.1 %, for the lowest-income 
groups of recipients, compared to those of the low, medium, high and top-bracket groups. 
which are respectively 35.9%, 13.2%, 6.7% and 0%. This 
further implies that the present 
scholarship system is inequitable to the lowest and 
low-income groups, since their 
recruitment effects are relatively greater but the scholarship 
distribution to them is relatively 
less, as indicated in Table 6.3. 
146 
The recruitment effect is greater for males (33.4%) than females (32.9%). Thus, more 
scholarships may have been given to males since the recruitment effect for them is greater 
than that for females. This further implies that the scholarship distribution has been 
inequitable to males as indicated in Table 6.3. In the case of ethnicity, the recruitment effect 
is higher for natives (33.9%) than non-natives (30.6%). Thus, the result in Table 6.3, which 
shows that the scholarship distribution is unequal to non-natives compared to natives, both 
in type-1 equality and type-2 equality measurements, may be partially justified in terms of 
vertical equity argument. The recruitment effect of scholarships for rural recipients (40.4%) 
is higher than for their urban counterparts (22.9%), suggesting that the present scholarship 
distribution favouring the rural undergraduates is partially justified in terms of "unequal 
treatment of unequals". 
Friends who did not attend the university but applied for scholarships further indicates the 
equity of the scholarship system. This is examined in terms of gender, ethnicity, income and 
areas. There is a higher demand for scholarships from the low-income group (96.1 %) than 
the middle income-groups (89.2%) and high income-group (0%). This suggests that 
scholarships have not fully reached the lower income-groups. This also further implies that 
the scholarship system is inequitable to lower income groups on horizontal and vertical 
equity grounds. There has also been a higher demand for scholarships in the case of native 
friends (95.5%), compared to 92.9% for non-native friends. The demand of female friends 
for scholarships (95%) is higher over male friends (94.3%). The higher demand for 
scholarships of friends from the rural (95.8%) than urban (92.3%) areas, and the significant 
association between the demand for scholarships and areas which friends come from, may 
partially justify the present distribution of scholarships which favours rural respondents 
in 
terms of vertical equity argument. The next chapter will examine the equality of 
loan 
distribution for equity implications. 
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Chapter 7 
Loan Distribution at the Malaysian Public Universities 
7.0 Overview 
This chapter uses a similar method to the analysis of scholarship distribution to 
undergraduates of five Malaysian public universities, by examining the provision of loans 
for undergraduates, grouped with reference to seven independent variables. These are ethnic 
groups, gender, regions (East Malaysia or West Malaysia), income groups, respondents' 
courses of studies, areas of origin (rural or urban), and previous academic performance, as in 
Chapter 6. Multiple logistic regression will be used in chapter 8 to take into account the 
interrelationships of these independent variables. 
Section One defines some of the terms as a preliminary to further analysis. Section Two 
analyses the equality of loan distribution for all groups (native and non-native combined), 
and for natives and non-natives separately, with reference to the seven factors stated. Section 
Three examines the equality of loan distribution for natives exclusively, while Section Four 
repeats the process for the case of non-natives exclusively. To further examine the equity of 
loans, Section Five investigates their recruitment effects by asking recipients whether they 
would have entered and continued university education if loans were not given in the first 
place. To further examine the equity of the loan system, Section Six investigates friends who 
did not attend universities in relation to demand for loans. Section Seven investigates the 
opinions of high school students (potential undergraduates) regarding financial support, 
while Section Eight concludes the chapter. 
7.1 Definitions of Terms 
7.. 1 The Demand for loans 
The demand for loans refers to those parties concerned who had applied for loans, whether 
successfully or not. These include the demand for loans of respondents who received loan 
and parental support, and of respondents' friends who did not attend university and gave 
financial reasons as the main factor. The study also investigated the demand of high school 
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students for loans. These enquiries allow the further examination of the equality of the loan 
system. These groups will be examined in Sections 7.6 and 7.7. 
7.1.2 The Provision of Loans 
There were 1689 respondents receiving loans from the Public Service Department, the 
MARA, the Ministry of Education, States Government and private firms. The amounts `given 
were standardised or the same, following the regulations set by the Public Service 
Department, though they differ marginally according to courses taken corresponding to 
differential fees charged. The number of loans was relatively large, compared to 
scholarships, as the funding bodies currently give only a limited number of scholarships. 
There were also 560 respondents who did not receive any form of financial support. My 
analysis will be based on the 1689 respondents who received loans as well as the 956 who 
did not receive any loans. Undergraduates are eligible to receive either loans or scholarships. 
Chi-square test is used to find whether there is any significant association between the 
provision of loans to recipients and the respective independent variables, for the same 
reasons as in the analysis of scholarships. The Kendall's-b statistic is also used to indicate 
the strength of the relationship between ordered categories, such as income groups. 
7.1.3 Equity 
The two facets of equity are used as in the analysis of scholarships. This means that equality 
is used when examining the loan distribution while equity is employed 
for normative 
judgement or implications. Thus, type-1 equality and type-2 equality measurements are 
used. For type-1 equality measurement, we investigate whether 
loans were distributed 
equally of all categories within each independent variable. 
These variables are ethnicity, 
gender, areas of origin, regions, income-groups, types of courses which respondents 
pursued, and scores attained in the previous academic achievement. 
Subsequently. we 
examine the percentage of each category that 
is provided with loans. For example, we can 
examine the percentages of males and females who were provided with 
loans, classified by 
gender, an independent variable. Subsequently, we compare 
the percentages of males and 
females who received loans. The loan provision 
is said to favour females over males if a 
higher percentage of the former received 
loans, as compared to the latter. We investigate 
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type-1 equality measurement for all groups (natives and non-natives combined), for natives 
and non-natives separately. 
Similar to the analysis of the type-2 equality measurement for scholarships, the shares of 
loans for different categories within the same independent variable can be compared with 
their respective shares in the general population. As in the case of scholarships, the 
representative index {ter Wheele eta 1, (1979), as cited by Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 
(1985)} is also used to indicate whether a particular group or category within the same 
independent variable is over- or under-represented in relation to the total population. I only 
examine such independent variables as the ethnic groups, areas which respondents come 
from, gender and region, as in the case of scholarships. The analysis involving the relative 
shares of loans in comparison with groups' percentage of the population is particularly 
useful to examine whether the loan distribution follows strictly the ethnic quota and the 
principles of the NEP and the NDP, as in the case of the scholarship distribution. 
Thus, for ethnic groups, I take as parameters their percentage distribution in the 1995 
estimates for the Malaysian population, which is 61.7% for natives and 38.3% for non- 
natives, compared with their relative shares of loans. For the areas which respondents come 
from, I use rural (45.3%) and urban (54.7%) the population percentage as parameters. 
Similarly, in the case of regions the estimated population of East Malaysia (20.7%) and 
West Malaysia (79.3%) are used as parameter. For gender, I use the male population of 
49.5% and 50.5% of female population as parameters. Thus, I need to examine whether the 
loan provision matches the population shares of the respective four independent variables 
mentioned above. Again, vertical equity underpins the judgements on equality or inequality 
of loan distribution. To a certain extent, "horizontal equity" will also be used to imply the 
equity of the loan system with reference to different variables as in the case of scholarships. 
The recruitment effects of loans are also investigated by examining how far loans 
help 
recipients to gain access to university. Loan recipients were asked whether they would 
have 
entered or would continue university studies if loans had not 
been offered to them in the first 
place. The level of negative responses would indicate the 
"recruitment effects" of loans. To 
further investigate the equity of the loan system, respondents were asked about their friends 
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who did not attend university because of financial problems, and their friends' demand for 
loans. 
Subsequently, I examine the equality of loan distribution for all groups with reference to 
seven independent variables. The same measures and concepts of independent variables are 
used to analyse the equality of the loan distribution as in the case of scholarships. 
7.2 Equality of Loan Distribution, for All Groups (Natives and Non-natives combined) 
Table 7.1: Provision and Equality of Loan Distribution for All Groups with Reference 
to Seven Independent Variables 
Variables 
(1) 
Ethnicity * 
Native 
Non-native 
Gender* 
Female 
Male 
Regions* 
East Malaysia 
West Malaysia 
Areas * 
Rural 
Urban 
Income C* 
Lowest 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Top-Bracket 
Courses * 
Art 
Humanities 
Professional 
Arts 
Medicine 
Pure SC 
Applied SC 
Technology 
Scores 
Low-Score 
Low-Middle 
Upper-Middle 
High 
Provision of Loans for 
Groups within Independent 
Variables 
(Type-1 Equality 
(2) 
77.3% (EL 1) 
45.6% (EL2) 
68.4% (EL5) 
56.6% (EL6) 
58.7% (EL9) 
64.6% (ELI 0) 
73.0% (EL13) 
53.3% (EL14) 
83.3% (EL17) 
64.9% (ELI 8) 
52.8% (EL19) 
46.3% (EL20) 
22.2% (EL21) 
86.0% (EL22) 
67.3% (EL23) 
36.3% (EL24) 
63.1% (EL25) 
60.5% (EL26) 
54.8% (EL27) 
72.5% (EL28) 
71.1 % (EL29) 
68.3% (EL30) 
54.8% (EL31) 
General 
Population 
Share 
(3) 
61.7% 
38.3% 
50.5% 
49.5% 
20.7% 
79.3% 
45.3% 
54.7% 
Proportions of loans 
For Each Group of 
Each Independent 
Variable 
(4) 
69.7% 
30.3% 
65.7% 
34.3% 
11.5% 
88.5% 
61.4% 
38.6% 
* chi-square significance at <_ 0.05; 
Sample Size = 2645; EL1... EL31 
loans on criteria 1 to 31 of independent variables 
Source: Tables 1- 8, Appendix 0 
Type-2 Equality 
(5)=(4). X100 
113 (EL3) 
79 (EL4) 
107.7 (EL7) 
88.5 (EL8) 
91.3 (EL 11) 
101.3 (EL12) 
135.5 (ELI5) 
70.6 (ELI 6) 
means equality measurements of 
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Column (1) of Table 7.1 shows how loans were distributed for respondents in five 
Malaysian public universities, with reference to seven independent variables as stated. 
Column (2) shows the percentage of each category, within every independent variable 
which is provided with loans. This is used to explore type-1 equality measurement for equity 
implications. Column (3) shows the population share between categories within the same 
independent variable. Column (4) shows the provision of loans as percentages between each 
category of the same independent variable, for four independent variables only (ethnicity, 
gender, regions and areas). Type-2 equality is calculated by dividing Column (4) with 
Column (3), to obtain the representative index for each category of the same independent 
variable. 
The results show that for ethnicity, there is a significant association between the provision of 
loans and ethnic groups with y, '= 282.068; df = 1; p= . 
000 (Table 1, Appendix 0). Also, 
Column (2) of Table 7.1 indicates that 77.3% and 45.6% of natives and non-natives 
respectively received loans. Therefore, the loan distribution favours natives rather than non- 
natives in terms of type-1 equality measurement. Mathematically, EL 1 >EL2. This aligns 
with the affirmative measure to favour the natives as in the case of scholarship distribution. 
Based on vertical equity argument, natives were being treated preferentially with more loan 
support, motivating them to gain access to university education. 
We can also examine the type-2 equality of loan distribution between ethnic groups by 
investigating their respective shares of loans compared to their shares in the Malaysian 
population. This enables us to examine whether the loan distribution follows the quotas 
embedded in the NEP and NDP as specified. According to these policies, the distribution of 
resources should reflect the ethnic composition of the Malaysian society. 
Column (4) shows that the percentages of loans received by natives and non-natives, were 
69.7% and 30.3% respectively. The estimated Malaysian population in 1995 was 61.7% and 
38.3% for natives and non-natives respectively. However, the provision of loans (69.7%) to 
natives, is higher than their share in the population (61.7%). In contrast, the provision of 
loans to non-natives (30.3%) is lower than their share in the population (38.3%). Thus, the 
loan distribution again favours the natives in terms of Type-2 equality measurement. In 
I 5? 
other words, natives are over-represented whereas non-natives are under-represented in loan 
distribution, as indicated by the representation index in column (5), that is, 113 and 79.1 for 
natives and non-natives respectively. Mathematically, EL3>EL4. Similar to scholarships, the 
loan distribution favours natives, rather than reflecting the racial composition of the country. 
The distribution of loans again favours natives more than would be allowed by the quota 
system. 
Non-natives therefore need to secure higher merit points in their previous academic 
attainment than natives to be awarded loans. As in the case of scholarships, the provision of 
loans is affected by the political quota system embedded in the NEP and NDP introduced 
after the racial conflicts of 1969. 
There is a significant association between the provision of loans and gender ( x2 = 37.693; 
df = 1; p =. 000; Table 2, Appendix 0). We can examine type-1 equality measurement of 
loan provision according to gender by investigating the receipts of loans in percentages of 
males and females shown in Table 7.1 (see also Table 2 of Appendix 0). Column (2) of 
Table 7.1 shows that 68.4% and 56.6% of females and males respectively receive loans. 
Thus, loan provision favours females over males. Mathematically, EL5>EL6. We shall 
further investigate this by taking into account interrelationships of other independent 
variables in chapter 8. 
To examine type-2 equality, we need to compare the relative shares of loans for males and 
females with their respective population percentages. Column (3) shows that the 
composition of females and males in the 1995 estimated Malaysian population, was 50.5% 
and 49.5% respectively. However, the percentages of all loans received by female and male 
respondents are 65.7% and 34.3% respectively. This means that females are over- 
represented in the loan provision whereas males are under-represented, indicated by the 
representation indices of 107.6 and 88.5 respectively in column (5). Mathematically, 
EL7>EL8. The loan distribution favours females in both types of equality measurements, 
implying a positive discrimination towards females in the offer of loans. This may align with 
the government policy of encouraging female participation in the economy. 
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For regions, East and West Malaysia are used in the analysis, as in Chapter 6. There is a 
significant association between the provision of loans and regions with x2 =4.314; df = 1; 
p= . 0378 as 
indicated in Table 3, Appendix 0. The loan distribution favours West 
Malaysians over East Malaysians, as 64.6% of West Malaysians receive loans, compared to 
58.7% of East Malaysians. Thus, EL9>EL10, as shown in column (2). The loan system is 
therefore inequitable to East Malaysians, both in terms of "horizontal equity" and vertical 
equity. 
In terms of type-2 equality measurement, we take the population percentages of West and 
East Malaysia as parameters to see whether the shares of loans for respondents in both 
regions reflect the regional population composition. Column (4) shows that the percentages 
of all loans given to East and West Malaysians are 11.5% and 88.5% respectively, compared 
to their respective population shares of 20.65% and 79.35% in column (3). East Malaysians 
are under-represented in the provision of loans because their share of loans (11.5%) is less 
than their population share (20.7%). In contrast, West Malaysians are over-represented in 
loan provision, as their share of loans (88.5%) is more than their share of population 
(79.3%). Representation indices in column (5), 91.3 and 101.3 for East Malaysians and West 
Malaysians respectively indicate again that the loan distribution favours West Malaysians. 
Thus, EL 11 >EL 12. Both type-1 equality and type-2 equality measurements show that loan 
distribution favour West Malaysians. The results are the reverse of scholarships. More loans 
should have been given to East Malaysians in terms of "horizontal" and vertical equity 
arguments, as East Malaysian states face more shortage of qualified manpower in all areas 
than West Malaysian counterparts. Loan system appears to be inequitable to East 
Malaysians, on "horizontal equity" and vertical equity grounds as the percentage of labour 
force with university education in East Malaysian state (for example, Sarawak) is relatively 
low, only 6.4% (Year Book of Statistics Sarawak, 1999) compared to 13.2% for the whole 
country in 1998 (Year Book of Statistics Malaysia, 1999). This implies that more of East 
Malaysians should be motivated to go for universities through financial support. 
For areas, the rural-urban dichotomy is used, as in Chapter 6 in examining the equity of 
scholarship distribution. There is a significant association between the provision of loans 
and areas of respondents' origin with X'= 110.671; df = 1; p =. 000 (Table 4, Appendix 0). 
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Provision of loans in percentages is used to investigate Type-1 Equality measurement. 
Column (2) of Table 7.1 shows that 73% and 53.3% of the rural and urban undergraduates 
are respectively provided with loans. This indicates that the loan provision favours 
undergraduates from the rural areas. Mathematically, EL 13>EL 14. This implies that 
"unequal treatment of unequals" is promoted for undergraduates coming from rural areas, 
aligned with the NEP and NDP of tending to eradicate or minimise poverty in rural areas. 
In terms of type-2 Equality measurement, the percentage distribution of the 1995 estimated 
Malaysian population between the rural and urban areas is used as the parameter. Column 
(4) shows that the provision of loans between the rural and urban areas is 61.4% and 38.6% 
respectively and their respective shares of the population are 45.3% and 54.7%. Thus, the 
share of loans to the rural respondents (61.4%), is more than their share of the total 
population (45.3%). In contrast, the percentage of loans given to urban respondents (38.6%) 
is less than their share in the population (54.7%). Thus, the loan distribution favours those 
from the rural areas. This inequality can also be shown by the representation indices of 
135.5 and 70.6 for the rural and urban areas respectively, as indicated in column (5). Rural 
undergraduates are therefore over-represented in the loan provision, and urban 
undergraduates are under-represented. This accords with the government's policy of 
eradicating hard-core poverty and of minimising the poverty in the rural areas through 
supporting higher education. 
However, the incidence of poverty in the rural areas is 4.1 times higher than that in the urban 
areas 1. Thus, an even greater share of loans should be given to those from the rural areas on 
vertical equity grounds as rural undergraduates receive only 1.6 times more loans than those 
from the urban areas. This is especially the case when the poor have to consider the 
opportunity costs foregone. 
The same classification of income is used as in the analysis of scholarship distribution in 
chapter 6. The association between the provision of loans and income-groups is significant 
with x2 =182.885; df =4; p= . 
000 (Table 5 Appendix 0). The provision of loans in 
' The incidence of poverty was 15.3% in the rural areas, compared to 3.7% in the urban areas in the year 1995 
(National Printing Press, the Seventh Malaysian Plan {1996-20001,1997). 
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percentages for the various income-groups, from Table 5 of Appendix P, is additionally 
indicated in Table 7.1 to examine type-1 equality measurement. 
Column (2) shows that 83.3%, 64.9%, 52.8%, 46.3%, and 22.2% of the lowest, low, 
medium, high and top-bracket groups are provided with loans. Thus, the loan distribution 
favours most the lowest-income group and then the low-income group, helping them to gain 
access to university education. The medium, high and top-bracket income-groups follow in 
descending order. Mathematically, ELI 7>EL18>EL 19>EL20>EL21. This suggests that 
lower income-groups were being treated preferentially in terms of vertical equity argument, 
following objectives of the NEP and NDP. 
There is a significant association between the provision of loans and the type of courses 
which respondents pursue with x2 = 203.148; df =5; p =. 000 (Table 6, Appendix 0). As 
Table 7.1 shows in terms of type-1 equality measurement, the distribution of loans most 
favours those taking arts and humanities, but least those taking medicine. 86%, 67.3%, 
63.1%, 60.5%, 54.8% and 36.3% respectively of respondents pursuing arts and humanities, 
professional arts, pure science, applied science, technology and medical courses are 
provided with loans. Thus, EL22>EL23>EL25>EL26>EL27>EL24. This implies that loans 
are most likely to be given for courses such as arts and humanities, which are not critically 
demanded by the economy. Courses in technology and medicine are least supported by loans 
but instead gain most scholarships, as they are critically needed by the economy, as 
examined in the previous chapter. The funding bodies (especially in the public sector) would 
like to commit scholarship holders to work with them and meet for their manpower needs 
after graduation. 
There is also a significant association between the provision of loans and scores attained in 
previous performance with x2 = 55.473; df = 3; p= . 000 (Table 7, Appendix 0). The loan 
distribution favours respondents with low-scores (32.50- 42.50) in terms of type-1 equality 
measurement, and it declines progressively with higher scores. As shown in column (4) of 
Table 7.1,72.5%, 71.1%, 68.3% and 54.8% of undergraduates obtaining low, low-middle, 
upper-middle and high scores in their previous academic performance are provided with 
loans. Thus, EL28>EL29>EL30>EL31. This implies that previous academic performance 
does not have much weight in the offer of loans, in contrast with the scholarship offer. 
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Perhaps more weight is given to the income criterion in the loan offer as those who have the 
lowest academic scores tend to come from the lowest and low- income groups (Table 8, 
Appendix 0). We shall investigate this by taking into account interrelationships of other 
variables, using multiple logistic regression in chapter 8. 
The quota system requires that ethnicity is a prominent factor in the distribution of financial 
support. The intra-ethnic equity of the loans is therefore investigated by examining the loan 
distribution on other six independent variables for the natives only. 
7.3 Equality of Loan Distribution on Natives Exclusively 
This is shown in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Provision and Equality of Loans to Natives and Non-natives Exclusively, 
Classified by Six Independent Variables 
Independent Variables Provision (Natives) Provision (Non-natives) 
(1) 12) (3) 
Gender 
Female 77.8% (EL32) 50.2% (EL53) 
Male 76.2% (EL33) 41.2% (EL54) 
Region 
East Malaysia 60.7% (EL34) 54.1 % (EL55) 
West Malaysia 80.4% (EL35) 44.8% (EL56) 
Areas 
Rural 80.5% (EL36) 53.6% (EL57) 
Urban 70.8% (EL37) 41.2% (EL58) 
mum Income Groups 
Lowest 86.6% (EL38) 68.2% (EL59) 
Low 78.5% (EL39) 49.5% (EL60) 
Medium 68.4% (EL40) 40.4 % (EL61) 
High 63.6% (EL41) 25.0% (EL62) 
Top-bracket 25.0% (EL42) 16.7% (EL63) 
Courses 
Arts Humanities 98.4% (EL43) 58.7% (EL64) 
Professional Arts 78.7% (EL44) 48.1% (EL65) 
Medicine 33.1% (EL45) 40.5% (EL66) 
Pure Science 82.2% (EL46) 50.9% (EL67) 
Applied Science 76.4% (EL47) 36.5% (EL68) 
Technology 72.1% (EL48) 42.4% (EL69) 
Previous Academic Scores 
Low (32.50 - 42.50) 84.8% (EL49) 14.3% (EL70) 
Low-middle (43.0 - 54.50) 80.0% (EL50) 48.7% (EL71) 
Upper-middle (55.0-65.0) 82.9% (EL51) 49.1% (EL72) 
High . 65.50 - 
75.50) 67.6% (EL52) 41.3% (EL73) 
* p<_ . 05; 
Sample Size = 1522 (Natives) and 1123 (Non-natives); ** . 05 <p <0.1; EL32... EL73 means 
equality measurements of loans on criteria 32 to 73 of independent variables 
Source: Tables 9-20, Appendix 0 
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Taking gender as a factor, there is no significant association between the provision of loans 
and gender in the case of natives, with y, '=. 507; df =1; p= . 477 (Table 9, Appendix 0). In 
terms of type-1 equality measurement, Table 7.2 indicates that the loan distribution slightly 
favours native females over their male counterparts. 77.8% and 76.2% of native females and 
males were respectively receiving loans. Mathematically, EL32>EL33. This suggests a 
positive discrimination towards the female natives in the loan provision for encouraging 
more female participation in higher education on vertical equity grounds as females were 
discriminated against in the past. 
The association between the provision of loans and regions where natives come from is 
significant, with x2 = 43.723; df = 1; p =. 000 (Table 10, Appendix O). The loan distribution 
favours the West Malaysian natives in terms of type-1 equality measurement. Only 60.7% of 
East Malaysian natives, compared to 80.5% of their West Malaysian counterparts are 
provided with loans, as indicated in Column (2). This implies that East Malaysian natives 
may be discriminated when compared to West Malaysian counterparts and hence inequitable 
on horizontal equity and vertical equity grounds. 
There is also a significant association between the provision of loans and areas where 
natives come from, with x2 =18.127; df =1; p =. 000 (Table 11, Appendix 0 ). Column (2) of 
Table 7.2 shows that 80.5% and 70.8% of rural and urban natives respectively are given 
loans. Thus, the loan provision favours rural natives in terms of type-1 equality 
measurement. This implies that the provision of loans helps to achieve one of the objectives 
of the NEP and the NDP, that is, to minimise poverty in the rural areas as mentioned earlier. 
Thus, EL36 > EL37. More loans were given to rural native undergraduates to promote 
"unequal treatment of unequals" as desired by the NEP and NDP. 
There is a significant association between the provision of loans and the income groups 
in 
the case of natives with x2 =71.736; df = 4; p= . 
000 (Table 12, Appendix 0)2. Column (2) 
shows the provision of loans in percentages to the lowest, 
low, medium, high and top- 
bracket groups. The loan distribution favours most the lowest income-group, that 
is, 86.6% 
of them are provided with loans, compared to 78.5%, 
68.4%, 63.6% and 25% of the low, 
medium, high and top-bracket groups respectively. The chance of getting a 
loan decreases 
' The kendall's tau-b also shows the correlation coefficient of -. 1857 at p=. 000 (two-tailed significance) 
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progressively with rising income status. Mathematically, EL38>EL39>EL40>EL41>EL42. 
This again aligns with vertical equity argument that more loans were given to lower income 
native undergraduates. 
Some respondents from the higher income group may also feel that it is troublesome to 
arrange a loan. 
"I do not need a loan. I do not bother to ask for it as it is too troublesome" Top-Bracket, Female Native 
In addition, there is a significant association between the provision of loans and the type of 
courses which natives pursued with x2 = 245.903; df = 5; p= . 000 (Table 13, Appendix 
0). In terms of the type-1 equality, Table 7.2 indicates the distribution of loans most favours 
natives pursuing arts and humanities, since 98.4% of them were provided with loans. This is 
mainly because those taking arts and humanities were more rarely offered scholarships, but 
instead were given loans. In contrast, respondents taking medicine were offered loans least 
because they were offered the most scholarships, as examined in the previous chapter. 
Mathematically, EL43>EL46>EL44>EL47>EL48>EL45. In terms of vertical equity 
argument, loans were given more to natives taking arts and humanities rather than medical 
and technology courses as more scholarships had been given to those pursuing courses in 
medicine and technology. 
There is also a significant association between previous academic performance and the 
provision of loans for natives with x2 = 41.368; df = 3; p= . 000 (Table 14, Appendix 
O). The loan distribution favours natives with low scores, as 84.8% of them were provided 
with loans. The upper-middle (82.9%), low-middle (80%) and high scores (67.6%) follow 
this. Thus, EL49>EL51>EL50>EL52. Thus ability is less important in loan provision, in 
contrast to scholarship provision. 
We shall now examine the type-1 equity of loans in the case of non-natives, with reference 
to six independent variables 
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7.4 Equality of Loan Distribution on Non-native Exclusively 
We examine the equality of loan distribution in the case of non-natives exclusively, for six 
independent variables. This is summarised in Table 7.2 in the previous section, page 158. 
There is a significant association for non-natives between the provision of loans and gender, 
with x2 = 9.217; df = 1; p= . 002 as shown in Table 15, Appendix 0. The provision of loans, 
in percentages for males and females from Table 15 of Appendix 0 is indicated in Table 7.2 
to examine type-1 equality. Column (3) shows that the provisions of loans for female and 
male non-natives are respectively 50.2% and 41.2%. Thus, the loan distribution favours 
female non-natives in terms of type-1 equality. Mathematically, EL53>EL54. More loans 
are given to females to promote vertical equity argument that non-native females3 had been 
probably neglected in the past in higher education. 
There is a significant association between the provision of loans and regions which non- 
natives come from, with x2 = 3.11955; df = 1; p= . 077 (Table 16 , Appendix 0). As 
Column (3) indicates, 54.1% and 44.8% of the East Malaysian and West Malaysian non- 
natives respectively receive loans. Thus, East Malaysian non-natives have a higher chance 
of receiving loans than their West Malaysian counterparts. These results differ, however, in 
the analysis of natives separately, and for all groups when taking region as a factor. This is 
mainly because the non-native clan associations and other private organisations in East 
Malaysia also play an important role in giving loans. East Malaysian non-native society 
appears to be more cohesive than in the West as their clans and associations care much for 
their members. Furthermore, East Malaysia faces an acute shortage of manpower, not only 
to meet the needs of the public sector, but also in the private sector. Mathematically, 
EL55>EL56. Thus, the loan distribution favours the East Malaysian non-natives in terms of 
type-1 equality measurement and hence based on regional differences, vertical equity 
argument is promoted. 
There is also a significant association between the provision of loans and areas which non- 
natives come from, with x2 =16.135; df = 1; p= . 
000 (Table 17, Appendix 0). As Column 
(3) of Table 7.3 shows, the loan distribution favours rural non-natives rather than their urban 
3 The chinese, for example in the past regarded females as less important than males. Therefore, priority was 
given to males for higher education. 
160 
counterparts, with 53.6% and 41.2% of each group receiving loans respectively. Thus, 
EL57>EL58. This indicates that the loan distribution in the case of non-natives follows the 
government's policy, embedded in the New Economic Policy and National Development 
Policy of minimising rural poverty and promoting vertical equity. 
There is a significant association with x2 = 48.699; df =1; p =. 000 (Table 18, Appendix 0) 
between income-groups and the provision of loans for non-natives4. Column (3) shows that 
68.2%, 49.5%, 40.4%, 25.0% and 16.7% of the lowest, low, medium, high and top-bracket 
non-natives respectively are provided with loans. The chance of getting a loan is lessened 
with rising social status, in the case of non-natives. 
Thus, the loan distribution most favours the lowest income non-natives and least the top- 
bracket non-natives, similar to the case of natives. The distribution of loans decreases with 
income status. This is consistent with the New Economic Policy and National Development 
Policy for minimising the incidence of poverty especially among the low income-groups. 
Again, this promotes "unequal treatment of unequals" based on financial needs. 
Mathematically, EL59>EL60>EL61>EL62>EL63. 
For type of courses which non-native respondents pursued, there is a significant association 
between courses and the provision of loans, with x2 =21.075; df = 5; p= . 000 
(Table 19, 
Appendix 0). Similar to natives, the loan distribution most favours non-native respondents 
taking arts and humanities as these courses are least supported by scholarships, and not 
critically needed by the economy, and least those taking applied science, in terms of type-1 
equality measurement. This differs from the case of natives whereby those pursuing medical 
courses receive the fewest loans as they get the most scholarships. 
Thus, 58.7%, 50.9%, 48.1%, 42.4%, 40.5% and 36.5% of those taking arts and humanities, 
pure science, professional arts, technology, medicine and applied science are respectively 
being provided with loans. Mathematically, EL64>EL67>EL65>EL69>EL66>EL68. Based 
on types of courses taken, vertical equity is promoted in giving more loans to arts and 
humanities as those who pursue medicine and technology had been given more scholarships. 
4 The kendall's tau-b with correlation coefficient of-0.1840 at p= 0.000 (2-tailed significance) 
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There is a significant association between the provision of loans and scores attained in the 
previous academic performance with x2 = 9.393; df = 3; p= . 025 (Table 20, Appendix 0). 
Column (3) of Table 7.2 shows that 49.1%, 48.7%, 41.3% and 14.3% of non-natives whose 
scores were at the upper-middle, low-middle, high and low levels respectively are being 
provided with loans. Thus, the loan distribution most favours those non-natives whose 
scores are in the upper-middle level as the main criterion for loan distribution is based on 
income. Mathematically, EL72>EL71>EL73>EL70. To summarise, vertical equity 
underpins the arguments in the distribution of loans, for achieving the desired objectives of 
NEP and NDP. 
Loan recipients were also asked whether they would have decided to enter and continue 
university education if loans were not given in the first place. The negative responses show 
the recruitment effect of the loans. This is discussed in the next section. 
7.5 The Recruitment Effect of Loans 
Similar to the analysis of the scholarship system, the same question was used to investigate 
the recruitment effect of the loans. The present section investigates whether the loans helped 
students, especially from the low-income groups, to begin and continue their university 
education. The question asked was: 
"If there had been no loans available, would you have started and continued your university 
education? " 
Table 7.3: Would students have started or continued university education if loans had 
not been available? 
Responses Frequency Per cent 
Yes, definitely 745 44.1% 
Yes, probably 439 26.0% 
No, probably not 392 23.2% 
No, definitely not 113 6.7% 
Total 1689 100.0% 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 7.3 indicates that 23.2%) and 6.7% of loan recipients respectively state that they 
would probably or definitely not have started or continued university education if there had 
been no loans available to them. Loans therefore have helped to recruit 29.9%5 of loan 
recipients to university education. 
5 Negative responses denote the recruitment effects of loans 
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In contrast, 44.1 % and 26.0% of loan recipients respectively state that they would definitely 
or probably have started or continued their university education even if there had been no 
loans given to them. The results suggest that those, for whom loans did not have any 
recruitment impact highly valued university education. They might have got financial help 
through part-time jobs, savings, parental or friends support to start or continue their 
university education if loans had not been available. This also suggests that some loan 
provision might have been misdirected. We shall next examine how loans recruit recipients 
to universities selectively by income-groups, gender, ethnicity and areas respondents come 
from as indicated in Table 7.5. 
For the recruitment effects in relation to income-groups6, the lowest-income group 
included the highest percentage probably and definitely not attending university education, 
that was 52.9% from a total of 508, if loans had not been available to them. This partially 
justifies the position that more loans are being given to the low and lowest income groups in 
terms of vertical equity, as indicated in Table 7.1. Thus, the claim found in the literature that 
loans may discourage the participation of the low/lowest income groups of students from 
attending higher education seems to be not true in the Malaysian case. 
Table 7.4: Decisions to Enter/Continue University Education by Income-Groups, 
Gender, Ethnicity, and Areas if No Loans had been given 
Independent 
Variables/Responses 
Yes, 
definitely 
Yes, 
probably 
No, probably 
not 
No, definitely 
not 
Total = 100% 
Income-Group * 
Lowest 23.6% 23.4% 36.6% 16.3% 508 
Low 44.4% 29.1% 22.1% 4.5% 674 
Medium 63.1% 24.5% 12.4% 0.0% 404 
High 68.7% 24.2% 7.1% 0.0% 99 
Top-Bracket 75.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4 
Gender** 
Female 41.7% 27.2% 24.3% 6.8% 1109 
Male 48.6% 23.6% 21.2% 6.6% 580 
Etui icily * 
Native 31.4% 31.1% 28.8% 8.7% 1177 
Non-native 73.2% 14.3% 10.4% 2.1% 512 
Areas * 
Rural 35% 27.6% 28.8% 8.6% 1037 
Urban 58.6% 23.5% 14.3% 3.7% 652 
* p< _ 
0.05 ** 0.05 <p <0.1; Sample Size = 16S9 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
6 The association between opinions of starting or continuing the university education and the 
income groups is 
significant, with X2 = 282.897; df =12; p =. 000). The 
kendall's tau-b also indicates the correlation coefficient of 
-0.3371 at p=. 
000. 
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In contrast, none of the top-bracket students stated that they would probably or definitely not 
have gone for university education if there had been no loans available. Only 26.6%, 12.4% 
and 7.1 % of the low, medium and high income-groups respectively indicated that they 
would probably or definitely not have pursued university education if there had been no 
loans given to them. Loans therefore have the greatest recruitment effects on the lowest- 
income group. However, the figures also suggested that much public funds are wasted, 
especially as students from the higher income-groups might not need the loans, which 
instead should be given to the lower-income groups. 
In the case of gender7, there was marginally a higher percentage of females (31.1 %) stating 
that they would probably or definitely not continue their public university education, 
compared to that of males (27.8%). The fact shown by earlier results (see in Table 7.1) that 
the provision of loans favoured the females in both types of equality measurement therefore 
was partially justified in terms of vertical equity argument, as the loans have a greater 
recruitment effect on females over males. This also implies that loans do encourage females 
to participate in university education. 
The selective recruitment effects of the loans can also be analysed in terms of ethnic 
groups8. The recruitment effect for natives was higher than for their non-native counterparts. 
37.5% natives and 12.5% non-natives respectively would probably or definitely not start or 
continue university education if loans were not given to them. Thus, the loans have 
moderate and weak recruiting effects for natives and non-natives respectively. Though other 
factors may intervene, the loan system seems to have an important recruitment effect for 
natives. Therefore, the fact as shown by earlier results that the loan distribution favours 
natives in both types of equality measurement is partially justified in terms of vertical equity 
argument, as the recruitment effects for natives are much higher than for non-natives. The 
majority of non-natives would still start and continue university education even if they had 
not been given loans. They may work part-time, and also receive support from parents, 
relatives and even friends. 
7The association between responses and gender, regarding whether to enter/continue the university education 
or not, if there had been no loans given, is at significance with x2 = 7.538; df = 3; p= . 
056 
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For areas which respondents come from9, the recruitment effects for rural respondents was 
higher (37.4%) than for their urban counterparts (18%). Thus, the current loan distribution 
favouring rural undergraduates in both types of equality measurements as shown in Table 
7.1 is partially justified in terms of vertical equity, in line with the government's effort to 
eradicate hard-core poverty or minimise poverty in the rural areas. 
7.6 Friends Not Attending University Education Because of Financial Reason 
As discussed in the previous chapter, reasons for not attending Malaysian public university 
education include financial problems as well as not being interested in university education, 
wanting to get a job, needing to take care of parents, and other reasons such as preference 
for overseas education. We can further investigate the equity of the loan system by 
examining the demand of friends for loans, selectively by income-groups, ethnicity, gender 
and the areas, which they come from. 
Table 7.5: Demand for Loans By Income-Groups, Ethnicity, Gender and Areas Which 
Friends Come From, with Financial Problem As the Main Factor in Non-Attendance 
Demand/Income Groups No Yes Not Sure Total = 100% 
Income-Groups' 
Low/Poor 5.3% 93.8% 0.9% 963 
Middle/Medium 7.7% 91.2% 1.1% 194 
High/Rich 50% 50.0% 0.0% 2 
Ethnicity 
Native 5.5% 93.7% 0.8% 836 
Non-native 6.5% 92.3% 1.2% 323 
Gender 
Female 6% 93.1% 0.9% 666 
Male 5.5% 93.5% 1.0% 493 
Areas 
Rural 4.9% 94.3% 0.8% 794 
Urban 7.7% 91.0% 1.4% 366 
*p 
_< 
0.05; Sample Size = 1160 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
For income groups10,93.8% of the low-income group friends who did not attend public 
university education and gave financial problems as the main reason stated that they had 
'There is a significant association between ethnic groups and decisions whether to enter/continue the university 
education ()(2 = 255.282; df = 3; p= . 
000). 
9 There is a significant difference between areas respondents come from and decisions whether to 
enter/continue the university education ()C2 = 104.07 1; df = 3; p= . 
000) 
10 There is a significant association between the demand for loans by friends who did not attend universities 
giving finance as the main reason, and income groups (x2 = 27.240; 
df = 4; p= . 
000). The Kendall's tau-b 
shows correlation coefficient of -0.0424, p= . 
147 (2-tailed) 
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applied for loans but were rejected. Probably, this is because of the limited fund available 
for loans, and sometimes, perhaps to lack of political connection". Only 5.3% of this group 
did not apply for loans. 0.9% of respondents were not sure whether their low-income friends 
applied for loans or not. The high demand for loans of low-income friends does not support 
the claim that loan schemes may deter low-income group members from applying and hence 
prevent them from attending the university. The present situation is therefore inequitable in 
terms of "horizontal" and vertical equity to those who are qualified academically but barred 
from university education because of financial problems, particularly to those in the low- 
income group. Loan provision would have recruited more students from the low income- 
group to participate in the university. Qualified candidates were denied places in universities 
because of lacking loan support. The loan system may be inefficient also, as potential 
manpower to meet the needs of economy is lost, when qualified candidates do not go to 
university because of financial constraints. This is especially significant when Malaysia is 
aiming to become a developed nation by the year 2020. This issue will be elaborated in 
Chapter 9. 
The demand of natives for loans (93.7%) is higher than non-natives (92.3%). Male friends 
have a marginally higher demand, that is, 93.5% than female friends (93.1 %). Rural friends 
have a higher demand for loans (94.3%) than their urban counterparts (91%) which may 
partially justify the fact that the present loan distribution favours the rural undergraduates in 
promoting "unequal treatment of unequals". Moreover, in terms of vertical equity, more 
loans should have been given to the rural undergraduates rather than urban counterparts, as 
the incidence of poverty in the rural areas is 4.1 times higher than that of the urban areas, as 
discussed in Section 6.3.4 of Chapter 6. 
7.7 The Case of High School Students 
I also carried out a survey of high school students (potential undergraduates) to gather 
opinions on financial support in order to modify the existing student financial system. Table 
7.6 shows the distribution of high school students in the high school survey. 
" Priority for MARA's education loans will be given to supporters of the National Front government (The 
Star, May 17,2000) 
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Table 7.6: Distribution of Samples of Four High Schools in Malaysia 
High Schools Sample size % to the total sample 
1. Klang High School, Selangor, West Malaysia 54 25.5% 
2. Sultan Idris High School, Petaling Jaya, West 30 14.2% 
Malaysia 
3. Abdillah College, Kuching, East Malaysia 58 27.4% 
4. Meradong Secondary School, East Malaysia 70 33.0% 
Total 212 100.0% 
Source: Data from the fieldwork, 1999 
High school students were asked whether they would intend to go to university if offered 
loans but not scholarships, scholarships but not loans, and neither scholarships nor loans. 
Although high school students face a probabilistic set of financial options, questions asked 
represented the certainty of receiving scholarships, loans or nothing, however, they would 
give some ideas how far financial support could help potential undergraduates to pursue 
university education. The high school study is indicative and can be compared with the 
findings of the undergraduate survey. Based on income groups, areas which respondents 
come from, gender and ethnicity, the results of the survey are shown in Table 7.7. 
Table 7.7: Would Pursue University Education if Offered With Different Options of 
Financial Support 
Variables Offered scholarships, Offered loans, Neither loans nor 
intending to attend intending to attend scholarships, intending 
university university to attend university 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overall 98.6% 90.6% 67.0% 
Income 
Lowest 97.3% 82.4% 43.2% 
Low 97.6% 94.5% 77.8% 
Medium 100% 95.0% 72.5% 
High 100% 95.8% 95.8% 
Top-Bracket 100% 100% 100% 
Areas 
Rural 98.6% 90.8% 58.2% 
Urban 98.6% 90.1% 84.5% 
Gender 
Female 99.2% 82.3% 47.9% 
Male 97.7% 88.6% 64.2% 
Race 
Natives 97.9% 82.3% 47.9% 
Non-natives 99.1% 97.4% 82.8% 
Sample Size = 212; Source: 1 ne purvey ut nIgIlOWuu' L)Luu%, l1LJ, 
1l/ 
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Overall, 98.6%, 90.6% and 67% of high school students would intend to go on to higher 
education if given respectively scholarships, loans and no financial support at all. Thus, the 
results clearly show that more high school students would intend to go to universities if 
offered scholarships rather than loans for participating in higher education. 97.3% of lowest 
income group would attend university if given with scholarships compared to 82.4% of them 
if offered with loans. Also, more low-income groups than higher-income groups, and more 
rural than urban respondents would intend to go for universities if given either loans or 
scholarships. This coincides with the recruitment effects of loans and scholarships shown in 
the undergraduate survey. But, the fact that more non-natives than natives would intend to 
participate in higher education may imply that natives have to consider more about the 
opportunity cost forgone before deciding on going to university. More females than males 
intend to go to university if offered scholarships, but vice versa in the case of loans. 
Financial support would recruit more students from the lower-income groups. This is 
indicated by the lower participation rates of lower-income students, if they are not offered 
any financial support, indicated in Column (4) of Table 7.8. However, 43.2% of the lowest 
income group would attend university with no financing, probably because most of them are 
non-natives. As indicated, 82.8% of them would still go to universities if not given financial 
support. Perhaps non-natives are more determined and their families are prepared to borrow 
money from relatives and friends to pay the cost of university education for their children. 
Similarly, financial support would recruit more rural than urban high school students, more 
females than males, and more natives than non-natives. 
We shall next investigate opinions of high school students regarding financial support which 
may be useful as references for a modified system of student finance in chapter 10. 
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Table 7.8: Opinions of High School students regarding Financial Support 
Opinion Statements/ Responses 
ýd d z D 
L.. ýa 
CD , Uc J 
ý CD 
i. There is no problem in loan repayment if it is linked to 2.4 7.5 9.9 59.9 20.3 
my income. 
ii. Unemployed married women should not have to repay 10.8 14.6 15.1 32.5 26.9 
the loans 
iii. Women may refuse mortgage loans for financing 24.1 20.8 16.5 17.5 21.2 
higher education because of fear of carrying debts when 
getting married later on. 
iv. I prefer my university education to be fully financed 5.2 13.2 16.5 42.0 23.1 
through an income-contingent loan whereby the loan 
repayment depends on the level of income. 
v. Industry should pay a portion in financing higher 0.9 1.4 9.9 50.0 37.7 
education. 
vi. Rich parents should share the cost on financing their 1.9 4.7 14.6 41.0 37.7 
children's education. 
vii. Loans should be interest-free. 1.4 5.7 10.8 32.5 49.5 
viii. Scholarships /grants should given to the very poor 0.5 0.9 2.4 24.5 71.7 
ix. Loans should be means-tested 0.5 3.8 7.5 28.3 59.4 
x. Bigger loans should be given to students pursuing more 0.5 4.2 7.5 46.2 41.5 
expensive of courses. 
xi. The "grace period", where graduates defer loan 3.3 7.1 20.3 44.3 25.0 
repayment six months after their studies, is reasonable. 
xii. A loan recipient will study harder, as he/she pays for 0.9 5.7 10.8 44.3 38.2 
his/her own education. 
xiii. It is highly irresponsible for an employed individual 1.9 7.5 12.7 56.1 21.7 
not to repay the loan he/she borrows if his can afford to. 
xiv. The Five Principles in the Pillars of a United 0.5 2.4 9.0 38.2 50.0 
Malaysian nation are very meaningful to me. 
xv. University education enhances productivity, and hence 20.8 4.7 9.9 20.8 43.9 
graduates should have higher pay than non-graduates. 
Source: The High School Survey, 1999 
Statements (i) - (iv) and (vii) - (xi) were asked to seek opinions of high school students 
regarding loans as a form of financial support which may have different effects on different 
groups of people. Statements (v) and (vi) seek opinions regarding sharing costs of higher 
education from industry and parents which may be proposed to relieve the public budgetary 
pressures. Statements (xiii) - (xiv) test the honesty of high school students which is 
important in the granting of loans. Statement (xv) seeks opinion of high school students 
regarding human capital theory. 
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The high school survey as illustrated in Table 7.9 shows high percentages of positive 
responses regarding: 
(i) no problem in loan repayment if it is income-contingent. 
(ii) Unemployed married women should not have to repay the loans 
(iii) income-contingent loans. 
(iv) the share of industry in financing the cost of higher education. 
(v) the share of rich parents in sharing the cost of higher education. 
(vi) interest -free loans. 
(vii) scholarships/grants for the very poor. 
(viii) means-testing of loans. 
(ix) bigger loans for more expensive courses. 
(x) a six-month "grace period" is reasonable. 
(xi) The likelihood that a loan recipient would study harder 
(xii) higher pay for graduates than non-graduates. 
(xiii) The great irresponsibility of not repaying the loans. 
(xiv) appreciating the values of the Five Principles in the Pillars of a United Malaysian 
nation. 
(xv) the human capital theory 
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the equality measures of loan distribution in the Malaysian public 
universities. The sample comprises 2645 respondents. Before examining the equality of loan 
distribution, the provision of loans to undergraduates (1996 intake) at the five public 
universities in Malaysia was investigated. Ethnicity, gender, regions and areas which 
respondents come from, courses of studies, income-groups and previous academic 
performance were used as independent variables. Cross-tabulations were employed to detect 
any association between categories of each independent variable and the provision of loans. 
Since ethnicity has a prominent effect in the loan provision and hence its equity 
implications, we have also examined intra-ethnic equality of loan distribution for other 
independent variables concerned (gender, respondents' courses of studies, areas and regions 
which respondents come from, income-groups and previous academic performance). 
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Type-1 equality measurement, investigates whether that loans were distributed equally 
across all categories within the same independent variable, for all groups, that is natives and 
non-natives combined, and for the native and non-native groups separately. 
On the other hand, type-2 equality investigates whether the loan distribution between all 
categories within each independent variable concerned, should be relatively equal to their 
percentage distribution in the general population. This was examined on four independent 
variables, which are ethnicity, income, gender and areas which respondents come from. 
Type-2 equality measurement is particularly useful to examine whether the distribution of 
loans follows the principles embedded in the NEP and the NDP. According to these policies, 
the distribution of resources should reflect the racial composition of the country12, minimise 
poverty in the rural areas, and promote regional integration between East and West 
Malaysia. I also examined whether there was any gender discrimination towards females in 
the loan distribution. The representation index was calculated to see whether the categories 
of these independent variables were respectively over- or under-represented in the general 
population. Type-1 and type-2 equality measurements were used for both "horizontal 
equity" and vertical equity implications. 
The equity aspect was further investigated by examining the recruitment effect of the loans. 
Loan recipients were asked whether they would decide to enter or continue university 
education if they had not been offered loans in the first place. Responses were selectively 
examined in the case of gender, ethnic, income-groups and areas which respondents come 
from. Though loans generally have weak recruitment effects (29.9% of loan recipients 
would not have begun or continued university) in helping undergraduates to enter or 
continue university education, the recruitment effects were greatest to the lowest-income 
group loan recipients (52.9% of them would not have entered or continued university). The 
recruitment effects for the low, medium, high and top-bracket groups were respectively 
26.6%, 12.4%, 7.1 % and 0%. This partially justifies the fact that more loans had been given 
to the lowest and low income-groups, as indicated in Table 7.1 in terms of vertical equity 
argument. The higher loan recruitment effects for the lowest and low-income groups do not 
12 According to the policies, the distribution of resources is to reflect the racial composition of the country so as 
to restructure Malaysian multicultural society so that occupational groups are not 
identified with racial origins. 
The policies advocate positive discrimination, favouring the native group. 
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support the claim that loans may discourage these groups from participating in university 
education because they are more risk-averse. 
The recruitment effect is greater for females than males. This may partially justify the 
situation shown in Table 7.1, that more loans are given to females than males in terms of 
vertical equity and implies that "negative dowry" do not exist in Malaysia, and hence loans 
do not prevent them from attending university education. This is supported by the high 
demand of female friends for loans, that was, 93.1 % of them who had applied for loans, but 
unfortunately were not given. 
The recruitment effect was also higher for natives than non-natives. Thus, the situation 
shown in Table 7.1, that the loan distribution favours natives, may be partially justified in 
terms of the vertical equity argument. The recruitment effect was also higher for rural than 
for urban undergraduates suggesting that the present loan distribution, favouring the rural 
respondents, is partially justified for promoting "unequal treatment of unequals". 
By investigating friends who did not attend university education because of financial 
problems, we can further examine the equity aspect of the loan system. This is examined in 
terms of gender, ethnicity, income and areas of origin. In the case of income-groups, 83.1 % 
of friends from the low-income group who did not attend university gave financial problems 
as the most important reason, compared to 16.7% and 0.20% of those from the middle- 
income and high income-groups respectively. This again shows that financial problems are 
the main factor, which prevents the poor from attending university. This is further verified 
by the high demand for loans (93.8%) of the low-income group who did not attend 
university education. More students from the low-income groups would have been recruited 
if funds were sufficient. This suggests that the loan system may be still inequitable to the 
low-income groups in terms of vertical equity, though as the main study shows, the loan 
distribution generally favours them in terms of type-1 equality measurement. It is 
inequitable if qualified individuals are denied places in universities because of financial 
factors such as not having loans. 
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The demand of friends who were natives for loans is higher (93.7%) over friend who were 
non-native friends (92.3%). Male friends have a marginally higher demand (93.5%) 
compared to females (93.1 %) for loans. 
The higher demand of friends from rural (94.3%) over urban friends (91%) for loans may 
partially justify the present loan provision which favours rural undergraduates based on 
"unequal treatment of unequals". However, more loans should have been given to rural 
undergraduates rather than their urban counterparts, as the incidence of poverty in rural 
areas is 4.1 times higher than in urban areas, as shown in Section 6.3.4 of Chapter 6. 
The survey of high school students also shows that a higher percentage of potential 
undergraduates would intend to go for higher education if offered scholarships rather than 
loans. Similarly, a higher percentage of lower- income groups than higher income groups 
may participate in higher education if given either loans or scholarships. This implies that 
on vertical equity grounds, more financial support should be given to potential 
undergraduates, especially to those from disadvantaged backgrounds to motivate them in 
participating university education. 
The next chapter will focus on the multiple logistic regression analysis, to examine the 
equity of loan and scholarship provisions respectively, taking into account the 
interrelationships of all independent variables. In addition, multiple logistic regressions are 
used to predict scholarship provision as well as the loan provision in Malaysia, given with 
characteristics of different independent variables. 
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Chapter 8 
Multiple Logistic Regression 
8.0 Overview 
The main purpose of this chapter is to use multiple logistic regression to take the analysis a 
step further. From this perspective, the interrelationships of the seven independent variables, 
which are ethnicity, gender of respondents, the areas and regions which they come from, the 
type of courses they pursued, their income groups and their previous academic 
performances, are taken into account to investigate the equality of loan and scholarship 
distributions in five public universities. Results from multiple logistic regression are 
compared with results from the cross tabulations when each independent variable was 
analysed separately as in chapters 6 and 7. Section One will investigate the odds /likelihood 
of having scholarships across all categories of each independent variable by entering all 
independent variables together, and will consider equity implications. The model is also 
used to predict the probability of having a scholarship, with characteristics given in Section 
Two. 
Similarly, Section Three examines the interrelationships of all independent variables to 
investigate the equality of loan distribution. Section Four predicts the probability of having a 
loan. Section Five concludes the chapter. 
8.1 Multiple Logistic Regression: Interrelationships of Independent Variables and 
Scholarship Provision 
Before using multiple regression analysis, we should define a simple logistic regression. A 
simple logistic regression is a multivariate technique when the dependent variable can have 
only two values: an event occurring or not occurring (Norusis, 1990). In this case, the 
dependent variable is whether or not one has a scholarship. Thus, it is a "yes or no" events. 
A simple logistic regression or logit can be written as: 
log [pi/(l -Pi) ]= logit P; =a+ bX : ........................................................ 
(8.1) 
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where Pi, is the probability of having a scholarship for observation i, given this model, and 
xi is the independent variable, for example, ethnicity. The parameter a gives the log odds of 
having a scholarship for natives (the reference category) and b shows how much higher the 
log odds are for non-natives to have a scholarship. 
The multiple logistic regression model is used when all independent variables are entered 
together in the model to take into account of interrelationships. The "Enter" method is used. 
The model can be written as: 
Logit P1 =a+ b1X1 + b2 X2 ,+ b3X3i + ......... 
bnX 
ni ......................... 
(8.2) 
where a denotes the constant, bl, b2....... b denotes how much higher the log odds are for 
non-reference categories than reference categories to have a scholarship. X1, X2.... Xn 
denotes independent variables. The model is shown in figure 8.1. 
Table 8.1: Interrelationships of Independent Variables, Scholarship Provision 
Independent Variables 
(1) 
Reference Categories 
(2) 
B 
(3) 
Significance (Wald) 
(4) 
Exponential 
(5) 
Race Native =0 -1.0778 0.0000 0.3403 
Gender Female =0 -. 1595 0.2208 0.8526 
Region East Malaysia =0 -. 9189 0.0000 0.3990 
Areas Rural =0 -. 1626 0.2070 0.8499 
Courses 
Technology Medical courses =0 -. 8746 0.0000 0.4170 
Applied Science -1.4445 0.0000 0.2359 
Pure Science -1.7581 0.0000 0.1724 
Professional Arts -1.2804 0.0000 0.2779 
Arts and Humanities -3.2986 0.0000 0.0369 
Income Groups 
Top-Bracket Lowest =0 1.4085 0.0104 4.0900 
High 0.0679 0.7645 1.0703 
Medium . 2571 0.1568 
1.2932 
Low . 1512 0.3609 
1.1632 
Previous Academic 
Attainment 
Low-Score High Score =0 -. 2734 0.5416 0.7608 
Low-Middle Score -. 5995 0.0010 0.5491 
Upper-Middle Score -. 5106 0.0001 0.6001 
Constant . 9380 
0.0001 
Sample size = 2645 
Column (1) shows the seven independent variables. Column (2) shows the values of non- 
reference categories for each independent variable. The non-reference categories 
for race, 
gender, region, areas, type of courses, income-groups and previous scores 
in academic 
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attainment are indicated in Column (2). The reference categories are given with values of 0 
whereas non-reference categories are given with values of 1. 
Table 8.1 shows that race, region, courses respondents pursued, and scores respondents 
attained in the previous academic performance are statistically significant in terms of the 
Wald statistic in the provision of scholarships, as indicated in Column (4). However, gender, 
areas, and income groups are insignificant in the provision of scholarships. 
Taking into account the interrelationships of all the variables which are included in the 
model, the model shows the relative odds for members of a non-reference category to have 
scholarships, as compared to those of a reference category. Thus, scholarship provision 
favours natives over non-natives as the odds' of a non-native having a scholarship are only 
0.3403 times (34%) those of a native (reference category) as indicated in Column (5). 
Similarly, a female (reference category) has a better chance of having a scholarship than a 
male (the odds of a male having a scholarship are only 0.8526 times (85%) those of a 
female). In addition, the scholarship provision favours East Malaysians (reference category) 
over West Malaysians, as the odds of having a scholarship for the latter are only 0.3990 
times (40%) that of the former. Respondents from rural areas (reference category) have 
higher odds of receiving a scholarship than those from urban areas, as the odds of an urban 
respondent having a scholarship are only about 0.8499 times (85%) those from the rural. 
The model also shows that scholarship provision favours most those pursuing medical 
courses (reference category). Those pursuing technology, professional arts, applied science, 
pure science, and arts and humanities follow this2. Scholarship provision most 
favours 
respondents from the top-bracket income group. The medium, low, 
high and lowest income 
(reference category) groups follow this3. Those who obtained high scores 
(reference 
category) in their previous academic performance have the 
highest chance of receiving the 
' The odds are defined as the number of any category 
(e. g. non-native) having scholarships divided by the 
number not having scholarships in the same category. 
2 The odds of getting scholarships for those pursuing technology, applied science, 
pure science, professional 
arts, and arts and humanities are only 0.4170,0.2359,0.1724,0.2779 
and 0.0369 as high as those pursuing 
medical courses in having scholarships. 
3 The odds for top-bracket, high, medium, and low- 
income groups are respectively 4.0900,1.0703,1.2932, 
and 1.1632 times as high as those 
in the lowest income groups. 
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scholarships. Those having low scores, upper-middle scores and low-middle scores follow 
this4. 
Thus, both multiple logistic regression and cross-tabulation analyses (chapter 6) show that 
scholarship provision for all groups, favours natives rather than non-natives, females rather 
than males, undergraduates from East Malaysia rather than West Malaysia, and 
undergraduates from rural rather than urban areas. Both analyses also show that scholarship 
provision favours most those taking medical courses and least those taking arts and 
humanities. When students are classified in income groups, cross-tabulation analysis shows 
that scholarship provision is regressive. When multiple logistic regression analysis is used, it 
is less regressive and appears to favour more the low and medium rather than high income 
groups, though still it favours most the top-bracket and least the lowest income group. In 
other words, this regressiveness is reduced when we take into account the interrelationships 
of other factors. Probably, the above results arise because the main criterion for non-natives 
to be offered scholarships is based on financial needs, rather than ability (See Section 6.5 of 
chapter 6). Both multiple logistic regression and cross-tabulation analyses also show that 
scholarship provision favours most those undergraduates who attained high scores in their 
previous academic performance, though the order of subsequent scores differs. 
8.2 Estimating the Probability of having Scholarships 
To find the probability of a respondent with certain characteristics given in the sample 
having a scholarship, we can transform the log odds into probability form as: 
P (event) =1-. (1 +e-Z) ........................................................................... 
(8.3) 
whereby P is the probability of having a scholarship, and e is the base of natural logarithms, 
approximately 2.718 (Norusis, 1990, p120). 
Where Z is the linear combination of independent variables, the equation can be written as 
Z=Bo+BIX1 +B2X2+ ................. 
BpXp.................................................. (8.4) 
4 Respondents having low, low-middle and upper-middle scores in the previous academic attainment have odds 
of 0.7608,0.549 land 0.6001 times as highly as those 
in the high scores in getting scholarships. 
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Bo and B1 are coefficients or log odds estimated from the data. X1..... Xp are the independent 
variables. Thus, the model 8.4 can be used for predicting the probability of having a 
scholarship. For example, a West Malaysian non-native taking arts and humanities is 
estimated as having a 1.3% chance of having a scholarship. This can be calculated as: 
Z= (-1.0778 x1 )+ (-3.2986 x 1) + (-0.9189 x 1) + (0.9380) = -4.3573 
The value - 4.3573 can be expressed as e-4.3573, the base of natural logarithms. The logit is 
e"(-4.3573) which is used in calculating the probability of having scholarships by using 
equation (8.3) above. The probability of having a scholarship is therefore estimated as 
= (1) -{1+ e- 
(-4.3573) 1= (1) -. (1+ e4.3573)=O. O13 =1.3% whereby e4.3573 = 78.05. 
More examples are indicated in Table 8.1 in ascending order. 
Table 8.2: Probabilities of Having Scholarships For Students with Given 
Characteristics 
Characteristics of Respondents Probability 
Non-native, Arts and Humanities, West Malaysia 0.013= 1.3% 
Non-native, Arts and Humanities 0.031 = 3.1% 
Native, Arts and Humanities 0.075 = 7.5% 
Native, Applied Science, West Malaysia 0.170 =17.0% 
Non-native, Medicine, West Malaysia 0.258 = 25.8% 
Native, Technology, West Malaysia 0.307 = 30.7% 
Native, Professional Arts, East Malaysia, 0.414 =41.4% 
Non-native, Medicine, East Malaysia, Low-middle Score, Low-Income 0.549 =54.9% 
Non-native, Technology, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket, High Score 0.599 =59.9% 
Native, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket, Upper Middle Score 0.606 = 60.6% 
Non-native, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket, Low-Middle Score 0.662 = 66.2% 
Non-native, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket, Upper Middle Score 0.704 = 70.4% 
Non-native, Medical, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket 0.781 = 78.1% 
Native, Medical, West Malaysia, Top-Bracket 0.806 = 80.6% 
Native, Medical, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket, High Score 0.909 = 90.9% 
Table 8.2 shows that the probability of having scholarships ranges from 1.3% to 90.9%, with 
given characteristics. 
8.3: Multiple Logistic Regression: Interrelationships of Independent Variables and 
Loan Provision 
The same model is used as in the case of scholarship provision, can 
be used for loan 
provision. 
Table 8.3 in the next page shows that such independent variables as race, region, areas and 
regions which respondents come from, types of courses which respondents pursue, 
income 
groups and scores obtained in the previous academic performances are statistically 
178 
significant in the provision of loans, as indicated in column (4). However, gender is 
insignificant in the provision of loans. 
Table 8.3: Interrelationships of Independent Variables and Loan Provision 
Independent Variables 
(1) 
Reference Categories 
(2) 
B 
(3) 
Significant (Wald) 
(4) 
Exponential (B) 
(5) 
Race Native =0 -1.2700 0.0000 0.2808 Gender Female =0 -. 0837 0.4002 0.9197 Region East Malaysia =0 0.4154 0.0023 1.5149 
Areas Rural =0 -0.2001 0.0376 0.8186 Courses 
Technology Medical courses =0 0.9827 0.0000 2.6717 
Applied Science 0.9245 0.0000 2.5207 
Pure Science 1.2917 0.0000 3.6389 
Professional Arts 1.2445 0.0000 3.4712 
Arts and Humanities 2.1017 0.0000 8.1801 
Income Groups 
Top-Bracket Lowest Income Group =0 -2.3814 0.0001 0.0924 
High -1.1229 0.0000 0.3253 
Medium -0.8732 0.0000 0.4176 
Low -0.5112 0.0002 0.5998 
Previous Academic 
Attainment 
Low-Score High Score =0 0.3808 0.8416 1.0791 
Low-Middle Score 0.1417 0.0237 1.3778 
Upper-Middle Score 0.1037 0.0307 1.2512 
Constant 0.2733 0.2003 
Sample Size = 2645 
Column (5) indicates that the provision of loans favours natives over non-natives, as the 
odds of a non-native receiving a loan are only 0.2808 times (28%) those of a native. The 
loan distribution also favours females over males, as the odds of a male respondent receiving 
a loan are only 0.9197 times (92%) those of a female respondent. Similarly, a West 
Malaysian is 1.5149 times (151%) as likely to have a loan as an East Malaysian. Urban 
respondents are less likely to be offered loans, as their odds of having loans are only 0.8186 
times (81.86%) those of rural respondents. In terms of types of courses pursued, the loan 
provision favours most those taking arts and humanities. Those taking pure science, 
professional arts, technology and applied science follow this5. 
As far as income groups are concerned, the loan provision most favours respondents from 
the lowest income group. The low, medium, high and top-bracket groups follow this6 . The 
5 The odds of a respondent taking a technology course are 2.6717 times than those of a respondent taking 
medicine. Similarly, the odds of respondents taking applied science, pure science, professional arts, and arts 
and humanities are respectively 2.5207,3.6389,3.4712, and 
8.1801 times as highly as those of respondents 
taking medicine. 
6 The odds of respondents from the low, medium, high-income and top-bracket groups are respectively 
0.5998, 
0.4176,0.3253, and 0.0924 times than those of lowest income group to be provided with a loan. 
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results also indicate that the loan provision most favours respondents having low-middle 
scores in their previous academic attainment. Respondents having upper-middle scores, 1"w 
scores and high scores follow this7. 
As using cross-tabulation analysis in chapter 7, multiple logistic regression also shows that 
the loan provision favours natives over non-natives, females over males, West Malaysians 
over East Malaysians, rural over urban undergraduates, is progressive in terms of income, 
and most favours those taking arts and humanities, but least those taking medical courses 
(though the subsequent courses differ in order) for all groups. Both analyses also show that 
the loan provision favours those whose previous academic scores were low rather than high. 
8.4 Estimating the Probability of having Loans 
Similar to the case of scholarships, the equation 8.4 can also be used for predicting the 
probability of having a loan. For example the constant term (0.2733)of figure 8.2 shows the 
probability of a native female, East Malaysian, rural, medical student from the lowest 
income-group who got a high score; she has a probability of 56.8% of receiving a loan. We 
shall give some more examples in Table 8.2, in ascending order. 
Table 8.4: Some Examples of Probability of Having a Loan, in Ascending Order 
Characteristics of Respondents Probability 
Non-native, Medicine, Urban, West Malaysia, Top-Bracket, High score 3.1% 
Non-native, Applied Science, East Malaysia, Rural, Top-Bracket, High-Score 7.9% 
Non-native, East Malaysia, Urban, Low-income 16.5% 
Native, Technology, Top-Bracket, Urban, East Malaysia 21.0% 
Non-Native, Pure Science, High-income 30.4% 
Non-native, Pure Science, Urban, West Malaysia, Low-income 39.7% 
Non-native, Technology, West Malaysia 44.6% 
Non-native, Technology, West Malaysia, Rural 59.9% 
Native, Medicine, West Malaysia, Rural 66.7% 
Native, Professional Arts, West Malaysia, Urban, Medium income 70.4% 
Non-native, Arts and Humanities, Rural Areas 75.2% 
Non-native, Arts and Humanities, Urban , 
West Malaysia 78.7% 
Non-native, Arts and Humanities, Urban, West Malaysia, Lowest Income, 82.6% 
Upper-Middle Score 
Native, Arts and Humanities, Rural, West Malaysia, Lowest-Income, Low- 95.2% 
middle score 
' The odds of respondents having low-scores, low-middle scores, and upper-middle scores are 
1.0791,1.3778 
and 1.2512 times than those of respondents having 
high scores, to be provided with loans. 
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We shall also examine some examples which share the same characteristics in the provision 
of scholarships and loans. 
Table 8.5: Comparing the Probability of Having a Loan and a Scholarship For 
Students With Various Characteristics (some examples) 
Characteristics of Respondents Probability 
(Scholarships) 
Probability 
(Loans) 
Non-native, Arts and Humanities, West Malaysia 1.3% 81.9% 
Non-native, Arts and Humanities 3.1% 75.2% 
Native, Arts and Humanities 7.5% 91.7% 
Native, Applied Science, West Malaysia 17.0% 83.3% 
Non-native, Medicine, West Malaysia 25.8% 35.8% 
Native, Technology, West Malaysia 30.7% 49.7% 
Native, Professional Arts, East Malaysia, 41.4% 81.9% 
Non-native, Medicine, East Malaysia, Low-middle Score, Low-Income 54.9% 21.6% 
Non-native, Technology, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket, High Score 59.9% 8.4% 
Native, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket, Upper Middle Score 60.6% 13.2% 
Non-native, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket, Low-Middle Score 66.2% 4.5% 
Non-native, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket, Upper Middle Score 70.4% 4.1% 
Non-native, Medical, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket 78.1% 3.3% 
Native, Medical, West Malaysia, Top-Bracket 80.6% 15.5% 
Native, Medical, East Malaysia, Top-Bracket, High Score 90.9% 10.9% 
Table 8.5 shows that scholarships and loans contrast distinctly with one another. Given the 
same characteristics, the probability of having scholarships is low when the probability of 
having loans is high, and vice-versa. This is manly because of different criteria used in the 
awards of loans and scholarships as discussed in chapters 6 and 7. 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter uses multiple logistic regression based on the independent variables stated, to 
take a further step in analysing the equality distribution of loans and scholarships. All 
independent variables are entered together to calculate the odds of having scholarships or 
loans for all groups (natives and non-natives combined). 
Taking into account interrelationships of other factors, ethnicity, regions which respondents 
come from, types of course which respondents pursued, and their previous academic scores 
are significant in the provision of scholarships. This result 
differs from the result of cross- 
tabulation when each independent variable was analysed separately, as 
discussed in chapter 
7. Cross-tabulation analysis indicated that the income-group, ethnicity, regions which 
respondents come from, type of courses which respondents pursued and 
their previous 
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academic scores are significant in the provision of scholarships. Both multiple logistic 
regression and cross-tabulation analyses yield similar results regarding the equality of 
scholarship provision for ethnicity, gender, regions, areas which respondents come from and 
courses which respondents take. When classified as income groups, cross-tabulation shows 
that scholarship provision is regressive, whereas according to multiple logistic regression 
analysis it is not regressive though it still favours most students in the top-bracket. Multiple 
logistic regression and cross-tabulation analyses also show that scholarship provision 
favours most those undergraduates who attained high scores in their previous academic 
performance, though the order of subsequent scores differs. The multiple logistic regression 
model can also be used to estimate the probability of having scholarships. 
In the provision of loans for all groups, ethnicity, regions and areas which respondents come 
from, types of courses which respondents pursued, income groups and previous academic 
attainment of respondents are significant in the provision of loans, when all variables are 
entered at once. This differs from the result whereby each independent variable is significant 
in the loan provision, using the cross-tabulation analysis as discussed in chapter7. 
Both multiple logistic regression and cross-tabulation analyses yield similar results 
regarding the equality of loan provision for ethnicity, gender, regions, areas which 
respondents come from, income-groups and previous academic scores. When classified as 
courses, multiple regression and cross-tabulation analyses show that loan provision still 
most favour respondents taking arts and humanities but least those taking medicine, though 
the order of subsequent courses differs. In terms of previous scores attained, both analyses 
differ the manner loans are provided though both least favours those who attained high 
scores. The model is used also to estimate the probability of having a loan. The next chapter 
will compare the efficiency aspect of student loans and scholarships in Malaysia. 
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Chapter 9 
Efficiency of Student Loans and Scholarships 
9.0 Overview 
This chapter comprises two main parts. Part One (Sections 9.1 and 9.2) analyses mainly the 
efficiency of loans as a system and compared with scholarship system where appropriate, 
taking data from the undergraduate survey for statistical analysis. Part Two, Section 9.3 
analyses the efficiency of individual loan schemes with reference to scholarship schemes 
and is based on information obtained during interviews and data from the annual reports, 
journals and working documents of some funding bodies. Thus, the main purpose for this 
chapter is to analyse the efficiency of the loan system as a whole as well as individual 
schemes, with reference to the scholarship system and to scholarship schemes respectively. 
From this perspective, Section One defines the criteria employed for efficiency in this study. 
Section Two examines the efficiency of loans as a system. The researcher examines the cost- 
effectiveness, administrative efficiency and economic efficiency of meeting manpower 
needs of loans as a system. Section Three examines different schemes individually in terms 
of different criteria of efficiency as defined. The PSD and MOE which give both 
scholarships and loans respectively will be analysed in more details particularly by 
comparing recipients' attitudes towards studies and expected results. Section Four makes a 
brief comparison of different loan schemes and scholarship schemes in terms of efficiency. 
Section Five discusses the implications of the cost-benefit principle of financing university 
education as applied in the Malaysian situation. Section Six concludes the chapter. 
9.1 Criteria of Efficiency 
9.1.1 Cost-effectiveness 
As explained in chapter 2, cost-effectiveness is used as a criterion to examine how far the 
investment in education through provision of loans or scholarships has achieved its 
efficiency objective as funding bodies desired, that is, how far students graduated on time 
with good grades. Students with different forms of financial support may have 
differential 
attitudes towards studies and the forms of support may affect their achievement 
for this 
reason. Proponents of loans have claimed that the loans are more efficient than scholarships 
as they motivate students to study harder (Woodhall, 
1970), and to become more cost- 
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conscious and thoughtful about future career prospects (Woodhall, 1987) since they have to 
pay at least part of the cost of attending higher education. However, this view is still 
empirically unproven. This study therefore compares the cost-effectiveness of the loan and 
scholarship systems. I will use the attitude towards study as an indicator to examine whether 
students study harder because of the convertibility of loans into partial scholarships. The 
attitude of loan recipients towards studies is then compared with that of scholarship 
recipients and those receiving parental or relative support. The number of hours spent in 
self-study such as doing revision, reading and other activities related to studies, and 
percentage of attendance will also be used as an indicator of the attitudes of students towards 
studies with different forms of financial support. 
Investments in education, through provision of loans and scholarships will not be wasted in 
so far as there has been a high passing rate and students graduated with good grades and on 
time. The cost-effectiveness of both systems is then compared. 
9.1.2 Efficiency in Meeting the Manpower Needs 
As defined in Chapter 2, this type of efficiency for this study refers to whether the output 
(graduates) meets the demand of the society. In other words, we examine the extent to which 
tertiary education satisfies manpower needs. Data regarding the demand and supply of 
manpower needs in various fields as forecasted by the Economic Planning Unit are used to 
examine the provisions of loans or scholarships in terms of the exchange efficiency 
argument. 
The efficiency above could also relate to "the recruitment effect" of loan and scholarship 
systems, as explored in chapter 6 and chapter 7. The extent to which loans and scholarships 
recruit qualified persons to university study and thus bring potential manpower into the 
economy, which would otherwise be lost because of financial constraints, implies its 
contribution to this type of efficiency. The impact of the recruitment effect of loans should 
be compared with that of scholarships, to suggest which option is better. 
9.1.3 Financial Efficiency 
As in Chapter 2, financial efficiency is defined as the recovery ratio, that is the extent to 
which the loan is repaid in full (Albrecht & Ziderman, 1989). 
What a government lends out 
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to students and what is returned in repayments would indicate the financial efficiency of a 
loan scheme. It depends on the cost of administration, the defaults, interest subsidy, rate of 
repayment, and grace period. Thus, financial efficiency examines loan efficiency at micro 
level. We shall investigate these criteria of efficiency. 
9.2 The Efficiency of the Loan System as Compared with the Scholarship System 
9.2.1 Cost -effectiveness 
The cost-effectiveness of loans is used to examine how far the investment in education has 
achieved its objective, that is how far students graduate on time with good grades. It is 
related to whether they motivate undergraduates to study harder (to use their time as 
efficiently as possible), contributing to better expected results' and hence economic 
efficiency. In the analysis, the attitude of loan recipients and their expected results are 
compared with those of scholarship recipients and of undergraduates receiving parental 
support. We shall investigate whether students study harder because of loans. 
Attitude towards study 
Attendance at lectures and hours of daily private study measure this. Two questions were 
asked in the survey, as elaborated in Table 9.1. 
"What is the average percentage which you attend lectures? " 
"On average, how many hours do you spend daily on private study such as reading, revision 
and other activities related to your studies? " 
Table 9.1: Forms of Financial support and Attitudes towards Study 
Attendance of Lectures Parental Loans Scholarships 
50%-79% (Low) 3% 4% 8% 
80%-89% (Medium) 13% 12% 11% 
90%-100% (High) 84% 84% 81% 
Total 100%(n=560) 100% (n=1689) 100% (n=396) 
Hours of Private Study 
0-2 hours (Below Average) 32% 36% 41% 
3-5 hours (Average) 55% 54% 52% 
6 hours & above(Above Average) 13% 10% 7% 
Total 100%(n=560) 100% n=1689 100% n=396 
Sample Size = 2645; (f = 19.369; df = 4; p =. 001); (X'= 13.239; df =4; p =. O1O) 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
' It would be better if actual pass rates are used rather than expected pass rates. Nevertheless, actual results 
hitherto would not differ much from the expected final result as respondents were in the final term of the final 
semester and results are accumulative in the calculation of CGPA. 
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Table 9.1 shows 3%, 4%, and 8% of the parental, loan and scholarship recipients 
respectively have a low attendance rate at lectures. Similarly, 13%, 12%, and 11% of the 
parental, loan and scholarship support recipients respectively have a medium attendance rate 
at lectures. Also, 84%, 84%, and 81 % of the parental, loan and scholarship support 
recipients respectively have a high attendance rate at lectures. Thus, loan recipients seem to 
have a higher rate of attendance at lectures, if compared with scholarship holders, though 
there may be other factors that affect students' attendance. 
Table 9.1 also 32%, 36% and 41% of respective parental, loan and scholarship support 
recipients respectively spend 0-2 hours daily on private study. Similarly, 55%, 54% and 
52% of parental, loan and scholarship support recipients respectively spend 3-5 hours daily 
on private study. Also, 13%, 10% and 7% of the parental, loan and scholarship support 
recipients respectively spend 6 hours and above daily on private study. This suggests that 
loan recipients appear to study harder than scholarship recipients, as they would like their 
loans to be converted into scholarships though other factors may be important also. But 
those who receive parental support seem to study even harder. Probably they value their 
higher education most since their families are paying for it directly. 
We shall next investigate whether loan recipients have higher attendance at lectures than 
scholarship holders, taking interrelationships of ethnicity, gender and others as in equation 
9.2 below. For this purpose, multiple regression analysis is used. 
In multiple regression, the values of the dependent variable (y), are estimated from those of 
, xp). two or more independent variables (xi, x2........................... 
In its general form, a linear equation can be constructed as 
y' = bo +b1 (x 1) + b2(x2) + ...... + 
bp(xp) ............................................ 
(9.1) 
where the parameters bl, b2,..... bp are the partial coefficients and the intercept bo is the 
regression constant. Taking attendance at lectures as the dependent variable and other 
factors as independent variables, the multiple regression of a linear equation 
is: 
Attendance at lectures = bo+ bl(ethnicity) + b2(gender) + b3 (regions) + 
b4 (areas) +b5 
(courses) + b6 (previous academic scores) + b7 (hours of daily private study) + b8 (financial 
support) ........ 
(9.2) 
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Tahle 9.2- Multinle Regression- Rate of AttPnrQ»no 
Standardised Coefficient t Significance 
Mode Beta 87.667 
. 000 1 Constant 
Ethnicity . 0370 1.574 . 116 Gender -. 090 -4.322 . 000 Regions 
. 001 . 053 . 958 Areas -. 004 -. 177 . 859 Courses 
Arts & Humanities -. 125 -4.018 . 000 Professional Arts -. 150 -4.493 . 000 Technology -. 095 -3.215 . 001 Pure Science -. 088 -3.486 . 000 Applied Science -. 081 -2.615 . 009 
Incomes -. 007 -. 338 . 735 Previous Academic Scores . 052 2.570 . 010 Hours on Private Study . 137 7.107 . 000 Financial Support 
Parental . 004 . 163 . 871 Scholarships . 017 . 807 . 420 Dependent Variable: Percentages lectures attended (Sample = 2645, df = 9, Mean Square= 471.454, 
R2 = 0.043 p= 0.000) Baseline categories: Natives, Female, East Malaysia, Rural, Medical 
Taking into account interrelationships of other variables, there seems to be that scholarship 
recipients have slightly higher attendance rates than loan recipients, indicated by the beta 
value of 0.017, though insignificant. The result differs when forms of financial support were 
analysed using cross-tabulation whereby loan recipients seem to have a higher attendance at 
lectures than scholarship-holders. It appears therefore gender, type of course, previous 
academic achievement and hours on daily private study which are significantly associated 
with the rate of attendance, rather than the forms of financial support when interrelationships 
with other variables are taken into account. We now investigate by using multiple 
regression, whether loan recipients spend longer hours on daily private study than that of 
scholarship recipients. This is elaborated in Table 9.3 
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Table 9.3: Multiple Regressions- Hours of Daily Private Study 
Standardised Coefficient t Significant 
Model Beta 
Constant 1.112 
. 266 Ethnicity 
. 014 . 597 . 550 Gender -. 008 -. 373 . 709 Regions -. 055 -2.804 . 005 Areas 
. 017 . 815 . 415 Courses 
Arts & Humanities -. 047 -1.507 . 
132 
Professional Arts -. 121 -3.608 . 000 Technology -. 008 -. 260 . 795 Pure Science -. 068 -2.675 . 008 Applied Science -. 049 -1.592 . 112 
Income -. 041 -1.942 . 052 Previous Academic Scores . 061 2.995 . 003 Attendance of lectures . 137 7.107 . 000 Financial Support 
Parental -. 004 -. 156 . 876 Scholarships 
. 
004 
. 
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Dependent Variable: Hours spent on private study (Sample = 2645, df = 14, Mean Square= 21.351, 
R2 = 0.042 p= 0.000) Baseline categories: Natives, Females, East Malaysia, Rural, Medical Courses, 
Loans 
Using multiple regression analysis to take interrelationships of other factors into account, 
results show that scholarship recipients have longer hours of daily private study than loan 
recipients, though the difference is not significant. This differs from the results shown by 
analysing forms of financial support using cross-tabulation. Multiple regression shows that 
regions which respondents come from, income groups, previous academic scores and 
attendance of lectures are respectively significant in relation to hours of private study, not 
forms of financial support. Attendance at lectures is significant in relation to hours of 
private study, possibly because some courses such as medicine and engineering need more 
practical work in the laboratory as a form of private study, and hence attendance at 
lectures 
is less. We can say that loan recipients do not study harder than scholarship holders when 
other factors are taken into account. 
Another indicator of efficiency is the expected results2 of respondents. 
2 For the expected final result, I could only use 2592 respondents. 
53 respondents were taking medicine at the 
University of Malaya which only classifies results as pass or 
fail. All of them expected to pass. However, I 
exclude them from the analysis as their grading 
differs from other courses. The failure rate in Malaysian Public 
universities is very marginal as shown 
in Table 1, Appendix P 
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Table 9.4: Expected Results By Forms of Financial Support 
Expected Result Financial Support Parental Loans Scholarships 
Good (First Class and Second Class 64% 35% 39% 
Upper Honours) 
Not Good (Second Class Lower, Third 36% 65% 61% 
Class Honours and General Degree) 
Total 100% (n=550) 100% (n=1671) 100% (n=371) 
ouui i: c; iviam oLuuy ýunuergraauates, 1999) 
Table 9.4 indicates a significant difference between forms of financial support given to 
respondents and their expected results (x2 = 146.969; df=4; p= . 000). 64%, 35% and 39% 
and of parental, scholarship and loan support recipients respectively expected their final 
academic results to be in the first class or second class upper (honours). Those with parental 
support are most likely to obtain the best expected results, probably they study harder as 
they (their parents) have to pay for the costs of higher education. Those with scholarship and 
loan supports follow this. 
To examine the interrelationships of other variables, we use the multiple logistic regression 
shown in Table 9.5. Scholarship recipients are most likely to have expected good results, 
followed by undergraduates who receive parental support and loan support respectively, 
though the regressions do not tell us the counterfactual, that is pass rates and distribution of 
degree class in absence of convertible loans (or different rates of convertibility). 
Thus, both results show that loan recipients do not expect better results than scholarship 
holders, when analysed separately, using cross-tabulation and taking interrelationships of 
other variables using multiple logistic regression. Clearly, scholarship holders are excellent 
students. 
Moreover, there are significant differences between ethnicity, areas which undergraduates 
come from, previous academic attainment, hours of private study, attendance at lectures, and 
scholarship support respectively with the expected results when interrelationships of all 
variables are taken into account. The results imply that non-natives expect better results than 
natives, females than males, East Malaysians than West Malaysians, urban undergraduates 
than their rural counterparts; and undergraduates who pursue arts and humanities rank top in 
expecting better results. Those taking pure science, medical, professional arts, technology 
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and applied science follow this. The results also imply that those having higher scores for 
their previous academic performance expect better results than those with lower scores. 
Expected results decline with declining income groups with top-bracket group expected the 
best result. Expected results also decline with declining hours of private study and 
attendance at lectures respectively. 
Table 9.5 : Multiple Logistic Regressions- Expected Results By Forms of Financial 
Support 
Variable Reference Categories B Significance 
(Wald) 
Exponential 
(B) 
Ethnicity Natives =0 1.8077 0.000 6.0965 
Gender Females =0 -. 1651 . 1109 . 8478 
Regions East Malaysia =0 -. 1892 . 1879 . 8276 
Areas Rural =0 . 2400 . 0161 1.2712 
Courses Medicine =0 
Arts & Humanities . 6223 . 0034 
1.8633 
Professional Arts -. 1259 . 5003 . 8817 
Technology -. 1311 . 
5162 . 
8771 
Pure Science . 
3429 . 
1597 1.4090 
Applied Science -. 1332 . 
4998 . 
8753 
Previous Academic Scores High-Score =0 
Low-Score -. 8942 . 0480 . 
4089 
Low-Middle Score -. 9339 . 0000 . 
3930 
Upper-Middle Score -. 3978 . 0002 . 
6718 
Income Groups Lowest =0 
Top-Bracket . 
4940 . 
3588 1.6388 
High . 2726 . 
1732 1.3133 
Medium . 1765 . 
2105 1.1930 
Low . 
0442 . 
7298 1.0452 
Hours at Private Study High =0 
Low -. 6182 . 
0001 . 
5389 
Medium -. 3219 . 0354 . 
7247 
Attendance at lectures High =0 
Low -1.1348 . 
0000 . 
3215 
Medium -. 9341 . 0000 . 
3930 
Financial Support Loan =0 
Parental . 
1599 . 
2220 1.1734 
Scholarships . 3373 . 
0175 1.4012 
Constant -. 3841 . 1606 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates), Sample size = 2592 
Though investment through provision of loans and scholarships are not wasted since most 
students graduate on time, multiple regressions seem 
to show that convertible loan recipients 
do not necessarily work harder and have 
better expected results than scholarship recipients. 
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9.2.2 Efficiency in Meeting the Manpower Needs 
As mentioned in section one, this type of efficiency is related to whether the output 
produced meets the demands of the society. Malaysia is developing fast, aiming to be a 
fully industrialised nation by the year 2020, as explained in appendix B (3). Qualified 
manpower needs in all fields have been high. This is especially the case in graduate 
teaching, engineering, technical and medical areas as forecast in the Seventh Malaysian Plan 
(1996-2000), indicated in Table 9.6. The Economic Planning Unit has access to all data 
concerned from the Labour Department and Manpower Ministry and others, to make 
forecasts for formulating the Malaysian Plans. Though the manpower requirement approach 
is a suspect technique, it has been used in formulating the Malaysian Plans since 1957 when 
independence was achieved, particularly enunciated in the Industrial Master Plan with 
flexibility (Lucas and Verry, 1999). 
Table 9.6: Additional Demand and Supply of Manpower by Selected Occupation 
in1996-2000 
Net Increase in demand Net increase in supply* Shortage 
Engineers 33,861 26,570 7,291 
Engineering Assistants 73,575 41,899 31,676 
Medical and Health Professionals 8,411 5,941 2,470 
Note: * includes graduates from local and private tertiary institutions as well as overseas graduates privately 
sponsored and those sponsored by the Government and major Corporations. 
Source: Government of Malaysia. Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000) 
In another source, the shortage of manpower in professional, science and technical fields is 
also quoted. 
" Shortages in skills especially in accountancy whereby 9,500 are registered but a demand of 60,000 is 
predicted by 2020 (Oxley et at, 1996). Similar shortages exist for engineers and scientists, so all 
qualifying are guaranteed a job" (Simpson, 1997, p35) 
Thus, the lack of skilled manpower is a critical problem. From this perspective, scholarships 
may be a more efficient way of binding the recipients, so that they serve the manpower 
needs of the country, contributing to efficiency in meeting the manpower needs of the 
economy. This will minimise the brain-drain, which needs to 
be combated because: 
"Malaysia has been experiencing a brain-drain of highly skilled personnel to Taiwan, Singapore, 
Australia and Canada. Because of high wages offered in Singapore, there has been an exodus of workers 
to the south. " (the Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994, p137) 
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This suggests that scholarships should be preferred to loans, for those students who pursue 
courses, especially in engineering and medicine, which are critically needed by the 
economy. Scholarship holders pursuing these courses are bonded with the government to 
serve the manpower needs of the economy. Though scholarships may represent a "dead- 
weight" loss to the public fund temporarily, it can be compensated for in the long run 
because external benefits will accrue to society later. These can be in the form of better 
health services to the general population, thereby improving the health condition. The high 
skills acquired would also enhance productivity, thereby contributing to economic growth. 
The recruitment effect of loans can also contribute to efficiency in meeting the manpower 
needs of the country. If loans had not been offered at all, many from the lowest income 
group would not have begun university education, meaning a loss of talents to the society. 
The recruitment effect of loans, discussed in chapter 6, shows that about 53% of the lowest 
income-group might not have begun or continued studies in universities if loans had not 
been made available to them in the first place. The result in Chapter 7 also shows that the 
recruitment effect of scholarships for the lowest income-group is high; that is, 75% of 
scholarship holders might not attend university if scholarships were not offered to them in 
the first place. The recruitment effect of scholarships may be greater than that of loans. This 
suggests that compared to loans, scholarships may contribute more to the exchange 
efficiency of the economy by meeting the manpower needs, as scholarship would bind the 
recipients to serve with Malaysia. Conversely, loan recipients are free to serve 
in any place, 
including places outside Malaysia, causing brain drain, and therefore a loss to the economy. 
9.2.3 Financial Efficiency 
The Possibility of Repayment 
I use the following question developed by Reuterberg, 1994 
in the study of student financial 
support in Sweden. 
"Do you think you will be able to repay all your 
debts after graduation according to the 
present rules for repayment? " (Reuterberg, 1994) 
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Table 9.7: Possibility of repayment of loans 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes, definitely 768 45.5% 
Yes, probably 749 44.3% 
No, probably not 121 7.2% 
No, definitely not 24 1.4% 
Missing 27 1.6% 
Total 1689 100.0% 
Source: i ne iviain ý! ituciy, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 9.7 implies that the rate of repayment for the loan system is high and affordable in 
accordance with the present rules. The survey results also indicate that only about 9% of 
recipients are doubtful about the possibility of repaying the total debt; this implies a low 
default rate, and may contribute to loan-efficiency. There is no reason for some non-repayers 
to think that they will get their loans converted into grants, unless they expect to obtain 
excellent results as stated in the agreement signed between the funding bodies and loan 
recipients. Part II of this chapter analyses the efficiency of various loan schemes beginning 
with section 9.3 
9.3 Efficiency of Various Loan Schemes 
We now examine the efficiency of different loan schemes by studying their cost- 
effectiveness, exchange efficiency and financial efficiency. Data from the main study, 
documents including annual reports and statements of accounts from the Auditor-General, 
and interviews are used for analysis. We shall first investigate the efficiency of the Public 
Service Department Convertible Loan, the major sponsorship programme. 
9.3.1 The Public Service Department (PSD)Education Loan Scheme3 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the Public Service Department provides education loans and a 
limited number of scholarships in the ratio of four to one. 
9.3.1.1 Cost-effectiveness 
The main objective of the Public Service Department is to ensure that the need for trained 
and skilled manpower for the Public Service and the nation as a whole is met through sound 
3 Here, the Education Loan Scheme refers to the Convertible Loan-grant. In the text, it will be interchangeably 
termed the Education Loan. 
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training policies and sponsorship programmes (Annual Report, 1996). Thus, the cost- 
effectiveness of the sponsorship programmes is of prime importance to fulfil manpower 
needs. PSD loans seems to be very cost-effective since the course failure rate of loan 
recipients is very low, less than one per cent (interview with the Director and panel, the 
Public Service Department). Those who fail in the first instance can repeat and pass finally. 
In the survey study of undergraduates, the PSD loan recipients all expected to pass. 
281(35.3%), 415 (52.1%) and 101 (12.7%) of them expected to get first class and second 
upper (honours), second lower and third class (honours), and general degrees respectively. 
This means that 696 (87.1%) of recipients expected have their loans converted into 75% 
grants after graduation. The result is compared with the average percentage of those who 
achieved this, which was 80%, between 1987 to 1998 (first hand information from the 
Director and panel). Thus, the scheme appears to motivate students to complete their studies 
on time, and strive harder to achieve the level of qualification expected of them to ensure 
that the required number of students will graduate. 
The scheme appears to be efficient in achieving the objective, and therefore cost-effective 
since the output is obtained on time. The loan investment in education is therefore not 
wasted. It also contributes to financial efficiency, as loan recipients can probably repay their 
debts on time since they are likely to graduate without extension. 
Using cross-tabulation, the Public Service Department scholarship recipients seem to not 
perform as well as its loan recipients (Table 2, Appendix P). 18% and 82% of scholarship 
holders expected to pass with good results {first class and second class upper (honours)}, 
and not good results {third class (honours), and general degrees} respectively compared to 
35% and 65% of the loan recipients respectively. 
Taking into account interrelationships of other factors, multiple logistic regression4 in Table 
3 of Appendix P shows that the PSD loan holders again seem to perform 
better than 
scholarship recipients, as indicated by the negative beta value, which 
is significant at 0.069. 
There are significant associations between ethnicity, attendance at lectures, and partially 
4 Again, regressions do not tell us the counterfactual, that is pass rates and distribution of degree class 
in 
absence of convertible loans (or different rates of convertibility) 
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previous academic scores which recipients attained respectively with the expected results. 
The model thus shows that non-natives expected better results than natives, and those with 
high scores in the previous academic attainment than those with low, upper-middle and 
lower-middle scores. We conclude that the PSD loan recipients do perform better than their 
scholarship counterparts. 
However, the survey shows a mixed result on the attitude towards study, when the Public 
Service Department loan and scholarship recipients are compared. On average, a loan 
recipient spends 2.97 hours per day on private study, compared to 3.23 hours for the 
scholarship recipient. But the loan recipients have a marginally higher average rate of 
attendance, that is, 92.90%, compared to 92.46% of the scholarship holders. 
When interrelationships of all other factors are considered, Table 4 of Appendix P indicates 
that PSD scholarship holders have longer hours of daily private study than PSD loan holders 
though not significant. But, the model shows that ethnicity, previous academic scores 
before entrance to universities and percentages of attendance are significantly related with 
hours of private study. 
Taking into account of interrelationships of other variables, Table 5 of Appendix P indicates 
that PSD scholarship recipients have a higher attendance at lectures than PSD loan 
recipients, when interrelationships with other factors are considered. However, the 
difference is insignificant. We conclude that PSD loan recipients appear to be not 
necessarily work harder than scholarship recipients. Analysis also shows that forms of 
financial support are not significant in relation to study harder. But instead, ethnicity, gender 
income, hours of private study and attendance at lectures are more important in relation to 
study harder. 
9.3.1.2 Efficiency in Meeting the Manpower Needs 
The PSD loan contributes to efficiency in meeting the manpower because of its recruitment 
effects. Data from the field study of undergraduates 
indicate that the overall recruitment 
effect (how far loans help undergraduates to begin and continue their studies) of the 
PSD 
loan is 32.6% and its recruitment effect on the lowest income group is 54.9% (See Table 6 
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and Table 7, Appendix P). This means that potential manpower is not lost to meet the 
demands of the economy as a consequence of loan provision. This would contribute to 
economic growth, as human capital can be more fully utilised through extensive loan 
provision. 
In contrast to the Public Service Loan Scheme, the Public Service Scholarship Scheme has a 
higher overall recruitment effect, 37.6% and also a much higher recruitment effect for the 
lowest income-group, 75.6% (Tables 8 and 9, Appendix P). This suggests that the Public 
Service Scholarships may contribute more than loans to the efficiency in meeting the 
manpower needs especially in critical areas such as teaching, medical and technology. 
Scholarship holders are bonded with the government for service for between 5 to 10 years, 
preventing "brain drain". 
9.3.1.3 Financial efficiency 
The Public Service Department Loan will never be fully self-financing, owing to several 
features. First of all, the loan can be partially converted into grant based on results. This 
implies that the portions which have been converted into scholarships will never be 
recovered. On average, 80%-87.1% of the borrowers have their loans converted into 75% 
grants, as they have succeeded in getting their honours degrees on time. 
Secondly, the heavy interest subsidy adds further to the costs, as the scheme is free of 
interest. The government has to borrow money from private sources to finance this public 
funding. Moreover, the grace period of 6 months for starting repayment of loans, or after 
getting a job, which ever is earlier, also adds to the cost. 
Defaults also add to the costs of the scheme. According to the data given during the 
interview, from a total of 146 000 recipients, 2000 had their loans written off between 1987 
to 1998. The real default rate was 3.4% after the portion converted into grants was 
excluded5. The rate was low compared with the Guaranteed Student Loans or the Stafford 
Loans in the USA, whose default rate was very high. Between 1983 and 1989, the volume of 
the Guaranteed Student Loans grew by 48%, but the volume of defaulted loans increased by 
5 Since 80% of recipients have their loans converted into grants, this means that 146 000 x 20% =29,200 of 
them are not eligible to have loans converted into grants. Also, 80% (116800) of recipients have to repay 
25% loans. This means another 29,200 repay full loans. The real default rate = 2000 - 58,400 = 3.4% 
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266 per cent during the same period. The PSD loan default rate was approximately the same 
as the loan defaults in Sweden, which were 1-2%. It was much lower than the rate in Kenya 
which was 75-80% (Woodhall, 1991b). The main reason for the very low default rate of the 
PSD loan was because at least 80% of borrowers on average had their loans converted into 
75% grants. PSD loan appears to be good in terms of cost-effectiveness but inefficient in 
terms of cost-recovery. 
According to the senior officer in charge of the accounts section, the cost of administration 
for the year 1998 was M$9 million or 1.28% from total loan expenses of $M700 million. 
This compared with 2.00% in the year 1996 (The Public Service Department, Annual 
Report, 1996 p. 9). However, the cost of administration for the PSD loan scheme may be 
more expensive if it is compared to an income contingent loan. The PSD Loan scheme as it 
is, has to maintain records about the particulars of the borrower, and records about the loan. 
The loan agency has to maintain both sets of records from the time the student first takes out 
a loan until the loan is fully repaid. An income-contingent loan scheme could use the Inland 
Revenue Board to administer the loan scheme, as the former has a full database of 
employees, including the self-employed. This would make administration much easier and 
cheaper. 
Under the PSD loan scheme, it is also difficult and costly to track changes of the graduate's 
address. The loan scheme does not liberate public funds, unlike privatising student loans 
through selling of student debts as suggested by Barr and Crawford (1996). It is also costly 
to administer the deferment for students who cannot afford to repay because of other 
commitments such as supporting their families, paying housing loans and so on. 
As a mortgage-type loan, the PSD Loan Scheme also faces the problem of securing 
repayment6. The average repayment is about 50% of total loan disbursements, excluding 
portions converted to grants (interview with the Director and panel, Training Division, 
Public Service Department), making the recovery rate very low. Nevertheless, the 
introduction of a computerised system in the Public Service Department has brought about a 
6 Students need to repay loans at regular intervals (See Table 10, Appendix P) 
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significant increase in the amount of loan collection. M$ 11.85 million was collected in 
1996 compared to only M$ 5.6 million collected under the manual system in 1995. 
The repayment period for students pursuing studies in Malaysian universities is not long, 
between 6-8 years, depending on the types of courses they take. If they are willing to repay 
on time, the repayment rate can be high. However, the deferment of repayment adds to the 
costs further. Thus, in 1998 the Public Service Department started bankruptcy proceedings 
against 89 former government scholars who have not repaid their loans despite repeated 
warnings over the last 10 years (Roslina Mohamad, The Star, 8th June 1998 and also 
interview with the PSD). Most of these former scholars are successful professionals, but yet 
refused to repay the loans. It is therefore the attitude, which causes them not to repay. In 
interviews, senior executives of funding bodies stated that willingness to repay is more 
important than ability to repay. They also considered that it is the attitude, not income factor 
which causes former recipients not to repay. Legal action and bankruptcy proceedings were 
the last resorts against former loan recipients who ignored the warnings for repayment, and 
further added to the cost. 
We shall next analyse another type of convertible loan, the MARA Loan. 
9.3.2 The MARA Convertible Loan 
As explained in chapter 4, the MARA Education Loans are given to native students only 
who pursue studies at institutions of higher learning, locally and abroad. In 1996,2414 
students pursuing first degrees in the local universities were given loans, and another 617 
undergraduates pursuing studies abroad were also provided with loans. A total of 10,424 
new students at all levels were given loans in 1996. (Tables 11 and 12, Appendix P). 
9.3.2.1 Cost-effectiveness 
The main objective of the MARA Education Convertible Loan? is to increase the quantity of 
trained Bumiputra (native) manpower in professional, technical and management fields, 
7 Those who complete on time with first class honours and second class upper (honours) are exempted from 
repaying the amount borrowed. Those who get the second class lower (honours) and third class (honours) on 
time, need to repay only 75% of the amount borrowed. Those who obtain the general degree need to repay 
50% of the amounts borrowed. Those who fail or cannot complete on time need to repay the full amount 
irrespective of the grades they obtain (Table 13, Appendix P) 
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producing the required workforce to meet the needs of the country, and moving towards the 
establishment of a Bumiputera commercial and industrial community (Annual Report, 
1996). The programme is cost-effective in achieving the above objective, as the failure rate 
is marginal, less than 4% (interview data, MARA). This can also be indicated by the 
percentages of loan recipients having loans fully or partially converted into grants or 
scholarships. The interview revealed that 55% of the borrowers had their loans converted 
into 100% grants, 40% converted into 75% grants, and 1% into 50% grants, 4% had to pay 
in full in the year 1998. Those who failed or did not complete their honours degrees on time 
needed to repay the full amount of the loan. Thus, the failure rate was very marginal, less 
than 4%. This shows that the convertible loan have achieved its objective. Thus, they are 
cost-effective in getting output (with a failure rate of less than 4%), though they may not be 
efficient financially. The assistant director claimed: 
"We want them to attain the highest grade in their studies. The convertible loan will motivate 
students to study harder. The universities will send us the results every semester. We will 
withhold the money if they under-perform. " (Assistant Director, MARA) 
Data from the survey show that 16.7%, 60.7% and 22.6% of MARA loan recipients obtained 
the first and second class Upper (honours), second class lower (honours) and third class 
(honours), and the general degree respectively. Thus, the loans are cost-effective in 
achieving the target, getting the output (graduates) on time with no failures. The fact that no 
one fails or need any extension to complete their studies implies that the graduates can start 
repaying their debts on time and meet the manpower needs of the economy, contributing to 
exchange efficiency. 
9.3.2.2 Efficiency in Meeting the Manpower Needs 
The government's objective is to increase the Bumiputera (native) participation in the 
commercial and industrial arena, restructuring Malaysian society so that types of economic 
activity are not identified with race. Hence, the financial support scheme aims to increase 
the number of trained Bumiputera in professional, technical and management fields. The 
loan scheme therefore contributes to achieve this objective and also to the efficiency in 
meeting the manpower needs, as most Bumiputera graduates have successfully graduated on 
time. Since its inception, the MARA has sponsored a total of 136,046 Bumiputeras pursuing 
studies at institutions of higher learning both locally and abroad (Table 14, Appendix P). 
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The contribution of the MARA loan scheme to efficiency in meeting the manpower needs 
can also be investigated by examining its recruitment effect. Survey data of the 
undergraduates show that 33.1%, 30.0%, 29.8%, and 6.8% of the MARA loan recipients 
state that they would definitely, probably, probably not and definitely not have entered or 
continued university education if they had not been given the loans (Table 15, Appendix P). 
Thus, the recruitment effect for the MARA loan scheme is 36.8% as in Table 15, Appendix 
P. The recruitment effect for the lowest, low, medium, high and top-brackets are 40.1%, 
33.0%, 16.0%, 9.3% and 0% respectively8. This implies that the scheme has been successful 
in recruiting the lowest and low income-groups to attend university education, contributing 
to the efficiency in meeting the manpower needs. The potential manpower contribution of 
Bumiputera (natives) is therefore to a certain extent not lost. 
9.3.2.3 Financial efficiency 
Analysis of financial efficiency is based on the cost of administration, the probable default 
rate, the repayment rate and interest subsidy. The MARA convertible loan scheme can never 
be fully self-financing. The 100 per cent interest subsidy (hidden grants) and loan portions 
which have been converted into grants can never be recovered. In 1998, for example only 
4% of borrowers needed to repay the full amount of money they borrowed. Between 1992 
and September, 1997, a total of 20,403 recipients had their loans partially converted into 
scholarships amounting to about M$706.7 million (PLZ538B, MARA, 1998). This means 
that 80.8% of the amounts borrowed had been converted into scholarships (Table 17, 
Appendix P). The results expected by the undergraduates also show that 16.6% of them 
expected not to repay the loans they borrowed, 22.5% of them need to repay only 50% of the 
amounts they borrowed before and 60.8% of them would need to repay only 25% of the 
amount borrowed. The free-interest subsidy also adds further to the costs of the scheme. The 
rationale is to encourage the poor to attend the university education. 
"If we charge interest even at 4%, we are discouraging the poor from attending the 
universities. We will not be alleviating poverty, especially those from hardcore poverty and 
also those who want to pursue their studies overseas at a higher cost..... It is too expensive and 
not fair if we charge them interest. It will discourage them from pursuing their studies" 
(Assistant Director, MARA) 
8 There is a significant association between social class and recruitment effects with x2 = 73.875; df =12; 
p=. 000 (Table 16, Appendix P) 
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Defaults also add to the costs of the scheme. Efforts have been made to reduce the defaults 
including the publication of names of hard-core defaulters (those who had never paid) in the 
local newspaper from January, 1997 to 30 June 1998 (Table 18, Appendix P). The result was 
quite encouraging. 1025 of defaulters came forward to repay, contributing M$ 3.97 million 
(MARA Resource Monthly Report, 30 June 1998). This may also have had a spill-over 
effect on those who did not belong to the hard-core group. In the same period, 7553 of them 
also came forward to repay, contributing M$ 3.42 million. According to a senior officer who 
is in charge of loan repayment, 
" The publishing of names is quite effective. It is very effective to those who are able to repay but 
unwilling to do so at the beginning. " (Senior loan repayment officer, MARA) 
Regarding the repayment, the senior officer of MARA states: 
"The most important reason for not paying back is their attitude, followed by other 
commitments.... " (Senior Executive Officer, MARA) 
It is the attitude factor which chiefly causes the recipients not to repay. Unemployment or 
low income is not the reason as the unemployment rate of graduates is very marginal in 
Malaysia. MARA has provided a good system to induce borrowers to repay the loans. The 
mortgage type of repayments can be made through deduction from monthly salaries. 
Borrowers can also repay the debts through any post office and any MARA office. 
Borrowers need to sign agreements with two guarantors and promissory contracts for 
repayment. Table 9.8 shows the rate of repayment. 
Table 9.8: Repayment rate: Cumulative Repayment Expressed As a Percentage of 
Expected Repayment. 
Sum till 31.12.96 in 
M$(million) 
Sum till 31.12.97 in 
M$ (million) 
Sum till 31.10.98 
M$ (million) 
1. Expenses (Disbursements) 1,535 1,621 1,890 
2. Need to repay 1,037 1,118 1,380 
3. a) Arrears 126 113 119 
b) Actual Repayments 178 216 241 
c)Expected Repayments9 305 329 359 
Repayment Rate = (b) = (c) 58% 66% 67% 
Source: The working Document, MARA PLZ536B, 1998 
9 This refers to portions which are not converted into grants and hence expected to be repaid 
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Table 9.8 shows that the rates of repayment were 58%, 66% and 67% respectively for the 
years 1996,1997 and 1998. Repayment improved from end of 1996 to 1998, probably due 
to the publication of names of defaulters from January 1997 to June 1998. 
In the survey study, from a total of 457 respondents, only 49 (10.8%) expressed that they 
would probably and definitely not to repay. This suggests that the repayment rate of loans is 
likely to appear high. The cost of administration is low. According to first hand information 
collected during the interview, the cost of administration for 1997 was only 0.071% of the 
total allocation10. This was lower than the cost of the Public Service Department loan, which 
was about 2%. The computerised system has minimised the cost of administration, while 
simultaneously motivating a higher repayment rate. 
"Our system is fully computerised, linking to the universities, bank or student accounts" 
(Assistant Director, MARA) 
The grace period of 6 months after graduation, or after getting a job, whichever is earlier, is 
reasonable, though to a certain extent it increases the cost of administration. According to 
the Assistant Director, 
"the rationale is to get students settle down to getting a career or to start off with a career... to 
buy new clothing when starting the career.... " (Assistant Director MARA) 
More importantly, MARA financial support to the natives is a social engineering tool. 
" We have helped to achieve the objective of the New Economic Policy by motivating natives 
to participate in higher education. All of them are employed. It is a social engineering 
programme for them to move up in social status, even with spill-over effects. They help their 
parents to live a much happier life than before and to improve their health status......... It 
helps to lessen the gap between the rich and the poor, the native and non-native. " (Assistant 
Director, MARA) 
9.3.3 The Ministry of Education Loan Fund 
From 1990 to 1997, the Ministry of Education has sponsored through loan, 5121 
undergraduates, pursuing first degree courses at Malaysian universities 
(Table 19, Appendix 
P). A total of 1,855 undergraduates were also awarded scholarships to take first degree 
10 This is calculated as $M389000 = $M543,000,000 = 0.071%. However, 
if we subtract the portion converted 
into scholarships in 1997, the actual expenditure on the 
loans will be only $M235,588,892. The cost of 
administration is then = $M389,000 = $M235,588,892 = 
0.1765% which is still low, compared to the actual 
expenditure spent on loans during the year. 
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courses especially in "Teaching English as a Second Language" between 1993 to 1997 
(Table 20, Appendix P). 
9.3.3.1 Cost-effectiveness 
The Ministry of Education Convertible Loan is cost-effective in achieving its objective. The 
passing rate of undergraduates has been very high. Using cross tabulation, Table 21 of 
Appendix P indicates that all MOE loan recipients expected to pass. 56.7% and 43.3% of 
them expected to pass with good and not good results respectively, compared to 37.6% and 
62.4% for the scholarship holders respectively. It seems that the loan recipients perform 
better than the scholarship holders, probably because they study harder to get better results. 
Taking into account interrelationships of other variables, MOE loan recipients seem to 
perform better than scholarship holders though it is statistically insignificant (Table 22, 
Appendix P). Though the regressions do not tell us pass rates and distribution of degree 
class in the absence of convertible loans (or different rates of convertibility), it indicates 
that it is ethnicity and hours of daily private study which are associated with expected 
results. Results show that non-natives secure better results than natives and those who have 
high attendance secure better results than those having low attendance at lectures. 
The survey result also shows that the MOE loan recipients spend longer hours on daily 
private study than their scholarship counterparts. On an average, a MOE loan recipient 
spends 3.2 hours daily on private study, compared to 2.4 hours for their scholarship 
counterparts. The MOE loan recipients also have a marginally higher average attendance at 
lectures, that is 93% compared to 92.8% of the scholarship counterparts. Taking into 
account interrelationships of all variables, MOE scholarship holders did not spend more time 
in daily private-study than MOE loan recipients (Table 23, Appendix P). The result is 
similar to the result when interrelationships of other factors are not taken into account. 
Moreover, only income groups and forms of financial support are significantly associated 
with hours of daily private study. 
MOE loan recipients also seem to have a higher attendance at lectures, compared with 
scholarship counterparts taking into account interrelationships of other variables, though 
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insignificant (Table 24, Appendix P). The result is similar with the average percentage of 
attendance at lecture when interrelationships of other variables are not taken into account. 
We can conclude that the MOE loan recipients did study harder than scholarship 
counterparts, contributing to better results and cost-effectiveness. 
9.3.3.2 Efficiency in Meeting Manpower Needs 
The Ministry of Education loan scheme and the scholarship scheme are efficient in meeting 
the manpower needs of the country, especially in the field of education. Though the 
Education Loan Fund does not bind the recipients to serve with the Ministry, it is likely that 
most of them would join the teaching profession since their fields are concerned with the 
teaching methodologies of different subjects (Interview with Assistant Secretariat). 
Furthermore, the grant of loans or scholarships is directed to those who are doing courses 
integrated with education so as to encourage more professionals to become teachers. 
" We have an agreement with the Public Service Department that we give loans or scholarships to those 
who are doing programmes integrated with education such as science with education, computers with 
education, arts with education , and so on ... " (Assistant Secretary, Scholarship Division, Ministry of 
Education, Malaysia). 
The provision of scholarships" may be more efficient if compared to loans, as the former 
will bind the recipients to serve with the Education Ministry as teachers. This is especially 
true when the Ministry faces an acute shortage of graduate teachers. By 1998, the Ministry 
was short of 10,466 graduate teachers, especially in Mathematics, English and Science 
subjects (See Table 25, Appendix P). 
" We have a shortage of teachers. Based on the facts from the Education Planning and 
Research Division, we know about the shortage of teachers in certain fields. So, we give more 
scholarships. " Interview with Assistant Secretary, Scholarship Division, Ministry of 
Education, Malaysia. 
Data from the fieldwork also show that the general recruitment effect of the Ministry of 
Education scholarships is 37.6%, higher than that of its loans, only 28.3%. Again, 
scholarships are more efficient in recruiting more undergraduates in percentage to enter and 
continue their university education, who would otherwise not do so. Thus, talents are not 
lost, contributing to the efficiency of the economy. 
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9.3.3.3 Financial efficiency 
The Ministry of Education Loan Fund Scheme will also be not fully self-financing, because 
of the heavy subsidy, the grant portion and interest subsidy. 93.4% of recipients expected to 
have their loans converted to 75% grant, as they expected to obtain second class (lower) and 
above. Only 6.7% of recipients expected to repay the full loans, as they expected to obtain 
the general degrees. Table 26 of Appendix P shows the conversion of loans into grants from 
1987 to 1993. Though the loans are also inefficient financially, they are efficient in getting 
an output in which no one fails. 
Furthermore, the repayment rate is very low, though most recipients (undergraduates) need 
to repay only 25% of the loans borrowed, as 75% has been converted into grants. There was 
no repayment from 1990 to 1993 (Table 27, Appendix P) though recipients had completed 
their studies and were expected to repay. The actual repayment only started in 1994, seven 
years after the scheme's inception. The repayment rate, taking the current repayment as a 
percentage of current cumulative expected repayments, increased from 0.188% in 1994 to 
3.95% in1997, as shown in Table 27, Appendix P. 
The deferment rate has been very high, though the default rate was marginal. A senior loans 
enforcement officer states this. 
"The deferment rate (of those who do not start paying after the grace period is over) is about 
80%. On average, one year after the grace period, still about 40% of them have not started 
paying. So far, we have written off very few cases because of health reasons or because they 
had died. It is under the jurisdiction of the treasury whether to have the loans written off. " (A 
senior loan enforcement officer, Ministry of Education). 
Moreover, the task is too heavy for officers to handle, for it involves a lot of paper 
work. The Ministry of Education Loan Fund has to keep two sorts of records, about the 
particulars of the borrowers, and about their borrowings and repayment matters. It 
seems that actually pursuing defaulters is secondary to record keeping. 
"We are lacking officers. We have 3000 active records to deal with. So, the default cases are 
not our priority. Our priority is concerned with giving notices for loan repayment, interviews 
and processing of loan application. " (Senior loan enforcement officer, Ministry of Education). 
" In the survey, the sample size of students receiving loans is 60, compared to 85 receiving scholarships. 
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It is the attitude of borrowers, which brings about low repayments. Defaulters may think that 
they can get away with it. It is not because of unemployment. 
"So far, most of them get jobs because of high demand in the labour market. "(Senior loan 
enforcement officer, Ministry of Education). 
The low repayment rate with high deferment rate, the heavy interest subsidy, and the 
convertibility of loans into partial grants make it impossible for the loan scheme to be self- 
financing. It is inefficient, as the grant portions represent a "dead-weight" loss to the public 
fund in the short-run and are financially inefficient. However, the scheme may be efficient 
in terms of cost-effectiveness and meeting the manpower needs of the country, especially in 
education. 
We now examine the Sarawak Foundation Loan Scheme. 
9.3.4 The Sarawak Foundation Loan Scheme 
The Sarawak Foundation Scheme was established in 1971 as a Sarawak State Government 
statutory body. The Foundation Scheme derives its income from the timber companies who 
give annual royalties in return for the timber concessions. The state resources are utilised to 
help the poor, helping them to attend higher education through provisions of convertible 
loans and grants. 
9.3.4.1 Cost-effectiveness 
The Sarawak Foundation convertible loan is cost-effective in producing graduates to meet 
the particular manpower needs of the state. The passing rate of undergraduates is almost 100 
per cent, with completion on time. In 1995, the passing rate was 99.98% (first 
hand 
information during the interview). The field data also show an 100% expected passing rate. 
An interview with the senior executive officer verified the fact that the passing rate has been 
very high and students complete studies on time. 
"Only one or two out of 1000 fail every year" (senior executive officer, 
Sarawak Foundation) 
This is because students need to perform well so that they can obtain the loans 
continuously. In the agreement document, each 
individual student (recipient) is asked to 
promise that: 
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"... he/she will ensure that a satisfactory academic result of every semester or academic year 
or whenever available in order to enable him/her to proceed to complete the prescribed course 
of study shall be furnished to the Board forthwith and if so required by the Board the student 
shall authorise the Educational Institution to transact the academic results to the Board. " 
(Sarawak Foundation, 1996, Education Loan Agreement, Clause 2 (b) 
Thus, the loan scheme is cost-effectiveness in getting graduates to complete on time. 
9.3.4.2 Efficiency in Meeting the Manpower Needs 
The Sarawak Foundation scheme to a certain extent contributes to the efficiency of the 
economy by providing for manpower needs of the state. As explained in Chapters 6 and 7, 
The East Malaysian States are facing more acute manpower shortage than the West 
Malaysian States, because of their recent rapid economic development undertaken in order 
to be on a par with the West Malaysian states. Data from the fieldwork show that the general 
recruitment effect of the Sarawak Foundation Loan though only 14.3%, is 40% for the 
lowest income group. Thus, support through loans has particularly motivated the lowest 
income group to enter and continue university education, who otherwise might not do so. 
This prevents the loss of talents to the society by recruiting young people who are qualified 
to attend universities, contributing to economic efficiency by meeting manpower needs in 
the long run. Since its inception, about 9000 Sarawakians have benefited from the pure loan 
and the convertible loan schemes. 
9.3.4.3 Financial Efficiency 
The Sarawak Foundation Convertible loan scheme12 will never be fully self-financing. This 
is because the loans can be fully or partially converted into grants/scholarships and are 
interest free. The survey data show that 43%, 41%, 9% and 7% expected to obtain first class 
(honours) and second class upper (honours), second class lower and third class (honours), 
general degree and pass degrees (medical course) respectively. This implies that 50% of the 
loans would be fully converted into grants or scholarships (including the 7% made up of 
those taking medical courses) whereas 41% and 9% expected to repay only 25% and 50% of 
their debts respectively. Thus, 85 % of the loans do not have to be repaid; the convertible 
loan is very heavily subsidised and can never be self-financing though it contributes to the 
12 The repayments of loans depend on performance in studies. Students may not have to repay at all if their 
results are excellent, and need only repay partially if their results are good (Table 20, Appendix P) 
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efficiency in meeting manpower needs and appears to be cost-effective. The recovery rate is 
15% at the most, without taken into account the cost of administration, defaults and interest 
subsidy. 
Table 9.9 shows the repayment rates for the Sarawak Foundation convertible loan. The rate 
of repayment increased from 23.4% of the yearly disbursement in 1989 to 113.8% for the 
1994 disbursement, as indicated in Column (5). The average yearly repayment rate is 61.9%. 
Table 9.9: Sarawak Foundation Loans 
Items 1989 M$ 1990 M$ 1992 M$ 1993 M$ 1994 M$ 
1. Convertible Loans disbursed during 2,143,750 3,070,981 4,192,300 3,586,150 2,181,163 
the year 
2. Portion of Scholarship Loans not 1,601,628 2,222,627 3,144,225 2,689,613 1,635,872 
repayable by students now charged to 
statement of Income and expenditure 
3. Convertible Loans repaid by students 126743 165204 599878 856843 620393 
at current years 
4. Loans need to be repaid = (1) - (2) at 542122 848354 1048075 896537 545291 
current years 
5. Percentage of repayment (3 = (4) 23.4 % 19.5 % 57.3 % 95.6 % 113.8% 
at current years(Repayment Rate )13 
6. Average Repayment Rate (1989-1994) 61.9% 
Source: Adapted from the Statement of Financial and Audit Reports, Sarawak Foundation 
The repayment rate was more than 100% of the 1994 disbursement mainly because of 
efforts taken to increase collections of arrears. Thus, the repayment rate 14 has been 
improving since 1992. This judgement was triangulated though an interview with the 
Sarawak Foundation. 
"Students are very open and positive about the loan repayments. They know that we use this to sponsor 
new students. And we are also very serious about this. They are afraid that Yayasan Sarawak will bring 
them to the court. There are few cases of defaults" (Assistant Director, Sarawak Foundation). 
A discussion with another senior officer confirmed that the repayment of the Sarawak 
Foundation Loan has been very high since 1990, if the loan portion converted into grants is 
not considered as loan disbursement. 
"The repayment rate is very high, that is above 90% for the loan grants" Senior Officer, Sarawak 
Foundation). 
However, for the minority of students who do not repay, the main reason is that they have a 
negative attitude towards loan repayment. The senior officer states: 
13 Repayment Rate : Calculation considers only that portion of loans not converted to grants/scholarships. 
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"For students who do not repay, they usually give the repayment of loans a very low priority. They give 
priority to the car loan, housing loan and giving money to members of their families. " (Assistant 
Director, Sarawak Foundation). 
It is not because they are unable to pay or the monthly loan repayment is too high. 
"All of them are working. If they are working with the government or the public sector, the starting 
monthly salary is usually more than $M1500 ($US395). In terms of repayment, it is only between RM50 
- RM100 a month. It is a small percentage. It is just a matter of attitude. " (Senior officer, Sarawak 
Foundation). 
The cost of administration is about 10% (interview with the senior officer, The Sarawak 
Foundation) because of the very small scale of the loans. The yearly disbursements for the 
loan are small. The amount ranges from RM2,143,750 in 1989 to RM 2,181,163 in 1994. 
The scale is too small to reach the economics of scale. Though students can be contacted 
with the help of the Income Revenue Department and the Employee Provident Department, 
the task is too burdensome as there are no computer links between the parties concerned. 
Moreover, students need to inform the Sarawak Foundation to arrange repayment after they 
have finished their studies. 
Repayment is done through salary deduction or paid directly to the Sarawak Foundation. 
Prior to this, students have signed an agreement form that they are willing to have 
deductions from their salary for repayment of loans. Thus, the cost of collection is expected 
not to be high, if recipients are willing to repay. The scheme is operated manually, making it 
wasteful and costly. Nevertheless, the fact that the loans need to be repaid within two to five 
years means that the cost of collection would be minimised. However, the loan recovery rate 
will be lower when taking into account the cost of administration, interest subsidy, 
deferment, and grace period. We shall now estimate the level of loan recovery, as indicated 
in Table 9.10. 
14 The portion converted into grant is not considered as loan disbursement in the calculation. 
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Table 9.10: The Loan Recovery at current price 15 for the convertible Loan 
Year Disbursement (net of Net Cost Repayment Inflows Recovery18 
conversion in M$) Administration 16 Default" 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=5-(3+4) (7)=6-. 2 
1989 542,122 54,212 5,421 126,743 67,109 12.4% 
1990 848,354 84,835 8,483 165,204 71,885 8.5% 
1992 1,048,075 104,807 10,480 599,878 484,589 46.2% 
1993 896,537 89,653 8,965 856,843 758,223 84.6% 
1994 545,291 54,529 5,452 620,393 560,412 102.8% 
Source: Calculated from Table 9.9 
Table 9.10 shows the loan-recovery rate between 1989-1994, based on the portion of loans 
not converted into grants or scholarships. This means that the loan portions that have been 
converted are subtracted from the yearly disbursement. The net administration, default cost, 
repayments and inflows are expressed for the current year. The recovery is expressed as the 
percentage of inflows over the yearly disbursement, but not in the net present value. The 
loan recovery rate increased from 12.4% in 1989 to 102.8% in 1994, expressed in respective 
yearly disbursements. The loan recovery in 1994 was over 100%, meaning that more than 
the yearly disbursement was collected. The average rate of cost-recovery between 1989 to 
1994 was 52.4%. This implies that the Sarawak Foundation Convertible Loan can be 
financially efficient for the loan portion not converted into grants/scholarships, as its 
recovery is currently more than 40%19 
There has been a shift from a highly subsidised form of student funding (scholarships and 
convertible loans) to a less subsidised form with the introduction of the National Higher 
Education loan in 1998. However, data from the fieldwork do not indicate any of the 1996 
intake getting this loan, as the loan was to be given to first year and second year students. As 
the loan has just been introduced, and recipients are still in the universities, it is too early to 
assess its efficiency. The next section summarises the efficiency of different schemes. 
15 The loan repayment at current year in Malaysian Dollars. 
16 The cost of net administration is about 10% of yearly disbursement (interview with Senior Officer, 1999) 
17 The default cases are very few only, and hence the default cost is approximately 1% of annual disbursement 
(Interview with the senior officer, 1999) 
18 The loan-recovery refers to the loan portion not converted into grants, and not in the net present value. 
19 Carlson (1992) suggests that loans are preferred instrument so long as its recovery is at least 40%. 
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9.4 A Comparison of Different Loan and Scholarship Schemes 
Except for the National Higher Education Loan, the PSD, MARA, MOE and SF Loans are 
interest free. The NHEL charges interest of 4%. The NHEL is a pure loan, as it differs from 
the first four types of loans which are convertible into grants or scholarships depending on 
results. Convertible loans are very cost-effective in achieving the objective, as graduates 
successfully graduate on time. The passing rate of MOE loan holders is 100% and is the 
highest, compared to other loan holders. The passing rate for the PSD, MARA and SF 
recipients are respectively 99-100%, 96-100% and 99.9-100%20 (From interviews and 
survey data). 
Table 9.11: Different Types of Loans and Scholarships In Terms of Efficiency 
Comparison of loans and scholarships based Names of Fundin Bodies 
on: PSD MARA MOE SF (%) NHEL (%) 
(%) (%) (%) 
Interest (%) 0 0 0 0 4 
Convertibility of loans Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
(expected repayment)" (44.7) (26.5) (36.7) (14.7) 
Expected results of loan recipients (%) ------- 
First Class and Second Class Upper (Honours) 35.3 16.7 56.7 42.9 
Second Class Lower and Third Class (Honours)) 52.1 60.7 36.7 41.1 
General Degrees 12.6 22.6 6.6 16.0 
Expected results of scholarship recipients (%) 
First Class and Second Class Upper (Honours) 17.8 37.6 
Second Class Lower and Third Class (Honours)) 65.3 56.5 
General Degrees 16.9 5.9 
Real loan defaults in % 3.4% n. a. marginal marginal ------- 
Cost of administration of loans expressed as 1.28 0.071 n. a 10 ------- 
percentage of annual allocation 
Average repayment rate of loans (%)22as of the About 66 39.5 82.8%23 ------- 
ear ended in 1997 50 
The MOE loan recipients expected to rank the highest in obtaining first class and second 
class upper (honours) degrees. In terms of expected results, the PSD and MOE loan 
recipients perform better than their respective scholarship recipients. When including 
interrelationships with other factors, especially when subjects are included, multiple logistic 
regression again shows that PSD and MOE loan recipients respectively perform better than 
their scholarship counterparts in terms of academic results. 
20 Since all respondents except those taking medical courses were in their final year, current accumulated 
results would most probably predict their final results. 
21 The expected repayment means the percentage of total loan disbursements which need to be repaid after 
deducting portions converted into scholarships, based on the expected results of respondents. 
22 This refers only to the portions of loans which are not converted into scholarships. 
23 The average repayment rate is obtained by dividing the combined annual repayment rates of 
1989,1990, 
1992,1993 and 1994. It is estimated that from 1995-1997, the average loan repayment is 90% in terms of 
yearly disbursement as informed during 
interviews. 
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In terms of financial efficiency, though the MOE loan has a high loan deferment rate (about 
40%), its real default rate may be low, as only very marginal cases of loans have been 
written off (interview with a senior loan enforcement officer). The PSD is estimated to have 
a real default rate of 3.4%. For cost of administration of loans expressed as percentage of 
annual allocation, the SF has the highest rate of administration costs because of its small 
scale, compared with other types of loans. For the rate of repayment to portions of loans 
which are not converted into grants, the SF has the highest average repayment rate (82.8%). 
Cost-effectiveness of loan and scholarship systems was compared earlier in Tables 9.1 and 
9.4. In terms of attitude towards study, though loan recipients spend more time on private 
study and also have a higher attendance rate than scholarship holders when taking these 
figures separately, the results differ when interrelationships with other factors are 
considered. This implies that loan recipients may not necessarily study harder. Scholarship 
holders seem to expect better results than loan recipients; the result is similar when taking 
into account interrelationships with other variables, as discussed in Table 9.5. The efficiency 
analysis of student financial support could also be related to the social cost-benefit principle, 
which we would like to investigate in the Malaysian case. 
9.5 Implication of the Social Cost-Benefit Principle in the Malaysian Case 
As discussed in Chapter 2, higher education should be expanded up to the point where its 
marginal social cost equates marginal social benefit. Society would have "enough 
education" at this point. However, individuals will only invest in higher education at a point 
where marginal private benefits equate marginal private cost. The point may be well before 
or beyond the optimal point from the socially desired amount of higher education. However, 
it is impossible to calculate this optimal point as it depends upon how the value of education 
to society is measured. Nevertheless, indicators such as the employment rate of graduates, 
graduates' wage levels as compared to those of non-graduates, and operational costs of 
universities are used to indicate whether the optimal point has been reached. 
In Malaysia, there is full or very close to full employment especially for graduates (Lucas 
and Verry, 1999). There was a shortfall of high-level workers (with degree qualifications) in 
all types of occupation during the Sixth Malaysian plan (1991-1995). During the Seventh 
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Malaysian Plan (1996-2000), there has been also an acute shortage of manpower in 
engineers and health professionals (as indicated in Table 9.6) as well as the graduate 
teachers for teaching in secondary schools as forecasted. The wage difference between 
graduates and non-graduates across all occupations in the private sector is still quite big, 
though there has been improvements in non-graduate wages in the public sector. The 
salaries for graduates and non-graduates in the age-group (21-25) are M$1971 and M$1190 
respectively (Job Street, 1998). The gap increases as seniority increases and is widened in 
the expected salaries. For the age group (41-60), the average current salaries of graduates 
and non-graduates are M$8570 and M$ 4221 respectively (See Tables 29 and 30 of 
Appendix P). This gap is increasingly becoming a pervasive culture in Malaysia as a 
consequence of the expanding economy (Thong, 1997). This indicates that the demand for 
manpower with degree qualifications is still high and that there are shortages. This is 
indicated in the Seventh Malaysian Plan, which continued the policy on the employment of 
expatriates and other highly-skilled manpower (Malaysia, 1996). 
Thus, the optimal amount of higher education appears not to have been reached in the 
Malaysian case. The demand for manpower with degree qualifications, especially in the 
fields of science, medical and technology will rise as the country heads towards becoming 
an industrialised nation. This coincides with the political will of the government, which 
would like to expand higher education so that it would reach the optimal point which can be 
implied. Overseas education in science, technology and medicine would also help to achieve 
the optimal point. The government has continued to send students abroad for especially 
valued courses in science and technology (The Star, 24 November 1997). Moreover, 
Malaysian universities can still be expanded to achieve economies of scales and to 
accommodate increasing numbers of students. A modified funding system should therefore 
consider subsidy, especially directed to the low-income groups on both efficiency and equity 
grounds. 
9.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed critically the efficiency of the student loan system in general, and 
of four major student loan schemes. Three facets of efficiency were used: cost-effectiveness 
in achieving the objective as funding bodies desired, efficiency in meeting the manpower 
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needs of the economy, and financial efficiency, whether loans can be self-financing. The 
loan system is inefficient in terms of financial efficiency as it will never be self-financing 
but seems to be efficient in achieving objectives, that is output can be acquired on time and 
efficiency in meeting the manpower needs. Multiple regressions show that loan recipient do 
not necessarily study harder than scholarship holders except in the case of MOE financial 
support. As a system, loan recipients do not perform better than scholarship counterparts as 
shown in cross-tabulations and multiple logistic regression analyses though PSD and MOE 
loan recipients respectively perform better than their scholarship counterparts though 
statistically insignificant. Thus, there is no clear evidence that convertible loan as a system 
could motivate students to study harder and contribute to better results in the Malaysian 
case. In other words, though convertible loans are "cost-effective" in achieving objectives 
where loan investments in education are not wasted, they may not motivate students to study 
harder to get better results, thereby contributing to cost-effectiveness. Multiple regressions 
show that other inherent factors such as regions, previous academic scores, attendance at 
lectures, hours of private study, gender, type of courses, and ethnicity are more important in 
contributing to attitude towards study and expected results. Nevertheless, to a certain extent 
loans do help to recruit the low-income groups in participating higher education thereby 
contributing to exchange efficiency though the recruitment effect of scholarships are greater. 
Thus, scholarships are more efficient than loans in terms of efficiency in meeting manpower 
and employment needs especially in certain areas, as the former could prevent the "brain 
drain" of expertise critically needed by the economy. Loans and scholarships should 
therefore complement and even supplement with one another. With the increasing number 
of students taking first degree courses in the public universities, that is, from an enrolment of 
52,810 in 1990 to 144,700 in 2000 (Malaysia, 1996), it is impossible for the government in 
the long run to subsidise them heavily. The government intends to increase the enrolment at 
the first degree leve124 in public institutions for those in the 19-24 age-group, from 3.5 per 
cent in 1995 to 5.6 per cent in the year 2000 (Malaysia, 1996). The present student financial 
system need to be modified, so that government does not have to rely more on public funds 
for financing higher education. This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
24 This does not include those taking diploma and matriculation courses. The percentage would be about 8 
percent in 1997 if including those taking diploma and matriculations. This also 
does not include those 
pursuing courses at the private institutions locally and overseas 
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Chapter 10 
Discussions and Recommendations 
10.0 Overview 
The thesis has focused on the equity and efficiency of student loans and scholarships in 
Malaysia while attempting to answer the open question, "loans or grants" as argued in the 
literature (Woodhall, 1989). Both aspects have been analysed in the light of the Malaysian 
quota system embedded in the New Economic Policy or NEP (1971-1990) and the National 
Development Policy or NDP (1991-2000) as well as other desired objectives related to these 
policies. The quota system states that 55 per cent of local public university places should be 
reserved for natives against 45 per cent for non-natives (Lim, 1993). Consequently, non- 
natives need to secure higher credits than natives for admission to the universities. 
Moreover, the distribution of resources such as the granting of student financial support is 
assumed to reflect the racial composition of the country so as to align with the objective of 
the New Economic Policy and National Development Policy that the major occupational 
groups of the Malaysian society are not identified with races for jobs (Gomez and Jomo, 
1997). To be on a par with non-natives in social and economic success, natives are being 
treated preferentially through the political quota system. Though the quota distorts the 
market mechanism of higher education, it encourages competition at intra-ethnic level. 
Other factors such as the regions and areas which undergraduates come from, the types of 
courses pursued, their gender, income and previous academic performance have also been 
analysed for all groups with natives and non-natives combined, and with natives and non- 
natives taken separately. The findings are summarised in Section One. 
The NEP was devised in favour of natives in all dimensions of the state's modernisation 
projects (Kim, 1998) so as to restructure Malaysian society so that major economic 
functions are not identified with races, and to eradicate poverty irrespective of race (Gomez 
and Jomo, 1997). However, according to Mahathir (1998), the NEP did not aim to 
redistribute wealth equally to different racial groups but rather to create more wealth and 
distribute it so as to correct the imbalances between the different communities. Special 
attention was also given to eradicate poverty in rural areas, and also to the regional 
integration of West Malaysia and East Malaysia. Vertical equity or "unequal treatment of 
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unequals" underpins the argument for the affirmative measures described above. Thus, the 
quota system was intended to correct the disparities between natives and non-natives for the 
sake of national unity. 
This chapter comprises five sections. Section One summarises the main findings. Section 
Two will suggest recommendations for policy formulation. The shortcomings and strengths 
of the present research are discussed in Section Three. Section Four will suggest future 
research, while Section Five concludes the thesis. 
10.1 Summary of main findings in achieving objectives of the study 
10.1.1 Equity in the Provision of Loans and Scholarships respectively 
There are different notions of equity, as explained in chapter 2. Barr (1989) defines equity 
as "equality of opportunity", which means equal opportunity of access to education for 
individuals who have similar tastes and abilities. McMahon (1982) cited by Psacharopoulos 
and Woodhall (1985) classifies equity into three types. Horizontal equity means "equal 
treatment of equals", for example, identical treatment for all fifth grade students. Vertical 
equity requires "unequal treatment of unequals". An example of vertical equity is treating 
different types of students differently because of their differences. Intergenerational equity, 
which lies between the first two types of equity, ensures that inequalities in one generation 
are not simply perpetuated to another generation. Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) 
suggests that a clear distinction should be made between equality and equity as the former 
relates to measurements whereas the latter is valued laden. In this study, I have used two 
measures of equality. Type-1 equality and type-2 equality as explained in chapters 6 and 7, 
and are summarised below. Vertical equity underpins the rationale of findings. I also defined 
"horizontal equity" as equal opportunity or access to financial support of all who are 
qualified for universities, and to a certain extent used this concept in the research. 
10.1.1.1 Type-1 Equality Measurement 
One of the specific objectives in the present study is to investigate the equality of financial 
support to university undergraduates in Malaysia according to seven independent variables. 
The independent variables are ethnicity, income, gender, type of course pursued, areas and 
regions which respondents come from, and previous academic performance. Type-1 equality 
measurement examines the distribution of respective scholarships and loans according to the 
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variables stated above, before making any equity implication or judgement. To examine 
intra-ethnic equity, we also analyse the equality in the distribution of loans and scholarships 
for each group separately, classified according to the other six independent variables. 
Type-1 equality examines whether scholarships and loans (as discussed in chapters 6 and 7) 
have been respectively distributed equally to all, irrespective of each of the independent 
variable. Subsequently, we examine the percentage of each category within the same 
independent variable that is provided with scholarships and loans respectively. For example, 
we can examine the percentage of natives and non-natives (categories) who were provided 
with scholarships by ethnicity, an independent variable. The scholarship provision, for 
example, is said to favour the category (natives) with its higher percentage to be provided 
with scholarships, when compared with another category (non-natives). Vertical equity 
underpins the arguments for the scholarship or loan distributions. 
I used chi-square test to examine whether there was any significant association between 
categories within the same independent variable in the respective provision of scholarships 
and loans. The provision of scholarships and loans to each category in percentages was also 
obtained respectively for the seven independent variables. Thus, each independent variable 
was analysed separately without taking into account interrelationships of other variables. To 
take into account interrelationships of other variables, I used the multiple logistic regression 
as in Chapter 8. 
10.1.1.2 Type-2 Equality Measurement 
In chapters 6 and 7, the study defined Type-2 equality as the shares of loans or scholarships 
of all categories within the same independent variable, as compared to their respective 
shares in the general population. For example, the percentages of native and non-native 
populations in the year 1995 were used to compare with their respective shares of 
scholarships. If the share of scholarship of each category matches its population share, type- 
2 equality is said to be achieved. The representation index was also used to 
indicate whether 
a particular group or category, for example native, within the same 
independent variable 
(ethnicity defined as natives and non-natives) was over- or under-represented in relation to 
the general population. This was calculated by dividing the scholarship share of natives with 
their share of the general population. Similarly, the representation 
index for non-natives was 
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obtained by dividing their scholarship share with their general population share. 
Representation indices for natives and non-natives were compared. A representation index 
greater than 100 indicated that the particular group was over-represented in the provision of 
financial support and vice-versa. Type-2 equality is particularly useful to examine whether 
the quota system and other aims related to regions, areas and gender embedded in the NEP 
and NDP have been followed in the distribution of financial support. 
Besides the two types of equality measurement for equity implications, the thesis also 
examines other facets of equity. These are the arguments regarding the public and private 
finance of higher education and also modes of loan repayment which have equity 
implications on low and high income earners, who were formerly loan recipients. 
Results of type-1 and type-2 equality measurements are summarised in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1: Equality of the Loan and Scholarship Distributions 
Variables 
(1) 
Type -1 Equality (Using Cross-Tabulations) 
(2) 
Type-2Equality 
(Representative 
Indices) 
(3) 
All groups Native Non-native All Groups 
Loans Scholarships Loans Scholarships Loans Scholarships Loans Scholarships 
In avour of In avour of In avour of In avour o 
Ethnicity Native Native - - - - Native Native 
Gender Female Female Female Male Female Male Female Female 
Regions West East West East East East West East 
Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia 
Areas Rural Rural Rural Urban Rural Rural Rural Rural 
Income Lt>Lw>M> Tb>H>M> Lt>Lw>M TB>M>H Lt>Lw> Lt>Lw> 
Groups H>Tb Lw>Lt >H>Tb >Lw>Lt M>H>Tb M>H>Tb - - 
Type of AH>PA Medical AH>PA Medical AH>PS> Medical 
Courses >PS>AS >Tech >AS>PA >Tech PA>Tech >Tech> 
>Tech >PA>AS >Tech >PA>AS >Medical PA>AS 
>Medical >PS>AH >Medical >PS>AH >AS >AH>PS 
Previous Low> High Low High Upper- Low 
Academic Low-middle >Low >Upper- >Low- middle> >High 
Scores >Upper- >Low- middle Middle Low- >Upper- 
middle middle >Low- >Low middle Middle 
>High >Upper- Middle >Upper- >High >Low- 
Middle >High Middle >Low Middle 
Lt = Lowest, Lw= Low, M= Medium, H=High, and Tb= 'l'op-bracket income groups 
AH= Arts & Humanities, PA= Professional Arts, AS= Applied Science, Tech= Technology 
Source: Chapters 6 and 7 
Column (1) of Table 10.1 shows seven independent variables used for type-1 equality 
measurement of loans and scholarships for all groups (natives and non-natives combined), 
for natives and non-natives taken separately. Their results (from chapters 6 and 7) are 
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summarised in Column (2). Column (3) shows the type-2 equality, using representation 
indices for four variables as stated. Multiple logistic regression took the analysis further, as 
in chapter 8, and results are summarised in Table 10.2 by taking into account 
interrelationships of all other factors to compare with results using cross-tabulations. 
Table 10.2: Results of Scholarship and Loan Distributions using Multiple Logistic 
Regressions and Cross-tabulations (All Groups) 
Independent Scholarships using Loans Using 
Variables Cross-tabulation Multi le Logistic Cross- tabulation Multiple Logistic 
In Favour of In Favour of 
Ethnicity Natives Natives Natives Natives 
Gender Female Female Female Female 
Region East Malaysia East Malaysia West Malaysia West Malaysia 
Areas Rural Rural Rural Rural 
Courses Med>Tech>PA Med>Tech>PA AH>PA>PS>AS> AH>PS>PA>Tech> 
>AS>PS>AH >AS>PS>AH Tech>Medical AS>Medical 
Incomes Tb>H>M>Lw>Lt Tb>H>M>Lw>Lt Lt>Lw>M>H>Tb Lt>Lw>M>H>Tb 
Previous Scores High>Low>Low- High>Low>Upper- Low>Low-middle Low-middle>Upper- 
Middle>Upper- middle>Low-middle >Upper- middle>Low>High 
middle middle>high 
Lt = Lowest, Lw= Low, M= Medium, H=High, and Tb= Top-bracket income groups 
AH= Arts & Humanities, PA= Professional Arts, AS= Applied Science, Tech= Technology 
Source: Chapters 6,7 and 8 
a. Ethnicity 
Cross-tabulations of the survey results (See Table 10.1) shows that both loans and 
scholarships favour natives in terms of type-1 equality measurement for all groups (natives 
and non-natives combined). Multiple logistic regression (See Table 10.2) shows similar 
results. This is because of positive discrimination towards natives in line with the NEP and 
the NDP to correct the economic disparities between natives and non-natives on vertical 
equity grounds. In terms of type-2 equality measures (Table 10.1), both loans and 
scholarships again favour natives. This suggests that the provision of loans and scholarships 
goes beyond what the policies require as the granting of financial support does not reflect 
the racial composition of the country set by the quota. In other words, natives were over- 
represented in the awards of scholarships and loans. Thus, the awarding of financial support 
may not follow the policies of political consensus' 
b. Gender 
Table 10.1 shows both loans and scholarships marginally favour females in both types of 
equality for all groups (natives and non-natives combined) when using cross-tabulation. 
1 The political consensus means that different political parties based on races form the National Front 
government whereby national policies formulated are agreed by all, rather than practising the politics of 
confrontation 
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When the ethnic effect is taken out, loan distribution tends to favour females, but males in 
the case of the scholarships. Both loans and scholarships also favour females when taking 
into account interrelationships of other factors, using multiple logistic regressions (Table 
10.2). These results therefore do not support the claim in the literature that females 
sometimes may be discriminated against in the granting of financial support. 
c. Regions 
Using cross-tabulation, results show that scholarships favour East Malaysians, for all 
groups, for natives and non-natives separately in terms of type-1 equality measurement 
(Table 10.1). Scholarships also favour East Malaysians in terms of type-2 equality. Multiple 
logistic regression analysis also shows that scholarships favour East Malaysians (Table 
10.2). This is mainly because the East Malaysian states give more scholarships to their own 
nationals, to commit graduates for jobs, to help to deal with the acute shortage of manpower. 
These states are developing rapidly since they have been lagging behind, owing to historical 
factor2 and their larger size but sparse population. This is evidenced by the fact that the 
percentage of the labour force with university education in Sarawak (an East Malaysian 
state), is still very low, only 6.4% (Year Book of Statistics Sarawak, 1999) compared to 
13.2% for the whole country in 1998 (Year Book of Statistics Malaysia, 1999). The East 
Malaysian States Foundations and the private sectors give out more scholarships in order to 
commit undergraduates to serve these states after graduation so that the states could 
accelerate their development, to be on a par with West Malaysia, enhancing national 
integration. Thus, the East Malaysians were given preferential treatment in the offer of 
scholarships, based on the principle of "unequal treatment of unequals". 
In contrast, loans distribution favour West Malaysians for all groups, using both cross- 
tabulation (Table 10.1) and multiple regression analyses (Table 10.2). When disaggregating 
all groups into natives and non-natives for analysis, the loan distribution favours West 
Malaysian natives over East Malaysian natives. It is therefore particularly inequitable to East 
Malaysian natives in terms of both horizontal and vertical equity arguments as these states 
face more acute shortage of manpower than West Malaysia as stated. However, loans tend to 
favour East Malaysian non-natives, compared to West Malaysian non-natives, using cross- 
2 East Malaysian states were under the rule of the British Company in the case of Sabah, and Brooke's 
families in the case of Sarawak. This differs from West Malaysia which was under the British rule. 
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tabulation. This is because the clan or associations of East Malaysian non-natives relatively 
give out more loans to children of their members, thereby promoting "unequal treatment of 
unequals". 
d. Areas 
As shown in Table 10.1, in terms of type-1 equality measurement, loans favour rural rather 
than urban undergraduates for all groups, and for rural rather than urban natives, and rural 
non-natives rather than urban non-natives when analysed separately. On the other hand, 
scholarships marginally favour undergraduates from rural areas for all groups (natives and 
non-natives combined), and rural non-natives than urban non-natives, but they favour urban 
natives over rural natives when analysed separately. Both loans and scholarships also favour 
rural undergraduates in terms of type-2 equality measurement. 
Taking into account the interrelationships of other variables, both scholarships and loans 
again respectively favour rural undergraduates (Table 10.2). All these imply that both 
scholarships and loans generally favour respondents from the rural areas, helping 
academically qualified rural high school students to gain access to university, so that they 
are not prevented from participating in university education because of financial factors. 
Based on vertical equity argument that rural undergraduates should be treated preferentially, 
this is in line with the aim of NEP and NDP to eradicate rural hard-core poverty or at least 
minimise the incidence of poverty in the rural areas through improving access to higher 
education. It is believed that higher education always leads to higher income to improve the 
social economic status of the poor. But if we compared the incidence of poverty in the rural 
areas (10.9%), with the urban areas (2.1%) in 1997 (Malaysia, 1999), more loans or 
scholarships should have been given especially to rural natives as this group received less 
scholarship than their urban counterparts. In terms of "horizontal equity" and vertical equity, 
the scholarship system is inequitable to rural natives. Though rural undergraduates as a 
whole have been treated preferentially, it should have been intensified as the incidence of 
poverty is much higher, and they have to consider more about the opportunity cost forgone. 
e. Income groups 
Using cross-tabulation, the loan distribution decreases with rising income status in terms of 
income groups, for all groups, for natives and non-natives when analysed separately (Table 
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10.1). By using multiple logistic regression analysis to take into account interrelationships of 
other variables, the loan provision again decreases with income status (See Table 10.2). This 
implies that the loan provision follows the objective of the NEP and NDP in reducing 
poverty generally, irrespective of ethnicity3 by helping low-income groups to gain access to 
universities and hence equitable to low income groups in terms of vertical equity argument. 
Using cross-tabulation, the scholarship distribution, however, is regressive for all groups, for 
natives but progressive for non-natives separately (Table 10.1). Taking into account the 
interrelationships of other factors, scholarship provision again favours most the top-bracket 
but least lowest income groups as shown in Table 10.2 (though the order of other income- 
groups differ from the cross-tabulation analysis). This implies that scholarships do not aim 
to help the lower income groups to gain access to universities. Thus, scholarships do not 
follow the objective of NEP and NDP to minimise poverty generally and hence are 
inequitable to low income groups in terms of both horizontal equity and vertical equity 
arguments. This is mainly because public scholarships are generally for good students who 
have excelled in their previous academic performance (see section 6.3.6 of chapter 6) and 
who choose courses with high entrance requirements (see section 6.3.7 of chapter 6). 
Usually, they are richer students. Thus, it may be equitable when taking ability as criterion 
for promoting "unequal treatment of unequals". 
f Type of Courses 
In terms of type-1 equality measurement, results of cross-tabulation as in Table 10.1 show 
that the distribution of loans favours most those taking arts and humanities and least favours 
those pursuing the medical courses for all groups, and for natives when analysed separately. 
For non-natives when analysed separately, loans also favour those taking arts and 
humanities but least to that taking applied science. Taking into account interrelationships of 
other factors, loan distribution again favours most those taking arts and humanities but least 
those taking medical courses (see Table 10.2). Thus, the loan provision favours respondents 
taking courses other than medicine, technology and science because policies do not 
recognise these courses as critical to the economy. 
3 It is believed that higher education would lead to earning higher income, thereby breaking the vicious cycle 
of poverty 
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In terms of type-1 equality, results of cross-tabulation (Table 10.1) and multiple logistic 
regression analyses (Table 10.2) show that scholarships favour most those taking medical 
courses and least those taking arts and humanities, for all groups. The same result obtained 
in the case of natives when analysed separately in terms of type-1 equality measurement. In 
the case of non-natives when analysed separately, those taking pure science were provided 
with fewest scholarships compared to those taking the arts and humanities in terms of type-1 
equality measurement. Thus, based on vertical equity argument, the granting of scholarships 
generally favours respondents pursuing courses particularly in medical courses, technology 
and sciences, which are critically needed for realising the vision 2020. This is supported by 
the recent development of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) in Malaysia, which 
indicates that the high demand for skills and technology in a knowledge-based economy. 
This would also make Malaysian goods to be competitive in the global economy. Moreover, 
scholarships will commit recipients to work with the public sector/the country after 
graduation to meet manpower needs. It would also prevent the "brain drain" to Singapore 
and other countries, offering more attractive wages. Thus, it is the deliberate policy of the 
government for meeting the more critical manpower needs in science and technology as the 
country is heading for a fully developed nation. According to the Minister of Science, 
Technology and Environment, the Malaysian government takes positive steps to call back 
Malaysian scientists working in foreign countries by offering them better pay (April 26, 
2000). 
g. Previous Academic Attainment 
Results using cross-tabulation (Table 10.1) and multiple logistic regression (Table 10.2) 
analyses show that scholarships favour recipients for all groups, who obtained high scores 
rather than low scores, in the previous academic performance before entrance to universities, 
in terms of type-1 equality. When analysed separately, cross-tabulation also shows that the 
scholarship provision favours those natives who achieved high scores in the previous 
academic performance before entrance to universities. In the case of non-natives when 
analysed separately, scholarships however, favour those who obtained low scores in their 
previous academic attainment before entrance to universities, followed by those with high 
scores. This is because non-natives receive private scholarships whose main criterion of 
offer is on financial needs rather than previous academic scores. This is possibly the non- 
native philanthropic bodies' response to the public sector who award more scholarships to 
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natives than non-natives. We can say generally the criterion for vertical equity argument is 
based on ability in the offer of scholarships, except in the case of non-natives where income 
criterion is used. 
Using cross-tabulation (Table 10.1), the loan distribution favours those recipients whose 
scores in the previous academic performance before entrance to universities were low, but 
least to those whose scores were high, for all groups and for natives. However, loans favour 
most to non-natives who obtained upper-middle scores but least to those who obtained low 
scores. But, when taking into account interrelationships of other factors, multiple logistic 
regressions show the loan distribution favours most to low-middle and least to high (Table 
10.2). Thus, ability is less important in terms of vertical equity argument in the provision of 
loans, rather it is the income criterion. More loans were given to the low income-groups as 
shown in Tables 7.1-7.3 for vertical equity argument. 
The study also shows that there is a significant difference between the provision of loans and 
criteria of each independent variable (ethnicity, gender, areas and regions where respondents 
come from, income-groups, courses which respondents take and previous academic 
attainment), at chi-square significance of <_ 0.05. In the case of scholarships, ethnicity, 
regions where respondents come from, income groups, courses which respondents pursued, 
and previous academic scores are significant in the provision of scholarships, at chi-square 
significance of _< 
0.01. 
Multiple regression models have also been used to predict the respective probability of 
obtaining loans and scholarships. Generally, the probability of having a loan is much higher 
than the probability of having a scholarship. This is because funding bodies currently give 
out more loans than scholarships. Scholarships are usually limited to those who pursue 
courses which are critically needed by the economy. 
10.1.2 Recruitment Effects of Loans and Scholarships 
In chapters 6 and 7, we defined recruitment effects as the extent to which scholarships and 
loans respectively helped undergraduates to begin and continue study at universities. 
Respondents were asked if they would commence or continue university education if they 
had not been given scholarships and loans respectively initially. Negative responses would 
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indicate the recruitment effects of respective scholarships and loans. The concept was 
adopted from the study of Reuterberg and Svensson (1994) on how Swedish financial aid 
helped undergraduates to begin their higher education. 
Not surprisingly, the survey indicates that the overall recruitment effect of loans is lower 
than that of scholarships. When examined selectively for income-groups, the recruitment 
effect is greatest for the lowest income-group and declines progressively to the top bracket 
for both scholarship and loan provisions. The greater recruitment effect of loans for the low- 
income groups than higher income- groups partially justifies the fact that more loans were 
being given to them than higher income-groups in terms of the vertical equity argument. In 
the case of scholarships, their higher recruitment effects for low-income groups further 
reinforces the results that the scholarship distribution has been regressive (See section 6.3.5 
of chapter 6) and hence inequitable to low-income groups both in terms of "horizontal 
equity" and vertical equity arguments. But, it is equitable if using ability as the criterion for 
vertical equity argument as scholarships are generally for excellent students, and its 
distribution increases with social status, as indicated in section 6.3.5, chapter 6. 
The recruitment effect is greater for females than males in the case of loans, but the reverse 
in the case of scholarships. For ethnicity, the respective recruitment effects of loans and 
scholarships for natives are greater than for non-natives. These findings may partially justify 
the fact that both scholarship and loan distributions favour the natives on vertical equity 
grounds, as analysed in chapters 6 and 7 respectively using type-1 and type-2 equality 
measurements. The recruitment effects of loans and scholarships are respectively higher for 
recipients who come from rural than for those from urban areas. Again, this may partially 
justify the current scholarship and loan distribution which respectively favours rural 
undergraduates in terms of vertical equity argument using type-1 and type-2 equality 
measurements, as examined in chapters 6 and 7. However, if we consider the incidence of 
poverty in the rural areas which is 4.1 times higher than that of the urban areas, more loans 
and scholarships would have been given to rural undergraduates. 
10.1.3 Qualified friends who did not attend university for financial reasons 
The equity implications of loans and scholarships have been further investigated by asking 
respondents about their academically qualified friends who did not attend university for 
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financial reasons. This has been examined with reference to the income-groups, ethnic 
origin, gender and areas (Table 6.9, Chapter 6). When citing financial problems as the most 
important reason, friends from the low income group have the highest percentage (93%) not 
attending universities, followed by the middle income-group (56%) and the high income- 
group (13%). Similarly, natives have a higher percentage (88%) not attending universities 
than non-natives (72%), financial constraints being the most important reason. Female 
friends have a higher percentage (88%) not attending universities than male friends (77%). 
Rural friends have a higher percentage (90%) not attending universities than their urban 
counterparts (71%). These findings may justify the vertical equity argument that loans and 
scholarships favour natives rather non-natives, females rather than males and rural 
undergraduates rather than their urban counterparts. It also partially justifies that loans 
favour low income rather than high-income groups on vertical equity grounds. However, the 
fact that more low-income friends who did not go to universities, financial reasons being the 
most important reason may imply that the present scholarship system is inequitable in term 
of "horizontal equity" and vertical equity arguments when taking income as the criterion. 
These findings also mean that the present provision of financial support has not reached 
extensively to those who needed it, as quite a high percentage of friends, varying according 
to income-groups, ethnicity, areas of origin and gender, did not attend university because of 
financial constraints. 
I also considered the demand (application) for scholarships (Table 6.10) and loans (Table 
7.6) respectively of qualified friends who regard financial problem as the first most 
important reason preventing them from attending university. This question helps to examine 
the extent of financial constraint as the most important factor preventing disadvantaged 
groups from entering universities. This was investigated in terms of income groups, 
ethnicity, gender and areas which friends of respondents come from. The low-income group 
friends rank highest in the demand for scholarships and loans respectively but the demand 
declines with rising income status. This further shows that the scholarship system is 
inequitable to the low income-groups on "horizontal equity" and vertical equity grounds, as 
the result in chapter 6 shows that the scholarship distribution increases with rising 
income 
status. The higher demand of low-income friends who did not attend universities 
because of 
financial problems, over high-income friends may partially justify the results in chapter 6 
that loans favour low income-groups. The higher demand of low-income for loans also 
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indicates that the loan distribution may also not have fully reached the low-income groups 
and therefore is inequitable to them in terms of vertical equity. 
Native friends have marginally higher demand for scholarships and loans over non-natives. 
There was also a higher demand of female over male friends for scholarships but vice versa 
in the case of loans. 
The higher demand of rural friends for scholarships and loans respectively than those from 
urban areas suggests that the distribution of present scholarships and loans, which favours 
undergraduates from rural areas as shown in chapters 6 and 7, may be partially justified in 
terms of "unequal treatments of unequals". 
10.1.4 Answering Some of the Claims in the Literature about Loans 
Literature generally claims that loans may encourage potential undergraduates to enter 
universities if there has been no existing financial support (Mace, 1987). But if loans are to 
replace scholarships, they may discourage students especially low-income students, from 
participating universities because of the fear of incurring future debts (Albrecht and 
Ziderman, 1991; 1992; Ziderman and Albrecht, 1995; Barr, 1989). With respect to the 
Malaysian case where both loans and scholarships are practised, results from the 
undergraduate survey indicate that loans may not necessarily prevent the lowest or low- 
income groups of students from attending university education. At least 86% and 79% of 
lowest and low-income undergraduates respectively applied for the convertible loans4. The 
recruitment effect on the lowest income group of loans (53%) also shows that loan schemes 
do not prevent the lowest income group from attending university, though the recruitment 
effect is higher in the case of scholarships (75%). Thus, 53% of the lowest-income group 
would not have begun or continued their university education, if loans were not offered to 
them in the first place. Similarly, for the low-income group friends who did not attend 
universities, their high demand for loans (94%), also shows that loans do not necessarily 
prevent low-income group from participating in university education. This indicates that 
'I only obtain two components of demand, loan recipients who definitely applied 
for loans and those who did 
not get any financial support, but applied for loans in the calculation of overall 
demand. The calculation 
excludes scholarship recipients who may have a high possibility to apply 
for loans. 
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more low-income group friends would have been recruited to enter university education if 
only more loans were available. 
In the literature, it is claimed that loans may prevent women from participating in university 
education because of fear of "negative dowry"(Atkinson, 1983). The present study suggests 
that this claim is not true in the Malaysian case, as there is no "negative dowry" effect. This 
is denoted by the recruitment effect of loans for females (31 %) which is higher than that for 
males (28%). The demand for loans of female friends who did not attend university 
education because of financial problems, is also high (93%). Moreover, the survey on 
undergraduates shows that at least 78% of females had applied for loans, though the demand 
of scholarship recipients for loans is excluded in the calculations. 
Thirdly, it is an open question in the literature whether loan recipients study harder over 
scholarship recipients. This is difficult to answer as the question is partly subjective, and the 
answer would vary according to the structure and curriculum of higher education (Woodhall, 
1982). The next section will explain this further. 
10.1.5 Efficiency of Loans and Scholarship Systems or Schemes 
Another specific objective addressed in the present study is to investigate the efficiency of 
loans and scholarships. Three criteria of efficiency are used as in chapters 2 and 9. 
10.1.5.1 Cost-effectiveness 
Cost-effectiveness criterion has been used to investigate whether the investment in higher 
education through provision of loans or scholarships respectively has achieved its objective, 
as sponsors desired. Costs refer to the sum of money disbursed as loans and scholarships 
respectively. Output refers to undergraduates who successfully graduated from universities. 
Scholarship or loan schemes would be very cost-effective if the output (graduates) have 
been produced on time without failure though there may be other factors at work. The 
funding bodies claim that convertible loans can motivate students to study harder so as to 
graduate on time with good results. 
The survey results show that convertible loans appear to be very cost-effective 
in achieving 
the stated objective as students with such loans successfully graduated on time. 
When taking 
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as individual schemes (See Table 9.11 of chapter 9), the passing rate6 of Ministry of 
Education (MOE) loan holders is highest. The passing rates for the Public Service 
Department (PSD), Sarawak Foundation (SF) and MARA loan recipients follow this. The 
MOE loan recipients also rank highest for obtaining First Class and Second Class Upper 
(Honours) degrees. The SF, the PSD and MARA loan recipients follow this. However, this 
may not be the result of the convertible loans. 
The present study shows that scholarship holders perform better than loan recipients when 
using cross-tabulation as shown in Table 9.4. When interrelationships of other variables are 
taken into account as shown in Table 9.5, results again show that scholarship holders do 
perform better than loan counterparts, and it is statistically significant). This suggests that 
loans are not more cost-effective than scholarships in producing better results. It is ethnicity, 
areas respondents come from, previous academic scores, hours of private study and 
attendance at lectures which are related to expected results. 
However, the PSD and MOE schemes, which give both loans and scholarships, seem to 
indicate that loan recipients can perform better than scholarship recipients, using cross- 
tabulation as indicated in Tables 2 and 21 of Appendix P. This is because excluding the 
MARA convertible loan scheme, which gives loan support to natives only, dilutes the effect 
of ethnicity7. Taking interrelationships of other variables, multiple logistic regression 
analysis again indicates that both PSD and MOE loan recipients could perform better than 
their respective scholarship counterparts, though statistically insignificant (See Tables 3 and 
22, Appendix P). This implies that PSD and MOE loans may contribute to better results and 
hence cost-effectiveness, though ethnicity, attendance at lectures and previous academic 
scores are significantly related to expected results. 
Cross-tabulation suggest that loan recipients as a whole spend more time on private-study 
and also have a higher attendance at lectures than scholarship holders. However, multiple 
regression analysis shows the opposite, but it is not significant statistically, as shown in 
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 of chapter 9. Other factors such as gender, regions which respondents 
5 Th e overall demand will be higher if the demand of scholarship recipients for loans is included. This 
demand is assumed to be high though unavailable. 
6 Information obtained during interviews and survey on expected results 
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come from, type of courses which respondents pursued, and previous academic scores, are 
more significantly associated with attitude towards study rather than forms of financial 
support. Though insignificant, results also show that PSD loan recipients do not necessarily 
work harder than their scholarship counterparts (See Tables 4 and 5, Appendix P). In 
contrast, the MOE loan recipients did study harder than scholarship recipients(See Tables 23 
and 24, Appendix P) though not significant statistically. 
10.1.5.2 Efficiency in Meeting the Manpower Needs of Economy 
As defined in chapters 2 and 9, this study also defines this facet of efficiency as the extent to 
which tertiary education meets the manpower needs of Malaysia. This is a narrow version of 
economic efficiency. The demand and supply of manpower needs in various fields 
forecasted by the Economic Planning Unit have been used to investigate economic 
efficiency in this sense. 
Both scholarships and convertible loans appear to contribute to the efficiency in meeting 
the manpower needs of the economy, as there will be a continuous shortage of graduate 
manpower in every field as the country is advancing towards being a fully developed nation 
by the year 2020, explained in chapter 9. However, the present financial support is too 
heavily subsidised because of heavy interest subsidy of loans, and their convertibility into 
partial or whole grants, and also scholarships thereby causing the fund to be self-contained, 
hence limiting the numbers of undergraduates that can be provided with financial support. 
This implies that the present financial support would not contribute to the efficiency of 
meeting manpower needs optimally as some qualified candidates are prevented from 
participating in university education because of financial constraints. Owing to limited 
funds, they were not provided with financial support. Nevertheless, scholarships could 
contribute more to exchange efficiency, especially for undergraduates pursuing courses in 
medicine, engineering and information technology, which are critically needed by the 
economy. The government uses them to commit the recipients to serve the manpower needs 
of the country and therefore minimise the "brain drain". For loans, they also meet efficiency 
of providing manpower needs to a certain extent, but graduates do not need to commit 
themselves to public services. They can work outside Malaysia and hence may cause a loss 
of talent. 
Ethnicity is significantly associated with the expected result as shown in Tables 9.5,9.9 and 9.15 
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10.1.5.3 Financial Efficiency 
In chapter 2, we defined the financial efficiency of loans as the recovery ratio- the extent to 
which the loan is repaid in full (Albrecht & Ziderman, 1989). What the government lends to 
students compared to what is returned in repayments would indicate the loan efficiency. but 
this also depends on the cost of administration, the defaults, interest subsidy, rate of 
repayment, and grace period. Thus, financial efficiency examines loan efficiency at micro 
level, and differs from exchange efficiency which relates to macroeconomics. 
The study has shown that the loan schemes will not be fully self-financing at all, because of 
free interest, low repayment rate, some defaults and the key item is convertibility into 
scholarships depending on results. The PSD, for example has a moderate real loan default 
rate of 3.4%, which is higher than the income-contingent loans in Sweden (1-2%) but lower 
than the Canadian mortgage loans (8.6%). It is inefficient in terms of financial efficiency as 
it will not be self-revolving at all though in this restricted sense (about 80%-87.1% of 
borrowers have their loans converted into 75% grants, high interest subsidy, low repayments 
though with low default rate). 
10.1.6 Drawbacks of the Present Financial Support Schemes 
The present scholarship and loan systems are respectively unequally distributed in terms of 
type-1 equality and type-2 equality measurements, on seven independent variables as 
discussed in the earlier section. Vertical equity or "unequal treatment of unequals" underpins 
the arguments for the findings as a consequence of the political quota system embedded in 
the NEP and NDP, as well as other objectives related to these policies, which need to be 
achieved. 
In addition to this, scholarships and heavily subsidised convertible 
loans are generally 
inequitable to general taxpayers who do not opt for universities but are subsidising 
undergraduates who are potentially high wage earners. 
This is viewed from an external 
aspect of equity whereby those who do not go to university are subsidising 
heavily in terms 
of grants either explicitly or implicitly to potential 
high wage earners. This inequity is 
further intensified if loan recipients do not repay what they are supposed to. It would be 
even more inequitable if more low-income 
high school students do not opt for university but 
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instead enter the labour market because of financial reasons, only then to subsidise higher 
income students in university education. 
The convertible loans in Malaysia may be seen as inequitable to low-income recipients 
because of the mortgage-type or straight-line repayment method for the portion not 
converted to grants. Under this mode of repayment, the loans may have adverse 
distributional effects for different life-time earners who were formerly loan recipients. As 
every graduate has the same amount to repay, these repayments will amount to a higher 
proportion of the lifetime incomes of low earners than of high earners. It is inequitable to 
low-income earners because such repayments are equivalent to a regressive tax. However, 
its impact depends on the proportion of income-groups whose loans are converted into 
partial or whole grants. It may not be regressive if more of the low-income borrowers than 
high-income counterparts have their loans converted into grants and vice versa. 
In terms of efficiency in meeting the manpower needs of economy as defined, the 
scholarship system is more efficient than the loan system, as the former commits the 
recipients to work in the public sector, meeting Malaysia's manpower needs. However, the 
drawback for the present system of financial support is that a cobweb problem may exist, 
especially in times of economic recession where there is an excess supply of certain types of 
manpower. Recently, 39,000 graduates and diploma holders were temporarily unemployed 
because the courses they had pursued were incompatible with the job market's demand for 
engineering and technology (The Straits Times Interactive, April, 23,2000). Graduates in 
engineering and information technology had the highest number of job offers compared to 
their peers in other areas. This suggests that manpower power planning approach has its 
weaknesses. Policy makers should not totally rely upon this method of planning. Perhaps the 
rates of return method can be used together with the manpower planning approach to 
monitor the market closely so as to minimise the "bottleneck" problem. 
In terms of financial efficiency, the present loan system can never be self-financing because 
of heavy subsidy (free interest and convertibility of loans to grants or scholarships, 
depending on results). Thus, government cannot subsidise heavily higher education and 
would face budgetary constraints on convertible loans with increasing enrolments of 
undergraduates, estimated at 450,000 in 2000 (Lee, 2000). 
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However, in terms of cost-effectiveness, the present scholarships and loans appear to be 
efficient as graduates could mostly complete their studies on time to achieve the objective of 
the funding bodies. This implies that the money invested through granting of loans and 
scholarships to students in higher education is not wasted. However, there is no clear 
evidence that forms of financial support such as convertible loans do motivate students to 
study harder and contribute to better results. Though convertible loans are "cost-effective" in 
achieving objectives, they do not really motivate students to study harder to get better 
results, thereby contributing to cost-effectiveness. Perhaps other inherent factors such as 
regions, previous academic scores, attendance at lectures, hours of private study, gender. 
type of courses, and ethnicity are more important in contributing to attitude towards study 
and expected results. 
10.1.7: Conflicts Between Efficiency and Equity 
There are also possible conflicts between equity and efficiency, and between horizontal and 
vertical equity with the seven independent variables. The conflicts occur because of the 
political value which plays a dominant role in determining the distribution of resources 
rather than economic rationality in the context of the Malaysian plural society. Financial 
policies are, therefore, politically driven in line with the quota system embedded in the NEP 
and NDP as well as other objectives as desired by the policies8. In terms of ethnicity, for 
example, affirmative measures are taken to favour the bumiputeras in university entrance 
and in the granting of financial support. The value judgement is therefore based on vertical 
equity which may conflict with horizontal equity". Similarly, vertical equity is used in the 
argument with reference to six other dimensions related to the objectives of social policies, 
which are more strongly affected by the political decision rather than economic 
considerations. In fact, efficiency and equity goals in different dimensions can conflict in 
any society. It may be that Malaysia's history makes these conflicts particularly acute. To 
minimise the drawbacks, the present system of higher student finance should be modified as 
recommended in the next section. 
8 This includes the eradication of hard core poverty in the rural, regional integration of West and East Malaysia 
and objectives related in realising the Vision 2020 when Malaysia would 
become a developed country 
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10.2 Recommendations 
I would suggest the present system of financial support is to be modified. Scholarships 
should not only target those pursuing courses in medicine and technology but also excellent 
students irrespective of courses as incentives as well as hard-core poverty group. 
Convertible loans should be changed to full income-contingency and convertibility should 
be abandoned. 
10.2.1 Targeted Scholarships 
The optimal subsidy for higher education as defined in chapter 2, has not been reached in 
Malaysia, as indicated by full employment and shortages of skilled graduates especially in 
science, technology and medical disciplines (chapter 9). Attempts are also being made by 
the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment to call back Malaysian scientists 
working overseas by offering them better deals. The wage difference between graduates and 
non-graduates especially in the private sector is still large, which indicates that the demand 
for graduate manpower is high, relative to non-graduate manpower. Thus, limited 
scholarships can be still given to certain groups to achieve certain desired objectives such as 
eradication of hard-core poverty and motivating high school students to take science stream 
subjects. However, I would suggest loans as opposed to grants generally. Income-contingent 
loans as opposed to other kinds of loans are also suggested to minimise the efficiency and 
equity drawbacks (will be discussed in the next section) which the present system 
encounters. 
Though scholarships represent a "loss" to the public fund, limited scholarships could still be 
given to the hard-core poverty group on vertical equity grounds, encouraging them to 
participate in university education9. This is because this group of students has to consider the 
opportunity cost forgone before deciding to go for university education. Their families may 
need their financial support by entering the labour market, instead of going to university. 
"For them, earnings forgone are high. Access for groups at lower income levels is much more a 
function of opportunity costs than of fees. Therefore, without sufficient support, they will not 
attend. " (Albretch & Ziderman, 1991, p28) 
9 The hardcore poverty level among Malaysians was 1.4% in 1997. The number of hardcore -poor households 
being 67,300. 
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Even after graduation, they need to help families financially. Scholarships should be 
provided to them as scholarship funding is an important tool of financial aid to those who 
might otherwise be prevented from attending university on grounds of financial need 
(Greenaway and Haynes, 2000). Recruiting them into the system would also contribute to 
exchange efficiency, as talents would otherwise be lost. This would also help to break the 
vicious poverty cycle since undergraduates would become high wage earners after 
graduation. Thus, rather than conflicting with one another, scholarships should supplement 
loans and be given to the disadvantaged groups. 
Besides this, on vertical equity grounds, limited scholarships could also still be given to 
excellent students pursuing courses in engineering, medicine, and technology, which are 
critically needed by the economy. These scholarships would contribute more to exchange 
efficiency as Malaysia has been facing shortages of medical doctors, teachers and engineers 
during the Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000). In 1998, expatriates totalling about 45,730 
were mainly employed as managers, engineers and trainers (Malaysia, 1999), indicating a 
shortage of graduate personnel in engineering, and management and in trainers in these 
fields. 
"Engineers, engineering assistants and IT professionals as well as highly skilled workers will 
continue to be in demand with the shift towards capital-intensive and high technology 
industries. The demand for physicians, surgeons, pharmacists and allied health personnel will 
increase with the greater demand for improved health services (Malaysia, 1999, p 121). " 
The demand for an educated and skilled workforce will increase in tandem with the 
Malaysia's rapid industrialisation, as stated in the Dearing Report, 1997 (Appendix 5, 
Higher Education in other countries). If Malaysia is to become a fully developed nation by 
2020, more investment should be given to science and technology in the knowledge-based 
economy, to promote science and technology in the process of building a modern industrial 
economy (Gomez & Jomo, 1997). The establishment of the Multimedia Super Corridor 
(MSC) also reinvents universities to meet the changing demands of the emerging digital 
society. Malaysian goods should be made more competitive internationally by increasing 
productivity through the development of advanced technologies. Thus, new forms of 
competition and co-operation among firms and countries encourage the diffusion of new 
ideas and technologies (OECD, 1999) which Malaysia should not ignore in realising "Vision 
2020". Therefore, it is necessary to give limited scholarships to excellent students pursuing 
these courses as rewards (National Economic Recovery Plan, 1998), motivating secondary 
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school students to follow science courses thereby overcoming the problem of inadequate 
numbers of science students graduating from schools. The Government's target of a 60: 40 
ratio for Science and Arts students to be enrolled in the local public universities to meet 
manpower needs has not been achieved (The Star, May 4,2000). 
10.2.2 An Income-Contingent Loan 
10.2.2.1 Minimising Efficiency Drawbacks of the Present System 
Results from the present study reveal that the present financial support system is very 
heavily subsidised (free of interest, and loans can be converted partially or wholly into 
grants). The majority of loan recipients have their loans converted into grants. Between 80 
to 87.1% of the PSD loans for example, have been converted into 100% grants. The 
conversion of loans into grants is very generous. As long as the loan recipients do not fail or 
extend their period of study, loans can be partially or fully converted into grants. In fact, the 
overall failure rate in Malaysian public universities has been small (See Table 1, Appendix 
P). The loan funds therefore cannot be self-financing at all. With current mass participation 
in higher education as compared to past elitist participation, the government cannot afford to 
heavily subsidise higher education from the public purse. The portion of convertibility 
should be removed so that funds saved can be given to those who really need it so as they 
are not barred from university education due to financial reasons. This is particularly 
relevant in an age of expansion in the higher education sector. 
Moreover, the study reveals that loan recipients do not necessarily study harder than 
scholarship holders. Although multiple logistic regression analysis in chapter 9 shows that 
scholarship holders may study harder than loan recipients, it is not significant. In other 
words, there are no significant differences between forms of financial support and attitudes 
towards study. In fact, it is regions which respondents come from, previous academic 
scores, gender, and types of courses respondents take, as indicated in Tables 9.2 and 9.3, that 
contribute to an attitude of studying harder. Cross-tabulation and multiple regression 
analyses show that the PSD loan recipients also do not study harder than PSD scholarship 
holders. Thus, results from the present study reveal that loan recipients would not 
necessarily study harder than scholarship holders. This defeats one of the aims of 
convertible loans, that is to induce recipients to study harder to gain 
better results. Thus, it is 
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rational for the convertible loan to be replaced by an income-contingent loan whereby' 
recipients have to repay fully what they had borrowed, with repayment linked to income. 
I would suggest that an Income-Contingent type of loan charged at near market rate (4%b0) 
and inflation-indexed could be introduced. This type of loan would be administratively 
cheap, easy to manage and not likely to fail (Barr, 1996) as it can use the existing records of 
employees via the Inland Revenue Board as in the case of Australia. This is possible in 
Malaysia as the Inland Revenue system is fully established, whereby individuals, whether 
employed in the public or private sector, or self-employed have to pay income tax. Barr and 
Crawford (1996) believe that the Income-Contingent loan would outweigh additional costs, 
through major savings by accruing enormous benefits in terms of access, restoring quality 
and reduced taxpayer cost. 
Barr and Crawford (1998) also stress a number of characteristics of Income-Contingent 
loans, which would also satisfy efficiency criteria as stated in the present study. Firstly, such 
loans would contribute to financial efficiency. As the repayment is spread over an extended 
period, making monthly repayment low, graduates could afford to pay an interest rate of 4%, 
encouraging them not to prolong payment duration. This is relevant in Malaysia where 
salaries are paid monthly and can be deducted from pay slips. Moreover, lower wage earners 
would also begin repayments, as repayments are based on a percentage of their incomes, not 
a fixed monthly amount. Using microeconomic simulation, the analysis of Harding (1993; 
1995) suggests that 96 per cent and 77 per cent of all former male and female recipients of 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) will be able to repay their debts 
respectively by the age of 65 (Chapman, 1997) which Malaysia can refer. 
Much of the administrative costs would be saved, as the procedure would be made more 
simple and automatic by "piggy-backing" loan repayments on an existing collection 
infrastructure (Barr and Crawford, 1998). Through simulation, the default rate has been 
estimated at only about 1.5% for the proposed NIC scheme in the UK. In Sweden, the 
default rate for an income-contingent loan is only 1-2% (Morris, 1989). In Australia, the 
income-contingent loan has a very marginal rate of default. The "default insurance" offered 
by the HECS means that former students do not have to bear the costs of revoking on their 
10 This is the standard interest rate offered by the government to civil servants for housing and car loans. Thus, 
the subsidy element is suggested not to be waived drastically. 
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debts arising from periods of low future incomes (Chapman, 1997), so that there is very low 
risk of defaults. A study on a different type of scheme (the mortgage-type loan) by D. N narski 
(1994) found out that in the US the default rate of the Guaranteed Student Loans presently 
known as the Stafford Loans was great. Between 1983 and 1989 for example, the volume of 
the loan programme grew by 48 per cent, from US$6.5 billion to US$9.6 billion. But. during 
the same period, the volume of defaulted loans increased by 266 per cent, from US$444 
million to US$1.6 billion (General Accounting Office). In Canada, the average default rate 
was 8.6% before the introduction of the Income-Contingent type of loan. Thus, international 
experiences suggest that the income-contingency loan would be more efficient financially, 
as this type of loan has lower default rates when compared with the mortgage-type of 
loans' l 
Secondly, the income-contingent loan can be more efficient in terms of meeting the 
manpower and employment needs, compared with convertible mortgage loans practised in 
Malaysia. With equal amounts of funds, a greater number of qualified students can be given 
this type of loan since it is expected to be fully self-financing in the long run. Recipients 
have to repay the loans with no or low interest subsidy. The recruitment effects, especially to 
the lower income groups would be greater as the fear of having debts for these groups of 
students would be reduced, with the income-contingency type of repayment. In other words, 
more qualified candidates would be recruited to universities in meeting the manpower needs 
of an expanding economy. 
I would suggest that the existing loans should be modified. The National Higher Education 
Loan, currently operating as a mortgage-type, should be changed to income-contingency. 
The Public Service Department and MARA should merge with the National Higher 
Education Loan, reducing administrative costs by achieving economies of scale. However, 
various States Foundations could still give out loans but change these to income- 
contingency with convertibility abandoned, and also limited grants and scholarships to their 
nationals, while supplementing the financial support of the National Higher Education 
Corporation. 
10.2.2.2 Minimising Equity Drawbacks of the Present Loan System 
Results of the present study also show that the loan distribution is unequal according to the 
" These include the convertible loan as the repayment is also based on mortgage type 
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criteria of seven independent variables (ethnicity, gender, regions income groups, courses of 
studies, areas which respondents come from, and previous academic performance), as stated 
in chapter 7. In terms of Type-2 equality measurement, whereby we compare the relative 
shares of loans with reference to criteria of respective independent variables concerned 
(ethnicity, gender, areas and regions respondents come from) with their corresponding 
population shares, the loan distribution is also unequal. 
Inequality in loan distribution can be improved with the introduction of income-contingent 
loans. Expected to be nearly full self-revolving12 in the long run and hence not self- 
contained, an income contingent loan can be generally provided to all except those who will 
be given with target scholarships. Thus, distribution would become more equal and hence 
the value judgement would be more tilted towards "horizontal equity" rather than vertical 
equity grounds. 
The present study also indicates that 93.8% of respondents' friends who belonged to the 
low-income group were qualified academically but did not attend universities because of 
failing to have loans. Income-contingent loans could have reached these groups more 
extensively if initially loans were repaid in high proportion to become self-revolving fund 
with additional allocations subsequently. This could ensure that no qualified candidates were 
barred from attending university education because of financial constraints. 
Income-contingent loans have been proven to be equitable in terms of equal opportunity of 
access in Australia, Sweden and Canada as they promote access, especially to low-income 
groups. The studies of Ernest and Young as cited by Chapman (1996,1997) indicate that the 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), an income-contingent loan scheme 
practised in Australia, encouraged the low-income group to participate in higher education. 
There was no significant relationship between the socio-economic status of the student and 
the decision not to participate in higher education. Research by the Australian Council of 
Education Research (ACER) has also shown that the introduction of HECS does not seem to 
have had any discernible effects on the socio-economic composition of the student body 
12 Sensitivity test of Barr and Falkingham (1996) shows that with a zero real interest rate, the combined 
repayments of men and women for income-contingent 
loans rise to 85% of total lending with 1.5% earnings 
growth and to nearly 90% with 3% earnings growth. 
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(Chapman, 1997). This shows that HECS does not deter qualified low-income groups from 
participating in higher education. 
The present study of university undergraduates indicates no significant differences between 
the income-groups and their opinions about the income-contingency type of loan for 
financing university education (Table 1, Appendix Q). 55% and 21.3% of the lowest 
income-group respectively agree and agree strongly with an income contingent type of loan. 
Similarly, 51.2% and 23.9% of the low-income group also agree and strongly agree for this 
type of loan. This implies that income-contingency loans would not discourage low-income 
students from attending university education. The present study of high school students 
(potentially undergraduates) also indicates no significant association between income- 
groups and opinions on income-contingent loans (Table 2, Appendix Q). 41.9% and 21.6% 
of the lowest-income group high school students respectively agree and strongly agree with 
income-contingency of loans and 18.9% of them are neutral about them. Similarly, 41.7% 
and 29.2% of the low-income high school students agree or strongly agree with this type of 
loans. This suggests that income-contingency loans could be implemented in Malaysia, as 
they would not discourage the lowest and low-income groups of high school students from 
attending university education. The government can also more effectively minimise the 
problem of risk aversion by limiting the repayment burdens in any given year. This can be 
done by linking payments to income, imposing payment ceilings, or providing exemptions if 
income falls, as in the case of Australia. In the long run, it would reduce the public cost of 
expanding higher education. It also solves the problem of unpaid parental contributions and 
increase equality of opportunity by reallocating public funds to disadvantaged students. 
The modification from convertible mortgage loans to full income-contingent loans would 
not prevent the disadvantaged groups from attending university. This is because Malaysians 
usually value university education highly irrespective of social and economic status. The 
quotation shows clear evidence. 
"The family unit values education in a complementary way as an "investment", 
One vivid example is of 
a poor family where 40 of the extended family members contribute small amounts on a regular 
basis to 
progress the education of just one able member (in this case 
for a doctorate at a foreign university) who 
will in turn enjoy an income which will support the extended 
family and educate other members. Such 
attitudes were seen in Western society, to a more 
limited extent, until as recently as one or two 
generations ago" (Simpson, 1997, p30) 
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This is supported by the high demand of the lowest income-group (98.6%) and low-income 
group (95.8%) for loans of the high school students. Hence, an income-contingent loan NN-ill 
not discourage them from entering the universities. They would accept the concept of 
"borrow first and pay later". The high demand for tertiary education is also reflected in the 
large number of Malaysian students studying overseas, as local institutions are unable to 
provide sufficient places13. About 54,000 students are pursuing tertiary level courses in 
foreign institutions (National Economic Action Council, 1998), either sponsored or privately 
financed. Income-contingent loans could also sponsor students pursuing overseas education, 
especially courses in expertise and technology. 
Income-contingent loans could be working well in Malaysia to relieve the burdens of the 
government in heavily subsidising the current mass participation in university education, 
compared to its support for past elitist participation. The famous observation of Kenneth 
Boulding that "if something exists, then it is possible" (cited by Chapman, 1996) can give us 
food for thought. HECS works well in Australia, and there is no reason why an income- 
contingency loan scheme cannot be introduced in the light of the rising student population at 
the tertiary level and the very high demand for loans and higher education in Malaysia. 
I should therefore suggest that the student aid programme for Malaysia should be mainly 
income-contingent loans supplemented with grants to achieve certain desired objectives, 
while becoming more equitable in both "horizontal equity" and vertical equity grounds, 
instead of substitutes for one another. Other recommendations include the followings. 
10.2.3 Securitisation of Loans 
To overcome the problem of the paradox that loans add to public expenditure 
for many 
years, loans could be privatised as an alternative, besides using the Inland 
Revenue Board as 
an administrative mechanism, through the process of selling the student 
debt. The 
government could sell the student debt at a discount to the private sector which would 
collect the repayments from graduates as suggested by Barr and 
Crawford, 1996; 1998; 
Williams, 1998 for UK. In this manner, the risk but at a cost is transferred to the private 
financial sector. The funds released could be used for alternative public spending while 
13 Less than half of applicants secure places in Malaysian universities annually 
in 1990 and 1991 (Ismail, 1997) 
though it has improved after 1995. 
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overcoming immediate budgetary pressures. In the UK, two tranches of debt under the old 
mortgage scheme have been sold by the SLC. These were the £1 billion sold to Greenwich 
Nat West in 1998 and £1.3 billion to Deutsche Bank/Nationwide in 1999 for around 50 per 
cent of its face value (Greenaway and Haynes, 2000). Malaysia can consider this suggestion 
as the Malaysian monetary system is similar to the UK. 
However, the problem of public sector accounting procedures in which all lending to 
students has to count against the current public sector cash requirement could delay the 
bringing in of additional private sources. (Greenaway and Haynes, 2000). To overcome this 
problem, Barr (1997) suggests the revision of public sector accounting procedures and also 
further privatising the organisation and finance of student loans (Greenaway and Haynes, 
2000) which Malaysia can learn from. 
10.2.4 Commercial Bank Loans are Encouraged 
Public funded income-contingent loan discussed in section 10.2.2 is suggested to ease the 
financial burdens of treasury, but is not the panacea. Other sources of student finance 
involving private financial institutions could be supplements, to accommodate differential 
needs and tastes. Students from affluent background, for example, may prefer loans from 
commercial banks, with parents as guarantors, for simplicity and speedy processing of loan 
applications though more expensive. However, the demand for these regular loans would 
depend on whether there were any favourable term. Currently, commercial banks in the UK 
provide education loans to undergraduates and graduates (The Times, April 22,2000). Such 
loans would also ease the public budgetary pressures. To ease parent burdens in supporting 
their children's education, allowances for parent taxable incomes should be increased to an 
amount that covers the total cost of higher education. 
10.2.5 Diversification of Resources and Marketisation of Higher Education 
Besides modifying the system of direct financial support, policy makers should also 
consider diversified resources for higher education to ease the financial burdens on the 
treasury. Before 1996, the allocation of recurrent expenditure for higher education was 
relatively lower than the secondary and primary levels of education (See Table 3, Appendix 
Q). But with mass participation in tertiary education beginning in 1996 this trend has 
changed. In 1998, the budget allocated RM 2.881 billion (represents 23.1% of the total 
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allocation for education) and in 1999, RM 4.5 billion (represents 33.3% of the total 
allocation for education, compared to only 14.3% in 1994) to the higher education recurrent 
expenditure. Thus, the allocation for higher education has recently increased tremendously 
though the total allocation to education represented 4.5% of the GNP in 1999 (Table 4. 
Appendix Q). 
Evidence shows that the social rates of return to primary education in Malaysia is very high, 
that is 42%, which is higher than normal secondary 15%, and university, 10% (Lucas and 
Verry, 1999). This may mean that the policy makers should consider more allocations of 
funds relatively to the primary level rather than higher levels of education especially to 
improve the rural primary school facilities. It would be a bad allocation decision to devote 
more public resources to higher education while many school-aged children do not complete 
the basic cycle because of poor facilities (Pscharopoulos, 1996). In Malaysia, measures need 
to be taken to reduce the dropout and also improve poor performance of rural students so 
that they accomplish better results for entrance into higher levels of education later on. Some 
3500 teachers' quarters and 700 rural schools, in East Malaysia are in bad shape ( The Star, 
2000) and lack of teaching aids, computers and qualified teachers. 
Thus, the financial reform should consider the diversification of resources for funding higher 
education, so that this level of education will not be so heavily subsidised especially in an 
age of expansion. To reduce the level of subsidy in higher education, universities should not 
only pursue academic excellence in teaching but also in research. Their research outputs can 
be commercialised to a certain extent so that universities need not rely mainly upon financial 
aid from the public purse. Universities can also conduct training programmes for the public 
to put theory into practice, instead of only pursuing academic excellence theoretically. A 
research by Thong (1995) indicates 73% of academics agreed that academic work should be 
closely related to the national industrialisation objective of Vision 2020. Corporatised 
universities should be allowed to generate funding from external sources based on business 
plans agreed by the government to reduce public subsidy. Thus, diversified sources of 
funding, private or public shall be necessary while pursuing academic excellence. 
243 
The subsidy for higher education in Malaysia could be shifted more directly to students by 
charging higher tuition fees 14, which are paid to universities through income-contingent 
loans or limited scholarships, rather than giving more direct grants' 5 to institutions. Granting 
financial aid to students directly would help to generate competition at the higher education 
level. Students would compete for support and higher education institutions would compete 
for students. This is because under direct funding, institutions are less able to differentiate 
themselves to students, especially in the charging of tuition fees, while students have limited 
choices (Ziderman & Albrecht, 1995). The loan or scholarship amount should cover the 
total costs of attending universities, so that the impact of consumerism would be greater. 
From the equity point of view, Woodhall (1989) also argues that more people would be able 
to benefit from higher education by subsidising students directly, rather than institutions, 
though this is still inequitable to taxpayers who do not attend university education. 
10.2.6 Stressing Moral Values and Stricter Rulings 
All funding bodies mentioned that attitude was the main factor that caused some former 
recipients not to repay the loans though they were able to. Students may think that higher 
education is a welfare service to be freely provided by the government. During interviews, 
all funding bodies revealed that unemployment was not the reason, as all graduates were 
employed. Thus willingness is more important than ability to repay. Students should be 
instilled with moral values besides imposing stricter rules on repayment such as imposing of 
bankruptcy procedures to those who were able to repay but refused to do so. Any system, 
including income-contingent loan may not work well if ethical values are not stressed. 
10.2.7 The Removal of Quota is Possible 
Evidence in chapter 4 demonstrates that the quota system has diluted the quality of higher 
education, as bumiputeras (natives) only need relatively low credits in their previous 
academic attainment to pursue types of courses in the universities than those of non- 
bumiputeras (non-natives). Moreover, better-qualified natives have been sponsored to 
pursue studies overseas while less-qualified natives have gained places in local universities. 
14 The fees charged to first degree courses are still very marginal ranging from $M1400 to $M2500 annually 
(represents about 10 per cent of the total operational cost of universities as discussed in chapter 4). 
15 As discussed in chapter 4, undergraduates are heavily subsidised through direct grants to universities even if 
they do not receive loans or scholarships. 
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In contrast, the best qualified non-natives gained places in local universities while richer 
non-natives with average results studied abroad. Consequently, natives are unable to 
compete with much better-qualified non-natives in Malaysian public universities. Thus, the 
quota has eroded the university tradition of admission of students based on merit and 
distorted competition, preventing the market from reaching optimality. I would recommend 
both the quota intake to university and the provision of student financial support, be lifted 
when social and economic disparities are corrected. The appropriate time will arrive when 
all races regard themselves as Malaysians who see the national interest as paramount and 
ethnicity is no longer dominant. Recently, Mahathir Mohammad (2000), the right honour, 
prime minister of Malaysia predicted that a non-Malay can become the prime minister when 
ethnicity is no longer a dominant factor. The quota was supposed to be only a temporary 
measure after the racial riots of 1969. It was embedded in the New Economic Policy (1971- 
1990) but prolonged under the National Development Policy (1991-2000) in a more diluted 
form16. The natives who were underrepresented in the public higher education system prior 
to 1970s, are now overly represented as a result of positive discrimination (Kim, 1998; 
Rosni, 1998; Lucas and Verry, 1999). Moreover, many more natives sponsored by 
government were sent overseas (Chapter 9). 
I believe it is possible for the government to lift the quota entry to universities when the 
natives are on a par with non-natives in social-economic arenas and ethnicity is no longer 
dominant. The move towards such parity is evidenced by the bumiputera share of corporate 
equity, which expanded from 2.4 per cent in 1970 to 20.3 per cent in 1990 as a result of NEP 
(Searl, 1999). By 1997,39 per cent of the companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange were bumiputera companies, indicating that bumiputera control of the corporate 
sector was more than 30 per cent'7. This indicates that the economic disparities have been 
narrowed. A meritocratic system should be restored to stimulate competition among the new 
generation of students and restore the quality of higher education. 
Therefore, every 
potentially qualified Malaysian should have equal access to 
higher education through 
financial support on the basis of merit, irrespective of their social economic 
background, in 
16 The government has tried to relax the quota system by setting up private universities and 
branches of foreign 
universities recently, which have enrolled more non-natives than natives 
(Musa Mohammad, 19 May 2000). 
This seems to offset the quota system in the public universities. 
17 It was stated in the NEP that the bumiputera should attain a target of 
30 per cent share in the ownership of 
corporate equity by 1990. 
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keeping with Article 26.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNESCO, 1998). 
The ethnic quota based on vertical equity could be removed at appropriate time, but only on 
the basis of strengthening rather than undermining national unity. The next section 
discusses the limitations of this study. 
10.3 Limitations and Strengths of the Present Research 
The present study has certain limitations because of resource and data constraints. I only 
conducted surveys in five of the ten Malaysian public universities. However, these samples 
may be well representative since all public universities recruit students throughout Malaysia 
through the Central Recruitment Unit. The study also does not take samples from Malaysian 
students who were sponsored to study overseas because of time and resource constraints. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1998, many sponsored Malaysian students from abroad 
were called back and placed in the public universities, because of the financial crisis of the 
Asian region. Some samples of these students were also included in the present study. 
The undergraduate survey is of interest as we obtained information from the undergraduates 
directly through questionnaires. However, this may also have some limitations. The 
population that is surveyed differs from the high school students in a number of ways. 
Currently enrolled undergraduates may be more ambitious, motivated, matured and far- 
sighted than high school students. Thus, currently enrolled undergraduates may not share the 
same characteristics, observed and unobserved, as the potential entrants. It is this latter 
group that is the focus of policies aimed at achieving increased participation in tertiary 
education. Consequently, extrapolation of the results of the surveys to this broader group 
could be subjected to selection bias. It would be risky to infer recruitment effects of 
scholarships or loans. Though the surveys may suffer from these limitations, there are 
advantages. Both surveys could be treated independently in investigating the equity and 
efficiency of the present financial support systems in the peculiar case of Malaysia as well as 
providing some recommendations. The high school survey is an indicative study to 
supplement the undergraduate survey in investigating the equity and efficiency. 
It may give a more accurate overall picture of demand for loans and scholarships 
respectively if demand of scholarship recipients for loans, and loan recipients for 
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scholarships was asked. This would provide us with an additional way of analysis by 
investigating how much of the demand was met across all categories of each independent 
variable. 
The survey of high school students is meant to triangulate the findings from the 
undergraduate survey and an indication for modifying the present system of finance. 
However, the high school survey was limited to two high schools in West Malaysia and two 
high schools in East Malaysia owing to time and resource constraints. The results cannot be 
therefore used for generalisation. It is therefore an indicative study to get opinions of high 
school students regarding types of financial support they would prefer in helping them to 
participate in university education. Both surveys are cross-sectional, and thus have the 
limitations of a snap-shot survey. Nevertheless, the present study may reflect the impact of 
funding systems for university education on students. 
Another constraint of the study is that some specific data given for examination of financial 
efficiency are limited due to the Official Secrets Act. However, through interviews with top 
level management of the funding bodies, I was able to obtain some first hand information 
and use data from the annual reports of funding bodies, working documents and the 
conditions listed in the agreements signed by students and funding bodies to infer the 
financial efficiency of loans. Qualitative data have only been used for some triangulation 
with quantitative analysis, though participant observation was also used. 
There are also strengths in the present study. Interviews with the directors or top-level 
management of five funding bodies have the advantages of getting first-hand information 
and opinions during the interviews. Information from publications, annual reports, working 
documents and agreements was also obtained to triangulate the evidence. Before interviews, 
questionnaires were sent to the parties concerned so that the funding bodies could prepare 
their answers or opinions about the questions asked. One of the funding bodies, that was the 
PSD, even fully prepared their responses for interviews so as to use the time more 
efficiently. Interviews enabled me to clarify some of the points regarding the finance of 
higher education. These also enabled triangulation with the quantitative data. 
The present study is an extensive study, using the vertical equity underpinning the 
arguments for the distribution of scholarships and loans respectively, according to seven 
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independent variables. Type-1 and type-2 equality measures were used. For type-1 equality 
measurement, we first assumed the provision of scholarships and loans should be equally 
distributed according to the seven variables stated. Subsequently, we examine the percentage 
of each category within the same independent variable in the provision of respective 
scholarships and loans. The next stage is to compare the percentages of all categories within 
the same independent variable to be provided with respective scholarships and loans. For 
example, the scholarship provision is said to favour the category/group with its higher 
percentage to be provided with scholarship compared with other categories within the same 
independent variable. 
Type-2 equality measure is used to compare the provisions of scholarships and loans with 
their relative shares in the general population of Malaysia. Type-2 equality would be 
achieved if provision of respective scholarships and loans matched their shares in the 
general population of Malaysia. These variables are used as they are related to the social- 
political context of Malaysia embedded in the NEP and the NDP. The researcher 
investigates how equitably the scholarship and loan systems are on horizontal and vertical 
equity grounds. 
The present study also uses three criteria of efficiency: cost-effectiveness, efficiency in 
meeting manpower and employment needs, and financial efficiency, which provide 
invaluable insights for modifying the present system of funding. The study also answers 
some of the issues raised in the literature on loans versus grants generally, for example that 
loan recipients do not necessarily study harder than scholarship holders. 
Though the main data derive from the university undergraduate survey, the data have been 
triangulated through a second survey with high school students, semi-structured interviews 
with funding bodies, informal interviews with randomly selected undergraduates, participant 
observation and discussion with head teachers. Annual reports and secondary sources of data 
from newspapers, bulletins and other reference are also used. Though the samples of high 
school students are only indicative, they do provide some valuable 
information on high 
school students' (potential undergraduates) views on different types of 
financial support. 
This may have implications for equity and efficiency arguments. All these 
increase the 
validity of the analysis. 
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10.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
Future research can use an additional model for analysing the equity aspect of student 
financial support, by considering the demand for loans and scholarships. The model can 
consider both demand and the provision of scholarships and loans respectively on each 
independent variable before investigating the equity aspect. For equity implication of 
scholarships, we firstly focus on examining whether scholarships are being distributed 
equally to each category within the same respective independent variables, for all groups, 
that is natives and non-natives combined, and the native and non-native groups exclusively. 
Subsequently, the process is repeated to find the demand of each category within the same 
respective independent variables for scholarships. From this perspective, equality 
measurement is defined as the percentage of demand being met for each category within the 
same independent variable. The present study did not use this model since the data regarding 
the aggregate demand is incomplete (See Appendix R for explanation). 
Latest data regarding the proportions of university aged population classified according to 
such independent variables as ethnicity, gender, income group, areas and regions of 
respondents could also provide an alternative benchmark in Type-2 equality measurements 
if newest data regarding those were available. However, the present benchmark using the 
general population share could reflect the equity implication as this benchmark is always 
used in the Malaysian political debate regarding the equity distribution of resources. 
The present study does not focus on the matching of jobs with graduates though there is 
argument in the literature that the mission of the university is to provide general education 
rather than vocational education. To minimise the mismatching of jobs, universities are 
encouraged to collaborate with employers (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1995). Future study may 
focus on this, to investigate how courses followed in universities could meet the needs of the 
society in achieving a wider aspect of exchange efficiency. Investments 
in education through 
loans and scholarships are wasted and inefficient if graduates cannot practice what they 
have 
learned. The phenomenon of possible "over-education" should also be investigated. 
Future 
research should also investigate other purposes of university education such as 
improving 
the quality of life, promoting democracy, reducing the crime and other externalities. 
249 
10.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, the present study shows that the rationale for subsidising higher education in 
Malaysia is strongly affected by the political quota enshrined in the Malaysian NEP (1971- 
1990) and in a more diluted form under the NDP (1991-2000). An intake quota system has 
been introduced in the context of a multi-racial society. Consequently, vertical equity 
underpins all arguments regarding the quota distribution of resources including financial 
support, as well as other objectives embedded in the NEP and NDP. The quota system is 
fundamentally inequitable in terms of "horizontal equity" as it does not give equal 
opportunity to all who have similar ability or tastes to participate in university. It therefore 
prevents certain qualified students from participating in university education because of 
limited allocations and hence inefficient as talents are lost. However, the quota may be 
equitable in terms of vertical equity argument, that is the disadvantaged group needs to be 
treated preferentially (unequally) because of historical factors. The quota system practised 
in Malaysia claimed to be similar to the affirmative policy of the United States to treat the 
disadvantaged groups of Asian and Hispanic origin preferentially in their access to higher 
education (Mahathir, 1998). 
Owing to very heavy subsidies (free of interest, and with convertibility into grants in the 
case of loans), the financial support scheme is financially inefficient. Scholarships and 
heavy subsidies of loans represent a loss to the public funds. However, to a certain extent, 
loans and scholarships appears to be cost-effective as students graduated on time, with 
marginal cases of failures to achieve the objectives as funding bodies desired. The 
investments in higher education through financial support are therefore not wasted. But in 
actual fact, tables 9.2 and 9.3 suggest that after standardisation, the form of financial support 
does not significantly affect lecture attendance or hours of study. Hence, other factors may 
induce students to study harder rather than forms of financial support. Financial support 
appears to contribute to the efficiency of meeting the manpower needs of the economy, since 
the majority of graduates are employed especially in areas where they are critically needed 
by society, such as medicine and technology. 
To improve equity and efficiency, the practice of quotas for admission to universities and 
for 
granting of financial support has to be lifted or 
further diluted at appropriate time in the 
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Malaysian spirit of mutual understanding. A meritocratic system would ensure that every 
qualified Malaysian has equal access to education, irrespective of social and economic 
backgrounds. 
Though the income-contingent loan is proposed for improving equity and efficiency, it is 
not a panacea. Financing of higher education would also depend on the objectives of policy' 
makers and needs of the economy. From this perspective, limited scholarships could still be 
given to undergraduates pursuing courses critically needed by the economy, to students from 
the hard-core poverty group and to those who scored excellent results in the previous 
examination as rewards. I take the position that scholarships would supplement or 
complement income-contingent loans, rather than be mutually exclusive. 
It would be better to channel financial support more to students to cover higher fees and 
other costs rather than direct grants to universities. This would stimulate competition. The 
selling of debt through a process of securitisation is an alternative to overcome the problem 
of budgetary pressure. Hopefully, the new financial support arrangements suggested would 
contribute to the realisation of the Vision 2020 when Malaysia will become a fully 
developed country while remaining united, progressive and harmonious, with a very 
distinctive multiracial, multicultural and multilingual society. We should never ignore the 
fact that human capital is a superior investment to physical investment in developing 
countries such as Malaysia (Esland, 1991) though the cost of higher education should be 
shifted more to private sources. Finally, the quotations below would give us food for 
thought. 
"An investment in Knowledge pays the best interest". (Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richar's Almamack, 
cited by Cohn and Geske p70,1990) 
"Nothing is more important than the development of human resources. Our people is our ultimate 
resource" (Mahathir, p 13,1997) 
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Chapter 1 
Appendix A: Models of Financing Higher Education 
1. The "Bureaucratic Model" 
Under this model, a powerful external funding agency such as the central government 
allocates resources to several institutions and has considerable monopoly power with 
respect to any one of them. The external agency often but not always own the 
institutions (Williams, 1987). The highest political level or the central government will 
make the financial decisions on funding of higher education both on the amounts of 
resources allocated and how these resources are distributed between institutions and 
within institutions. The external agency will also establish regulatory mechanisms to 
assure itself that the public interest is being met. These regulatory mechanisms are 
likely to be seen as bureaucratically intrusive within the institutions (Williams, 1987). 
However, the looseness and flexibility of the rule will determine the "freedom" of 
action of institutions, departments and teachers. But, the freedom is subjected to the 
central control, which can tighten the rules at any time. In most European countries, 
including UK, elements of this model can be found. In mid 1980s, the British 
universities were made more accountable to central control. 
There are two merits of this system, namely quantitative and qualitative. 
Quantitatively, such a system of central control would adjust educational provisions so 
as to meet manpower needs. Hence, good academic leadership, supported by 
centralised management structures and an effective bureaucracy, will 
lead to an 
efficient resource use and rapid response to a changing environment. 
Qualitatively, 
educational standards can be protected from above. This means that 
bureaucratic 
procedures can protect the quality of education by ensuring that resources are adequate 
for the tasks which operating units are asked to perform (Williams, 1987). 
However, the main disadvantage of the system is that administrative regulations tend 
to be cumbersome and to be inertial. The ability to adjust as necessary to changing 
economic situations is questionable under this system. 
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Another disadvantage is that an authoritarian management may neglect the stage of 
innovation process while imposing innovation. This means that proposed changes. 
which are supposed to be tested in debate with colleagues selecting ideas, are being 
neglected. 
Moreover, there is also conflicting interests between managers and managed in a 
bureaucratic structure. Students and teachers use the loopholes in the bureaucratic rules to 
serve their own interests whereas the management, with equal justification, makes new 
rules. If professional expertise is concentrated near the base of the bureaucratic pyramid, 
it is almost impossible to implement effective resource allocation rules without a mass 
positive support from those who have to conform to the regulations. Under bureaucratic 
allocation procedures claims for resources will be made with little consideration on 
overall resource constraints. 
2. The Collegial Model 
The "collegial model" contrasts sharply with the "bureaucratic" model. As a 
consequence of past endowment, present investments and ownership of property, 
institutions are financially independent. They are therefore free to manage their own 
affairs such as determining their own educational priorities as well as controlling a 
significant part of their expenditure. 
Under this model, the board of governors or Trustees is entrusted with responsibility to 
ensure that the school or college conforms to the requirements of the various 
bequests 
that constitute the source of its endowment income. The management also acts 
in 
accordance with the regulations governing the charitable status that educational 
institutions usually find it convenient to acquire (Williams, 1987). 
Usually, the 
endowed institutions will adhere legally to a charter, which 
has been established. 
Hence, within these constraints, the endowed school or college 
has very considerable 
freedom over its utilisation of resources. 
An example of this model is the University 
Grant Committee (UGC) used for the 
funding of universities in Britain in 1920-1980. Universities were given 
their recurrent 
2-17 
funds in the form of block grants which, within broad limits, they were free to spend 
as they wish within the terms of their charters. It has the advantage of academic 
freedom that is achieved without outside influences. 
However, this autonomy has the danger of turning higher education institutions into 
clubs operated in the interests of teachers (Mace, 1987). Adam Smith commented the 
university of Oxford in the eighteen-century fell into this danger. 
".... The discipline of colleges and universities is in general contrived, not for the benefit of students, but for 
the interest, or more properly speaking, the ease, of the masters. Its object is, in all cases, to maintain the 
authority of the master, and whether he neglects or performs his duty, to oblige the student in all cases to 
behave to him as if he performed it with the greatest of diligence and ability. " quoted in (Williams, 1987, 
pp40) 
This suggests that students are privileged to be in such an institution and they must 
accept what it offers. 
Another advantage of the collegial model is that educational institutions that control 
their own resource allocation will evolve participatory styles of management. 
Resource allocation decisions have an authority legitimised by consensus, amongst 
those to whom they apply. Independence in financial matters frees institutions from 
dependence on consumers and from external regulatory agencies. However, there may 
be problems in consensus- building, which is time-consuming and erratic in its 
outcomes (Williams, 1987). It can sharpen conflicts and even neglect the interests of 
those who are not part of the consensus. The fundamental weakness of the collegial 
forms of management is their ability to resist innovation and change. 
There is also the problem of "opportunity cost" or " there is no such thing as free 
lunch" for all members of any institution, which controls its resources. The problem 
will become more apparent when resources are not increasing. Collective decisions are 
highly required since expansion of some activities will reduce the interests of others. 
Generally, collegial forms of management are most likely to be successful in 
institutions, which do not compromise too wide a range of interest. 
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3. The "Market Model" 
Under this model, a university generates its income by selling its services - teaching, 
research and consultancy - to whoever wishes to buy them. Under this model, the 
consumer has the sovereign right whether to buy or not to buy the education services 
provided to them. Power is also shifted to the units that produce and sell the services. 
Resources will be allocated according to an incentive structure. If teaching is more 
highly rewarded than research, university employees will devote more of their time 
and energy to teaching, and vice versa. 
Hence, resource allocation decisions are taken out of the hands of both politicians and 
self-interested professionals. They are determined instead by independent decisions of 
many consumers of education services. Output becomes what consumers are prepared 
to buy. Effectively the power is now in the hands of students, and their families. 
The US system of higher education is akin to the market model where almost 100%, 
or usually between 50% to 80% of the private institutional revenues comes from fees 
and student tuition. This represents sums that generate keen competition for student 
enrolments (Leslie and Slaughter, 1997). 
In UK, the full cost fees for overseas students in the British higher education heralded 
a major shift towards a market model in at least a part of British higher education. 
Where foreign students form a large part in many British universities and 
polytechnics, they have developed new courses, tailored to the demands of foreign 
students. Universities are able to retain the income generated by the recruitment of 
overseas students and hence an incentive to try to expand their recruitment of foreign 
students, leading to even more fierce competitions. Education fairs are organised 
overseas to recruit students. In 1995,80,000 foreign students were studying in the 
Australian universities contributing about $1.9 billion to the national 
economy. (Juddery, 1996). This shows how enhanced competition in a deregulated 
higher education environment appears to produce the desired outcome (Meek, and 
Wood, 1997). However, this market model may be temporarily impaired because of 
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the currency crisis, which has plunged the exchange value of Asian currencies. 
Institutions in the UK stand to lose £300 million in fees if students from the South 
East Asian countries facing a currency crisis decide not to apply for places in the UK 
(Tony Tysome, The Times Higher Education Supplement, January, 16 1998). 
However, the problem could be overcome by shifting recruitment efforts to other 
regions such as the Eastern Mediterranean, South America and East Asia. 
The British higher education will become more akin to the market model with the 
introduction of tuition fees of £ 1000 per undergraduate beginning of 1998. Students 
will be more conscious about the choice of courses and universities as their proportion 
of financing higher education will be increased. If they have to pay for higher 
education, they value of money. Higher education system will become more 
consumer-oriented as universities will respond more effectively to student demand 
(reflecting relative earnings and shortages in the labour market). Universities will be 
forced to compete for students (in terms of price, quality of education and subsequent 
marketability of skills provided). The student loans may be topped up or even replaced 
by the income-contingent student loan system (Alan Thomson, The Times Higher 
Education Supplement, January, 16,1998, ) causing the higher education sector to 
become more competitive and responsive in times to come. Hence, exchange 
efficiency will be achieved. 
However, the market model is criticised because the assumptions mentioned above 
may not hold. Some of those such as externalities, consumer ignorance, imperfect 
capital market and economies of scale may distort the market model that it cannot 
function efficiently. There is also a danger that responsiveness to student demand 
could have both undesirable and desirable effects. For institutions that fail to attract 
students, there may be a lowering of admissions standards and degrees or 
examination standards. For example, by 1994, the UK government was worried about 
the universities showing little regard for quality as student numbers exploded at ever 
decreasing costs (Williams, 1997). The deterioration of quality results because it is 
difficult to specify the quality of output and where purchasers of services are not well 
informed about the technical specification of the product they are buying. This 
danger 
is particularly acute when institution's survival 
is at stake and universities, colleges 
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and schools need to compete fiercely to ensure the use of their capacity at an 
economy level. But, this is not necessary undesirable or indicative of a fall in the 
"value added" in higher education. 
The market model may face "the principal-agent problem". How does the "principal" 
that is, the manager ensure that the "agent", that is, the individual and organisation 
which he/she is responsible behave in ways which the manager require? (Williams, 
1997). The solution to the problem can be coercion through physical force, 
bureaucratic or legal authority, charismatic persuasion, professional expertise, or the 
provision of incentives. However, it is believed that the provision of incentives is the 
most efficient way for principals to "persuade" agents to achieve outcomes desired by 
the principals (Williams, 1997). In the UK, the principal-agent problem was "solved" 
through a double pronged approach: financial incentives to encourage agents to act in 
desired ways and market monitoring to ensure that they do effectively. This is the 
zero based formula funding and ongoing quality assessment of teaching and research 
as the case of higher education. Hence, the Conservative government in the UK 
substituted the quasi-markets for real markets. I believe that the New Labour 
government will intensify the substitution by introduction of a thousand pound tuition 
fees per student in 1998 and a new student income-contingent loan system. This will 
indeed make the higher education more competitive and consumer-oriented. Students 
can even forgo the universities in the remote areas so that they can stay at home, 
cutting down the costs of attending higher education (The Times Higher Education 
Supplement, 16 January, 1998) 
But, the students' demand for more time of lecturers devoted to teaching than doing 
research would be damaging to the total output of the higher education system 
(Mace, 
1987). There would be a shift towards exchange efficiency if the government wishes 
to see the objectives of universities shifted. 
To what extent the power is desirable in the hands of consumers of education services 
is an issue that can be examined. To reduce the power of students, 
it is possible to 
combine market-type model with central 
funding by rewarding teacher and 
institutions via special pay increments, promotions and so on. The government could 
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award additional grants to institutions that attract outside research funds or additional 
students. However, the government would need to monitor such activities to ensure 
they were consistent with its objectives, that is constitutes a move towards increased 
exchanged efficiency. 
The market model, or the creation of market mechanisms, however is not the same as 
the establishment of a free market. In the UK, for example, universities have partially 
lost their autonomy in financial and academic decisions that they were beginning to 
acquire in the 1980s, as a result of some market features combined with increased 
bureaucratic controls. Universities are faced with increasing demands for 
accountability for the use of public funds while subjected to external quality 
monitoring. The marketisation of higher education as Professor Gareth Williams 
terms it, while beneficial to students and other consumers of higher education 
services on short-time basis, would bring an erosion in the professional autonomy of 
the university academe. As members of the academic profession face lessening 
control over matters such as the curriculum and definition of area for research, the 
professional integrity and quality may give way to the short-term benefits of so called 
consumers. 
Each of these models bears different implications for consumers and producers in 
financing higher education. The Collegial and the bureaucratic models of financing 
tuition expenses work smoothly with a student grants system, whereas a market model 
of tuition funding combines more easily with a system of student 
loans. However, the 
impact of student loans and grants operating in the models 
depend on their 
proportionate contributions towards the total university 
finance. 
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Appendix B: National Policies (Chapter 1) 
1. The New Economic Policy (1971-1990) 
The Malaysian Government admitted the root for the cause of the racial riot in 1969 Evas 
that of the economic disparities between the predominantly Malay Bumiputeras (native) 
and the predominantly Chinese non-Bumiputera (non-native) Thus, the aftermath the 
racial riot in the west Malaysia, the Malaysian Government formulated an affirmative 
policy called the New Economic Policy (NEP) favouring the Bumiputeras. The policy 
lasted for 20 years (1971-1990), embedded in the First Outline Perspective Plan. 
Breifly, the primary objective of the NEP announced in 1970, was to achieve national 
unity, through "eradication of poverty " and restructuring the Malaysian society. 
Eradication of poverty means by eradicating poverty irrespective of races to ensure 
minimal political opposition, gaining legitimacy and broad support. The Malaysian 
society is structured so that the major economic functions are not identified with races. 
Thus, the main aim of the restructuring the society is to achieve the inter-ethnic economic 
parity between the predominantly Malay Bumiputeras and the predominantly Chinese 
non-Bumiputeras. It was hoped that by 1990, the Bumiputeras would share 30 per cent in 
the corporate sector. The redistribution of wealth is based on the sustained economic 
growth so that no one would lose. It was supposed not to be a zero-sum game. 
The NEP however, have been criticised. Adam and Cavenish (1994) and Yoshihara 
(1988) viewed that the NEP hindered economic growth: 
"While real GDP growth had been impressive (during the two decades of the NEP) and the 
standard of living of the Bumiputeras as a whole had improved dramatically, the overall 
performance of the economy had not been outstanding by regional standards. It has been widely 
argued that growth was hampered by the NEP. When it was introduced, Malaysia ranked third 
only to Japan and Singapore among East Asian nations in terms of GDP per capita; by 1990, it 
had fallen behind South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong as well. Had growth not been 
constrained by the NEP, it is argued, the economic performance and welfare of the 
Bumiputera 
would have been even more greatly enhanced (Adam and 
Cavenish 1994: 15)" 
It seems that the NEP only benefited the upper Class Malays 
in the redistribution of 
wealth. The NEP has been criticised for neglecting the poorer section of the non- 
Bumiputera especially the problems of poor chinese in new villages, the predominantly 
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Indian workers in the plantation and even from the non-Malay Bumiputera of Sabah and 
Sarawak, and at least 19 distinct tribal groups in Peninsular Malaysia (West Malaysia). 
Criticisms also came from within the ruling coalition government. 
When the NEP ended in 1990, the formulation of the National Development Policy 
(1991-2000) took considerations of these weaknesses. 
2. The National Development Policy (1991-2000) 
The New Economic Policy (NEP) expired in 1990. The Malaysian government then 
introduced the National Development Policy, which is considered as part of the second 
Outline Perspective Plan, which started in 1991 till 2020. The NDP however, has a ten- 
year time horizon as against 20 years for the NEP. 
The twin objectives of poverty eradication and restructuring society, embedded in the 
New Economic Policy are still being uphold in the NDP. The difference is that the. NDP 
primarily focuses on rapid industrialisation aiming at promoting more actively a "viable 
and resilient " Bumiputra commercial and industrial community in restructuring the 
society. On the other hand, the poverty eradication is directed at hard-core poverty (the 
very poor). In other words, the NDP's targets are broader and it is also noticeably less 
concerned with race and numerical goals. 
The salient features of the NDP are as quoted from The Economist Intelligence Unit 
Limited, 1994): 
1. To shift the focus of the anti-poverty strategy towards eradication of hard-core 
poverty while reducing relative poverty simultaneously. The NDP also expresses 
concerns about relative poverty, and hence income inequality, both inter- and intra- 
ethnic groups. 
2. To focus on employment and the rapid development of an active Bumiputera 
commercial and industrial community with the meaningful participation of Bumiputeras 
in the modern sectors of the economy. The emphasis is on "raising the quality of 
participation and ensuring that the significant progress which 
has been made can be 
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sustained and improved further. This differs from the NEP which emphasised on an 
outright redistribution of wealth through progressive government intervention towards 
the Malays/Bumiputeras irrespective of their capabilities. The numerical targets for 
ownership of equity capital of different racial groups are not empahsised though 
"efforts will continue to be made to increase Bumiputera equity ownership, towards at 
least the 30% target". 
3. To rely more on the private sector's involvement in restructuring by creating more 
opportunities for its growth; and 
4. To focus on human resource development as a fundamental requirement from 
achieving the objectives of growth and distribution. 
3. The Vision 2020 
In February, 1991, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad presented the 
Vision 2020 plan. The main goal is to achieve a fully developed nation by the year 2020 
by accelerating industrialisation, growth and modernisation. However, the Prime 
Minister insisted the "fully developed nation in the Malaysian mould" 
"Modernisation is not westernisation or Japanisation or Easternisation or Asianisation. The 
land that must be fully developed by 2020 must be uniquely modern, i. e. in keeping with 
progress that the world has made in every field by then and yet remain distinctly and uniquely 
Malaysian........ " (Mahathir, 1997) 
Thus, Malaysia hope to reach the "fully developed nation " without duplicating any of 
the present developed countries whether of Japan, Canada, the UK, Holland or any other 
country as different countries differ in various ways. However, the Prime Minister 
stressed that Malaysia should not be developed only in the economic sense. It must be 
fully developed along all dimensions. These are economically, politically, socially, 
spiritually, psychologically and culturally. Above all the national unity is emphasised 
whereby forging a Malaysian nation (Bangsa Malaysia). 
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Gomez and Jomo (1997) simplified the nine main objectives of the Vision 2020 as to 
establish: 
1. a united, peaceful, integrated and harmonious Malaysian nation; 
2. a secure, confident, respected and robust society committed to excellence; 
3. a mature, consensual and exemplary democracy 
4. a "fully moral" society with citizens strongly imbued with spiritual values and the 
highest ethical standards; 
5. a culturally, ethically and religiously diverse, liberal, tolerant and unified society; 
6. a scientific, progressive, innovative and forward-looking society; 
7. a caring society with a family-based welfare system; 
8. an "economically just" society with inter-ethnic economic parity; and 
9. a "fully competitive, dynamic, robust, resilient and prosperous" economy. 
These objectives were regarded as challenges for Malaysians in achieving the main goal 
of the Vision 2020, that is a "fully developed nation". 
The two prongs of the New Economic Policy (1971-1990) are again aspired in achieving 
the Vision 2020. These twin objectives are firstly the eradication of poverty irrespective 
of races, and secondly the restructuring of society by removing the identification of race 
with major economic functions. 
The policy therefore envisaged a more competitive, market disciplined, dynamic, self- 
reliant, resilient, diversified, adaptive, outward-looking, technologically proficient and 
entrepreneurial economy, having strong industrial links, productive and knowledgeable 
human resources, low inflation, exemplary work ethnics and strong emphasis on quality 
and excellence. 
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Chapter 2 
Appendix C: Who pays the costs of higher education ?( Johnstone, 1986) 
Johnstone (1986) has listed the sources of revenues for paying the costs of higher 
education. This is illustrated in table 1 which explains who pays for the costs and how 
are they being paid. 
Table 1: Costs of Higher Education and Sources of Revenue 
Sources of Revenue Costs of Higher Educa tion 
Costs of educational living Costs of instruction 
Room Faculty and staff salaries 
Board Operation and maintenance of plant 
Books, travel, entertainment, and all other Supplies and equipment 
Amortization and depreciation of plant 
Parents Any parental contribution toward Tuition and fees as paid by parents, net 
children's education living expenses. of any portion covered by grants, 
scholarships, or loan subsidies. 
Students Any student contribution from savings Tuition and fees as paid by students, 
or own assets, plus term-time work and net of any portion covered by grants, 
summer savings...... plus loans net of scholarships, or loan subsidies. 
governmental subsidies 
Taxpayers Any student grants, need-based or Educational and general portions of 
otherwise, for cost of living.. . plus any public 
institution budgets, net of any 
direct governmental subsidies specially revenues derived directly from students 
for students' room and board..... plus or parents via tuitions and fees .... plus 
indirect subsidies via tax preferences to any portion of that tuition and fee 
parents of students or loan repayment revenue that is covered by 
subsidies governmental grants or loan 
subsidies... plus governmental grants 
to private institutions. 
Institutions Scholarships or grants to defray living Current gifts or endowment earnings 
/Philanthropists costs supported by endowment earnings for the support of basic instructional 
or current gifts budgets plus any portion of 
philanthropically originated 
scholarships covering tuitions or fees. 
Business* Scholarships or grants to defray living Unrestricted gifts to institutions plus 
(Consumers, costs through gifts to institutions any portion of tuition or fees paid on 
employees, or behalf of employees or other grant 
stockholders) recipients 
* Business is presented here as a potential fifth source of revenue. The true incidence, or impact, of 
business contributions, however, is passed on to consumers, employees, stockholders, or even to the 
general taxpayer. For this reason, as explained in the text, and 
because its contributions are generally 
minor, "business" will not be covered in this text as an 
independent fifth "bearer of costs". 
1. The Parents 
In most countries, parents are expected to pay at least the costs of living 
for their 
children while the latter are attending higher education at their teenage. 
Therefore, it is 
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argued that the basic costs of living such as room, board, clothing and entertainment can 
be excluded from the costs of higher education because they would be expended whether 
or not students are attending higher education or not. 
However, the above view may not be true if students have to leave their families while 
attending higher education in institutions usually located in the metropolitan areas, far 
away from their hometowns. In Malaysia, students from small towns and rural areas 
need to travel by land, sea and even by air from their hometowns to destinations where 
universities are located. 
Besides the living costs, parents may also help to pay part of the costs of instruction. The 
portion of parental contributions depends on the types of higher institutions their 
children are attending, and whether the latter are receiving other forms of financial 
support. In Malaysia, parents share a bigger portion of paying the costs for their children 
for attending the public universities if the former do not receive any form of financial 
support. If students are attending the private colleges without other financial support, 
parents have to pay even more. 
Parental contributions (if parents have to contribute) towards their children higher 
education however, is limited by their ability to pay and willingness to pay. The ability 
to pay is usually measured by current income, savings and wealth or assets (Johnstone, 
1986). The willingness to pay is determined by whether parents are willing to forego 
some other expenditure such as leisure activities for the sake of paying for their 
children's higher education. In Malaysia, parents highly value their children higher 
education by even willing to sell off their properties to send their children to study in the 
local or overseas universities. Having children with higher education would bring glory 
to their families. In cases, having higher education for a child coming from a poor family 
may have chain effect, that is to bring the family out from the poverty cycle. 
2. Students' Contribution 
Students also need to share part of the costs of their own education while attending 
universities, especially if their parents cannot afford or are unwilling to pay them. 
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Students may pay a portion of their living costs, tuition fees as well as a portion of the 
instructional costs. Students' revenues may be from their own savings or assets, term- 
time incomes or repayable loans from future earnings. In some cases, spouses may also 
contribute to the costs of their partners' higher education. Sometimes, unmarried couples 
in France may also contribute for their partners' higher education. But, in some countries 
in Scandinavia, the public policy prohibits the working spouse to contribute to the costs 
of his/her student spouse. 
3. Taxpayers /Government/Public 
Taxpayers or the public in many countries world-wide are still playing an important role 
in subsidising the costs of higher education even though there is now a trend of shifting 
it more to private funding. In most European countries, for example, the state typically 
still pays for the institutional costs of instruction while students pay little or no tuition. 
Moreover, most European countries are public which, means that universities receive 
grants from the states to finance most of the costs of higher education. In Malaysia, all 
public national universities receive annual grants from government and hence heavily 
subsidised'. 
Some poor countries in Africa not only provide free higher education but also virtually 
free board and room as well (Altbach, 1998). Sometimes free meals are also provided. In 
this case, the public or the taxpayers bear the full costs of higher education. 
In the US, the public still has to pay a large portion for the actual cost of instruction, as 
students in the public universities need to pay tuition fees amounting to about only 25 
per cent of the actual cost of instruction. Moreover, taxpayers in the USA and in most 
European countries also subsidise the costs of living of students through some 
combinations of direct cash grants, subsidised loans and also indirect subsidies of room, 
board and other expenses. 
There may be allowances for deduction of taxable incomes. In Malaysia, parents are 
eligible to have deduction of their taxable incomes of $M2400 for each child attending 
higher education in the local public university. Prior to 1997, the parents who have 
' Details about the annual grants given to the Public Universities in Malaysia are shown in table 3. 
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children studying overseas can also have a deduction of the taxable income of RM 1600 
per child . 
4. Institutions/Philanthropic 
In many countries, institutions or philanthropic bodies are also contributing to the 
instructional costs of higher education through endowment income, current gift or 
donations to universities. This is particularly true in the case of the USA where 
institutional /philanthropic support is prevalent because of the autonomous private 
institutions whose survival also depends on the alumni support. The real cost of giving is 
greatly reduced if donations are exempted from taxes and hence encouraging business 
sector to donate. In the USA, the spirit of loyalty among alumni towards alma mater also 
promotes this culture of donations. Sometimes, these endowments may pay partially the 
living costs of students through grants and scholarships. 
In Malaysia, public universities also receive donations and endowments from 
philanthropic bodies as well as from the business sector. However, this still forms a 
small percentage of the total costs of higher education. However, some philanthropic 
bodies rather want to set up their own trust funds or scholarship or loan programmes to 
help students based on merit and need grounds. 
5. IndustryBusiness sector 
It is argued that since industry accrue benefits by employing graduates who are more 
productive because of skills acquired in the higher education, it is equitable that the 
industry should also share the costs of higher education. 
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Chapter 3 
Appendix D: International Experiences of Student Financial Support 
Table 1: Federal Stafford Loan Limits 
Academic Year Dependent Independent Student Maximised 
Student* Sub & Unsub Additional Subsidised & 
Sub & Unsub Unsubsidised Unsubsidised 
First Year $2,625 $2,625 $4,000 $6,625 
Second Year $3,500 $3,500 $4,000 $7,500 
Third And Remaining $ 5,500 $5,500 $5,000 $10,500 
Years $8,500 $10,000 $18,500 
Graduate/Professional 
Aggregate Limit 
Dependent $23,000 $23,000 
Undergraduate $23,000 $46,000 
Independent $73,000 $138,500 
Undergraduate 
Graduate /Professional 
Tror aepenaent stuaents wnose parents are unable to obtain a 1LU loan, the amount a stuaent can 
borrow under the unsubsidised programme s the same as for an independent student. 
Source: California Student Aid Commission (2000) http: //www. csac. ca. gov/pubs/manuals/i-2. pdf 
Table 2: The increase in the Base Amount, Study Assistance and Child Allowance 
during the period 1965-88 in Sweden 
Year Base amount Study assistance Child allowance 
SKr £ SKr £ SKr £ 
1965 5,000 417 7,000 583 1,250 104 
1970 6,300 525 8,820 735 1,250 131 
1975 9,000 900 12,600 1,260 2,250 225 
1980 15,400 1,571 21,560 2,200 3,850 393 
1985 21,800 2,180 31,626 3,163 5,454 545 
1988 25,820 2,391 37,341 3,457 6,455 597 
Note: The sums related to a nine-month academic period 
Skr = Swedish crowns 
Source: Johansson and Ricknell, 1986 (modified) cited by Morris (1989). 
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Table 3: Repayment Plan for a Student with a Twenty -Year Repayment Period 
and Debt of SKr 40,000 (£3,704) in 1984. 
Year Debt at 1 January Repayment Charge Debt after 
Re a ment 
Index 4.2% Debt at 31 December 
1 40,000 2,000 38,000 +1,596 39,596 
2 39,596 2,084 37,512 1,576 39,088 
3 39,088 2,172 36,916 1,550 38,466 
4 38,466 2,263 36,203 1,521 37,724 
5 37,724 2,358 35,366 1,485 36,851 
6 36,851 2,457 34,394 1,445 35,839 
7 35,839 2,560 33,279 1,398 34,677 
8 34,677 2,668 32,009 1,344 33,353 
9 33,353 2,780 30,573 1,284 31,857 
10 31,857 2,897 28,960 1,216 30,716 
11 30,176 3,019 27,157 1,141 28,298 
12 28,298 3,146 25,152 1,056 26,208 
13 26,208 3,278 22,930 963 23,893 
14 23,893 3,416 20,477 860 21,337 
15 21,337 3,559 17,778 747 18,525 
16 18,525 3,708 14,817 622 15,439 
17 15,439 3,864 11,575 486 12,061 
18 12,061 4,026 8,035 337 8,372 
19 8,372 4,195 4,177 175 4,352 
20 4,352 4,352 0 0 0 
Total 60,802 20,802 
Source: Johansson and Ricknell (1986), p. 61. Cited by Woodhall (1989), p91. 
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Appendix E 
Figure 4.1: : The Political Map of Malaysia 
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Appendix F 
Table 1: Enrolment and Output For First Degree Courses From Local Public 
Educational Institutions, 1990-2000 
Enrolment 
Course 1990 
Increase(%) 
% 19952 % 
Output 
2000 % 6MP 7MP 6MP % 7MP % 
Arts 31,220 59 43,610 55 70,970 49 28 63 38,270 58 54,090 50 
Arts & Humanities3 17,790 21,600 36,080 21 67 22,160 28,520 
Economics & 
Business4 11,320 19,210 31,600 70 64 13,770 22,970 
Law 2,110 2,800 3,290 33 18 2,340 2,600 
Science 14,460 27 22,290 28 42,280 29 54 90 17,370 27 33,980 31 
Medicine & 
Dentistry 2,380 2,580 5,230 8 103 2,900 3,030 
Agriculture & 1,610 3,260 4,330 102 33 1,430 1,400 
Related Sciences5 
Pure Sciences6 4,610 5,580 8,130 21 46 3,600 7,590 
Others' 5,860 10,870 4,590 85 126 9,440 21,960 
Technical 7,130 14 13,430 17 31,450 22 88 134 9,830 15 20,010 19 
Engineering 5,520 10,430 24,750 89 137 6,420 14,110 
Architecture & 640 1,750 3,670 173 110 1,200 3,050 
Town Planning 
Survey 300 460 1,130 53 146 370 700 
Others8 670 790 1,900 18 141 1,840 2,150 
Total 52,810 100 79,330 100 144,700 100 50 82 65,470 100 108,080 100 
Source: The Seventh Malaysian Plan, 1996, p313 
2 It was estimated a total of 50,600 students was enrolled in degree level courses abroad. Of this total, 18,300 were 
Government- sponsored students enrolled in first degtree courses of whom 59.8 per cent were in science and technical 
courses. 
3 Includes art design, Islamic studies, languages, library science, literature, Malay culture and social science 
4 Includes accountancy, agri-business, business management and resource economics. 
5 Includes home science and human development 
6 Refers to biology, chemistry, mathematics and physics 
7 Includes applied science, environmental studies, food technology, pharmacy and science with education. 
8 Includes property management. 
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Tablet: Enrolment of First Degree By Field of Study 1998/99 
FIELDS OF STUDY FIRST DEGREE 
NO. OF STUDENTS % 
Arts and Humanities 30,013 21.96 
Professional Arts 44,951 32.89 
Pure Science 6,846 5.01 
Applied Science 23,636 17.29 
Technology 25,244 18.47 
Medicine 5,999 4.39 
TOTAL 136,689 100.00 
Source: Briefing Notes, Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Education Malaysia, 
December, 1998, p4 
Table 3: Student Enrolment, Public Higher Education Institutions (First Degree) 
INSTITUTION 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 
UM 11,660 13,294 14,536 15,778 
UKM 10,950 13,011 16,029 18,207 
USM 13,651 14,404 12,248 20,588 
UPM 9,317 12,352 17,201 20,852 
UTM 7,914 9,786 12,962 14,691 
UUM 8,120 8,167 9,602 11,655 
UTA 5,899 6,300 6,936 8,416 
UNIMAS 735 1,110 1,595 3,429 
UMS 205 443 1,338 3,569 
UPSI ---- ---- 338 685 
ITM 7,807 8,563 11,218 14,864 
KTAR 2,756 2,962 3,059 3,955 
Source: Briefing Notes, Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Education Malaysia, 1998, p4 
Table 4: Budget (Operating & Development ) 1998, Public Higher Education 
Institutions 
Institutions Operating (RM Million) Development (RM Million) 
UM 302.3 80.1 
UKM 241.2 67.2 
USM 187.0 20.0 
UPM 132.7 28.6 
UTM 142.1 35.7 
UUM 52.3 13.4 
UTA 74.3 157.2 
UNIMAS 45.1 18.6 
UMS 20.2 260.0 
UPSI 10.1 4.0 
ITM 280.3 36.5 
KTAR 13.1 4.7 
ITTHO 14.1 -- 
ISTAR 6.5 30.0 
TOTAL 1,521.2 756.0 
Source: Briefing Notes, Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Education Malaysia, 1998, p8 
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Table 5: Budget (1991-1999), Public Higher Education Institutions 
YEAR OPERATING (RM Million) DEVELOPMENT (RM Million) 
1991 861.0 148.6 
1992 939.0 484.7 
1993 999.9 470.4 
1994 1,101.0 430.0 
1995 1,218.9 611.7 
1996 1,337.0 570.1 
1997 1,316.0 734.7 
1998 1,521.2 756.1 
1999 1,760.2 1,097.4 
Source: Briefing Notes, Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Education 
Malaysia, December, 1998, p9 
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Appendix G: The Multimedia Super Corridor 
(http: //www. ntdc. coin. mOmsc/index. htuzl) 
The multimedia Super Corridor(MSC) was created to accelerate the country's entry into 
the information age, and through it, help actualise Vision 2020. The MSC is a length of 
greenfield "corridor" of 15 Kilometres wide and 50 kilometres long, starting from the 
Kuala Lumpur City Centre at Petronas Towers or "Twin Towers" down south to the 
Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) in Sepang, the region's largest international 
airport. 
Two of the world's first Smart Cities are being developed in the corridor. These are : 
1. Putrajaya, the new seat of government and administrative capital of Malaysia with 
introduction of electronic government. 
2. Cyberjaya, an intelligent city with multimedia industries, R&D centres, a multimedia 
University and operational headquarters for multinationals wishing to direct their 
worldwide manufacturing and trading activities using multimedia technology. The use of 
multimedia does not mean to forsake other industries (Jabatan Penerangan, 1997b). 
MSC will be: 
fA vehicle for attracting world-class technology-led companies to Malaysia, and 
developing localindustries. 
fA Multimedia Utopia offering a productive, intelligent environment within which a 
multimedia value chain of goods and services will be produced and delivered across the 
globe. 
f An island of excellence with multimedia -specific capabilities, technologies, 
infrastructure, legislation, policies, and systems for competitive advantage 
fA test bed for invention, research, and other ground-breaking multimedia 
developments spearheaded by seven multimedia applications 
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fA global community living on the leading-edge of the Information Society 
fA world of Smart Homes, Smart Cities, Smart Schools, Smart Cards and Smart 
Partnerships 
The Multimedia Development Corporation envisions a 20-year time-frame for the full 
implementation and execution of the MSC, when Malaysia will have achieved 
leadership in the information Age. 
The four primary aims of the Multimedia Super Corridor are: 
" To demonstrate the effectiveness of multimedia in increasing the efficiency and 
productivity in the production and delivery of goods and services inboth the public and 
private sector. 
" To introduce a new supply and demand spiral for the multimedia industry, located in 
Malaysia, for the world market. 
" To add value to the infrastructure already put in place in the Multimedia Super 
Corridor. 
In Putrajaya, to stimulate electronic governance; more open, transparent, responsive and 
entrepreneurial, suited to the Information Age. 
In order to use the new technology not merely as "technological artefacts", 
implementation should be made balancing technology and social needs. Five key 
principles are: 
  Technology push is balanced by social pull 
  Technological sophistication is balanced by efficacy of information content 
  Government leads but requires private sector to improve its level of innovation 
  Greater focus on transformation, changing organisational structures rather than 
merely automating the current situation. 
  Re-emphasis on the importance of human resources in realising these aspirations. 
There will be three phases of activity: 
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Phase 1: 
Under this phase, the MDC (Multimedia Development Corporation) will successfully 
create the Multimedia Super Corridor, attract a core group of world-class companies, 
launched seven Flagship Applications, put in place a world-leading framework of 
cyberlaws, and established Cyberjaya and Putrajaya as world-first intelligent cities. 
Phase II: 
The MDC envisages that during this period, it will link the MSC to other cybercities in 
Malaysia and the world. It will create a web of corridors and establish a second cluster of 
world-class companies. It will also set global standards in flagship applications, 
champion cyberlaws within the global society, and establish a number of intelligent 
globally-linked cities. 
Phase III: 
During this final phase, it is expected that Malaysia will be transformed into a 
knowledge-based society - being a true global test bed for new multimedia and IT 
applications and a cradle for a record number of multimedia companies. It will have a 
cluster of intelligent cities linked to the global information super highway, and become 
the platform for the International Cybercourt of Justice. 
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Appendix H: Questionnaires Survey For the undergraduates in Malaysia 
Dear Fellow Students, 
This questionnaire comprise 7 pages and is printed on both sides. It is part of a study 
examining the provision of existing student loan and scholarship schemes as a mechanism of 
financing higher education in the public universities of Malaysia. Please answer the following 
questions as accurately as possible. Data obtained will be treated in confidence. It is to be used 
for research and academic purposes only. Many thanks. 
Please respond by ticking ( ) in the appropriate bax or filling in the required information 
Part A: Social Economics Status and Family Background of the undergraduates 
1. What is your gender? (Please  in the appropriate box) 
(1) Female (2) Male 
2. What is your age in years and months as on 1St January, 1999? (Insert your age in the box) 
Years Months 
-1 
1 
3. What is your ethnicity/Social group? (Please  in the appropriate box) 
(1) Malay (5) Native of Sarawak 
(2) Chinese (6)Eurasian 
(3) Indian/Pakistani/Ceylonese (7) Others (Please state) 
(4) Native of Sabah 
4 (a). What is your home town or village? (Please state below with full home address) 
(Village) Town City State 
4(b). What is the Population of the home place where you stay? (Please  in the appropriate box) 
(1. ) Less than 1,000 people (kampung) e. g Tam in, Ayer Keroh, Tapah) 
(2) 1,000-9,999 (Small Town) e. g Sarikei, Setiawan 
(3) 10,000 - 30,000 (Bi Town e. g Sibu, Kota Baru) 
(4) 30,000- 75,000 (Semi-Metropolitan e. g. I oh, Johor Baru, ) 
(5) Over 75,000 (Metropolitan e. g. Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Kuching) 
5 (a. ) What is your parent's highest education attaintment? . (Please 
 in the appropriate box) 
Level of Education Father's Mother's Level of 
Education 
Father's Mother's 
(1) No Schooling (5) Form 6 
(2) Primary (6) Vocational 
Secondary 
(3) Form 1- Form 3 (7) Diploma 
(4) Form 4- Form 5 (8) Degree/higher 
degrees 
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5 (b) What is your parent's or guardian's main income earning in your family? (If retired or deceased, 
state his previous occupation). Please  in the appropriate column. 
Occupational Groups Father's Mother's Guardian's 
1. PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND RELATED WORKERS 
(e. g Architects, engineers, doctors, teachers, religious workers, 
technical- assistants) 
2. ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL WORKERS (e. g 
Government administrators, general managers) 
3. CLERICAL AND RELATED WORKERS (e. g. Stenographers, 
typists, clerks, cashiers, book-keepers, transport conductors, 
telephone operators etc) 
4. SALES WORKERS (e. g. Managers (Wholesale and retail trade), 
business salesman, insurance agents, shop-assistants, vendors, etc) 
5. SERVICE WORKERS (e. g. catering and lodging, housekeepers 
members of the Armed Forces, fire-fighters, guides 
6. AGRICULTURAL, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY, FORESTRY 
WORKERS, FISHERMAN AND HUNTERS (e. g. Farmers, loggers, 
agricultural workers, livestock farmers, fishermen) 
7. PRODUCTION AND RELATED WORKERS, TRANSPORT 
EQUIPMENT OPERATORS AND LABOURERS (e. g. Painters, 
miners, bakers, tailors, machinery tailors weavers processors) 
8. OTHERS (Please state below) 
5 (c) To be more specific, please state the occupation of your parents/guardian* 
Father's Occupation 
Guardian `s Occupation 
5 (d). What is the average monthly incomes of your parents/guardians ? (If retired, state their last incomes 
before retirement. Besides monthly salaries, income also includes rental income, Farm income, pension, 
dividens, interest or savings, and contributions from family members if any. ) 
(Code) Income Father's Mother's Guardian's 
(150) $MO- $M300 
(450) $M301- $M600 
(800) $M601-$M 1000 
(1250) $M1001-$M1500 
(1750) $M 1501-$M2000 
(2250) $M2001-$M2500 
(2750) $M2501-$M3000 
(4000) $M3001-$M5000 
(6500) $M 5001-$M8000 
(8000 ) $M above 8000 
Part B: Your Academic Characteristics 
6. What is your highest grade attained before your enter the present university? (Please  in the 
appropriate box) 
(1) STPM/STP/HSC* 
(2) Matriculation 
(3) Diploma 
(4) Teacher Training College Certificate/Diploma 
(5) Others 
Mother's Occupation 
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7(a) Please write down the number of subject passes at each level for the HSC/STP/STPM* Examinations 
For example: 
Principal Level A 1 Principal D - 
Principal Level B 2 Principal E 1 
Principal Level C - Subsidiary Level 1 
Principal Level A Principal D 
Principal Level B Principal E 
Principal Level C Subsidiary Level 
7 (b) What is your CGPA of your Matriculation/ Diploma/Teacher's Certificate/Teacher's 
Diploma/Others*? 
The CGPA which I obtained from the course before I entered university was 
state) 
(Please 
8 (a). Please tick the university at which you are currently studying (Please  in the appropriate box) 
(1) University of Malaya 
(2) University of Malaysia, Sarawak 
(3) University PUTERA Malaysia 
(4) The National University of Malaysia 
(5)University of Science Malaysia 
8 (b) Which Faculty are you presently enrolled? (Please  in the appropriate box) 
(1) Arts (14) Medicine 
(2) Science (15) Dentistry 
(3) Science Farmacy (16) Law 
(4) Physical and Applied Science (17) Science and Technology 
(5) Social Sciences (18) Forestry 
(6) Life Sciences (19) Industrial Technology 
(7) Science and Natural Resources (20) Veterinary Medicine and Animal 
Science 
(8) Mathematical Science (21) Engineering 
(9)Technology Information Science (22) Education 
(10) Computer Science and Information (23) Housing Building and Planning 
(11) Social Science and Humanities (24) Mass Communications 
(12) Economics and dministration/Business (25) Agriculture Science 
(13) Business management (26) Others(Please State) 
8 (c ) The main field of study is 
8 (d) The length of my course is 
(Please state) 
years (Please State) 
9 (a) How many hours do you spend daily to do your self-study such as reading, revision, etc.? 
I spent hours to do my self-study 
9 (b) What is your rate of attending lecture? 
My rate of attending lecture is percent. 
9 (c ). What result (that is, first class (honours), second class upper (honours) or CGPA do you expect? 
I expect to get class honours or CGPA of for my course. 
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Part C: Financing Your University Education 
Questions 10a to Question 13 are for those who are receiving loans or schoarship/grants, those who 
do not receive loans or scholarship/grants, please proceed to Question 14. 
10(a) Do you receive any form of financial support either from the government or the private sectors? 
10 (b). This question is for those who receive loans. Please specify sponsor and amount received as in the 
table below where appropriate) 
Name of Sponsors (Loans) Amounts received annually (Please write) 
1S' year 2nd year 3rd year 4h year 5h year 6th year 
(1) MARA 
(2) Sarawak State's Foundation 
(3) Other State's Foundation (Please 
State) 
(4) Public Service Department 
(5) Ministry of Education 
(6) Other Ministries 
(7) National Student Loan 
(8) Private Loans (Please state here) 
(9) The State's Government Loans 
(10) Loans by Realatives and Friends 
(11) Student Loan Funds 
(12) Others (Please specify here) 
10 (c) If you are receiving grants or scholarship from any sponsor, please state the amount in the 
appropriate columns. 
Name of Sponsors (Scholarships /Grants) Amounts received Annually 
1s` year 2nd ye 3rd ye 4th year 5th year 6th year 
(1) Public Service Department Scholarship 
(2) Ministry of Education 
(3) Other Ministries 
(4) Sarawak State's Government Scholarship 
(5) Other State's Government Scholarship 
(specify ) 
(6) Private Firms 
(7) Others (Please specify ) 
11. Do loans/scholarships cover all your expenses for attending universirty education? Expenses include 
the fees, boarding costs (if you are staying away from your family because of attending university), 
transportation (if you commute every day, or going back to your hometown during vocation), maintenance 
cost ( books, stationary), and living cost (Food and entertainment). Please tick. 
(1) YES (2) NO 
M, 
12. If there had been no student loan/scholarship/both loans and scholarships* given to you when you 
entered university education, would you have begun to study at all? (Please tick) 
(1) Yes, definitely (3) No, probably not 
(2) Yes, probably (4) No, definitely not 
13. Do you think you will be able to repay all your debts after graduation according to the present rules for 
renavment? (Please Tick) 
(1) Yes, definitely (3) No, probably not 
(2)Yes, probably (4) No, definitely not 
Questions 14 to be answered by all of you (Based on two semesters or one academic year ) 
14. Please state the sources to finance your university education. You can estimate in terms of %. Your 
amount should not exceed 100%. 
Loans % or $M annually 
Scholarships/Grants/Bursaries* % or $M annually 
Parents/ Guradians*: % or $M annually 
Relative % or $M annually 
Own Saving Incomes % or $M annually 
Part-time work (if any) % or $M annually 
Others (Please state) % or $M annually 
Total 100 % or $M annually 
*Delete where not appropriate 
Questions 15a and 15b are to be answered by those who do not receive any loans /scholarships. 
Those who have loans or scholarships, please proceed to question 16. 
15 (a). Did you ever apply for any student loan or scholarship to finance your university education? 
1 (1) Yes (2) No 
15 (b). If your answer is Yes, what types of loans and scholarship did you apply? (Please state) 
I did apply for loans (i). (ii). 
I did apply for scholarships 
(i) (ii) 
15(c) If you do not apply any loan/scholarships, give the reasons. 
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The following questions (16 to 17) are to be answered by all of you. 
Part D: Why your friend did not attend university? 
16 (a). Think of a friend/someone who is qualified to pursue university education but is not attending 
university. 
Give your friend's background. Gender Race 
Income Group: Poor/Moderate/Rich* Place of stay: Rural/Town City* 
*Delete where not applicable 
16(b) Please give reasons why he/she does not attend the university education (Please indicate the priority 
of importance by using I as the most important reason ,2 as the next 
important reason and so on. Leave 
the box blank if you think it is not the reason) 
(i) Financial problem (iv) Take care of old parents 
(ii) Not interested for university 
education 
(v) Other reasons (Please state) 
(iii) Wants to get a 'ob 
16 (c). If financial problem, did he/she apply for loans or scholarship? 
(1) YES (2) NO 
16 (d. ) For what types of scholarships/loans did he/she apply? 
Type of scholarship applied 
Type of loans applied 
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Part E: Your Opinions about student financial support/ moral values 
17. Below are statements about financial support schemes. Please tick in the appropriate box, which 
expresses your view. 
ýd öý d W z C ý D 
C 0 CD 
A There will be no problem in loan repayment if the amount I 1 2 3 4 5 
repay is based on the level of income I earn. 
B Unemployed married women should not have to repay the 1 2 3 4 5 
loans they have borrowed before. 
C Usually, women do not want to take mortgage loans to 1 2 3 4 5 
finance their higher education because they are afraid that 
they may carry debts when getting married later on. 
D I prefer my university education to be fully financed through 1 2 3 4 5 
an income-contingent loan (the type of loan whereby the loan 
repayment amount depends on the level of income). 
E The industry should pay a portion in financing higher 1 2 3 4 5 
education 
F Rich parents should share the cost for financing their 1 2 3 4 5 
children's education. 
G Loans should be interest free. 1 2 3 4 5 
H The government should give scholarships /grants instead of 1 2 3 4 5 
loans to the very oors. 
I Loans should be mean-tested according to the parental income 1 2 3 4 5 
J Bigger amounts of loans should be given to more expensive 1 2 3 4 5 
courses than cheaper courses. 
K The "Grace period", that is the period where graduates can 1 2 3 4 5 
defer loan repayment six months after their studies is 
reasonable. 
L A loan recipient will study harder because he/she pays for 1 2 3 4 5 
his/her own education. 
M Graduates should play a leading role in realising the vision 1 2 3 4 5 
2020. 
N University education enhances productivity and hence 1 2 3 4 5 
graduates should have higher pay than non graduates. 
If you are willing to be interviewed, please fill the information below. 
Your Term- time address: 
Your Telephone Number: Your e-mail address: 
Your proposed time and date of interview: 
Time Date Day 
My E-mail is L, HSPPSQ(c ioe. ac. uk. 
Many thanks 
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Appendix I: Questionnaires to the High School students (A- Level students) 
This questionnaire comprise 3 pages and is printed on both sides. It is part of the study about 
student financial support in higher education. Please answer the following questions as 
accurately as possible. Data obtained are highly confidential. It is to be used for research and 
academic purposes only. 
Please respond by ticking () in the appropriate box or filling in the required information 
Part A: Your Personal and Family Background 
1. How old are you? 
Years Months 
2. What is your gender? (Please Tick) 
Male Female 
3. What is your ethnicity? 
(1) Malay (4) Bumi utera Sabah 
(2) Chinese (5) Bumi utera Sarawak 
(3) India/Pakistani/Ceylonese (6) Others 
4. Where is your home- town or village? (Please state below your home address only) 
(Village) Town City State 
5 (a). What is your parent's occupation? Please State) 
i. Father's 
ii. Mother's 
iii. Guardian's 
6 (b ). What is the average monthly incomes of your parents/guardians ? (If retired, state their last 
incomes before retirement. Besides monthly salaries, income also includes rental income, Farm income, 
pension, dividens, interest or savings, and contributions from family members if any. ) 
(Code) Income Father's Mother's Guardian's 
(150) $M0- $M300 
(450) $M301- $M600 
(800) $M601-$M 1000 
(1250) $M1001-$M1500 
(1750) $M1501-$M2000 
(2250) $M2001-$M2500 
(2750) $M2501-$M3000 
(4000) $M3001-$M5000 
(6500) $M 5001-$M8000 
(8000 )$M above 8000 
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5 (c) Total monthly Income of your parents = (Please state) 
6 What is your parent's highest education attaintment? (Please, / in the appropriate box) 
Level of Education Father's Mother's Level of Education Father's Mother's 
(1) No Schooling (5) Form 6 
(2) Primary (6) Vocational Secondary 
(3) Form 1- Form 3 (7) Diploma 
(4) Form 4- Form 5 (8) Degree/higher degrees 
Part B: Academic 
7. What stream are you now in? (Please ) 
Arts 
Science 
Technical 
Part C: Your ambition 
(8 ). If you intend to apply for loans and scholarships, please state the name of the funding bodies, for 
example the Sarawak state's Foundation, JPA loan, MARA loan, private bank loan, JPA scholarship, 
MARA scholarship, Sarawak Foundations Scholarship and so on. 
i. Name of loan I would like to apply: 
ii. Name of Scholarship I would like to apply: 
9 (a ). If you are not offered with scholarships but instead offered with the type of loans that would cover 
the total costs of university education, will you still intend to go for university education? Please  and 
give reasons for your answer. 
(1) Yes, definitely (3) No, probably not 
(2) Yes, probably (4) No, definitely not 
Reasons 
9 (b). If you are not offered with loans but instead offered with the type of scholarships that will cover the 
total costs of education, will you still intend to go for university education? (Please  and give reasons 
for your answer) 
(1) Yes, definitely (3) No, probably not 
(2) Yes, probably (4) No, definetly not 
Reasons 
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9 (c ). If you are neither offered with scholarships nor loans (assuming that loans/scholarships will 
cover the total costs of university education), will you still intend to go for university education? Please  
and give reasons for your answer. 
(1) Yes, definitely (3) No, probably not 
(2) Yes, probably (4) No, definitely not 
Reasons 
10. Below are statements that require your opinion also. Please circle the number in each related box, 
which expresses your view. 
`ý d d z a ýa 0 
CD CD 
CD 
0 
CD 
CD 
CD CD 17 
A There will be no problem in loan repayment if the amount I repay is 1 2 3 4 5 
based on the level of income I earn. 
B Unemployed married women need not have to repay the loans they 1 2 3 4 5 
have borrowed before. 
C Usually, women do not want to take mortgage loans to finance their 1 2 3 4 5 
higher education because they are afraid that they may carry debts 
when getting married later on. 
D I prefer my university education to be fully financed through an 1 2 3 4 5 
income-contingent loan (the type of loan whereby the loan 
repayment amount depends on the level of income). 
E The industry should pay a portion in financing higher education 1 2 3 4 5 
F Rich parents should share the cost for financing their children's 1 2 3 4 5 
education. 
G Loans should be interest free. 1 2 3 4 5 
H The government should give scholarships /grants instead of loans to 1 2 3 4 5 
the very poors. 
I Loans should be mean-tested according to the parental income 1 2 3 4 5 
J A bigger amount of loans should be given to students who pursue 1 2 3 4 5 
expensive type of courses than cheaper type of courses. 
K The "Grace period", that is the period where graduates can defer 1 2 3 4 5 
loan repayment six months after their studies is reasonable. 
L A loan recipient will study harder because he/she pays for his/her 1 2 3 4 5 
own education. 
M University education enhances productivity and hence graduates 1 2 3 4 5 
should have higher pay than non-graduates. 
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Appendix J: Questionnaire for Administrators of Funding Bodies (Loan Schemes). 
Name of the Funding Body: Loan scheme A Code Number: L 
PART A: Rationale and criteria for loan provision 
1. What are the main objectives of your organisation in providing loans to university 
students? 
2. What types of universities do you provide loans? 
universities or both? 
Public universities or private 
3. Is there any difference in the annual loan amount given to every recipient at the local 
private universities and the local public universities? If there is a difference, how much 
are the annual loan amounts respectively? 
4. What are your organisation's criteria of loan provision? That is, does it limit to 
courses of studies, mean-tested (according to parental incomes or student incomes), social 
groups (according to the New Economic policy), academic performance? Would your 
mind specifying this in detail. 
5. Is the loan inflation-indexed ? That is, the calculation for the average size of the loan 
annually considers the rate of inflation? What is your opinion? 
6.1 understand that your organisation gives a grace period of 6 months/12 months to 
loan recipients before they can repay the loans? What is the rational of this ? How 
effective does it help to improve the loan-recovery? 
7a. What is your opinion of charging interest on loans? Please give reasons for your 
answer. 
X10 
7b. What is your opinion of charging the interest on loans during the period of study? 
Please give reasons. 
7c. What about charging of interest to recipients during the "grace period"? Please give 
reasons for your answer. 
8. What is the length of the repayment period/amortisation period? Please give reasons 
for your answer. 
9. In your opinion, what are the most effective/ efficient ways of reducing the 
administrative cost? 
10. How does your organisation disburse the loan? Is it based on yearly or one lump 
sum? Please give the reasons for your answer. 
11. How does your organisation administer the loan schemes? Does your organisation 
dedicate the administration of loan schemes to an outside body such as the commercial 
banks or creating a special section internally to administer the loans? Please give the 
reasons for your answer. 
12. What is your opinion about the collection of loans through the Income Revenue 
Department or the EPF? 
13. How does the repayment is done? Is it based on the mortgage type of loans (that is a 
flat rate of interest is charged and recipients need to pay equal amounts of repayments 
monthly) OR Is it an income contingent loans (recipients need to repay the amounts 
based on their income level)? Which one does your organisation prefer? Please give the 
reasons for your answer. 
14.1 also understand that the loan default is a prominent problem faced by any agency 
especially in the developing countries. How is the default rate of your loan schemes? 
Here, the loan default is defined as the loans, which are not repaid by recipients of loans 
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after the grace period is over. Express in terms of per cent of the borrowers. No of 
defaults in the year 1998? 
15. What are the reasons for loan default? 
a. Unemployment e. Intervening personal problems 
b. Low income f. Confusion about the repayment process 
c. Other more important loans such as 
housing loans to pay 
g. Misconception that the loan need not be 
paid 
d. Dissatisfaction with their education 
programmes 
h. Other reasons. Please state here) 
16. What are the measures taken by your organisation to ensure repayment security? 
Borrowers need to sign promissory contracts for repayment 
Guarantors are needed 
Using private collection agencies to recover the loans 
Deducting overdue payments directly from income taxes 
Repayments through deduction from monthly salaries 
Others (Please state) 
17. What are the default penalties employed by your organisation to defaulters? 
Applying higher interest rates to outstanding payments 
Seizure of collateral 
Guarantors need to pay the defaults 
Others (Please state) 
18. Who usually defaults ? Studies show that defaulters can be distinguished according 
to gender, income groups, religious beliefs, institutional influence, fields of studies, peer 
influence and so on ? Have you studied this? What, if you have, are the reasons for your 
default? 
19. If your answer for Question 17 is YES, would you mind elaborate these with your 
scheme according to the indicators mentioned above such as income group, institution 
etc. 
20. In your opinions, what are suitable ways to prevent/minimise the loan default rate? 
Giving counselling to recipients prior borrowing 
Recipients have to pass the honesty/integrity tests 
Inculcation of moral values. 
Others (please state) : 
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21. Do your organisation computerising operation of loan programmes in the following 
areas? 
Accounting system 
Registration of borrowers 
Loan application 
Budgeting and salary payment system 
Others (Please state) 
21. What is your opinion about: 
a. an income-contingent type of loans whereby the loans are repaid based on the 
proportion of the income level? 
b. the proportion of income needs to be used for loan-repayment? 
c. the interest subsidy of loans? 
d. the suitable repayment period of loan ? 
e. the mechanism of collecting the loan? that is, via the inland revenue or the 
Employment Provident Fund Corporation? 
f. the privatisation of loans, that is the government sells the loans to the private sector 
through the process of securisation? 
g. the length of the grace period? 
h. your comments about loans and scholarships as funding mechanisms for university 
students. 
i. the major problems in administering loans? 
j. the major problems in administering scholarships/grants? 
k. loans or scholarships. Give reasons for your answer. 
22. It is argued that the poor are more risk-averse than the rich. Please comment. 
23. How do the present schemes help to achieve the objectives of the New Economic 
Policy? 
a. eradication of poverty 
b. restructuring the society 
24. Owing to the current currency crisis, what steps are/will be taken 
by your 
organisation to ensure that the provisions of 
loans /scholarships will not be adversely 
affected 
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PART B: Request for Secondary Data/Records related with the following questions 
I would be of utmost grateful if you would provide me the information asked in the 
following questions 1 to 13. The information could be in the form of secondary data 
from the published journal, annual report, and bulletin and records. 
1. What is the average size of the loan/scholarship for 1998? Does it cover the total cost 
of higher education? including the tuition fees, maintenance cost, and living cost ? 
2. What is the total value lent/ disbursement value in 1998? 
3. What is the outstanding debt of loan as in 1998? 
4. How many new borrowers of loans/scholarship in the year 1998? 
5. What is the total numbers who have received loans/scholarships from the starting 
year to current year (1998)? 
6. What are the total current borrowers including borrowers in the grace period and 
those in repayment status? 
7. How much are the capital repayments in 1998? 
8. How much are the cumulative capital repayments? 
9. What is the initial start-up cost of your loans? 
10. How much is your annual administration cost? (this includes the cost of collection, 
salaries of the staff, cost of recording, deferment, tracking students and so on). You can 
express in terms of the percentage of the total value of loans awarded/disbursed yearly, 
and in terms of outstanding debt annually. 
11. How many of them have successfully completed courses under your loan schemes until 
1998 since the inception of loan schemes? 
12. How many of recipients of loans fail to complete their courses until 1998 since the inception 
of loans? In other words, what is the drop out rate? 
13. How is the default rate of your loan schemes? Here, the loan default is defined as 
the loans, which are not repaid by recipients of loans after the grace period is over. 
Express in terms of per cent of the borrowers. 
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Appendix K: Structured Interview Questionnaires with Administrators of Funding 
Bodies -Scholarships/Bursaries/Grants 
1. What are the main objectives of your organisation in providing scholarships to 
university students? 
2. What types of universities do you provide scholarships/bursaries/grants? Local 
universities or overseas universities or both? 
3. Is there any difference in the scholarship/bursaries/grants amount given to students at 
the local private universities and the local public universities? If there is a difference, 
how much are the scholarship/bursary/grant amounts respectively? 
4. What are your organisation's criteria of scholarship/bursaries/grants provision? That 
is, does it limit to courses of studies, mean-tested (according to the incomes of parents or 
students themselves) , social groups 
(according to the New Economic policy), academic 
performance? Would your mind specifying this in detail. 
5. What is the average size of the scholarship in 1998? 
6. Does it cover the total cost of higher education? (including the tuition fees, 
maintenance cost, and living cost ? 
7. What is the total cost of the programme for 1998? 
8. What is the average cost of the programme for 1998)? 
9. How many new recipients for the year 1998? 
10. What is the total number of recipients of scholarship/bursaries/grants until 1998? 
since its inception? 
11. How does your organisation disburse the scholarship/grant? Is it based on yearly or 
one lump sum? 
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12. Does your organisation face any difficulty in administering the scholarship scheme? 
13. If so, what are the difficulties? 
14. I also understand that the prominent limitation faced by any agency to give away 
scholarship is that the amount is limited. Once the scholarship/grant is given out, 
students are expected to complete the courses on time. So far, what is the completion 
rate of recipients? 
15. What are the reasons for students not completing their courses. (Please tick the 
appropriate reasons) 
a. Not interested in studies since they are not using their own money 
b. courses are too difficult 
c. Dissatisfaction with their education programmes 
d. Interveninpersonal problems 
e. Other reason Please state here) 
16. How many undergraduates who are recipients of scholarships/bursaries/grants have 
successfully completed courses until 1998 since the inception of 
scholarship/bursaries/grants? 
17. How many recipients of scholarships/bursaries/grants fail to complete their courses 
until 1998 since the inception of scholarships/bursaries/grants? 
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Appendix L: Semi-Structured Interview with Undergraduates 
Part A: Personal Particulars and Background 
Gender 
............. 
Age 
........... Race.............. Marital Status............. 
Religion ................. Town/Village..................... Father's 
education .................. 
Mother's education ..................... Father's occupation................... 
Mother's occupation .................. Father's Income................... 
Mother's income ................... Total parental income............................... 
Part B: Academic 
Field of study at the University ......................... 
Why do you want to go for university education? ....................................... 
Your entry point for the university.. Higher School Results ............................ 
School Certificate Results .................. Your current academic results.................. 
Rate of attending lectures ..................................... 
Part C: Cost of attending University (per semester) 
Tuition fees 
.................. 
Transportation.................. 
Travel by air ................ 
Books, supplies and equipment......................... 
Food and clothing ............................ 
Accommodation................................. 
Others for example entertainment ..................................... 
Earning forgone (monthly)_ ........................ 
(occupation prior entrance to university) 
Part D: Financial support 
Forms of financial support ? Who is your funding body? amount per year? Does it 
meet the total cost of education? How many percent? What other forms of 
financial 
support? 
Comment on the present forms of financial support you are receiving in terms of 
amount, bondage (Grants/scholarships) and amount, 
interest subsidy, repayment period, 
'11; 
and how likely you can repay loans borrowed? mode of repayment, amount repayable 
per month, the grace period and other conditions stated in the agreement etc. 
Would you have begun to study in the university if there had been no loan/scholarship 
given to you? 
For those who do not receive any form of financial support, who supports you and how 
much? What is your opinion about financial support schemes? Did you ever apply for 
loans and/or scholarships? What types of loans /scholarships have you applied? 
Part E: Your Studies 
What is your current Results ? 
What is your rate of attending lectures? 
How many hours you spend on doing your own studies each day? 
Part F: Opinions about different schemes/packages of financial supportand reasons 
for your answers 
Mortgage loans 
Income contingent loans -- 
Graduate tax 
Income -contingent loans and grants/scholarships---- their proportions 
Subsidised or unsubsidised, recommended rate of interest charged for loans? 
Method of repayment ? Repayment period? Grace period? Negative Dowry? Income 
threshold for repayment? Hard core poverty group? Lower Income groups? Minority 
groups? (forms of financial support?? ) 
Part G: Your opinion about ethical values and roles of graduates in the aspiration 
of the Vision 2020 
Part played by graduates in realising the Vision 2020 
Moral values ---- appreciation, thankfulness, 
loyalty, serving the nations...... repayment 
of loans... 
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Financial support system in helping the access to the university education---and the 
outcomes of it------ academic performance, contributions to society, social equalising 
engine .... unity .... 
Appendix M: Informal discussion with the head teachers 
1. Cases when qualified students did not go for higher /university education. What are 
the reasons. 
2. Opinions about the student financial support. 
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Appendix N: Scholarship Distribution (Chapter 6) 
Table 1: Provision of Scholarships and Ethnic Groups 
Receiving scholarships or not Natives Non-Natives 
NO 80.4% 91.3% 
YES 19.6% 8.7% 
Total 100% (n=1522) 100% (n=1123) 
hample Size = 1645 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 2: Provision of Scholarships and Gender 
Receiving scholarships or not Female Male 
NO 84.6% 85.6% 
YES 15.4% 14.4% 
Total 100% (n=1621) 100% (n=1024) 
Sample Size =2645 
Source: Data from the Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 3: Provision of Scholarships by Regions 
Receiving scholarships or not East Malaysia West Malaysia 
NO 69.9% 87.2% 
YES 30.1% 12.8% 
Total 100% (n=332) 100% (n=2313) 
Sample Size =2645 
Source: Data from the main study, (final year undergraduates, 1999) 
Table 4: Provision of scholarships and areas (All Groups) 
Receiving scholarships or not Rural Urban 
NO 84.5% 85.6% 
YES 15.5% 14.45% 
Total 100% (n=1421) 100% (n=1224) 
Sample Size =2645 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 5: Provision of Scholarships and Income-Groups (All Groups) 
Receiving Lowest Low Medium High Top-Bracket 
scholarsh 
ips or not 
NO 86.9% 85.3% 84.2%) 84.1% 55.6% 
YES 13.1% 14.7% 15.8% 15.9% 44.41 ,0 
Total 100% (n= 610) 100% (n=1038) 100% n=765) 100% (n=214) 100% (n=18) 
Sample Size =2645 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
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Table 6: Merit points for granting financial support according to different modes 
of entrance to universities 
The SPMV/STPM entrance using 5 best subjects 
Principal 
A 15 
B 13.5 
C 12.0 
D 10.5 
E 9.5 
R 7.5 
The entrance through Matriculation by using 4 best subjects 
Al 18.75 
B2 15.625 
C3 12.5 
D4 9.375 
The entrance through the Diploma of Education by using the CGPA: 
CGPA % 
75.0 
3.9 73.1 
3.8 71.2 
3.7 69.4 
3.6 67.5 
3.5 65.6 
3.4 63.8 
3.3 61.9 
3.2 60.0 
3.1 58.1 
3.0 56.2 
2.9 54.3 
2.8 52.5 
2.7 50.6 
2.6 48.8 
2.5 46.9 
2.4 45.0 
2.3 43.1 
2.2 41.2 
2.1 39.4 
2.0 37.5 
Table 7: Previous Academic Performance and Provision of Scholarships (All 
Groups) 
Receiving Low Low-Middle Upper-Middle High 
scholarships or not 
NO 82.5% 87.6% 89.7% 78.2% 
YES 17.5%) 12.4% 10.3% 21.8% 
Total 100% (n=40) 100% (n=419) 100% (n=1214) 100% (n=972) 
Sample Size =2645 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
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Table 8: Provision of Scholarships by Classifications of Courses 
Receiving Arts & Professional Medicine Pure Applied 
scholarships Humanities Arts Science Science 
or not 
NO 97.8% 84.2% 59.8% 93.0% 86.8% 
YES 2.2% 15.8% 40.2% 7.0% 13.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(n-457) (n=795) (n=256) (n=187) (n=521) 
oall1p1G oIGG -GVYJ 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 9: Provisions of Scholarships by Gender (Native) 
Receiving scholarships or not Female Male 
NO 80.7% 79.7% 
YES 19.3% 20.3% 
Total 100% (n=1069) 100% (n=453) 
Sample Size =1522 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 10 : Regions and Provision of Scholarships (Native) 
Receiving scholarships or not East Malaysia West Malaysia 
NO 64.1% 83.4% 
YES 35.9% 16.6% 
Total 100% (n=234) 100% (n=1288) 
Sample Size =1522 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 11: Provision of Scholarships and Areas (Native) 
Receiving scholarships or not Rural Urban 
NO 82.5% 76.2% 
YES 17.5% 23.8% 
Total 100% (n=1022) 100% (n=500) 
Sample Size =1522 
Source: The Main study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Tablel2: Provision of Scholarships and Income-Groups (Native) 
Technology 
82.5 9ö 
17.5°o 
1009 0 
(n=429) 
Receiving Lowest Low Medium High Top- 
scholarships 
Bracket 
NO 87.0% 80.3% 74.3% 75.4% 33.3% 
YES 13.0% 19.7% 25.7% 24.6% 66.790 
Total 100%(n=500) 100%(n=553) 100%(n=339) 100%(n=118) 100%(n=12) 
Sample Size =1522 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
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Table 13: Provision of Scholarships and Types of Courses (1 ative) 
Receiving 
scholarships 
Arts & 
Humanities 
Professional 
Arts 
Medicine Pure 
Science 
Applied 
Science 
Technology 
or not 
NO 
YES 
Total 
98.7% 
1.3% 
100% 
(n=314) 
80.5% 
19.5% 
100% 
(n=498) 
40.7% 
59.3% 
100% 
(n=145) 
87.7% 
12.3% 
100% 
(n=73) 
81.5% 
18.5% 
100% 
(n=313) 
75.40 o 
24.6° o 
100% 
(n=179) 
3aaipie maize =1: 5LL 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 14: Previous Academic Performance and Provision of Scholarships (Native) 
Receiving Low Low-Middle Upper-Middle High 
scholarships or 
not 
NO 84.8% 83.3% 85.3% 71.6% 
YES 15.2% 16.7% 14.7% 28.4% 
Total 100%(n=33) 100% (n=300) 100% (n=689) 100% (n=500) 
hample size =1522 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 15: Provision of Scholarships and Gender (Non-native) 
Receiving scholarships or not Female Male 
NO 92.2% 90.4% 
YES 7.8% 9.6% 
Total 100% (n=552) 100% (n=571) 
Sample Size =1123 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 16: Regions and Provision of Scholarships (Non-native) 
Receiving loans or not East Malaysia West Malaysia 
NO 83.7% 92.0% 
YES 16.3% 8.0% 
Total 100% (n=98) 100% (n=1025) 
Sample Size =1123 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 17: Provision of Scholarships Based on Areas (Non-native) 
Receiving scholarships or not Rural Urban 
NO 89.7% 92.1%) 
YES 10.3% 7.9% 
Total 100% (n=399) 100% (n=724) 
Sample Size =1 123 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
ýý; 
Table 18: Provision of Scholarships and Income-Groups (Non-native) 
Receiving Lowest Low Medium High Top-Bracket 
scholarships 
NO 86.4% 90.9% 92.0% 94.8% 100% 
YES 13.6% 9.1% 8.0% 5.2% 0% 
Total 100% (n=110) 100%(n=485) 100%(n=426 100%(n=96) 100%(n=6 ) 
Sample size =1123 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 19: Provision of Scholarships and Courses (Non-native) 
Receivi Arts & Professional Medicine Pure Applied Technology 
ng Humaniti Arts Science Science 
loans or es 
not 
NO 95.8% 90.2% 84.7% 96.5% 94.7% 87.6% 
YES 4.2% 9.8% 15.3% 3.5% 5.3% 12.4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(n=143) (n=297) n=(111) (n=114) (n=208) (n=250) 
Sample Size =1 123 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 20: Previous Academic Performance By Provision of Scholarships (Non- 
natives) 
Receiving Low Low-Middle Upper-Middle High 
scholarships or not 
NO 71.4% 98.3% 95.4% 85.2% 
YES 28.6% 1.7% 4.6% 14.8% 
Total 100%(n=7) 100%(n=119) 100%(n=525) 100%(n=472) 
Sample Size =1123 
Source: Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
324 
Appendix 0: Loan Distribution (Chapter 7) 
Table 1: Composition of Students Receiving Loans or Not, Based on Ethnic Groups 
Receiving loans or not Natives Non-Natives 
NO 22.7% 54.4% 
YES 77.3% 45.6% 
Total 
ry __ 
100% (n=1522) 100% (n=1123) 
04111PIC aILC -GUFJ 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 2: Composition of Respondents Receiving Loans or Not, According to 
Gender 
Receiving loans or not Female Male 
NO 31.6% 43.4% 
YES 68.4% 56.6% 
Total 100% (n=1621) 100% (n=1024) 
Sample Size =2645 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 3: Regions by Having Loans or Not 
Receiving loans or not East Malaysia West Malaysia 
NO 41.3% 35.4% 
YES 58.7% 64.6% 
Total 100% (n=332) 100% (n=2313) 
Sample Size =2645 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 4: Provision of Loans by Areas 
Receiving loans or not Rural Urban 
NO 27.0% 46.7% 
YES 73.0% 53.3% 
Total 100% (n=1421) 100% (n=1224) 
Sample Size =2645 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 5: Association Between the Provision of Loans and Income-Groups 
Receiving Lowest Low Medium High Top-Bracket 
loans or 
not 
NO 16.7% 35.1% 47.2% 53.7% 77.8°'o 
YES 83.3% 64.9% 52.8% 46.3% 22.20/"o 
Total 100% (n=610) 100% n=1038) 100%(n=765) 100% (n=214) 100% 
(n=18) 
Sample Size =2645 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
; ýý 
Table 6: Provision of Loans by Classifications of Courses 
Receiving 
loans or 
Arts & 
Humanities 
Professional 
Arts 
Medicine Pure 
Science 
Applied 
Science 
Technologe 
not 
NO 
YES 
Total 
14.0% 
86.0% 
100% 
(n=457) 
32.7% 
° 67.3% 
100% 
(n=795) 
63.7% 
o 36.3% 
100% 
(n=256) 
36.9% 
0 63.1% 
100% 
(n=187) 
39.5% 
60.5% 
100% 
(n=521) 
45.2% 
54.8% 
100% 
(n=429) 
, ýampie size =Ld4ý 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 7: Previous Academic Attainment and Provision of Loans (All Groups) 
Receiving Low Low-Middle Upper-Middle High 
loans or (32.50-42.50) (43.0-54.50) (55-65) (65.50-75.50) 
not/Scores 
NO 27.5% 28.9% 31.7% 45.2% 
YES 72.5% 71.1%) 68.3% 54.8% 
Total 100%(n=40) 100% (n=419) 100% (n=1214) 100% (n=972) 
Sample Size =2645 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 8: Association Between Scores and Income Groups 
Income Lowest Low Medium High Top- Total 
Scores Income Income Income Income Bracket 
Low 45.0% 40.0% 15.0% 0% 0% 100% (n=40) 
Low-Middle 27.0% 36.0% 27.7% 8.8% 0.5% 100% (n=419) 
Upper-Middle 27.6% 38.9% 25.9% 7.1% 0.6% 100% (n=1214) 
High 14.8% 41.0% 33.8% 9.4% 0.9% 100% (n=972) 
Sample Size =2645 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 9: Provision of Loans by Gender in the Case of Native 
Receiving loans or not Female Male 
NO 22.2% 23.8% 
YES 77.8% 76.2% 
Total 100%(n=1069) 100% (n=453) 
Sample Size =1522 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 10 : Association Between Regions and Provision of 
Loans in the Case of 
Native 
Receiving loans or not East Malaysia West Malaysia 
NO 39.3% 19.6% 
YES 60.7% 80.4% 
Total 100% (n=234) 100% (n=1288) 
Sample Size =1522 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
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Table 11: Provision of Loans and Areas (Native) 
Receiving loans Rural Urban 
or not 
NO 19.5% 29.2% 
YES 80.5% 70.8% 
Total 
CI 1_ [l "1 rAA 
100% (n=1022) 100% (n=500) 
L. 7QIilp1G Jiz -1066 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 12: Association Between the Provision of Loans and Income-Groups in the 
Case of Native 
Receiving Lowest Low Medium High Top-Bracket 
loans or 
not 
NO 13.4% 21.5% 31.6% 36.4% 75.0% 
YES 86.6% 78.5% 68.4% 63.6% 25.0% 
Total 100%(n=500 100% (n=553) 100%(n=339) 100%(n=118) 100%(n=12) 
hample size =1511 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 13: Provision of Loans and Types of Courses (Native) 
Receiving Arts & Professional Medicine Pure Applied Technology 
Loans or Humanities Arts Science Science 
not 
NO 1.6% 21.3% 66.9% 17.8% 23.6% 27.9% 
YES 98.4% 78.7% 33.1% 82.2% 76.4% 72.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(n=314) (n=498) (n=145) (n=73) (n=313) (n=179) 
Sample Size =1522 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 14: Previous Academic Performance and Provision of Loan (Natives) 
Receiving Low Low-Middle Upper-Middle High 
loans or not 
NO 15.2% 20.0% 17.1% 32.4% 
YES 84.8% 80.0% 82.9% 67.6% 
Total 100%(n=33) 100%(n=300)) 100%(n=689)) 100%(n=500) 
Sample Size =1522 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 15: Association Between the Provision of Loans and Gender (Non-natives) 
Receiving loans or not Female male 
NO 49.8% 58.8% 
YES 50.2% 41.2% 
Total 100%(n=552) 100% (n=571) 
Sample Size =1123 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
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Table 16: Regions and Provision of Loans (Non-native) 
Receiving loans or not East Malaysia West Malaysia 
NO 45.9% 55.2% 
YES 54.1% 44.8% 
Total 100% (n=98) 100% (n=1025) 
Sample Size =1123 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 17: Provision of Loans by Areas (Non-native) 
Receiving loans or not Rural Urban 
NO 46.4% 58.8% 
YES 53.6% 41.2% 
Column Total 100%(n=399) 100%(n=724) 
hample size =1123 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 18: Association Between the Provision of Loans and Income-Groups for the 
Case of Non-native 
Receiving Lowest Low Medium High Top- 
loans or Bracket 
not 
NO 31.8% 50.5% 59.6% 75.0% 83.3% 
YES 68.2% 49.5% 40.4% 25.0% 16.7% 
Total 100% (n=110) 100%(n=485) 100%(n=394) 100%(n=128) 100%(n=6) 
Sample Size =1 123 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 19: Provision of Loans and Courses (Non-native) 
Receiving Arts & Professional Medicine Pure Applied Technology 
loans or Humanities Arts Science Science 
not 
NO 41.3% 51.9% 59.5% 56 132 144 
49.1% 63.5% 57.6% 
YES 58.7% 48.1% 40.5% 58 76 106 
50.9% 36.5% 42.4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(n=143) (n=297) (n=111) (n=114) (n=208) (n=250) 
Sample Size =1123 
Source: The Main Study, 1999 (Undergraduates) 
Table 20: Previous Academic Performance and Provision of Loan (Non-native) 
Receiving Low 
loans or not 
NO 85.7% 
YES 14.3% 
Total 100%(n=7) 
Sample Size =1 123 
Source: The Main Study, 
Low-Middle I Upper-Middle High 
51.3% 50.9% 58.7% 
48.7% 49.1% 41.3°o 
100%(n=119) 100%(n=525) 100%(n=472 
1999 (Undergraduates) 
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Appendix P: Efficiency of Student Loans With Reference to Scholarships 
(Chapter 9) 
Table 1: Examination Results of Undergraduates at the University of Malaya 
Degree and Year No. of Students Taking No No Fail and No fail 
of Study Examination Pass Repeat and 
Expires 
Bachelor of 
Economics 
Year 1 399 365 31 3 
Year 2 265 260 4 1 
Year 3 194 187 6 1 
Final Year 247 242 5 - 
Bachelor of 
Accountancy 
Year 2 172 151 16 5 
Year 3 147 125 20 2 
Final Year 139 133 4 2 
Bachelor of Arts 
Year 1 878 876 
2 - 
Year 2 875 
867 5 3 
Year 3 831 
827 2 2 
Final Year 811 
809 1 1 
Bachelor of 
Education 
85 83 - 2 Year 1 
85 85 - - Year 2 
105 103 2 - Year 3 97 97 - - Final Year 
Bachelor of Laws 15 2 
Year 1 108 91 7 
Year 2 107 98 6 
Year 3 96 87 1 2 
Final Year 98 95 
Bachelor of 
Computer Science 
Year 1 64 61 2 1 
Year 2 64 1 - 
Year 3 48 48 - - 
Final Year 51 50 - 1 
Bachelor of Science 
Year 1 413 
382 
24 7 
Year 2 490 
4 30 3 
Year 3 41 
94 10 g 
Final Year 446 
442 
X29 
Bachelor of Science 
3 
With Education 
Year 1 74 73 1 Year 2 53 50 3 Year 3 77 74 3 Year 4 69 67 2 
Bachelor of 
Engineering 
Part 1 247 
Part 2 210 
231 
16 
Part 3 214 
1 94 
15 
Final Part 215 
205 
9 
Stage 1 51 
210 
5 
Stage 2 15 
27 
11 17 7 
3 
Bachelor of 
Medicine and 
Surgery 
Year 1 168 
160 
7 
Year 2 156 - Year 3 148 
148 
- Year 4 No Exam 
No Exam 
141 - - Final Year 155 14 
Bachelor of Dental 
Surgery 64 
Year 1 69 65 5 
Year2 65 62 - 
Final Year (Part 1) 62 60 - 
Final Year (Part 2) 65 3 
Bachelor of Science 
Pharmacy 
40 40 Semester 1 
39 39 39 Semester II - - 
Bachelor of Sports 
Science 119 
Semester II 
119 
Bachelor of 
Nursuing 
Year 3 
32 29 
Year 4 3 
Bachelor of 
Usuluddin 
(Religious Studies) 
Year 2 118 118 
1 
Year 3 119 118 - Final Year 120 120 
Bachelor of Syariah 
Year 2 172 171 
Year 3 155 152 
o 
Year 4 
Bachelor of Islamic 
Education 
Year 2 
Year 3 
Year 4 
145 
71 
143 11 
65 71 - - 
65 - - 58 
58 - - 
Table 2: Expected Results By Forms of Financial Support of PSD Recipients 
Expected Result Financial Support Loans Scholarships 
Good (First Class and Second Class Honours) 35% 18% 
Not Good (Second Class Lower, Third Class Honours 65% 82% 
and General Degree) 
Column Total 798 117 
)(, G = 1.3. /: )4; QI = 1; P=. UUU 
Table 3: Multiple Logistic Regressions-Expected Results of PSD Recipients 
Variable B Significance (Wald) Exponential (B) 
Ethnicity 2.1360 
. 0000 8.4658 Gender -. 3368 . 
0929 
. 7140 Region -. 5138 . 0630 . 
5987 
Areas 
. 
2224 
. 2321 1.2491 Courses 
Arts & Humanities 1.0334 
. 
0147 2.8106 
Professional Arts -. 3356 . 
4193 
. 
7149 
Technology -. 4691 . 
2803 
. 
6256 
Pure Science . 
6661 
. 
1689 1.9465 
Applied Science -. 3520 . 
3940 . 
7033 
Previous Academic Scores 
Low-Score . 
1742 . 
7963 1.1903 
Low-Middle Score -. 9188 . 
0012 . 
3990 
Upper-Middle Score -. 6741 . 
0015 . 
5096 
Hours of Private Study 
Low -. 6075 . 
0476 . 
5447 
Medium -. 4208 . 
1544 . 
6565 
Attendance a Lectures 
Low -1.9967 . 
0102 . 1358 
Medium -1.1313 . 
0002 . 
3226 
Income Groups 
Top-Bracket -4.7347 . 
6222 . 
0088 
High . 
6427 . 
0781 1.9017 
Medium . 
3710 . 
1188 1.4492 
Low -. 0871 . 
6785 . 
9166 
Financial Support 
PSD Scholarships -. 6258 . 0694 . 
5348 
Constant 0.0739 . 8954 
Baseline categories: Natives, females, East Malaysia, 
Medical Course, High-Score and PSD Loans, sample 
size =915 
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Table 4: Multiple Regression- Hours of Private Study (PSD Recipients') 
Standardised Coefficient t Significance 
d M l o e Beta 
Constant 
-. 737 . 
461 
Ethnicity -. 072 -1.994 046 Gender 
. 024 . 698 
. 485 Regions 
. 000 -. 013 
. 
. 989 Areas 
. 
024 
. 690 490 Courses . 
Arts & Humanities 
-. 017 -. 244 808 Professional Arts 
-. 072 -1.125 
. 
261 Technology 
. 
021 
. 
423 . 
. 
673 Pure Science 
. 028 -. 624 . 533 Applied Science 
-. 104 -1.980 . 048 Income 
-. 032 -. 904 . 366 Previous Academic Scores 
. 
087 2.585 
. 010 Attendance of lectures 
. 
165 5.040 
. 000 Financial Support 
PSD Scholarships 
. 068 1.584 . 114 Dependent Variable: Hours of study (Sample = 935, df = 13, Mean Square= 12.108, R'= 0.26 p= 
0.000) Baseline categories: Natives, Female, East Malaysia, Rural, Medical, PSD Loans 
Table 5.: Multiple Regression- Attendance at Lectures (PSD Recipients) 
Standardised Coefficient 
(Beta) 
t Significance 
Model Constant 
. 
000 
Ethnicity 
. 
041 49.593 
. 
253 
Gender -. 154 1.144 . 
000 
Region -. 026 -4.500 . 
423 
Areas 
-. 024 -. 802 . 
474 
Courses -. 716 Arts & Humanities 
-. 154 . 
030 
Professional Arts 
-. 069 -2.174 . 
276 
Technology 
-. 059 -1.090 . 
240 
Pure Science 
-. 021 -1.175 . 
636 
Applied Science 
-. 034 -. 473 . 
514 
-. 654 
Previous Academic Scores 
. 
101 . 
380 
Income 
. 
031 . 
878 . 
003 
Hours of Private Study 
. 
163 3.022 . 
000 
PSD Scholarships 
. 
019 5.040 . 
654 
. 
448 
_ .. -. .... ý .n I- wq -- n ------- Inn AAn. 
Dependent Variable: Percentages 01 Attenaance at Lectures kaump'G - u. - "ý, ""-1- ýyýý" ýýý ,- 
R2 = 0.076 p=. 000) Baseline categories: Natives; 
Female; East Malaysia; Rural; Medical; PSD 
Loans 
Table 6: The "Recruitment Effects" of the Public Service Department 
Convertible Education Loan 
Res onses Frequency 
Percent 
p 
Yes, definitely 335 42.0% 
robably Yes 202 
25.3% 
,p 
probably not No 
192 24.1% 
' , 
definitely not No 68 '° 
8.5 
, 
Total 797 
100.0% 
Source: Data from the main study (1999) 
,. -, ý `- 
Table 7: Association between the selective recruitment effect and income-groups 
of the Public Service Department Convertible Education Loan 
Responses/Inco 
me Groups 
Lowest Low Medium High Top-Bracket 
Yes, definitely 20.1% 44.1% 63.9% 72.3% 66. i° 
Yes, probably 25.0% 30.5% 19.5% 20.0% 33.30 o 
No, probably 
not 
37.5% 18.8% 16.6% 7.7% 0% 
No, definitely 
not 
17.4% 6.6% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 288 272 169 65 3 
Table 8: The "Recruitment Effects" of the Public Service Department 
Scholarships 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes, definitely 42 30.4% 
Yes, probably 43 31.2% 
_ No, probably not 38 27.5% 
No, definitely not 14 10.1 % 
Missing 1 0.7% 
Total 138 100.0% 
Source: Data from the field study, 1999 (final year undergraduates) 
Table 9: Association between the selective recruitment effect and income-groups 
of the Public Service Department Education Scholarship 
Responses/Income 
Groups 
Lowest Low Medium High Top-Bracket 
Yes, definitely 10.8% 19.6% 55.2% 55.6% 100% 
Yes, probably 13.5% 39.2% 37.9% 
38.9% 0% 
No, probably not 48.6% 33.3% 6.9% 
5.6% 0.5% 
No, definitely not 27.0% 7.8% _0% 
0% 0% 
Total 288 272 169 65 
3 
;;; 
Table 10: Repayment Schedule for First degree holder 
Loan Amount Monthly Repayment Repayment Period 
$5,000 and below $139.00 12-36 months $5,001-10,000 $157.00 32-64 months $10,000-15,000 $190.00 53-79 months $15,001-20,000 $209.00 72-96 months $20,001-25,000 $221.00 91-113 months $25,001-30,000 $230.00 109-131 months $30,001-35,000 $247.00 122-142 months $35,001-40,000 $261.00 134-154 months $40,001-45,000 $273.00 147-165 months $45,001-50,000 $283.00 159-177 months $50,001-55,000 $292.00 171-189 months 
$55,001-60,000 $309.00 178-194 months 
$60,001-65,000 $325.00 185-200 months 
$65,001-70,000 $341.00 191-205 months 
$70,001-75,000 $356.00 197-211 months 
$75,001-80,000 $369.00 203-217 months 
$80,001-85,000 $382.00 210-223 months 
$85,001-90,000 $394.00 216-229 months 
$90,001-95,000 $406.00 222-234 months 
$95,001-100,000 $417.00 223-240 months 
Above $100,001 $437.00 240 months and above 
Source: The Public Service Department, Malaysia (1996) 
Table 11: 1996 Sponsored Students According to Level of Studies 
Levels of Studies Local Institutions Foreign Institutions TOTAL 
Pre Universities 4,622 114 4736 
Technical 1.051 0 1,051 
Diploma 967 0 967 
Advanced 396 0 396 
Diploma 
First Degree 2,414 617 3031 
Professional 141 0 141 
Masters 94 8 102 
TOTAL 9,685 739 10,424 
Source: The MARA Annual Report, 1996, p25 
Table 12: Distribution of MARA Sponsored Students 1994-1996 
No of newly sponsored students Year 
Local Institutions 
Foreign Institutions 
4,846 ?g 1994 
,ý3g, ý 1995 11,345 
1996 9,685 
739 
Source: The MARA Annual Report, 1996, p25 
3i4 
Table 13: Conversion of MARA Loans into Partial 
Universities) 
Scholarships (Local 
Courses 100% 
Scholarshi 
75% Scholarships 50% Scholarships 100% Loans 
s 
i. Medicine/ 
Dentistry 
Pass with 
no 
Pass with extension < 
1 year 
Pass with extension 
>1 year 
Fail 
repetition 
ii. Engineering/ 
Accountancy/ 
Second 
Upper and 
Second Lower to 
Third Class 
Extension <1 year Extension >1 year 
Laws/ 
Management/ 
above 
(CGPA 
(Honours) 
(CGPA = 2.50 to 
General degree or 
CGPA 2.00-2.49 
Fail or terminated 
Others different =3.0 and 2.99) 
from above above) 
source: ivIAKA ,i yuy anti interview (1999) 
Table 13 above shows the conversion of loans into partial scholarships, depending on 
the final academic results of students. Those study medicine, for example can have 
their loans converted into 100% scholarships if they pass with no repetition and 75% 
pass with extension of one year. Those in engineering and others, will have their loans 
converted into 100% scholarships if they obtain Second Class Upper (Honours) and 
above or CGPA of 3.00 and above. 
Table 14: MARA Education Sponsorship Programme (TMP1 - TMP7) 
The Malaysian Plans STUDENT SPONSORSHIP 
LOCAL ABROAD TOTAL 
TMP 1 (1966-70) 2,168 918 3,086 
TMP 2 (1971-75) 5,148 2,585 7,733 
TMP 3 (1976-80) 4,866 2,200 7,066 
TMP 4 (1981-85) 5,697 5,849 11,546 
TMP 5 (1986-90) 11,517 3,107 14,624 
TMP 6 (1991-95) 34,567 9,904 
44.467 
TMP 7 (1996-2000) 
1996 9,685 739 
10,424 
1997 13,878 329 
11 207 
1998 22,788 105 
22,893 
TOTAL 110,310 25,736 
136,046 
TMP 1- TMP7 = The first Malaysian Plan - 
The Seventh Malaysian Plan 
Source: littp: / www mara ý,, ov my/statstik/bpp 
la. htm 
,: 
Table 15: The General Recruitment effect of the MARA Education Loan Grant 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes, definitely 151 33.1% 
Yes, probably 137 30.0% 
No, probably not 136 29.8% 
No, definitely not 31 6.8% 
Missing 1 0.2% 
Total 456 100% 
Table 16: Association between the income groups and "recruitment effects" of MARA student loans 
Responses/Income 
Groups 
Lowest Low Medium High Top-Bracket 
Yes, definitely 16.9% 33.3% 48.1% 58.1% 1% 
Yes, probably 26.8% 29.6% 35.8% 32.6% 000 
No, probably not 40.1% 32.8% 16.0% 9.3% 0% 
No, definitely not 16.2% 4.2% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 142 189 81 43 1 
x` = 73.845; df =12; p =. 000 
Source: Data from the field work, (final year undergraduates, 1999) 
Table 17: Statement of Conversion From Loans to Scholarships between 1992 to 
1998 (in Malaysian dollars) 
Year No. of 
Recipients 
Payment by 
MARA 
(Expenses) 
Amount converted Amount should be paid 
by students 
1992 1,109 32,353,690.43 27,231,614.85 (84.16%) 5,122,075.58 (15.840'o) 
1993 1,044 41,938,934.83 32,119,815.81 (76.59%) 9,819,119.02 (33.41%) 
1994 2,019 66,429,328.60 56,042,810.60 (84.36%) 10,386,58.00 (15.67%) 
1995 5,549 175,060,299.30 147,834,253.40 (84.44%) 27,226,045.90 (15.56%) 
1996 1,410 24,463,185.63 9,033,638.06 (36.93%) 15,429,547.57 (63.07%) 
1997 6,670 377,572,346.33 301,411,108.24 (78.82%) 76,161,238.09 (20.180 o) 
1998 2,602 156,876,936.62 133,109,864.28 (84.85%) 23,767,072.34 (15.15°ö) 
(Sept) 
TOTAL 20,403 874,694,721.74 706,783,105.24 (80.80%) 167,911,616.50 (19.20%) 
Source: Adapted from PLZ538B, MARA, (1998) 
HDSI- CONVERT 
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Table 18 : Response of MARA Borrowers and Guarantors as a consequence of Publications Names till 30/06/98 
- Date 
-------- - ---- 
No come 
for disc 
forward 
ussion 
No of Tel 
called 
ephone 
by: 
*Total **Paym ent Received 
a b a b No Amount 
Paid 
A. From Names 
13/01/97- 30/06/98 10 1 54 7 72 84 
-399,158.0- 
30/03/97- 30/06/98 18 - 41 3 62 81 598,859-3,1 
28/02/97- 30/06/98 18 - 18 4 40 74 269,697.84 
17/03/97-30/06/98 16 2 6 - 24 63 396,099 21 
31/03/97-30/06/98 38 - 9 2 49 68 214,914.29 
15/04/97-30/06/98 24 1 10 - 35 70 220,793.83 
07/05/97-30/06/98 6 - 11 - 17 65 315,620.68 
29/05/97-30/06/98 16 - 4 3 23 63 310,039.72 
01/07/97-30/06/98 13 - 17 1 31 73 231,560.26 
TOTAL 1 159 4 170 20 353 641 2,956,743.21 
a= borrower ; b= Guarantor 
Date No come forward 
for discussion 
No of Telephone 
called b: 
*Total **Payment Received 
a b a b No Amount 
Paid 
B. From Names 
13/10/97- 30/06/98 15 1 16 - 32 60 227,228.45 
31/10/97- 30/06/98 13 - 6 1 20 
49 146,363.10 
15/11/97- 30/06/98 11 2 6 2 21 49 172,026.03 
30/11/97-30/06/98 15 - 6 3 
24 54 151,020.55 
20/12/97-30/06/98 6 1 4 1 12 
66 143,712.80 
30/12/97-30/06/98 4 - 3 
1 8 40 83,361.91 
16/04/97-30/06/98 20 - 7 - 
27 38 64,936.11 
15/05/97-30/06/98 8 - 
3 - 11 28 32.952.80 
92 4 51 8 155 384 
1,021,601. 'S 
TOTAL 1 
>; 
Date No come 
forward for 
discussion 
No of Telephone 
called by: 
*Total **Payment Received 
a b a b No Paid Amount 
Total 1+ Total 2 251 8 221 28 508 1,025 3.978,344.96 
C. From other 
borrowers of 
3,945 107 4,495 380 9,084 6,528 3.4: 7O7.2 
MARA 
(Former students) 
13/01/97 till 
30/06/98 
TOTAL 4,196 115 4,716 408 9,592 7,553 7,405,852.28 
I ne total number of names published until 30/06/98 - 1704 (cited from the monthly 
Report PLZ239E dated 30/06/98 
* The number is limited to the respondents who had directly contacted the BKK phone 
or come to the office for the repayment at various levels, including the direct 
repayment through the main Office counter or the post office. The number obtained 
from the computer network. 
Table 19: Education Loan Fund 
Ministry of Education Malaysia 
B. 30- Treasury 
Number of Students Receiving Education Loan in Pursuing the First degree Courses at the Local 
Universities 
Universities 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total 
UPM 130 143 130 211 209 261 334 211 1629 
UKM - - - 
42 92 53 57 244 
UTM 56 41 61 70 98 114 244 
95 779 
USM 236 249 240 243 219 251 
244 96 1778 
UM 92 104 106 119 44 87 
64 48 664 
UNIMAS - - - 
- 
5 
9 
2 
3 8 
7 
20 
UMS 
TOTAL 
- 
514 537 
- 
537 643 617 814 944 515 5121 
11O 
Table 20: Number of students receiving the Ministry of Education Scholarships 
pursuing the First Degree Courses as on 31.12.1997 
University Course 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total UM TESL 
1St Degree 
0 
0 
46 
17 
51 
57 
53 
51 
51 
75 
201 
100 
UPM 
TESL 
1St Degree 
0 
0 
49 
20 
47 
29 
65 
35 
36 
88 
1 
172 
UKM 
TESL 
1St Degree 
0 
0 
99 
0 
96 
4 
105 
15 
103 403 
34 5; 
USM 1St Degree 0 27 2 98 156 283 
UTM l st Degree 10 24 29 67 206 3,6 
UMS 1St Degree 0 0 0 0 10 10 
Subtotal TESL 
1St Degree 10 
194 
88 
194 
121 
223 
266 
190 
569 
801 
1,054 
Total 10 282 315 489 759 1,8 5ý 
Source: Scholarship Division, Ministry of Education, working document, 1998 
Table 21 : Expected Results By Forms of Financial Support of MOE Recipients 
Expected Result Financial Support Loans Scholarships Row total 
Good (First Class and Second Class 34(56.7%) 32 (37.6%) 66 (-15.5°°) 
Honours) 
Not Good (Second Class Lower, Third 26(43.3%) 53 (62.4%) 79 (54.50o) 
Class Honours and General Degree) 
Column Total 60(100%) 85(100%) 145 (100%) 
x2 = 5.131; df = 1; p=0.018, 
ý9 
Table 22: Multiple Logistic Regressions: Expected Results of MOE Recipients 
Variables B Significance (Wald) Exponential (B) 
Ethnicity 1.7890 
. 0114 5 9836 Gender -. 4058 . 5529 
. 
6664 Region 
. 7692 . 4776 
. 
2.1580 Areas -. 5109 . 2596 . 6000 Courses 
Arts & Humanities -7.0755 . 
9068 
. 0008 Professional Arts -5.8836 . 
9224 
. 
0028 
Technology -7.3014 . 
9039 
. 0007 Pure Science -6.8913 . 9092 . 0010 Applied Science -4.2175 . 9444 . 0147 Previous Academic Scores 
Low-Score 6.9882 
. 8534 1083 Low-Middle Score -1.6087 . 0112 . 2001 Upper-Middle Score -1.0556 . 0287 . 3480 Hours of Private Study 
Low -2.7328 . 
0207 
. 
0650 
Medium -2.3018 . 
0505 
. 1001 Attendance a Lectures 
Low -2.2121 . 
0846 
. 1095 Medium -. 9834 . 
2149 
. 
3740 
Income Groups 
Top-Bracket 9.5217 
. 7494 13652.3 72 High 1.0446 
. 
2119 2.8424 
Medium 
. 5439 . 4139 1.7227 Low 
. 
3277 
. 
6226 1.3878 
Financial Support 
MOE Scholarships -. 1585 . 7894 . 
8535 
Constant 7.9130 . 
8959 
Baseline categories: Natives, females, East Malaysia, Medical Course, High-Score and MOE Loans 
sample=145 
Table 23: Multiple Regression- Hours of Private Daily Study (MOE Recipients) 
Standardised Coefficient t Significance 
(Beta) 
Model 
Constant 2.186 . 031 
Ethnicity . 
138 1.226 . 223 
Gender -. 023 -. 
240 . 
811 
Regions -. 094 -1.145 . 
254 
Areas -. 030 -. 
342 . 
733 
Courses 
Arts & Humanities -. 311 -. 
879 . 
381 
Professional Arts -. 200 -. 
466 . 
642 
Technology . 
024 . 
146 . 
884 
Pure Science -. 242 -1.151 . 
251 
Applied Science -. 092 -. 
503 . 
615 
Incomes -. 266 -3.123 . 
002 
Previous Academic -. 018 -. 
213 . 
83 "' 
Scores . 
037 . 
118 . 
655 
Attendance of lectures 
Financial Support 
MOE Scholarships -. 233 -2.18 . 
031 
Mean Square= 4.365, RZ= O. I-R p= 
Dependent Variable: Hours of Private 
Study (Sample = 145, df = 13, 
0.013) Baseline categories: Natives, 
Female, East Malaysia, Rural, Medical Course, 110E 
Loans 
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Table 24: Multiple Regression- Attendance at Lectures (MOE Recipients) 
Standardised Coefficient 
Beta 
t Significance 
Model 
Constant 9.284 
. 000 Ethnicity 
. 057 . 469 . 640 Gender 
-. 181 -1.774 078 Regions 
. 009 . 107 
. 
. 
915 
Areas 
. 111 1.194 235 Courses 
Arts & Humanities 
-. 116 -. 306 760 Professional Arts 
-. 171 -. 374 
. 
709 Technology 
. 021 . 119 
. 
906 Pure Science 
-. 116 -. 517 
. 
. 
606 
Applied Science 
-. 079 -. 404 . 
687 
Incomes 
-. 128 -1.377 . 171 Previous Academic Scores 
. 105 1.204 . 
231 
Attendance of lectures 
. 042 . 
448 
. 
655 
Financial Support 
MOE Scholarships 
-. 006 -. 051 . 
959 
1Jependent Variable: Percentages of Attendance at lectures (Sample = 145, df = 13, Mean Square= 48.584, 
R2= 0.07 p= 0.697) Baseline categories: Natives, Female, East Malaysia, Rural, Medical Course, MOE Loans 
Table 25 : Shortage of graduate teachers from 1992 to 1998 as forecasted by the 
Education Planning and Research Division, Ministry of Education 
Year Shortage of graduate teachers 
1992 4,987 
1993 4,769 
1994 6,134 
1995 6,803 
1996 6,945 
1997 7,365 
1998 10,466 
Source: Education Planning and Research Division, Ministry of Education, Malaysia. 
Table 26: Conversion of Ministry of Education loans into partial grants 
Year No of 
Borrowers 
No of 
Borrowers 
whose loans 
converted 
Total allocation 
for "convertible 
Loans" 
Total loans 
Eligible for 
conversion 
Total 
repayment for 
25% 
1987 915 554 11,271,818.40 6,871,973.20 
1,774,501.80 
1988 778 527 9,916,529.98 
6,764,667.98 1,763,912.50 
1989 809 696 10,488,676.30 
9,158,026.00 2,286,417.50 
1990 499 380 7,438.471.10 
5,668,435.74 1.416,830.94 
1991 528 371 8,863,305.00 
6,297,691.00 1,574.422.7-5 
1992 529 396 8,690,360.00 
6.524? 10.00 1.629.552.50 
1993 614 434 10,238,391.40 
7.043,125.00 1,760,781.25 
Total 4672 3358 
66,907.552.18 48.328,128.92 12,206,419.24 
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Table 27: Repayments of the Education Loan Fund- Ministry of Education, Malaysia 
Year Loans 
Universities Polytechnics 
Amounts need to 
collect back 
Actual 
Re a ment 
Ra ment -R R 1987 11,271,81 0 
8.40 
p y s 
0 
ate ate 
0 
1988 14 076 , , 820.00 0 0 9,916,529.98 4160291 0 
1989 15,306,508.30 0 0 10,488,676 4,817,832 0 
1990 12,175,331 0 0 0 7,438,471 4,736,860 
1991 15,495,691 0 0 0 8.863,305 6,632,386 
1992 14,308,780 0 0 0 8,690,360 5618420 
1993 16,824,107 0 0 0 
10,238,391 6585716 
1994 17,718,350 63,408,000.00 119,297.50 0.188° o 10,555,350 7163000 
1995 19,225,550 76,408,000.00 292,158.50 0.38o 
11,209,550 8016000 
1996 25,561,865 89,972,000.00 1,218,646.08 1.3% 
17,577,865 7984000 
1997 13,696,940 105,440,000.0 4,165,419.12 3.95° ö 
6,844,940 6852000 
Source: Ministry of Education, Malaysia, Working document (1998) 
Table 28: Cancellation and Reduction of Convertible loan Repayments (Sarawak 
Foundation) 
Academic Achievement Portion of loans need to pay back 
Pass with First class and second class upper or I No need to repay 
with CGPA of 3.50 and above 
Pass with Honours or CGPA of 2.75 to 3.49 
General Degree or CGPA of 2.74 and below 
25 per cent of the total loans 
50 per cent of the total loans 
Fail or not completing the studies 100 per cent of the total loans. 
Source: the Annual Report, Yayasan Sarawak, 1992, p 23 
Table 29: Current and Expected Salary for Graduates (Samples Collected: 6936) 
Age Group 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-60 
Current (M$) 1971 3297 5432 9557 8570 
Expected 2246 4302 6744 15909 16663 
(M$) 
Source: JobStreet, June, 199 nr / \\\\\ýýý. ýýýºýºýýý. ýýýººº. ýºýý ><<1L1 t1lLS-NU . ºº1ººº 
; ý, 
Table 30 : Current and Expected Salary for Non-Graduates (Samples Collected: 2730) 
Appendix Q (Chapter 10) 
Table 1: Association between the opinions on income-contingent loans and income- 
groups of undergraduates 
Opinions/Income Lowest Low Medium High Top-Bracket 
Disagree strongly 2.1% 2.7% 3.3% 3.7% 0% 
Disagree 8.4% 7.2% 10.5% 10.7% 5.6% 
Neutral 13.1% 15% 15.9% 19.6% 11.1% 
Agree 55.0% 51.2% 48.2% 48.1% 61.1% 
Agree Strongly 21.3% 23.9% 22.1% 17.8% 22.2% 
Column Total 609 1038 765 214 18 
I missing 
Source: The Main Study (Undergraduates, 1999) 
Table 2: Association between the opinions on income-contingent loans and income- 
groups of high school students 
Opinions/Income Lowest Low Medium High Top-Bracket 
Disagree strongly 6.8% 4.2% 2.5% 8.3% 0% 
Disagree 10.8% 12.5% 15.0% 20.8% 0% 
Neutral 18.9% 12.5% 12.5% 29.2% 0% 
Agree 41.9% 41.7% 50.0% 29.2% 50% 
Agree Strongly 21.6% 29.2% 20.0% 12.5% 50% 
Column Total 74 72 40 24 2 
Source: JobStreet, June, 1998 i tti):! /wwww. jobsti-eet cotii my/statistics-stats hrni 
; ý; 
Table 3: Recurrent Expenditure By Level of Education 
Year Primary (%) Secondary (%) Higher Education (%) Total Recurrent 
Expenditures* (R\1) 
1970 46.3 24.7 6.0 476.413,982 
1973 42.4 24.8 8.5 805,000,000 
1975 35.5 27.7 11.3 1,157.500,000 
1980 39.2 31.2 12.8 1.437,714.452 
1986 35.5 30.3 15.8 4,046,827,170 
1987 35.7 30.3 16.2 4,043.944,600 
1988 35.5 31.3 16.5 4,037,064,700 
1989 34.5 30.7 15.1 4,334.596,000 
1990 34.3 31.8 15.8 4,664,243,600 
1991 34.0 31.7 15.5 5.551.520,900 
1992 34.2 31.4 14.1 6,674,317,800 
1993 35.8 32.8 13.7 7,286,249,000 
1994 33.1 30.9 14.3 7,686,055,000 
Source: Educational Statistics 1970-1994, and also Rosni (1998, p55) 
Note: * The recurrent expenditure is at market price and the expenditure includes I) 
Emolument, 2) Services and Supply, 3) Fixed charges and Grants, and iv) Other 
Expenditures. 
Recurrent expenditure on other programmes of education include: I) Technical and 
Vocational Education, 2) General Administration, 3) Students' Welfare, 4) Planning, 
Research and Evaluation of Educational Planning, 5) Teacher Education, and 6) Conduct 
of Examination. 
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Table 4: Estimated Educational Expenditure against Total Government 
Expenditure and Gross National Product (1970 -1998) 
Year Total 
Educational 
Expenditure 
(RM) 
(1) 
Total Public 
Expenditure 
(RM) 
(2) 
GNP at Market 
Price 
(RM) 
(3) 
% of Total 
Educational 
Expenditure 
Against Total 
Government 
Expenditure 
4=1 :2 
Percentage of 
Educational 
Expenditure 
Against GNP at 
Market Price 
(5) = (1) = (3) 
1960 165,000,000# 856,000,000 5,636,000,000 19.3% 2.9% 
1961 184,000,000# 939,000,000 5,656,000,000 19.6% 3.3% 
1962 219,000,000# 1,003,000,000 5,978,000,000 21.8% 3.7% 
1963 237,000,000# 1,277,000,000 6,344,000,000 18.6% 3.7% 
1964 257,000,000# 1,503,000,000 6,774,000,000 17.1% 3.8% 
1965 303,000,000# 1,429,000,000 7,389,000,000 21.2% 4.1% 
1966 320,000,000# 1,533,000,000 7,761,000,000 20.9% 4.1% 
1967 409,000,000 2,552,000,000 9,688,000,000 16.0% 4.2% 
1968 457,000,000 2,520,000,000 10,037,000,000 18.1% 4.6% 
1969 482,000,000 2,597,000,000 10,981,000,000 18.6% 4.4% 
1970 476,413,982* 2,283,000,000 11,821,000,000 20.7% 4.0% 
1971 528,339,664* 2,463,000,000 12,169,000,000 21.4% 4.3% 
1972 798,000,000* 3,126,000,000 13,641,000,000 25.5% 5.9% 
1973 805,000,000* 3,396,000,000 17,443,000,000 23.7% 4.6% 
1974 1,051,000,000* 4,366,000,000 21,234,000,000 24.1% 4.9% 
1975 1,157,500,000* 4,900,000,000 21,747,000,000 23.6% 5.3% 
1976 1,487,597,400 7,323,730,719 27,047,225,454 20.31% 5.5% 
1977 1,769,893,974 10,995,921,149 31,050,771,473 16.09% 5.7% 
1978 2,088,081,171 12,701,295,961 35,391,206,288 16.44% 5.9% 
1979 2,363,366,660 13,570,148,822 40,747,700,000 17.44% 5.8% 
1980 2,574,677,220 20,724,348,256 52,544,433,061 12.42% 5.0% 
1981 3,099,067,160 23,077,122,809 56,346,675,636 13.42% 5.6% 
1982 4,122,867,220 31,951,016,095 59,690,000,000 12.90% 6.9% 
1983 3,926,896,000 28,749,017,033 65,154,000,000 13.66% 6.0% 
1984 3,926,930,000 27,691,802,690 74,182,000,000 14.18% 5.3% 
1985 4,493,205,450 29,191,096,194 71,838,000,000 15.39% 6.3% 
1986 5,023,424,380 30,811,911,490 65,851,000,000 16.30% 7.6% 
1987 4,820,664,790 27,411,630,230 69,757,000,000 17.59% 6.9% 
1988 4,895,728,050 28,121,399,060 81,482,000,000 17.41% 6.0% 
1989 5,289,140,700 30,164,326,960 95,150,000,000 17.53% 5.6% 
1990 6,032,528,460 33,405,637,300 102,111,000,000 18.05% 5.9% 
1991 6,269,962,850 38,473,896,520 123,232,000,000 16.30% 5.1% 
1992 7,959,762,010 45,446,757,660 140,547,000,000 17.51% 5.7% 
1993 8,525,411,610 44,144,837,530 159,043,000,000 19.31% 5.4% 
1994 9,781,364,920 48,797,932,300 178,090,000,000 20.04% 5.5% 
1995 10,603,000,000 n. a n. a. 20.90% n. a. 
1996 12,489,000,000 55,467,000,000 n. a. 21.40% n. a. 
1997 13,200,000,000 59,982,000,000 n. a 22.006% n. a. 
1998 12,458,000,000 64,124,000,000 262,100,000,000 19.427% 4.75% 
1999 13,500,000,000 65,095,000,000 299,900,000,000 21.00% 4.5% 
Sources: Educational Statistics t9IU-11J J IVIIIIISüy UI Fulanv-,; + Iv1a1aya1a, vat iuua L' V11ViIliI. nc1Juj W 
Note: * The data refer to the normal operating expenditure of the Federal government and do not include 
development expenditure. 
# The data refer to the Semananjung (West) Malaysia only and 
its normal operating expenditure without 
including the development expenditure. 
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Appendix R: An Additional 'Model for Equity : Analysis for Scholarships or Loans 
For this model of equality I firstly focus on examining whether the scholarships NN cre 
being distributed fairly or equally to all categories within the same respecti\ C 
independent variables, for all groups (native and non-native combined), for native group 
and non-native group exclusively. We have to examine both the demand and provision 
of scholarships to recipients for all categories (for example, males and females) within 
each independent variable (for example, gender) concerned. The next step was to find 
how much of the demand was met by dividing percentage provision with percentage 
demand, for all categories within each independent variable as stated. The values 
obtained would indicate how equally was the scholarship distribution between categories 
within the same independent variable. If values obtained were the same for all categories 
within the same independent variable, this aspect of equality was achieved. 
a. How I got the assumed demand of loan recipients who might demand for 
scholarships 
For the demand, it means those who had asked for scholarships whether accepted or 
rejected. From the questionnaires, there are three components of demand to be added up 
to get the total demand. The first component of demand derives from those who are 
scholarship recipients. They definitely have demanded for scholarships as in question 
10(c), that is only 396 of them. The second component of demand is obtained from those 
who did not receive any from of financial support but had applied for scholarships as in 
question 15(a), that is 423 of them. The third component of demand can derive from loan 
recipients who might also apply for scholarships. I could not get the third component of 
demand from the questionnaires directly. However, some statements from question 17f. 
and question 17h would indicate the demand for scholarships of the income-groups of 
loan recipients. I assumed that all lo\tiV income-group loan recipients \N ho agreed ww ith 
statement 17h would have applied for scholarships. 
Similarly, all high income and top- 
bracket loan recipients who agreed with the statement 17(f) would not have demanded 
for scholarships. After sorting out all these, 
I assumed the rest of loan recipients would 
have applied for scholarships besides 
loans. This is supported by the fact that 16% of 
undergraduates who did not receive any 
financial support applied for scholarships while 
, 46 
13% of them applied for loans. Also, 94.7° o and 93.3% of friends who did not attend 
universities applied for scholarships and loans respectively when considering financial 
problem as the main factor. The high school student survey also shows that respondents 
usually applied for loans and scholarships especially those from the low and lowest 
income-groups. 89.6% and 87.3% of high school students respecti,, tlv- applied for loans 
and scholarships. Hence, there is only a small difference in the demand for scholarships 
and loans. Using the above assumption, the estimated demand of 1689 loan recipients for 
scholarships was assumed to be 1628. Therefore. the total demand for scholarships 
derived is 92.5% (2447) of respondents. Only 198 (7.5%) of respondents did not ask for 
scholarships. The demand for scholarships in percentage, based on seven independent 
variables is then investigated while analysing on equity of scholarship distribution in 
Section Three. 
b. Reasons that this assumed demand may not be valid 
1. The number of loan recipients who might or might not demand for scholarships is 
very big (1689 of them) 
2. Statements used for implications may not be very accurate. 
3. Demand may differ according to seven variables. 
c. Reasons for this assumed demand may be valid 
1. The high school student survey and friends not attending universities sliow, that the 
demand for loans and scholarships are generally high. Those who applied for financial 
support would usually apply for both scholarships and loans. 
2. The main findings using this assumed demand and type l equity, neglecting demand 
side only marginally differs. 
This model is therefore suggested for future research. 
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